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ABSTRACT 
Detection of 'anomalies', empirical regularities that are inexplicable within a pre-
eminent or accepted paradigm, is a key aspect of the operation of scientific endeavour. 
The dominant theories of financial economics, those deriving from the CAPMI APT 
literature, hold that there should not exist persistent differences in the returns to assets 
across calendar frequencies. An extensive review of the literature reveals that in a wide 
variety of assets and markets there is evidence that returns differ according to the 
calendar frequency, in particular across days of the week and months of the year and 
around recurrent holidays. However, this review also reveals considerable room for 
increased methodological and statistical sophistication. In particular, the nature and 
extent of the data indicate that techniques based on robust regression, non-parametric 
statistics and Bayesian inference are more appropriate than the predominantly OLS 
based approaches displayed in the literature. Papers that adopt these more sophisticated 
approaches generally find much weaker evidence for such calendar anomalies. 
In essence, the Irish Stock Exchange operated free from exchange controls and in a 
broadly homogenous monetary and economic environment from 1988 to 1998. Daily 
returns from 1988 to 1998, on official equity indices, and from 1993 to 1998 on equal 
and value weighted equity indices, are examined. The evidence is that even when more 
sophisticated and appropriate techniques are used there is still some evidence for a daily 
pattern in the returns to these indices. However this pattern is dissimilar to that found 
elsewhere, consisting of a midweek positive peak as opposed to the more commonly 
found low returns at the start of the week and higher returns on Friday. This pattern is 
not a function of the settlement system, does not appear to be related to the pattern of 
either microeconomic (firm-specific) or macroeconomic infonnation releases, nor does 
it appear to be a function of endogenous news generation. 
Previous international research indicates a January peak in returns, while previous 
research on the Irish market had also fOlUld an April peak. While the investigation here 
of the monthly pattern of returns confinns, in a statistically and methodologically robust 
manner, the January peak no evidence is found of an April peak. 
Examination of the return pattern around exchange ho lidays indicates that, in common 
with other markets referenced in the literature, there is a rise in returns before a holiday. 
However, on decomposition into local and international components we find that 
although the local effect is strong this effect is negative, which is a major point of 
departure from previous research findings. 
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o. Introduction and Overview 
-This work examines the extent and nature of seasonality in the returns to equities traded 
on the Irish Stock Exchange between 1988 and 1998. The central thesis of this work can 
be summarized as follows: there may well exist economically and statistically 
significant seasonal patterns in equity return indices, in particular at tre daily, monthly 
and holiday frequencies, but the detection of these is highly dependent on factors such 
as the choice of estimation method, the time period over which the investigator 
investigates, the amount of data examined and the method of constructio n of the indices 
themselves. 
0.1. OVERVIEW 
The work begins in Chapter 0 :Introduction and Overview, where an overview is 
presented of the modem theory of financial economics. From this we see that there is 
little room for predictable calendar based regularities in this theoretical framework. The 
chapter continues with an examination from the perspective of the philosophy of 
science of what such 'anomalies' may mean for a theory. One of the key issues in 
financial econometrics is the issue of how novel apparently novel facts are. This is also 
an issue for the philosophy of science. The chapter concludes with a discussion of this 
issue. 
In Chapter 2, Chapter 3 and Chapter 5, I outline the evidence on general calendar 
regularities, showing that for some, in particular monthly, especially January, 
seasonality, there exist reasonable, if partial, explanations within the operation of 
normal science. For others, such as the Friday the 13th regularity there appears, as yet, to 
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be none. Daily seasonality appears to be somewhere in the middle, with many 
alternative explanatory theories competing but none fully, or in the author's opinion, 
satisfactorily, explaining them. These theories are discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, 
wherein it becomes clear that there are yet no convincing explanations. 
Chapter 6 introduces the Irish market. In this chapter we note that there has been a 
natural experiment in the changing of the settlement system from an account based, 
fixed, settlement system to one of a rolling settlement. As some of the explanations 
predicated for the existence of daily seasonality is based on the settlement system this 
allows us to examine this set of explanations in an easy and simple way. This chapter 
also provides us with the basis for the timeperiod chosen for analysis. 
Chapter 7 outlines the basis of the robust statistical methodology employed in the 
investigation of the existen::e, the extent and possible causes of this regularity in the 
Irish equity market. Here we note that there are new methods, in particular that of 
resampling and bootstrapping, which are intensely non-parametric and thus allow us to 
have considerable confidence on our results. In addition, significant methodological 
gaps in much of the previous literature are discussed and remedies proposed. 
Chapter 8 introduces the data, providing inter alia a set of portfolio based indices to 
remedy the lack of small capitalization indices over part of the timeperiod. 
Chapter 9 presents the results of the application of this methodology to the issue of 
daily seasonality. The results are mixed, in that while there does appear to be 
seasonality of a particular pattern not seen elsewhere, this is not statistically robust in 
the sense of being present across a wide range of estimation procedures and approaches. 
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Chapter 10 indicates that preholiday effects are present, and that they are both robust 
and again have an unusual pattern, the local effect dominating the international but in a 
perverse manner. 
Chapter 11 shows the application of the robust methodology to data at the monthly 
frequency. While the results here are broadly in line with both previous Irish and 
international work, unlike that for daily seasonality, the findings are still somewhat nOIr 
robust and thus those elements that diverge from previous research must be treated with 
caution. 
Chapter 12 concentrates on the issue seeking a potential explanation of daily 
seasonality, this being the pattern most at divergence with international prior evidence. 
What emerges is that the available hypotheses are not powerful or even in some cases 
adequate explanations for the pattern found. Part of this chapter involves the creation of 
yet more indices from existing data, the official data being inadequate to allow 
investigation of some crucial hypotheses. 
Chapter 13 provides a wrap-up of the work and some tentative conclusions. 
0.2. POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION 0 F THIS WORK 
In doing this, a number of contributions to the research agenda are likely. First, the data 
that are analysed assist in our understanding of calendar regularities, with some 
insulation from the charge of data snooping. Their relative neglect heretofore renders 
the results more powerful than would be a similar set of findings for a market such as 
the US or the UK. Thus, both from a statistical and philosophical perspective the data 
speak loudly. Arising from this is the second contribution. Given that the results are to a 
3 
greater or lesser extent, immune from the charge of data mining, they stand as a 
potentially highly anomalous set of results. In some cases' (monthly seasonality for 
example) the results are similar in magnitude and nature to those found elsewhere; in 
others, such as the behaviour of the Irish market around holidays and in tenns of the 
daily pattern, the results are dissimilar to the existing literature. The third contribution is 
that of completeness. As will be seen later there are sound theoretical reasons for 
financial economics to examine the higher moments of the data distribution. However, 
for a number of reasons this has not been the case. This work, unlike the vast majority 
of papers on seasonality, examines the patterns in the first (mean), second (variance), 
third (skewness) and fourth (kurtosis) moments. The patterns found are again similar to 
the literature in some cases and different in others. The fmal major contribution of the 
work is completeness of another fonn. A set of findings, no matter how anomalous, are 
of greater import if we cannot, as seems to be the case here, find reasonable 
explanations, explanations broadly congruent with the main precepts of fmancial 
economics, for them. Thus, the completeness of the studies carried out in describing and 
analysing the moments of the data are matched, it is hoped, by the completeness of the 
attempts to find explanations. 
The contributions made are already recognised in that parts of this work have appeared 
in a number of scholarly journals. In all cases the present author was the lead researcher 
and the material contained in the articles noted at the beginning of each chapter are fully 
and comprehensively integrated in this work. 
4 
1. Anomalies, Regularities and Final')ce 
This section briefly discu;ses aspects of~ the modem theory of finance. In particular, it 
discusses how the time series properties of asset returns should look, were these asset 
returns generated according to the precepts of the theories. It then goes on to discuss the 
nature of inquiry from a philosophy of science perspective, with particular reference to 
financial economics. 
1.1. AssET PRICING & MARKET EFFICIENCY- A BRIEF HISTORY 
Modem scholarship accepts that the work of Bachelier (1900) prefigured a substantial 
part of what later was termed the efficient markets hypothesis I . While many of the main 
issues subsequently raised in the debates in the late 1950's and 1960's were addressed 
in this work, economic and financial academicians ignored it almost totally until Paul 
Samuelson began its recircul.ation and rehabilitation, a process that was completed by 
the publication of the entire work in Cootner (1964) This volume also contained a 
number of papers looking at randomness and statistical properties of stock prices. It is 
instructive to note that while there was at that stage no formal, generally accepted 
paradigm of how asset prices are formed and thus how the time series properties of the 
returns to these assets should look, work by Working (1934), Cowles and Jones 
(1937),Kendall (1953), Roberts (1957) and Granger and Morgenstern (1963) had 
confirmed the insight of Bachelier; the time series properties of the returns to financial 
assets could be described as being indistinguishable from a random walk. The work of 
Cowles (1933; Cowles (1944) indicated that investment professionals, as reflected in 
their stock recommendations, do not, on average, outperform the market as a whole. 
I This magisterial work also contained an early version of the mathematics later used by Einstein in his nobel winning 
work on the foundations of quantum mechanics in 1905. 
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This was despite the dominant legacy of Williams (1938)and Graham and Dodd (1934), 
which works suggested tha t fundamental valuation Of stocks was the proper role for 
investment analysts and advisors asd implicitly that there were gains to be made in 
stock picking on the basis of these advisors. Combining all these factors left the 
impression at the end of the 1950's that the market for fmancial assets in the US and the 
UK seemed to perform in a manner congruent with what was later described as weak 
and semi-strong form efficiency. 
The rnid-to-late 1960's saw much of the foundations of the modem theory of finance 
brought together in a series of works. Work by Fama (1965) showed that the existing 
literature on the statistical properties of asset prices strongly favoured the random walk 
hypothesis. At the same time Samuelson (1965, (1973) and Mandlebrot (1966) showed 
that a martingale process, a statistical process akin to but less restrictive than a random 
walk, both fitted the data and had the possibility to provide the as then missing linkage 
between market efficiency IIld the observed data. Samuelson and Mandlebrot made a 
linkage between the statistical formulation of a martingale process and stock valuation2. 
Fama (1970)provides the foundation of the theory and empirical programme of research 
on market efficiency, while Fama, Fisher, Jensen and Roll (1969)and Ball and Brown 
(1968)provide the results of the two earliest event studies. At the same time, Sharpe 
(1964) and Treynor (1961) provided the foundations of the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model, the CAPM, which became, and remains, the dominant theory of how asset 
2 A stochastic process Xt is a martingale with respect to a set of information Pt if it has the property 
E(X,+II<I> I) = X, ,and a stochastic process Yt is a fair game if it has the property E (1';+ 1 1<1> , ) = 0 , 
for which reason a fair game is sometimes also called a martingale difference model. 
- -I 
Mandlebrot and Samuelson showed that based on the fundamental valuation model P, = L, (1 + R) E, D,+! 
;=1 
where R is t he discount rate and D the dividend payment rates of return on a stock should follow a fair game. 
More detailed derivation of this result can be found in most intermediated level investment texts, such as 
Cuthbertson (1996) 
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prices are determined and thus how the time series of their returns should emerge. Ball 
& Brown also show the first observed 'anomaly3" the post-earnings announcement 
drift. Finally, the modem theory of market microstructure can be traced to the work of 
Treynor, writing as Bagehot (1971). Further, more detailed, historical overviews of the 
emergence of financial economics as a discipline are contained in Leroy (1989) 
especially Part II, Bernstein (1992) and Dimson and Mussavian (1998). 
1.2. MODERN FINANCE AND THE RETURN DISTRIBUTION PROCESS 
The work of Fama (1970,1976) gives a full account of the mature efficient markets 
hypothesis. 
It also provides the well-known taxonomy of IlIfket efficiency into three forms of 
nested efficiency, which fits perfectly with the martingale/ fair game model. 4 
It is important to realise however that Fama cast his taxonomising and theorising not in 
terms of the actual prices of financial assets themselves but rather in terms of their 
deviation from an expected price. The development of the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) and its subsequent extensions allowed for both the accurate, theoretically 
justified, measurement of expected returns and prices and also overcame a deficiency 
inherent in the SamuelsonlMandlebrot formulation of the martingale model, namely 
that it strictly held only where agents were risk neutral. Papers such as Ohlsen (1977), 
) The very use of the word anomaly is itself in dispute, as shown by the comprehensive review offered in Frankfurter 
and McGoun (200 I). 
4 Weak form efficiency holds when the infomlation set consists only of past prices, semi-strong when it includes 
prices and all publicly available information, and strong when all information, public as well as private, forms part 
of the relevant information set investors use in formulating their investment decisions. 
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Mehra and Prescott (1980), and Salyer (1988) indicate that risk aversion does not 
necessarily fundamentally alter the market efficiency argument. However, work by 
LeRoy (1973) showed that an assumption that investors and agents hold rational 
expectations was a necessary condition for market efficiency even in the weak sense. 
The CAPM gives an explicit formulation for the risk premium, rpi, the excess return of 
a stock over the risk-free rate. It is 
where Am refers to the slope of the capital market line, and gives the market price of 
risk. The implication of Eq. I is that only the covarimce of returns between asset i and 
the market will affect the excess return on asset i. Issues such as the price-earnings 
ratio, the capitalization of the stock, or indeed the day of the week on which the stock is 
trading, should have no effect. The CAPM allows for the possibility that returns are 
both variable and predictable, as the equilibrium, excess returns are dependent on the 
conditional variance of the forecast error of these returns. This arises from the fact that 
the CAPM applied to the market as a whole implies that 
Investors make their expectations based on forecasts, which have of course some 
forecast error involved. 
In general, the efficient market approach implies the moment condition for tre return on 
an asset as per Eq. 3: 
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, where Qt.} is the pricing kernel reflecting the intertemporal rate of substitution by an 
agent between present and future consumption and E/ is the conditional expectations 
operator taken with respect to a given infonnation set J,. From Eq. 3, it follows that the 
conditionally expected return is then 
E .4 E (R ) = 1- cov1 (QI+I,R1+1 ) 
q 1 1+1 E (Q ) 
1 1+1 
Finding therefore that some degree of predictability exists in returns of a stock or a 
portfolio of stocks is not inconsistent with investors being rational or the CAPM not 
holding. The CAPM implies that the returns to fmancial assets, particularly stocks, 
should follow a martingale. Predictable returns in asset prices can arise through the time 
varying conditional covariance between the returns and the pricing kernel, or in the 
pricing kernel itself. The pricing kernel is typically assumed to be an aggregate 
consumption related kernel, and thus this implies that the asset returns over economic 
cycles should vary. However~ nowhere in finance theory is there offered a satisfactory 
theoretical reason why the calendar should affect the individual pricing kernels. Thus in 
the absence of theory we are relegated to searching for empirical facts on which perhaps 
a theory may later be constructed. The only mechanism, accepting the implications of 
Eq. 3 & Eq. 4, by which this could arise would be in the case where individuals 
intertemporal rate of time preference for consumption differs as between Monday and 
other days of the week, or between the time around the tum of the month and other 
times, and so forth. 
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The alternative approach to equilibrium stock pricing, the Arbitrage Pricing Theory, 
APT, is a more general formulation than that of the CAPM5. Unlike the CAPM, it 
requires little or no assumptions regarding the utility theory of the investor, beyond that 
the central tendency (mean) and dispersion (standard deviation) of the returns generated 
are of interest to the investor. The APT says little about the causes of individual stock 
movements, only that these are likely to vary from stock to stock and that the responses 
of stock prices to general events economy wide will differ. Combining gives potentially 
as many different factors driving stock prices, as there are stocks. By judicious 
combination the investor can create portfolios that diversifies the unsystematic or 
idiosyncrati: risk. However, as to what these shocks are, not to mention the reason or 
even the extent of firm specific reactions thereto, the APT provides no guide. Again, 
like the CAPM, the APT implies a martingale process for the asset returns. 
Put together with tre elements of martingales and fair games, we can summarise 
therefore the market efficiency story as having a number of elements: All agents act as 
if they have a model of equilibrium valuation of stocks (CAPM or APT for example), 
these agents act on this ilformation in a rational manner to forecast/predict prices and 
therefore returns in the future, and these agents, by the principle of arbitrage, cannot 
make persistent supernonnal profits. Jensen (1978) summarizes the issue as 
" A market is efficient with respect to an information set Q if it is impossible to 
make economic profit s by trading on the basis of Q. By economic profits we mean 
the risk adjusted rate of return, net of all costs" 
Testing therefore of violations of the modem paradigm of finance involves a joint test: 
that of rational expectations and of the model under investigation. As the model most 
S However, even though it 6 a more general formulation the APT, even though a multi-factor model is not 
inconsistent with the CAPM., a single factor model See Cuthbertson Op cit 
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commonly deemed to hold is the CAPM, this implies that a test of the model involves 
testing that only systematic risk is priced. 
1.3. THE NATURE AND PHll..OSOPHY OF INQUIRY 
In this section, I discuss the nature and philosophy of inquiry in the social sciences. The 
section begins with an outline of the work of Kuhn and Lakatos. It then outlines the 
characteristics of what Lakatos calls "degenerative work programmes", corresponding 
to what followers of Kuhn would call 'a period of crisis'. Inter alia, I intend to argue 
that finance as a body of organizing theories and suggested methodologies may fall into 
this class. This section ends with a discussion of the terminological and philosophical 
importance of anomalies, regularities and predictabilities. 
1.3.1. POPPER, KUHN, LAKATOS & 1HE PHll..OSOPHYOFSCIENTIFIC 
INQUIRY 
The philosophy of science refers to the way in which philosophers have approached 
the questions of how are and how should scientific inquiries be conducted. On this 
definition the philosophy of science stretches back to the origins of scientific thought 
and philosophy, combining for instance in Aristotle and other classical philosophers 
who speculated as much about how to know as what (and indeed if) to know. The 
major intellectual forces in the last 50 years in this area have been the work of Popper, 
Kuhn and Lakatos. An outline of these provides both an introduction to the modem 
themes in the philosophy of science as well as providing, it is arguable, a mini case in 
the way that a body of knowledge advances. 
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The Logic of Scientific Discovery Popper (1959) has been the work that many, 
particularly in economelrics, have seen as the great influence on the work of 
economics. This work emerged originally from the Viennese logical positivist school 
of philosophy6 in 1934, being translated into English in 1959. The major part of his 
work taken on board by economics has been the concept of falsification. By this 
Popper means that we can, in principle, decide if a theory is false far more readily 
than if it is true. He argues that a 'good' theory is one that is falsifiable. An example, 
oft quoted, is on swans. If we have a theory that asserts or predicts that all swans are 
white then the discovery of a black swan is sufficient to prove this theory false. This 
arises from his rejection of inductive reasoning as a way forward. Discovering that 
swans are white, no matter how many times, cannot prove the theory. Therefore, the 
logical way to test the theory is to search for black swans. His view of the process of 
science is the testing of theories, which arise from practical problems, by means of 
attempts at falsifying theories adduced to explain these problems rather than attempts 
at confirming. The highly influential essays by Friedman (1953) advocating that the 
realism of the assumptions matters little in a theory compared to the predictive or 
assertive power, derives from a Popperian approach to scientific endeavour. 
Popper's view of falsification as the touchstone of scientific methodology has come 
under significant criticism from modem philosophers however, mainly from five 
perspectives - sociological, measurement, processual, manifestational and self-
inductive. 
• First, the sociological superstructure of scientific endeavour is one that many 
scientists, social and otherwise, have spent their professional life contributing 
to and being influenced by. It would seem a reasonable observation that few 
6 See Hausman (1994 )Inlroduclion for more on this school of philosophical thought 
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persons are willing to discard a well-known and comfortable theory or 
scientific method. 7 
• More seriously for a science that, like financial economics, IS heavily 
concerned, with the empirical testing of theories, as indeed is the entire work 
following here, the implied standard of measurement and empirical accuracy 
in Popper's approach to falsification is absolute 8. 
• A third, related, issue is that a survey of the history of science provides us with 
ample evidence that scientific progress is not, as Popper seems to imply, a 
process of confronting of theories with empirical facts, but is a rather more 
elliptical and inchoate process. From the perspective of economics, a more 
complex issue is that which Lakatos uses as his central organizing theme. 
Most theories do not exist sui generis, but are composed of complex 
interwoven assumptions and sub-theories. As we have noted above, testing 
efficient markets hypotheses requires a simultaneous testing of at least two 
issues - rational expectations and a particular model or class of models of 
equilibrium asset pricing. 
• A related aspect of this problem is that identified by Papandreou (1958) and 
Boland (1979}- the falsification of a particular version or manifestation of a 
theory (however intertwined and convoluted the elements of this theory are) 
does not necessarily falsify the theory itself. 
7 Indeed, as we shall see in the analysis of Lakatos, the existence of an alternative theory or methodology is a crucial 
pre-requisite to such a discarding. 
8 Popper realises that this is a major problem, even in the natuml sciences. He likens science to a house mised on log 
pilings above a swamp. The pilings are driven in deep enough to gain solidity, but they are not driven to a (possibly 
non existent) bedrock. In his later works he states explicitly that this is not a problem ..... the following maxim 
holds for all science: never aim at more precision than is required by the problem in hand". A more succinct 
version might be phmsed as: it is better to be approximately right than precisely wrong. 
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• Finally, some philosophers of science (NewtorrSmith (1981» have accused 
Popper 'of having ultimately fallen into the trap of induction in his own work 9 . 
~ The work of Thomas Kuhn seems to have had rather less impact on economics, 
compared to that of Popper. Kuhn (1970) introduced and expounded both a theory of 
scientific progress and a theory of scientific decay. Kuhn's main contribution was that 
he extended the notion of what is investigated beyond the theory based view of 
Popper to encompass what he calls a paradigm, although nowhere in Kuhn is there a 
clear statement of what exactly he sees as a paradigm \0. A paradigm may be defined 
as a set of guiding, generally accepted, research questions and methods within which 
a body of researchers work. Kolb (1993) defines it as 
It. •• a set of rules or shared assumptions accepted by a community of 
researchers that constitutes the (at least temporarily) unquestioned 
background against which research proceeds" p 2 
In the Kuhnian view, a paradigm arises when there is a succession of events, or a 
single shattering event, which compels a body of researchers to cleave from an 
existing paradigm, the which cannot accept the new results or events, and adhere to a 
new, competing, paradigm. A paradigm cannot purport to solve all questions on the 
area, but must provide both sufficient areas for fruitful investigation and suggest 
modes of such investigation. Paradigms provide the shared, central, assumptions that 
all working within them accept, allowing the working of what Kuhn terms 'normal 
science'. Normal science is research designed to answer the questions posed within 
the paradigm and to propagate the paradigm to further generations of researchers. 
9 Newton-Smith notes that Popper views scientific endeavour as not a search for the truth but in reality a working out 
of Zeno's Paradox.. The objective is to gain ever more truthfulness, verisimilitude, real content. However, in 
examining how well one theory fares against another, the only test Popper offers is that of the 'degree of 
corroboration', how well a theory has stood against severe tests. If a theory has stood up to 100, or 1000, or 
100,000 severe tests Popper counsels that we may infer that it will so continue to pass tests. Therefore, induction 
lies at the heart of the work. A further discussion of this is contained in Redman (1994). It is also perhaps 
instructive to note that based on this analysis the use of bootstrapping and resampling approaches must be seen as 
being heavily inductive. 
10 Kolb (1993) notes that some critics have found over 10 different definitions. 
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Kuhn compares nonnal s::ience to a mopping up operation, where the main questions 
are settled 'by the paradigm and the nonnal science is a gap filling exercise. Textbook 
accounts of the paradigm are generated rapidly & nonnal science proceeds rapidly. 
Important as Kuhn's characterisation of paradigms is however, it is his view of how 
paradigms succeed each other that is his most crucial addition. 
The operation of nonnal science generates vast quantities of observations, many of 
which do not fit the paradigm. These may be for exarrple the retrograde apparent 
motion of Mars, unaccountable in a geocentric cosmology with circular motion, or the 
discovery of a series of ever more complexly adapted fossils in ancient strata, 
inconsistent with a strict biblical view of the emergence of life. Kuhn suggests that the 
proponents of the paradigm with which the data conflict typically react in one of two 
ways. First, akin to "naive falsification " in the works of Popper, the followers of the 
paradigm could accept this datum and its inconsistency with the paradigm, and 
abandon the paradigm for a competing one. Kuhn states that this almost never occurs, 
a criticism also levied, as we have seen, at the strict falsification approach adoptable 
from Popper. The second, much the more common, result is that the anomalous result 
is treated as part of the paradigm, recognised as a problem for nonnal science to deal 
with and, crucially, incorporate into the paradigm. Indeed, Kuhn contends that one 
measure of success for a paradigm is its ability to incorporate into itself such 
anomalous results. However, as these anomalies accumulate the paradigm is under 
increased pressure. Ad hoc modifications and changes to the paradigm, designed to 
save the appearances, accumulate. II Eventually, in what Kuhn tenns a 'period of 
crisis' the paradigm begins to shift to a competing one, which must both be in 
II Kuhn discusses the increasing number of hemicycles, epicycles and other celestial cyclicalities with which the pre 
Copernican paradigm attempted to save the appearances of the apparent motion of the planets against the 
competing heliocentric paradigm. 
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existence and be both incommensurate with key assumptions and predictions of the 
old paradigm and also be sufficiently well developed as to allow the existence of 
normal sc ience within it. This paradigm shift is what Kuhn sees as scientific 
revolutions and as the driving force of scientific change. 
Following from the work of Kuhn, Lakatos (1978) provides a more chaotic but 
perhaps more realistic view of the progress of science and knowledge. He too 
provides both an analysis of how science works and how it should work. Science 
should work by means of comparing an:i assessing competing theories, or in his 
terminology scientific research programmes. Where Popper is concerned with 
theories, Kuhn with paradigms, Lakatos is concerned with programmes of research 
comprising interconnected and overlapping theories and paradigms. A scientific 
research programme comprises two parts. The 'hard core' (reminiscent of Kuhn's 
paradigms) consists of a crucial set of theories or beliefs. Around this 'hard core' is 
then a 'protective belt', auxil,iary or supplementary beliefs, methods or theories, which 
can be altered, discarded or enhanced without affecting the hard core. The hard core 
contains besides these beliefs a 'positive heuristic', the perhaps imperfectly 
articulated or partially completed set of methodological suggestions. There is also a 
negative heuristic in the hard core, directing that the hard core not be itself tested. 
Thus the hard core directs testing, the confrontation of reality, against the protective 
belt rather than itself. This is of course similar to the operati:m of normal science in a 
Kuhnian world. The protective belt, allied with the positive heuristic provides the 
specific testable theories that give scientific validity to the scientific research 
programme. 
Lakatos then provides a set of criteria that both define where a scientific research 
programme lies in terms of its probable future and provides insight into how scientific 
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research programmes evolve and change. He characterises changes as being either 
progressive or degenerative, distinguishing between theoretic and empirical changes. 
A theoretically progressive programme has the characteristic that each new theory has 
new empirical content. These theories must have continuity. By empirical content 
Lakatos requires that it predict novel facts. A scientific research programme is 
empirically progressive only if it confirms or discovers some of these novel facts. 
Only those scientific research programmes that are both theoretically and, at least 
intennittently, empirically progressive are progressive, according to Lakatos. 
Otherwise, they are termed degenerative; one of the key hallmarks of these types of 
programmes being the creation of theories to explain known facts that have been 
discovered to be anomalous, that is to say inconsistent with the hard core. fused on 
this, Lakatos sees the replacement of one scientific research programme with another 
as being less cataclysmic and more gradual than Kuhn. He also stresses however that 
such shifts are only possible when there is an alternative available, and thus suggests 
that novel scientific research programmes be given time, perhaps decades, to prove 
themselves. 
1.3.2. THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE & FINANCIAL ECONOMICS# 
Although financial economics has elements in its origins of both accountancy and 
economics, the very name itself indicates that the field is in reality a subdivision of 
economics. It is curious therefore that, despite there being a substantial and growing 
literature on the philosophical in economics 12 there has been almost a total lack of 
journal material in either the mainstream financial economics literature or in the 
# An abridged version of this section appears in Lucey, B. M. (2000). "Friday the 13' & The Philosophical Basis of 
Financial Economics." Journal of Economics and Finance 24(3): 294-301 
12 Observe for example the emergence of the Journal of Economics and Philosophy and the Journal of Economic 
Methodology, as well as the survey works byBlaug (1992), Redman (1989; 1990; 1991) & Hausman (1994» 
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economic methodo-philosophical literature on the philosophy of financial economics. 
, There have been some papers which have adopted arguments from the philosophy of 
science literature, for example, Kleidon (1986) who provides a detailed discussion 
within a Kuhnian / Popperian framework of the variance bounds literature in financial 
economics. 
Both Lakatos and Kuhn stress the role played by empirical material that does not 
confonn to the paradigm within which the researcher is working. Both stress that the 
response of a profession to these anomalies is two-fold. First, the tendency for 
anomalies to be seen, as even the name suggests, not as counter-examples that 
contradict the theory but as research problems and special cases. This typically results 
in the accretion of adjustments that are ever mo re elaborate to the theories to 'save the 
appearances'. In Lakatos' tenninology, these adjustments then become part of the 
protective belt around the core. Second, they indicate that while the anomalies may 
continue to accrete, this is n~t in itself enough to lead to what Kuhn tenns a paradigm 
shift and Lakatos a change in research programme. This can only come about when an 
alternative theory, research programme or paradigm exists which encompasses the 
anomalies and yet has at least the explanatory power and logical consistency of the 
previous. 
Both Kolb (1993) & Frankfurter and McGoun (1999) suggest that financial 
economics is at present in a state of paradigm crisis, with more and more anomalies 
requiring increasingly special case theories 13. In both papers, the authors discuss the 
additions Ptolemaic cosmologists were required to add to their theoretical. 
13 They cite the French-Fama three factor models as a classical example of this. with other factors being tacked onto 
the original 'pure' CAPM model with little excuse from within the theory. This is a classical case. it is argued, of 
making ad hoc adjustments to the model to explain known facts. 
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Saunders (1994) in an essay on testing and. falsification in financial economics, urges 
that the profession needs 
' .... tests of economically neutral influences on asset prices that requires 
no assumptions' 
if the central assumptions of the dominant paradigms of modem fmancial economics is 
to be adequately tested. He self-cites Saunders (1993) as an example, where it is found 
that the weather in New York had a statistically and economically significant influence 
on asset prices. Popper and others argue that falsification of theories can never proceed 
from \\holly inductive but only from deductive reasoning. Much of fmancial economic 
appears to rely on inductive reasoning, with confirmatory findings, even if these require 
accretions to the protective belt of the theories, vastly outweighing non confirmatory 
findings in the literature. As will, I hope, be seen from a reading of this work, the 
existence of empirical calendar based regularities poses a problem to the dominant 
CAPMI APT based view of asset returns. Finding that days of the week or months of the 
year, or other calendar regularities partially determined the returns to assets (or could be 
explained in a statistically robust way be reference to, to be absolutely correct), would 
be a major problem within the CAPMI APT paradigm/scientific research programme. It 
would require for instance that the ex ante expected return to an asset be a function not 
only of its risk free rate and the relative market risk but also as a function of the 
calendar. This strikes at the core of the mean variance approach that, in the terminology 
of Lakatos, forms the 'hard core' of the paradigm - risk alone is priced with no role for 
calendar manifestations. 
If the adherents of the CAPMI APT cannot then rationalize, incorporate, dismiss or 
otherwise resolve the regularities, as they seem to have been unable to do, then a 
Lakatoshian perspective would classify them to be paradigms 'in crisis', or the rather 
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more apocalyptic sounding 'degenerative work programmes'. At the very least it would 
pose significant questions for the paradigms validity and direction. 
1.4. DATA SNOOPING AND THE ROLE OFNoVEL FACTS 
We have noted above that novel facts playa centrally important part in the process of 
replacement of one theory by another. On their own however they cannot provide a 
theory. A part of this reasoning lies in the role of data snooping, or data mining as it 
may sometimes be called. 
Consider a bag containing 99 black balls and one white one. What is the chance of 
picking out blindly the white ball? The answer is obviously one in a hundred. Now 
imagine having 100 chances, replacing the selected ball each time, what now are the 
chances of getting the white ball at least once? The chances clearly improve with each 
extra drawing and, in this case, the odds are better than Y2 that at least one drawing will 
produce the white ball. Clearly, plucking the white ball out becomes less remarkable the 
more dips are made. 
Some fear that the results reported on calendar anomalies are simply a more 
sophisticated version of the above dull game. Academics have been dipping into stock 
market databases since at least the work of the Cowles commission in Yale in the 
1930's, and so it is not surprising that they can pull out such an anomaly. The anomaly 
would be remarkable if it was discovered in the early days but after a hundred years of 
trawling by a succession of academics and fund managers an anomaly as strange as this 
was bound to appear (especially given the intensity of efforts being matched in recent 
decades by the scaling of computing power and the developme nt of intensive search 
methods such as neural nets and genetic algorithms). This process, known as 'data 
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mining' or 'data snooping', invalidates the results. Researches have long been wary of 
this, particularly when reporting calendar anomalies in stock markets but, as 
Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) make clear, it is difficult to allow for: 
"Data snooping is sometimes thought of as an individual sin .... 
However, it is also a collective sin. A hundred researchers using the 
same data test a hundred different hypotheses. The IOI S' derives a 
theory after studying the previous results and tests theory using more or 
less the same data. " 
Indeed, the working of normal science in the sense discussed above can be expected 
to compound the problem. There is a survivorship bias operating in financial 
economics: the trading rules, anoma lies and regularities that investment analysts and 
academics have found to perfonn well historically naturally receive more attention 
than those that have not. After long periods, only a small sample of all available 
potential rules is still under investigation. However, pure chance alone would indicate 
that some rules would in fact be survivors even if in reality they do not allow for 
accurate prediction of equity returns. 
Data mining is a particular worry with stock price data given the large industry of 
stockbrokers and fund managers seeking to exploit any perceived infonnational 
advantage it might give, however slight, due to its financial significance. A forthcoming 
article by Sullivan, Timmerman and White (2002) goes further than merely worrying 
about the possibility of data mining: they claim that all calerrlar anomalies can, in fact, 
be dismissed as such: 
"We find that although nominal P-values of individual calendar rules 
are extremely significant (i.e. pointing to a low probability that the 
result is due to mere chance), once evaluated in the context of the full 
universe from which such rules were drawn, calendar effects no longer 
remain significant. II 
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Their claim extends beyond calendar effects indicating that stock prices contain little 
information to the current generation of researchers in this field: stock prices have been 
data-mined almost to exhaustion. 14 In a working paper Sullivan, Timmerman and White 
(1999b) show the sort of discipline that should be exercised by the data-sharing 
scientific community to allow properly for data-mining. 
There are of course several solutions that can be applied to the charge of data snooping. 
These range from the simple, such as waiting till new evidence (typically new 
observations of relevant asset returns when one is dealing with financial economics) 
arises, through randomisation and the application of simple bootstrapping techniques, to 
applications of extreme bounds theory, as applied in Sullivan, Timmerman and White 
(1999a) and Sullivan, Timmerman and White (2002). A discussion of some of the 
relevant approaches is contained in Sullivan, Timmerman and White (l999b). Part of 
the difficulty, from a philosophical perspective, is that none of the cale ndar regularities 
were discovered deductively,... they were all inductive, in that they are after the fact data 
discoveries. No theoretical foundation existed to suggest that they should exist. 
Notwithstanding the importance of anomalous or contradictory data in the Kuhn-
Lakatos view of how knowledge evolves, philosophers of science have consistently 
argued that novel facts on their own are not enough. Campbell and Vinci (1983) state 
"Philosophers of science generally agree that when observational 
evidence supports a theory the confirmation is much stronger than when 
the evidence is novel. " 
However, one of the suggested solutions to ascertaining whether the results are a data 
mining artefact or are really novel facts, namely to wait until new data are available is 
often impossible. In the case for example of Monday returns there may be as little as 45 
14 Having said that they do find some technical trading rules that work, even after allowing for the intensity of the 
search. Typically, they remain coy on the rules 
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in any year - coupled with the knowledge that there are seemingly consistent 
interrelationships between calendar regularities this may imply that it is beyond any 
human lifespan to wait until sufficient new, unmined, data are available. Some 
alternative solutions are available. One is to partition the data into sub-samples, as 
advocated by Thaler (1987), allowing the individual sub-samples to act as checks on 
each other. This approach is followed here. An alternative is signalled in Lakonishok 
and Smidt (1988) , who declare 
"The statistical tests routinely used in financial economics are usually 
interpreted as if they were being applied to new data. But the data 
employed in finance are seldom new. When new data are not available, 
significance levels on tests ... must be adjusted if multiple tests are 
performed on the dame data. " 
This indicates two approaches; the first is the use of Bayesian methods to take account 
of the data properties, the second to seek new data. The data here examined comprise a 
dataset that is little tested, and has had, as will be clear in the review of the relevant 
literature, little attention paid .to it. 
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2. Daily Seasonality In Security Returns 
Well-documented daily seasonality seems to exist across national markets and through 
time. There is an interesting dichotomy between the literature on daily seasonality and 
that on monthly. While a large number, perhaps the majority, of the papers on the issue 
of monthly seasonality combine a description of results with an attempt to provide, and 
in many cases test, an explanation, a large number of the papers on daily seasonality 
content themselves with description. Naturally, the co-existence of the CRSP database 
and the largest number of researchers in financial economics has led to the 
predominance of research in the area of daily calendar anomalies being carried out on 
and in the USA. Compared to monthly seasonality however, there also exists a very 
substantial body of literature internationally on daily regularities. 
Researchers have observed two major forms of daily regularity. The first is the 
tendency for stocks to show systematic variation over the days of the week. In the 
major, liquid, markets, this has typically manifested as a regular peak in returns on a 
Friday and a trough on Monday. The other regularity relates to the behaviour of stocks 
on days before market closings other than weekends. Given that the majority of these 
closings are associated with public holidays, this is commonly called the holiday effect. 
The remainder of this chapter and the next examine the magnitude of and variety of 
explanations for the daily regularity, while I discuss the holiday eturns regularity 
separately in 5. 
It is important to note at the start that the initial research in the US, which concentrated 
on the behaviour of stocks around weekends, has led to terminological issues being 
perhaps confused. Within the US literature there exists, as we shall see, a distinction 
between the 'weekend' and 'Monday' regularity. Internationally however there is, as 
24 
will be seen, a more complex and different pattern, with empirical regularities 
appearing important m other days. Thus, a more exact terminology would note that 
these are all investigations of particular aspects of daily seasonality. Thus Monday does 
not encompass all daily seasonality, nor does the weekend 
2.1. DAILY SEASONALITY: AN OVERVIEW. 
As we have seen already in 1.2, the CAPMI APT tells us nothing about the temporal 
distribution of the information processing which underlies the asset pricing. 
Researchers have raised two alternative hypotheses; the trading time hypothesis tells us 
that the asset pricing mechanism works only when the markets are open and available to 
process information, and the calendar time hypothesis suggests that the process is 
continuous. The distinction is important for consideration of the Monday/Friday returns 
regularities alluded to above. 
2.1.1. EVIDENCE FROM THE USA 
Examination of the daily seasonal pattern of equities in the US is not new. Evidence 
from Maberly (1995) indicates that by the early 1930' s US researchers (fields (1931) 
and Kelly (1930) were aware of the tendency of stocks to decline on Mondays. The 
paper by Cross (1973) represents one of the first academic papers in the era of modem 
fmance to examine the issue 15. He investigated the returns of the S&P index over the 
1953-1970 period, 'rediscovering' the average negative Monday return of -0.18%. 
Cross's paper is also interesting methodologically as his paper combines parametric and 
ISMaberly (1995) and Kolb (1993) speculate as to why, given this long history of the existence of daily seasonality, 
predating even the formalisation of the science of financial economics, this evidence was ignored, concluding that 
the material was both so aged and published in non traditional academic journals that the profession ignored it as 
evidence. The work of Merrill (1966) and Fosback (1976) also discuss the Monday pattern, giving further credence 
to the Kolb/Maberly argument 
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non parametric approaches, a robust approach to investigation of daily seasonality that 
is more the exception than the rule. 
Published research on the daily return pattern languished until the work of French 
(1980) who extends the analysis of Cross. Unlike Cross, French distinguishes explicitly 
between the trading time hypothesis, where returns are generated only in trading time, 
and the calendar time hypothesis, where returns are generated across all periods, 
whether trading or not. In trading time, the returns for Monday would not be expected 
to differ from another day of the week, in calendar time they should be three times the 
return on other days (representing as they do a three day period). Indeed, in the trading 
time hypothesis the returns of any day should not differ from those of any other day. 
French, like Cross, analysed the S&P index. Over the period 1953-1977, he identified 
an average Monday return of -0.17% with Monday returns negative in 20 out of the 25 
years studied. This negative Monday contrasts with an all day average of 0.015%. The 
riskiness of Monday returns, as proxied by the standard deviation was the highest of all 
days. This dual anomaly, the inversion of the core precept of risk being compensated 
for by return and a significant deviation on one-day mean returns was not explicable by 
French. 
French (1980) marks the start of a much more active period in the investigation of daily 
seasonality. Both Cross and French analysed Friday close - Monday close data, leading 
to the effect or anomaly being known as the Monday effect, the assumption being that 
the negative return was a product of some events occurring in the market on Monday, 
during Monday trading. However, work by Rogalski (1984) and Harris (1986) looking 
at the returns from Friday closing prices to Monday opening indicated that the effect 
manifested itself in lower Monday opening, thus perhaps being better called a weekend 
effect. 
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Since these papers, a large amount of confirmatory data for broad US based stock 
indices has emerged. Lakonishok and Levi (1982) examine the CRSP indices, 
Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) the Dow Jones Industrial Average and Kohers and 
Kohers (1995) the NASDAQ. These and many other papers and communications ha ve 
reinforced the pattern of Monday having the lowest, often a negative, return of the week 
despite having the highest, or at least higher than average, risk as proxied by standard 
deviation. 
There is also some evidence that there is a firm size effect in terms of the daily seasonal 
in the US. Gibbons and Hess (1981) examined the CRSP Equal am Value weighted 
indices over the 1962-1978 period. They find that although the average Friday return is 
greater in the equally weighted index the Monday returns are similar. The effect of this 
is to give a higher apparent weekend effect in the equally weighted index. Keirn and 
Stambaugh (1984) extend this work. They break their data (NYSE/AMEX companies 
1963-1979) into size deciles,. finding that the smaller deciles exhibit a stronger negative 
Monday than larger deciles. Rogalski (1984) and Keirn (1983) (both again using 
AMEXINYSE firms formed into size based portfolios) find a relationship between size 
and the Monday return, as well as finding a relationship between the January-small firm 
and Monday regularities. They find that the Monday negative is only evident in non-
January months. Indeed, Monday returns in January are positive and significant. 
Kohers and Kohers (1995) using an ANOVA analysis find over their entire sample that 
there is a significant relationship between size and the intensity of the negative Monday 
return. Smaller firms show a more pronounced weekend effect than larger. 
A question does arise however as to the continued existence of the effect. Connolly 
(1989, 1991 )examines both the CRSP equal and value weighted indices and the S&P 
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500 index over the 1963 -1983 period. He fmds that the weekend effect largely 
disappears in the post 1975 period 16. Connolly utilises Bayesian methods of attributing 
statistical significance to results, methods that take into account not just the results but 
also the volume of data that have generated the results. Using these methods he fmds 
that the effect is not evident, while traditional, classical, methods, show the effect 
persisting. Chang, Pinegar and Ravichandran (1993) support this contention and 
increase the sophistication of the methodology. Examining the FT-Actuaries indices for 
the US for 1985-199i 7 and adjusting not just for sample size (Bayesian adjustments) 
but also for deviations of the data from nonnality, they find no evidence for daily 
seasonality in the US index. Further doubt on the stability of the weekend effect over 
time is found in Agrawal and Tandon (1994), Peiro (l994)and Dubois and Louvet 
(1996). Agrawal and Tandon fmd that while the data (the S&P 500 over the 1970- 1987 
period) exhibited a significant negative Monday return overall and in the 1970-1979 sub 
period this disappears in the 1980-1987 sub period. For the DJIA over the December 
1987 - December 1992, Peiro (1994) finds no evidence of daily seasonality. Finally, 
Dubois and Louvet, examining the DJIA and S&P 500 indices over 1969-1992 find that 
while there exists a negative Monday return over the entire period, this is not evident in 
the 1985-1992 sub-period. 
2.1.2. INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE ON DAILY SEASONALITY 
It is not only for the US equity markets that researchers have found evidence of daily 
seasonal patterns. As pointed out, the conjunction of significant numbers of researchers 
and a considerable body of easily accessed securities data has provided the opportunity 
16 This would of course be consistent with the market noting the Cross (1973) article and acting to eliminate this 
regularity. 
17 A period and an index outside that of Connolly and therefore free from any potential charge of data mining. 
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for much of the US work to flourish. The increasing availability of data for non-US 
markets has allowed replication and extension of the studies mentioned above. 
The UK: As, historically, the second or third largest equity market after the US, it is not 
surprising that a considerable number of papers have, evaluated the extent of daily 
seasonality in the UK market either as the single focus of the paper or in tandem with 
data from other countries. Theobald and Price (1984) examine the Financial Times All 
Shares (ITA) and Financial Times Ordinary Shares (FTO) indices from 1975-1981. 
They provide evidence of a negative and statistically significant Monday return. This 
return is robust to the statistical technique used. Average Monday returns of -0.2% for 
the ITA and-0.3% for the FTO, against an all days average of 0.04% for both indices 
compare in broad magnitude the results for the US found by French (1980). For the 
ITA the Monday standard deviation is the joint highest of the week while for the ITO 
it is the highest Again, this joint anomaly is inexplicable. Examining a considerably 
longer time period (1950-·1983), Jaffe and Westerfield (1985b) demonstrate a 
significant negative Monday in the ITO index, with Monday returns of -0.14% against 
an all day return of 0.028%, Monday showing the highest standard deviation. 
Condoyanni, O'Hanlon and Ward (1987) show that the ITA index over 1969-1984 
returned a Monday return of -0.95% against an all day average of 0.31%. Other works 
on the FTO and IT A indices have generally confirmed the existence and stability over 
long time-periods of results. For the FTA Board and Sutcliffe (1988) and Dubois and 
Louvet (1996) give consistent negative Monday returns over the 1962-1986 period and 
1969-1992 period respectively. In both cases the Monday risk, as proxied by the 
variance of returns, was the highest of the week. For the FTO Agrawal and Tandon 
(1994), Peiro (1994),Arsad and Coutts (1996) and Coutts and Hayes (1999) all provide 
evidence over a considerable period of negative Monday returns. Agrawal and Tandon 
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examine the 1963-1987 period, Peiro 1987-1992, Arsad and Coutts 1935-1994 and 
Coutts and Hayes 1979-1994. All fmd a negative Monday return and an all days 
average positive return comparable in magnitude to that found by Theobald and Price 18, 
with some evidence that the effect is weaker in the latter years. Evidence on the risk 
patterns, as proxied by the variance of the daily returns, also indicates that the Monday 
risk tends to be at the higher end of the daily risk spectrum despite the return being 
always the lower. Finally, Mills and Coutts (1995) examine the FT-SE indices (1986-
1992). They fmd that all three indices demonstrate a negative Monday, ranging from -
0.09% for the FTSE 100 to -0.15% for the FTSE 350. In all cases, the Monday risk was 
the highest of the week. 
Japan: The size and importance of the Japanese market notwithstanding, relatively little 
appears to have been written on the issue of daily seasonalities in Japan. Such evidence 
as exists indicates that a different but no less persistent form of daily seasonality may 
operate in the Japanese market. Jaffe and Westerfield (1985a) utilise the Nikkei-Dow 
and Tokyo stock exchange indices, over the 1970-1983 period. They report fmding that 
while a negative Monday return was realised, this was accompanied by a more 
substantial negative Tuesday return. 19 There was, however, evidence of different 
patterns on the risk profiles. For the Nikkei-Dow Monday had the highest risk, while for 
the TSE Index neither Monday nor Tuesday showed higher than average risk. Jaffe and 
Westerfield (1985b) present essentially the same results. Both papers argue that the low 
Tuesday return may well be a manifestation of the low Monday return in the US, but 
18 1963-1987, Monday -0.165% all days of .037%; December 1987-December 1992, Monday-0.22% al\ days .031%, 
Monday standard deviation highest of all days; July 1935-December 1994, Monday -0.13% all days.02%, Monday 
standard deviation highest of al\ days, these patterns persistent throughout al\ sub periods); June 1979 - December 
1994, Monday -0.11 % all days.05%, Monday having the second highest standard deviation. 
19 For the Nikkei-Dow, Monday -0.02% , Tuesday -0.09% all days .04%. For the TSE, Monday -0.1%, Tuesday-
0.06% al\ days 03%, 
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accept that the statistical evidence in favour of this is weak. Neither addresses the cause 
of the negative Monday. An analysis of the TSE index over a similar time span to that 
of Jaffe and Westerfield was conducted by Condoyanni, O'Hanlon and Ward (1987). 
They present different evidence to that found by Jaffe and Westerfield, the negative 
Monday return apparently disappearing (becoming 0.09% against an all day average of 
0.4%) but a persistent negative Tuesday return fO.95%) remaining. However, this 
positive Monday is on closer be a reflection of the fact that the paper aggregates the 
Saturday trading return (.11 %) with Monday, leaving a negative Monday return if this 
is accounted for. This error is not present in Kim (1988) however, who fmds a positive 
Monday return20 for the 1980-84 periods on the TSE. Other papers (Lee, Pettit and 
Swankoski (1990) examining the Nikkei-Dow from 1980-1988; Ho (1990) examining 
the Nikkei-Dow from 1975-1987 ; Agrawal and Tandon (1994) examining the Nikkei-
Dow from 1970-1987; Dubois and Louvet (1996) examining the TSE Index from 1969-
1992 and the Nikkei-Dow 1971-1992) on daily returns in Japan have presented 
evidence that Japan shows a negative Monday and Tuesday. 
Other Asia-Pacific Markets: Evidence on the other main Asian and pacific markets are 
congruent with that for Japan. For the major markets, the Australian, Singaporean and 
Hong Kong equity markets have generally shown significant negative Monday and 
Tuesday returns. Only in Dubois and Louvet (1996) and Ho (1990) does Australia 
demonstrate a positive Monday, but in conjunction with a negative Tuesday return , 
while the latter paper also has a positive Tuesday in Hong Kong as does Lee, Pettit and 
Swankoski (1990). Although primarily concerned with testing for daily seasonality 
using robust regression techniques, and therefore not providing estimates of daily 
returns, Easton and Faff(1994) conclude that the evidence on Australian data is weakly 
20 .06% against an all day average of .05% 
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in fa\Our of a day-of-the-week effect. There is little agreement on the relative size of 
the negative returns, some finding that Monday returns are greater in magnitude than 
Tuesday, others the reverse. Those that provide details on the risk profiles across days 
of the week ~ondoyanni, 0' Hanlon and Ward (1987) and Wong, Hui and Chan 
(1992» show that these negative patterns are not a manifestation of risk, these days 
having higher risk than average. Table 1 provides a summary of these and other papers 
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TABLE 1 : AsIA PACIFIC EQUITY MARKErS : MONDAY AND TuESDAY RETURNS 
Country Authors Index Period Monday Tuesday All Days 
Return Return 
Australia Agrawal and Stock 1972-1988 0.06% -0.1% 0.041% 
Tandon Exchange 
(1994) All Ordinary 
Australia Jaffe and Statex 1973-1982 -0.05% -0.13% 0.032% 
Westerfield 
( 1985b) 
Australia Condoyanni, Stock 1980-1984 -0.49% -20.0% 0.02% 
O'Hanlon Exchange 
and Ward All 
(1987) Ordinaries 








Hong Kong Agrawal and Hang Seng 1973-1987 -0.09% -0.16% 04% 
Tandon 
(1994) 
Hong Kong Dubois and Hang Seng 1973-1989 -0.23% -0.03% 0.04% 
Louvet 
(1996) 
Hong Kong Ho (1990) Hang Seng 1975-1987 -0.03% 0.0% 0.1% 












Singapore Agrawal and Straits 1973-1987 -0.05% -0.02% 0.04% 
Tandon Times 
(1994) 
Singapore Ho (1990) Straits 1975-1987 -0.03% -0.07% 0.04% 
Times 
Singapore Wong, Hui SES All 1975-1988 -0.03% -0.12% 0.06% 
and Chan Share 
(1992) 
Singapore SES All 1980-1988 -0.01% -0.035% 0.06% 
Share 
Source: cited papers 
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Smaller Asirurpacific markets show a variety of patterns, from the consistent negative 
Monday and Tuesday returns of Malaysia as found Ho and Cheung (1991), Wong, Hui 
and Chan (1992), Chan, Khanthavit and Thomas (1996) and Clare, Ibrahaim and 
Thomas (1998) to the negative Tuesday of Korea as fomd in Lee, Pettit and 
Swankoski (1990), Lee (1992) and Ho (1990) to inconsistent results for Thailand, with 
a finding of a negative Tuesday in Ho (1990) and Wong, Hui and Chan (1992), but all 
days being positive in Chan, Khanthavit and Thomas (1996). Taiwan and Sri Lanka 
deserve special notice for having no day with negative returns and no evidence of daily 
seasonality. Taiwanese evidence is presented in Ho (1990), Lee, Pettit and Swankoski 
(1990) and Wong, Hui and Chan (1992) while the evidence for Sri Lanka is in 
Elyasiani, Perera and Puri (1996). 
Other European Markets: The main (Paris, Frankfurt, Milan) European equity markets 
show a variety of daily seasonal patterns. For Frankfurt, the evidence is consistent. 
Peiro (1994), Agrawal and Tandon (1994) ,Dubois and Louvet (1996) and Kramer 
(1996) all provide evidence across a variety of time frames and across a variety of 
indices of a negative Monday and Tuesday return, with the Monday return being greater 
in magnitude. The evidence for the Paris Bourse is however inconsistent. Condoyanni, 
O'Hanlon and Ward (1987) and Peiro (1994) fmd evidence of negative Monday and 
Tuesday returns in the CAC index. By contrast, Dubois and Louvet (1996) find a 
negative Monday and Friday while both Solnik and Bousquet (1990) and Agrawal and 
Tandon (1994) find evidence only a negative Tuesday. 
Barone (1990)and Agrawal and Tandon (1994) present conflicting evidence for Milan,. 
Barone finds a negative Monday and Tuesday return while Agrawal and Tandon (1994) 
find a negative Monday return with a positive and significant Tuesday return. Corhay 
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(1991) and Agrawal and Tandon (1994) agree in regard to the Belgian situation, with 
both finding a negative Tuesday. Alexakis and Xanthakis (1995) for Greece and Pena 
(1995i I for Spain show a negative Tuesday return. A summary of these papers is found 
in Table 2. 
21 This pattern also holds through seven industrial sectors but disappears for a sub sample of 1989-1993 • which period 
starts after stock market refonns including computerised trading and broker deregulation 
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TABLE 2: EuROPEAN EQUITY MARKETS: MONDAY AND TuESDAY RETURNS 
Country Authors Index Period Monday Tuesday All Days 
Return Return 
Belgium Agrawal and Stock Exchange 1971- 0.05% -0.07% 0.03% 
Tandon Value 1987 
(1994) Weighted 
Belgium Corhay Stock Exchange 1977- 0.09% -0.032% 0.07% 
( 1991) Value 1985 
Weighted 
Belgium Corhay Stock Exchange 1977- 0.08% -0.026% 0.05% 
( 1991) Equal Weighted 1985 




France Peiro (1994) CAC 1987- -0.03% -0.12% 0.04% 
1992 
France Dubois and SBF240 1969- -0.11% 0.06% 0.03% 
Louvet 1992 
(1996) 
France Solnik and CAC 1978- 0.1% -0.9% 0.06% 
Bousquet 1987 
(1990) 
France Agrawal and CAC40 1971- 0.04% -0.1\% 0.05% 
Tandon 1987 
( 1994) 
Germany Peiro (1994) Commerzbank 1987- -0.03% -0.01% 0.012% 
1992 
Germany Agrawal and FAZ 1971- -0.08% -0.02% 0.04% 
Tandon 1987 
(1994) 
Germany Dubois and FAZ 1969- -0.1% -0.01% 0.02% 
Louvet 1992 
( 1996) 
Germany Kramer DAX 1960- -0.17% -0.02% 0.022% 
(1996) 1992 
Greece Alexakis and Athens Stock 1985- 0.029% -0.003% 0.03% 
Xanthakis Exchange 1994 
(1995) 
Spain Pena (1995) Madrid 1986- 0.0013% -0.0009% 0.02% 
• 1993 General 
·Excess of percentage return over the risk free rate 
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Ireland: Very few studies have examined daily seasonality in the equity markets in 
Ireland to date. Donnelly (1991), examining the Irish Times Cara Index (an equally 
weighted index covering only some of the market) over 1975-1988, finds no evidence 
of a day of the week effect, with a positive return on all days. Donnelly also finds on 
examination of sub periods that the pattern of daily returns is not stable. Monday, 
Thursday and Tuesday all appear at some period as 1he days with the highest return, 
while in some sub periods Tuesday and Thursday are the lowest. After adjusting the 
data for the settlement system, the pattern found elsewhere asserts itself, with non-
account weeks showing a negative Tuesday, with Thursday providing the highest 
return. One difficulty with the Cara index is that it was an equally weighted index based 
on selected components of the Irish market. By contrast, Lucey (1994) examines the 
official stock market ISEQ Index over the 1987-1991 period and finds a negative 
Tuesday22 with evidence of a day-of-the-week effect. Using a longer (1987-1997) series 
of the same index, Stephenson (1998) finds that dropping the data for October 1987 
from the dataset the negative Tuesday effect disappears. Lucey (2000) finds a midweek 
effect from an analysis of the Irish market over the 1973-1998 period, using Datastream 
indices. A significant and positive Wednesday and Thursday effect, unusual in this 
literature, was found. Prior to this study no detailed, long-term, statistically robust 
examination of the official stock market indices had been undertaken. 
22 Tuesday -0.14% all days .03% 
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2.2. DAILY SEASONALITY IN HIGHER MOMENTS 
While much of the published research on equity returns concentrates on mean-
variance analysis, there is theoreti::al and empirical evidence that higher moments 
merit investigation. 
From a theoretical perspective, Lee and Wu (1985) show how kurtosis impacts on the 
stationarity of standard deviation, Conine and Tamarkin (1981) show how higher 
moments affect diversification in investors' portfolios, and Scott and Horvath (1980) 
show that, under common utility functions, investors have a preference for kurtosis 
and are averse to skewness. Despite this there exists considerably less documentation 
on the daily variatim in these higher moments. A small body of work does exist that 
explicitly examines seasonality in the higher moments. For the US, Aggarwal and 
Schatzberg (1997) examine a sample of 1107 and 889 firms over the 1980-1986 and 
1987-1993 periods respectively. Aggarwal and Schatzberg (1997) calculate aggregate 
skewness and kurtosis firm size classes and weekdays, and examine these directly 
using ANOY A and Kruskal-Wallis measures. A difficulty with this approach is that it 
requires, in effect, a rolling estimate of the average skewness and kurtosis of the 
sample They find a negative Monday return, with smaller firms demonstrating a more 
intense negative return. They also find, unlike Connolly (1989) that the negative 
Monday persists over their sub periods. In terms of the higher moments, they find that 
the pattern of standard deviations is identical to that of the mean returns. Skewness 
patterns follow those of the first two moments for the first time period, but 'flip' in 
the second, with the Monday skewness going from lowest to highest. Although this is 
noted no explanation is provided. Neither is there made an investigation of the 
potential effects, if any, of the inclusion of data for October 1987. Finally, kurtosis 
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also follows the mean patterns, with Monday kurtosis below average and Friday 
above. Evidence for Asian markets as presented in Ho and Cheung (1994) and Tang 
(1997) is that daily seasonality in higher moments does not follow a pattern similar to 
that of the lower moments. German evidence, from Kramer (1996), indicates that 
although the pattern of volatility and other higher moments differs from that of mean 
returns, it is not sufficient to explain daily seasonality in mean returns. Evidence in 
Choudhry (2000) on South-East Asian markets indicates a significant daily seasonal 
in the conditioml variance of a number of equity indices. There he finds a positive 
Monday effect in the mean and in the conditional variance. 
2.3. DAILY SEASONALITY IN NON-EQUITY SECURITY RETURNS 
Many of the papers, which address the issue of why there is a daily seasonal, rely on 
some structural element of the equity markets. In the case of Ireland and Spain 
Donnelly (1991) and Pena (1995) find that the pattern of such seasonality is at least 
partially a function of the microstructure. 
One problem with this approach to 'saving the appearances' is that such special cases 
may be valid only in the particular national market (easily tested) or more generally 
may be valid only for the particular asset under investigation. There is significant 
evidence of persistent daily seasonality across a wide variety of securities other than 
equities. For fixed income securities, Gibbons and Hess (1981), Flannery and 
Protopapadakis (1988) ,Jordan and Jordan (1991) , Singleton and Wingender (1994) 
,Kohers and Patel (1996) and Adrangi and Ghazanfari (1996) have all detected 
various degrees of daily seasonality. Gold has reen analysed by Ball, Torous and 
Tschoegl (1982) and Ma (1986), while Chang and Kim (1988), Chamberlain, Cheun 
and Kwan (1990) and Johnston and Kracaw (1991) all investigate futures markets. 
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Finally, Redman (1997) finds evidence of daily and monthly seasonality in real estate 
investment trusts. Surprisingly, a search of ABI-Infonn, Econlit and of the Social 
Science Citation index failed to discover any studies of calendar seasonality, on the 
lines discussed above, for commodities or 'softs' 23 • 
2.3.1. GOVERNMENT SECURITIES 
Gibbons and Hess (1981) examine short maturity US treasury bills over the December 
1962 - December 1968 period, fmding that average Monday returns are negative and 
significant. Flannery and Protopapadakis (1988) find, over the 1977-1984 period, that 
there exists a significant degree of daily seasonality across a number of bonds, with 
longer maturity bonds exhibiting a more significant degree of seasonality. The usual 
stock pattern of negative Monday returns seems to carry across to the bond market. 
Singleton and Wingender (1994) examine 30-day treasury bills and 30-year treasury 
bonds, over the same period as Flannery and Protopapadakis, but trim their data to 
eliminate outliers. They find that while this reduces to insignificance the daily 
seasonality in treasury bonds it does not affect the shorter maturity bills series. 
2.3.2. CORPORATE BONDS 
Jordan and Jordan (1991) analyse the Dow Jones Composite Bond Average from 1963-
1986. They find that while they cannot reject the hypothesis of different returns across 
days of the week, there is no evidence that the Monday return is significantly negative. 
Their main fmding is that Thursday seems to demonstrate an unusually high positive 
23 There are of course a great deal of studies on the seasonal production pattern and demand of certain commodities, 
such as agricultural and other produces which are inherently seasonal. In addition there are numerous studies of the 
seasonal pattern of the futures of commodities and softs, but not of the underlying cash markets. What is striking is 
the lack of studies on such commodities as oil, rubber, cocoa, tin and aluminium, which although having a certain 
seasonal element embedded in their demand function are traded constantly in highly liquid markets and are of 
founding importance for the world economy. 
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return. Kohers and Patel (1996), analysing the Merrill Lynch High Yield Bond Index 
over the January 1987-June 1994 period, find the lowest daily average return on 
Monday with the highest on Friday. This pattern is also in the index for investment 
grade bonds, the Merrill Lynch Corporate Master Bond Index. Non-parametric tests 
indicate that the two series demonstrate daily seasonality. Finally, Adrangi and 
Ghazanfari (1996) analyse the Merrill Lynch Corporate Bond Index over the 1986-1991 
period, fmding no evidence of daily seasonality. 
2.3.3. GOLD 
Ball, Torous and Tschoegl (1982) investigate the morning and afternoon fixings of 
gold in the London metal exchange over the 1975-1979 period. 
They find little evidence of either a daily seasonal or a negative Monday. This is 
independent of whether Monday returns are measured as Friday AM - Monday AM 
or Friday PM - Monday PM .If anything, there appears to be a negative Tuesday 
return. Ma (1986) provides contradictory results. Ma analyses the afternoon fixings 
from January He finds that while both pre and post 1981 (when significant changes in 
settlement procedures and institutional arrangements were instituted) there existed 
daily seasonality, the nature of this seasonality changes. Pre 1981 there was a negative 
Tuesday (as found by Ball, Torous and Tschoegl) and a highly significant positive 
Wednesday. Post 1981 the negative Tuesday disappears and the average return on 
Monday switches from positive to significantly negative. 
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2.3.4. FUTURES 
Chang and Kim (1988), Chamberlain, Cheun and Kwan (1990) and Johnston and 
Kracaw (1991) all investigates futures markets. 
Examining the Dow Jones Commodities Future Index over the December 1959-
December 1986 period, Chang and Kim find that only in the period 1966-1971 was 
there a negative return on Monday. In respect of fmancial futures, Johnston et al find 
that GNMA (1975-1985) and T-bond (1977-1988) contracts exhibit a negative 
Monday seasonal. This is attributed however to seasonality being strongly present 
only in the period up to 1980. For T-notes (1982-1988) and T-Bill (1976-1988) 
futures contracts however there was no evidence of a daily seasonal. This pattern in 
futures contracts, of greater intensity of seasonality as the maturities of the underlying 
cash instruments increases parallels the results of Flannery and Protopapadakis (1988) 
and Singleton and Wingender (1994) for bonds. Chamberlain, Cheun and Kwan 
(1990) examine the futures contract on the NYSE index over the 1982-1986 period. 
They find no evidence of daily seasonality. 
2.4. THE EVIDENCE SUMMARIZED 
The evidence presented above ind icates three irreducible and irrefutable elements. First, 
there is evidence over 70 years, with voluminous evidence over the last 30 that systemic 
variation in the pattern of mean returns to stocks over days of the week does exist. 
Second, this systemic variation, although perhaps of a slightly different pattern, is 
evident not only in the major stock exchanges but also is widespread across different 
depths of market liquidity, different microstructure patterns, and different trading 
42 
regimens. Third, there is some, albeit very limited, evidence that analogous patterns of 
daily return variation occur in other financial assets, notably precious metals, corporate 
and government bonds and financial futures. The extent of these variations may not in 
and of themselves be sufficient to allow a profitable trading strategy to be built on them, 
but it does indicate that some advice as to trading timing may be possible. The 
dominant theoretical framework of financial economics has no place for such systemic 
variation. The next chapter therefore examines explanations put forward in regard to 
such daily seasonality. If we can find explanations that are congruent both with the facts 
and with the theoretical underpinnings of the modem theory of finance then these daily 
return variations are not anomalous. If however the theories and hypotheses served are 
either not sufficient to explain the results or are ad hoc theories put forward for 
particular manifestations of the regularitl4, then we must consider these daily 
regularities as true anomalies. 
24 Recall that the evidence is that such daily seasonality is not confined to particular days in the US equity market, and 
as such we must treat with scepticism any purported explanation which is not international in scope, general in 
terms of days and generalisable in terms of the assets examined 
43 
3. Non Daily Calendar Anomalies 
3.1. MONTIn.,v SEASONALITY 
A significant body of literature exists to suggest that, especially for smaller 
capitalisation stocks, returns vary across the months of the year. Most typically, the 
evidence is that high returns can be earned in January, especially the early part of 
January. This has led, in a similar manner to daily seasonality being shorthand coded as 
'Monday' anomalies or effects, to monthly seasonality often being assumed to be 
identical to January seasonality. More generally, January seasonality is a particular 
manifestation of monthly seasonality - the tendency for equity markets to show 
systematic and regular monthly patterns of returns. Like the results on daily seasonality 
discussed in Maberly (1995), monthly regularities have been known in US equity 
returns for many years. For example Persons (1919), as noted in Pettengill (1986) noted 
the tendency for equity markets to rise in January. 
Early evidence on the tendency of January returns to exceed those of other months 
comes from Wachtel (1942), and later from Zinberger (1964), with a gap emerging in 
the discussion until Officer (1975) and Rozeff and Kinney (1976). From the evidence 
presented in Rozeff and Kinney (1976) & Gultekien and Gultekien (1983) , the 
existence ofa form ofthe effect in the USA from 190425 cannot be ruled out. Evidence 
also exists that the effect is international, with significant numbers of papers showing 
unusually high returns in January in countries other than the US. Much of the 
discussion on the January effect co-exists with the issue of whether a size effect, the 
phenomenon whereby small-capitalization firms earn superior returns to large-
2S Using Cowles Commission indices 
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capitalization firms, exists and if so, when it manifests itself. From the pioneering work 
of Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981), through Brown, Keirn, Kleidon and Marsh 
(1983) and Kato and Schallheim (1985) to Fama and French (1992) and onto the work 
of Berk (1995), Baker and Limmack (1998) and Garza-Gomez, Hodoshima and 
Kunimura (1998) it has been l:1 consistent finding that small capitalisation firms produce 
higher returns than those with higher capitalizations. 26 Evidence from Keirn (1983) and 
Roll (1983) indicates that the majority of the return to small capitalization stocks occurs 
in January, indeed being concentrated in the first weeks of the month. 
As we have seen, a finding that the return of a fmancial asset varied according to the 
month of the year would be a direct violation of the EMH. However, a number of 
possible explanations, with significant explanatory power, are available. These typically 
fall into four main categories: 
• The monthly seasonal is a consequence of seasonal risk factors; 
• The monthly seasonal is a consequence of seasonal liquidity factors; 
• The monthly seasonal is a consequence of the tax code; 
• The monthly seasonal is explainable by the remuneration patterns of market 
managers. 
These explanations are each individually explicable within tre CAPMI APT framework, 
and as a consequence evidence of calendar regularity is not in itself indicative of a 
degenerative research programme. Rather, through the operation of normal science the 
regularity may be seen as a reflection of deeper issues than were previously surfaced. 
26 See however Dimson and Marsh (1999), who examines UK data and finds that the small firm premium has 
reversed in the 1990's 
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3.1.1. How LARGE Is MONTHLVSEASONALlTY? 
A very considerable number of papers have addressed the issue of whether equity 
returns differ systematically across months of the year. One issue in the interpretation of 
these results is that while some researchers examine average daily returns others 
examine total monthly returns 27. The resulting magnitudes are of course considerably 
different. If we accept that in general there are approximately 20 trading days in January 
then multiplying the average daily returns by 20 allows comparability between the two 
strands of the literature. 
3.1.2. INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE 
International evidence on the returns to equities in January exists in a large number of 
papers. The papers presented below are not by any means exhaustive, but serve to 
indicate both the extent of international evidence on monthly seasonality and to show 
the predominant but not undisputable tendency for January returns to be the highest of 
the year. For example, the evidence on the Spanish market presented in Santesmaes 
(1986) indicates that February, not January, Jl"esents the highest return for the 1979-
1986 period. However, this period was one of thin trading and restricted opening, and 
consequently the operational efficiency of the Spanish market may be doubted. It is 
notable that the degree of difference between the February mean daily return at 0.12% 
and that of January at 0.1 % is also small28 . For the Johannesburg stock exchange Coutts 
and Sheik (2000) report a January return which is negative and statistically insignificant 
from zero. While no overall month is indeed significant, statistically, the month that 
27 As a consequence it is not as easy to create a synoptic table of results on monthly seasonality as it proved for daily 
seasonality. . 
28 Corresponding to 2.4% and 2% on a monthly basis. 
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demonstrates the highest mean daily return is June, at 0.186%29. For Jamaica 
Ramcharran (1997) finds no January seasonality, with instead the month of May 
showing the highest return. January returns were in fact at or close to the mean across 
the 1974-1994 period examined. 
Early results on Canadian equity market seasonality can be found in Berges, McConnell 
and Schlarbaum (1984). Examination of monthly data from 1950-1980 shows a January 
return of between 8% (for small stocks) to 2.3% (for larger stocks). More recent work 
on the Canadian market is summarized in Athanassakos and Foerster (2000). There the 
evidence is that the average daily return in January on the Toronto equity index is 
0.0247%, over the 1959-1991 period. Again however this return was not the highest -
December average daily returns being 0.0268%30. 
For Italy, specifically the Milan exchange over the 1975-1989 period, results are 
presented in Barone (1990). There the January mean daily return at 0.33% is the highest 
of the year, with February and September tying for second place at 0.24%. The 
significance of January is confirmed by a regression F test. A test over a longer period 
is presented in Canestrelli and Ziemba (2000), who examine the 1973-1993 period , 
with sub period analysis. There the mean returns in January and February were 
significantly higher, at 0.258% and 0.205% respectively, than other months. The only 
other month that was statisti:ally significantly different from zero was August, with an 
average return over the period of 0.116%. These patterns also held over sub periods. 
Evidence on seasonality in the Amsterdam exchange, from January 1966-December 
1982 is contained in Van Den Berg and Wessels (1985), who find that January mean 
2Y Corresponding to 3.72% on a monthly basis 
30 These returns correspond to .494% and .53% on a monthly basis 
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returns amount to 4.39% , the highest of any month. The second highest monthly return 
was April, at 3.15%. 
In south-east Asia, the results reported in Table 3 of Ho (1990), analysing the 1975-
1987 period, indicate that out of 12 markets analysed, including the US and UK, 1031 , 
including the UK and US , have significant January returns. The mean January daily 
returns range from 0.44% in Singapore to 0.08% in New Zealand. For the south-east 
Asian countries which show a significant January return, these returns typically exceed 
the mean of all other months by 10 to 20 times. While it seems, by contexts from the 
paper, that the countries with significant January effects also have January as the month 
with the highest returns this is not made explicit. This pattern, of high and statistically 
significant daily January returns, is confirmed for Hong-Kong, Korea and Taiwan in 
Wong, Neoh, Lee and Thjong (1990). However, for both Taiwan and Korea the 
evidence from Tong (1992) is that February (for Taiwan) and May (for Korea) returns 
are the highest32 . Chan, Khailthavit and Thomas (1996) present results contradictory to 
Ho (1990). They analyse returns in Malaysia, India, Singapore and Thailand from 1974 
to 1992, and find that only for Malaysia and Singapore are there significant lmuary 
monthly returns. In addition, it is only for these markets that the F test of equal monthly 
returns is rejected. It is however only in Singapore that the highest monthly return 
occurs in January; for Malaysia it is December (0.195%), for India, February (0.306%), 
and for Thailand, April (0.176%). Malaysian results are further complicated by the 
results of Wong, Neoh, Lee et a/. (1990); they present results for the Kuala Lumpur 
stock exchange which indicate that the return in January is among the highest of all 
31 Hong-Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand, as well as the UK and USA 
32 This paper is a good example of a common mistake. Despite the evidence cited, shown by the authors in Table I, 
they proceed to test for the presence of a January effect. Unsurprisingly none is found. 
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months, over the 1970-1985 period on six sectoral indices. The January return was in 
fact the highest in three of the six indices and in a value weighted index of large finns. . 
Results for Japan can be seen over a long period, 1949-1994, by combining the findings 
of Ziemba (1991) and Comolli and Ziemba (2000). There the evidence indicates that 
over the 1949-1988 period January mean daily returns averaged 0.182%, considerably 
above the next month, August, at 0.079%. For the 1990-1994 period this has dropped 
somewhat, January mean daily returns now averaging 0.052% with the highest monthly 
mean return being October, at 0.189%. 
As noted, the work of Officer (1975), although drawing on earlier work (praetz (1973) 
noted in the paper), is one of the first 'modem' academic papers to examine seasonality. 
The paper does not indicate monthly returns, examining instead lag and correlation 
patterns. It does however allude to a January - February peak in the market. More 
detailed data for the Australian markets is to be found in Brown, Keirn, Kleidon et al. 
(1983). Examining data from 1958-1981 the find that January returns are in fact the 
highest, a monthly average return of3.14%, with this being the case across a variety of 
size measures. Again, as found in Berges, McConnell and Schlarbaum (1984), this is 
larger in small capitalization stocks. 
By contrast, Agrawal and Tandon (1994) examine, over the 1970's and 1980's, a much 
greater number of countries, 19 in total, finding that the mean January returns are high 
and positive. In 11 33 instances a norrparametric Kruskal Wallis test rejects the 
hypothesis of equality of monthly returns 34. The magnitude of the January returns range 
from a high of 13.04% in Mexico to a low 0[0.94% in New Zealand. The typical return 
JJ Belgium, France, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland (and the UK and US) 
J4 Although the KW test is properly a test of median returns, the authors do not note this, discussing mean returns 
instead. 
49 
to January, from Table 6, appears to be in be 3% to 6% range, with other months 
returning much lower rates. 
3.1.3. THE UK 
Evidence on the magnitude of monthly seasonal patterns in the UK can also be found in 
a wide variety of papers. Many of these results can be found in papers that include 
equity indices from the UK and US as a point of comparison to the index under 
investigation. Rather fewer have been the papers that have focused in detail on the UK. 
One of the earlier papers of this sort is Reinganum and Shapiro (1987). They fmd, using 
a variety of data sources, that April returns dominated in the period prior to the 
introduction of capital gains taxation in 1965, while after 1965 January returns were the 
largest in the year. For example, using the FT A index the January return over the period 
April 1965 - December 1979 was 5.18%, compared to the next li.ghest month, April, 
with a return of 3.85%. Using a different dataset, the FT-SE indices, Mills and Coutts 
(1995) find that over the January 1986 - October 1992 period the mean return to 
January was the largest of any month. For the FT-SE 100 index mean January returns 
were 0.159% as against the next highest return of 0.136% (February). The FT-SE 250 
index on the other hand showed a February return, of 0.196%, as the highest, with 
January, at 0.190% being the second highest. In both cases the April return, so 
significant in the results of Reinganum and Shapiro (1987), was low and insignificant. 
Examining the FT30 index over the 1935-1994 period, Arsad and Coutts (1997) find 
results confirmatory to Reinganum and Shapiro (1987). Overall January returns, at 
0.104%, were the highest of all months. However, this is driven by two elements. In the 
pre 1965 period the January returns were high, but the market peak return occurred in 
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April. After 1965 this April return was diminished somewhat and the January return 
increased. 
3.1.4. THE USA 
As noted, much of the work on monthly seasonality in the US has been driven by an 
examination of 'January effects'. Rozeff and Kinney (1976), using data from 1904 to 
1974, find that in all periods the mean January return in the US market was the largest 
of all months. The return overall was 0.0348%, compared to the next highest month, 
July, at 0.0190%.35. Work by Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) on the Dow Jones index, 
from 1897 to 1986 , shows however that the January return of 0.818% was in fact only 
the fourth largest return after July, August and December. This is consistent with the 
results on the interrelationship between the size and monthly issue as seen in Keirn 
(1983) and Reinganum (1983). The evidence here, and that presented in Haugen and 
Jorion (1996) shows clearly that the US effect is confined to the smaller stocks. Haugen 
and Jorion (1996) examine the CRSP indices for the New York Stock Exchange from 
1926 to 1993, and show that the return in January to the smallest stocks is of the 
magnitude of 12.4%, falling monotonically to as little as 0.5% for the very largest 
stocks. More recent work (Riepe (1998, (2001»has indicated that the returns to January 
may be weaker in latter years. 
3.1.5. IRELAND 
Evidence on monthly returns in Ireland arises from a small number of papers. 
35 One difficulty with this however is that the paper combines into one data series a set of three different indices. 
Some of these were equally weighted, others value weighted. Evidence from Theobald and Price (1984) shows that 
seasonality is more easily detected in equally weighted data. 
51 
McKillop and Hutchinson (1989), Donnelly (1991), Gahan (1993) and Lucey (1994) 
hav:e all addressed the issue of the pattern of returns. McKillop and Hutchinson (1989), 
without stating why, examine April and August returns, in the context of small finns. 
They find that an April effect, but not an August effect. 
A more detailed examination is that carried out in Donnelly (1991). He examines the 
Central Statistics Office monthly index, a market capitalization weighted index, over 
the 1951-1988 period, splitting the data into pre and post 1969 samples. From January 
1934 to the mid-1980s the Irish Central Statistics Office (CSO) compiled a capital 
return index of Irish companies, the CSO Price Index of Ordinary Stocks and Shares of 
Companies incorporated in Ireland (except Railways). Details on the construction of 
the index are rather scant with, for instance, official sources such as the CSO itself, the 
annual Statistical Abstract of Ireland or its forerunner, the Irish Trade Journal, 
providing minimal descriptions. However, Geary (1944)describes it as an arithmetic, 
market-capitalisation weighted index with (at that time) complete coverage of the 88 
non-railway Irish registered stocks listed on the two Irish exchanges of Dublin and 
Cork. This method of construction was unusual for that time with, for instance, the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average being a unweighted arithmetic average of 30 share prices or 
the British FT Ordinary Share Index being an unweighted geometric average of again 
just 30 share prices. 36 Overall, the evidence is that mean January returns are 
substantially larger than those in other months. A return of 2.77% overall, with 1.22% 
pre 1969 and 4.32% post is found. This compares to the next highest monthly return 
36 The CSO Index is calculated from share prices quoted on the Irish Stock Exchange on the first trading day of each 
month. There have been a few changes in its method of construction since 1934. Each January beginning in 
January 1958, the index was adjusted to include only those shares that had been dealt in the previous twelve 
months. This entailed a reduction ofthe number of companies covered from 118 in January 1957 to 101 in January 
1958 (Murray (1960». In 1967 the index was again adjusted to include only companies with a market capitalisation 
in excess oflR£0.5 million (Kirwan and McGilvray (1983». Finally, the index was later superseded in the January 
1988 (Statistical Abstract 1988) by the more comprehensive Irish Stock Exchange Equity (ISEQ) series of indices. 
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overall (April) of 2% and 1.21% (October) and 3.01% (April) pre and post 1969 
respectively. A shorter time span is investigated in Gahan (1993), that of 1983-1993. 
Examining the ISEQ index, the official market value weighted index of the Irish Stock 
Exchange, she finds January returns are again the highest, at 6.86%; the next highest 
month (February) showed a return of 3.97%, with April being the third highest at 
2.79%. Only in three years was January not the month showing the highest return. 
Finally, over a shorter time period again, the work of Lucey (1994) again investigates 
the ISEQ index, this time over 1987-1991, a period of high volatility in the ISEQ index. 
In common with Donnelly (1991) January daily returns, at 0.00306% are the highest, 
February (0.0025%) being the second highest. In contrast to both Donnelly (1991) and 
Gahan (1993), April returns are negative and close to zero. 
A more recent study is that of Lucey and Whelan (2002), who use the CSO monthly 
index and the ISEQ index with interpolation and splicing, to create a consistent data 
series from 1930-2000. They find that over the entire period January returns are again 
the highest, with a mean monthly return of 2.5%, the next highest being April at 1.5%. 
The pattern of monthly mean returns was not attributable in that paper to risk patterns as 
shown by stochastic dominance analysis. 
3.1.6. RISK AND SEASONALITY 
A body of literature exists that suggests that the monthly seasonality, especially the 
January seasonal, arises from risk factors that, in and of themselves, may be inherently 
seasonal. If this is the case then clearly the EMH is unchallenged. Two broad threads 
can be distinguished in this literature, one deriving from an Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
approach, another from the CAPM. These differ mainly in the initial specification of the 
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return generating process investigated; while the CAPM papers take a Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) approach and estimate beta coefficients' then investigate the seasonal 
variation of these, the APT papers teml to include directly in the return generating 
equation a set of hypothesised exp lanatory variables for assumed seasonality. This is of 
course in the spirit of the differences between the two models, with the CAPM in its 
naive forms indicating that only idiosyncratic corporate risk is rewarded, while the APT 
allows for the possibility of other variables influencing risk and therefore the rewards 
for stocks. 
Much of this geme of work derives from Tinic and West (1984) who showed that the 
relationship between expected return and risk is positive and significant only in January. 
In all other months, therefore there is no reward for holding risky assets. 
3.1.7. APT TYPE MODELS 
A number of papers have used the Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) methodology to 
identify whether or not macroeconomic factors, perhaps acting differentially on small 
versus large firms, could explain the dual January-Small firm effect. Other papers 
have taken the Fama and MacBeth (1973) two stage regressions and examined the 
role of beta over months of the year. 
Chang and Pinegar (1989),Chang and Pinegar (1990) & Kramer (1994) find that 
placing small firms in the Chen-RoIl-Ross methodology does provide an explanation 
that is consistent with market efficiency. However, Sehun (1993) who operates within 
a Stochastic Dominance framework provides contradictory evidence as to the role of 
macroeconomic factors in the January-Small firm effect. 
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Two papers by Chang & Pinegar both use a Chen-Roll-Ross framework to directly 
examine macroeconomic factors over a range of firm sizes. Rozeff and Kinney (1976) 
found that there was both a January and July peak in stock prices. Chang and Pinegar 
(1989) note that growth rates in industrial production, which is partially flow data, have 
seasonal peaks in February and August. Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) show that this 
industrial production figure as reported lags actual production by at least part of a 
month. To some degree, therefore the reported peaks in industrial production and stock 
returns are contemporaneous. Adjusting the industrial production data for this lag, stock 
returns & industrial production are positively related. This relationship declines as firm 
size increases. Chang & Pinegar find that the January effect is stronger in portfolios 
formed on firm size than on portfolios formed on sensitivity to industrial production. 
They therefore conclude that the January effect is more of a size effect than a 
macroeconomic effect. Chang and Pinegar (1990) found that the factor loads (effects on 
the portfolio returns) of industrial production and corporate-government bond spread 
were greater in January than in other months. They also find that the market risk 
premium was priced in January only for small finns for small firms (proxied here by the 
CRSP equal weighted index) This was further confirmation of the findings of Tinic and 
West (1984), and supporting evidence on the size effect of Reinganum (1983)& Keirn 
(I 983).Tinic & West's conclusion that investors would not be compensated for holding 
risky assets in months other than January was not altogether justified. For non-January 
months, Chang & Pinegar found that there was a statistically significant premium from 
changes in unaI1icipated inflation. It seems that only in January is the holder of risky 
assets compensated for default possibilities (proxied by the spread between government 
and corporate bonds), overall economic risk (as proxied by industrial production) and 
for risky assets (at least for smaller stocks as proxied by the equally weighted stock 
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index). In the other eleven months of the year there is only a premium for overall 
economic risk and for inflation induced erosion of wealth (changes in unanticipated 
inflation), The term structure of interest rates seems to have little impact. 
Kramer (1994) analyses default risk and maturity risk (roughly analogous to the 
corporate bond spread and term structure variables of Chen-roll-Ross), consumption, 
and inflation expectations. Rather than choose a stock index directly, Kramer uses the 
residuals from a regression of an equally weighted stock index on the first four factors. 
He shows that the return on January is significantly higher than other months, and that 
this is captured more effectively in a multivariate than a univariate model. The 
multivariate model includes, in addition to the factors noted above, a January dummy to 
capture seasonality directly. Again, the influences on the small firm portfolios of the 
macroeconomic factors are higher than on the large firm portfolios. For small firms all 
factors are priced (except for inflatio n in the very smallest decile (perhaps reflecting the 
poor nature of very small firnts as inflationary hedges». 
3.1.8. CAPM TYPE MODELS 
A further set of papers have examined seasonality in the context of the methods 
popularised by Fama and MacBeth (1973). The paper by Tinie and West (1984) 
provided considerable impetus to this research agenda. These papers typically employ 
some version of the two step direct test of the CAPM as popularised by Fama and 
MacBeth (1973). As expressed in Hawawini and Keirn (2000), this takes the form of a 
regression of the following type 
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, where Cij represeq!:s particular characteristic j, such as price, SIze, PIE ratio or 
whatever, of stock i, Of course, if one is simply testing the CAPM then there does not 
have, necessarily, to be characteristics included. However, the ~ coefficients in Eq. 
5arise from a previous regression. Under the assumption that there is no time variation 
in ~ coefficients for each individual stock, a first pass time series regression of the form 
, with the expectation that the constant term, a, is zero for each security or portfolio of 
securities, gives the estimated ~ coefficients that can be used as inputs into a regression 
of the type shown in Eq. 5.37 
Tinic and West (1984) focus on the fact that to that date there had been no examination 
of the seasonality of the risk-return relationship. They found that in an examination of 
the CRSP indices, the risk premium was explicable using January data only. Tinic & 
West examine this in more detail via a cross-sectional regression of CAPM parameter 
estimates on February-December dummies. The results show that the monthly dummies 
for market risk premia are negative, significantly so, for all months. The results were 
robust as to index choice (value or equal weighted), and are stable over time 
In the context of the UK a recent paper on this is that of Chelley-Steeley (1996) while 
for the US the work of Pettengill, Sundaram and Mathur (1995) may be taken to 
37 Of course, it is immediately clear that tests using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach require that there be 
estimable J3 coefficients for a sufficient number of stocks. In practice this has meant that in markets where the 
numbers of stocks are small then tests of this type are rare. They appear more frequently where large numbers of 
actively traded securities are present, such as the UK, Germany and the USA. 
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represent this strand. International studies include Heston, Rouwenhorst and Wessels 
(1999) and Fletcher (2000). 
As practical implementations of this approach, consider Chelley-Steeley (1996). There 
the emphasis is on a joint set of issues - do size and calendar effects exist in the risk 
return relationship? There an initial equation of the form of Eq. 5 is estimated, the 
characteristics being relative size and (beta*relative size). The slope coefficients, 
defined as ao and a L in Eq. 5, from these regressions are then themselves regressed on 
calendar dummies. The result is a fmding, over the 1976-1991 period, that risk is priced 
only in January and April, the months that also show the highest raw returns. 
Unusually, there does not seem to be a systematic small firm risk premium, with larger 
firms receiving a larger risk premium than smaller. This finding, of January seasonality 
in the risk premium, confmns the UK results of Corhay, Hawawini and Michel (1987). 
They find that for the USA, UK, France and Belgium that January risk premia are the 
largest of the year as well as, in the case of all save Belgium, being significantly 
different from zero. Again, they adopt a two-stage methodology, dividing the stocks 
(from 700+ in the USA to 170 for Belgium) into portfolios and using these as the basis 
for further investigations. 
Pettengill, Sundaram and Mathur (1995) examine the CRSP database from 1926 
through 1990, and find, consistent with the findings of Tinic and West (1984) that only 
in January (with February marginally failing to achieve statistical significance) does the 
risk-return trade-off predicted by the CAPM actually occur. Following the method of 
splitting the data according to whether the returns are positive or negative as given in 
Lakonishok and Shapiro (1984), they fmd that the relationship differs according to 
market direction. When the market is rising then there exists a positive trade off 
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between risk and return, whereas when the market is falling a negative relationship, as 
the CAPM would predict, occurs in all months except January. A similar finding is 
evident-in Heston, Rouwenhorst and Wessels (1999), who examine portfolios of stocks 
across a number of European countries. 
Summarizing the debate on macroeconomic factors, it seems that while there is 
agreement that factors do influence the market the transmission mechanism of such 
factors influences on the January effect is unclear. Tinic & West found that risk is 
priced in January only. Kramer finds that an equilibrium pricing mechanism operates 
across months. Concerning the particular factors that influence stocks there is also 
disagreement. Thus, while there is evidence that there is a linkage between seasonality 
in the stock market and macroeconomic factors there is little in the way of plausible 
explanations offered for the transmission mechanism. However, within an APT 
framework, which is the theoretical basis for the Chen-Roll-Ross methodologies 
employed in the debate, there is nothing impermissible with different factors 
influencing different sized stocks. Thus, the small firm element of the January-small 
firm regularity is explicable. Even in a CAPM world, allowing for transactions costs 
and liquidity, higher and lower respectively in smaller firms, could give rise to a higher 
required return to small firms. The January element remained unexplained however. 
3.1.9. TAX Loss SELLING AND PARKING THE PROCEEDS 
While the liquidity arguments (on page 66) and the macroeconomic seasonality 
arguments (on page 66) are primarily US orientated this has the obvious difficulty that 
it is driven by peculiarities in the US macroeconomic calendar while there is evidence 
that the January effect is found internationally. If financial economics is to avoid the 
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accretion of special case theories and theories that explain only anomalies then a more 
general and genera'lisable theory was required. 
Roll (1983) takes his lead from Keirn (1983) & Branch (1977) to explicitly investigate 
the linkages between the small firm and January anomalies. He coins the term 'tum of 
the year' effect to reflect the joint anomaly. Ritter (1988) claims Roll's paper as the first 
to explicitly link the two issues together. This is despite the work on the small firm 
effect that undertaken by Banz (1981) and on the January anomaly by Rozeff and 
Kinney (1976), Blume and Stambaugh (1983) and Keirn (1983). 
Roll begins by noting that the last trading day of December38 and the fITst four of 
January contain the largest price changes of any tum of the month, for the difference 
between an equally and value weighted index. He subsequently dismisses data errors, 
construction problems, outliers, survivorship bias, and thin trading as possible 
explanations and reaches the conclusion that this effect is tax loss selling related. The 
presupposed but not fully articulated mechanism is that investors sell stocks that have 
realised losses to minimise capital gains taxes, these losses being offset against the 
other stocks that have gained. This will therefore depress prices; this price depression 
will last at least up to the US tax year-end of Dec 31. The January price rise is then at 
least in part a reaction to the removal of this downward pressure 39 . Roll's explanation 
for why the small firms show a greater sensitivity is that they typically have a higher 
volatility than larger stocks. Consequently, there is a greater probability that they will 
show a decline in any given time period. 
38 As we will see later this choice of time frame can be criticised on the grounds that it contains a day preceding a 
holiday, which days in themselves are the subject of anomalous, but regular, rises in security prices. The so called 
'holiday anomaly' is discussed in more detail in section 5 
39 A market participant version of this bounce is the so-called 'dead cat bounce', to the etTect that even a dead cat will 
bounce if it falls from a great enough height. 
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Reinganum (1983) provides a direct and focused examination of the tax loss selling 
approach. His work is a synthesis Roll (1983),Branch (1977), and Dyl (1977) on year 
end tax loss selling, as applied to small finns. Dyl found a significant abnonnal increase 
(decrease) in trading volume in December for stocks that had shown declines 
(increases). Reinganum's analysis is driven by his classification of portfolios into one of 
forty - ten size based portfolios and four fonned based on tax loss selling potential as 
measured by his ratio. Three facts emerge. First, smaller finns are more likely to have 
experienced greater potential tax loss selling Second, firms in the bottom portfolio of 
potential tax loss selling show a larger average return of all in early January. Third, as 
one moves from smaller to larger firms, there is a marked reduction in the mean return 
in early January40. Reinganum had thus identified an explanation, tax loss selling, that 
was consistent with the facts. It was not however fully satisfactory as he had found that 
even after adjusting for tax loss effects (in effect looking at firms that had had little tax 
loss) there was still a residual January anomalous return. 
Ritter (1988) produces a variant on the tax loss-selling hypothesis that he calls 'parking 
the proceeds'. This is similar to the portfolio manager based window dressing theory of 
Haugen and Lakonishok (1988) but differs from it in that its primary focus is on an 
individual rather than an institutional driver. Ritter's main innovation is that he allows 
for a less rapidly acting investor than was implicitly assumed in either Reinganum or 
Roll. Miller (1990) formalises this by pointing out that the period under analysis is a 
socially and culturally active one. Individuals might reasonably be expected to place a 
higher than normal opportunity cost on their time during the holiday period, and thus 
40 Reinganum has a measure of tax loss selling potential which is particular to his paper. Others have criticised this 
measure and proposed alternatives. The literature on this are alone is substantial, and the measures complex. 
However, the basic insight of Reinganum, that portfolios composed of firms with higher measures of tax loss 
selling potential are associated with higher excess January returns, is broadly accepted. 
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the balance of investment decisiorrmaking may shift from a (presupposed) costly 
search for quality investible stocks to a rapidly executed search for sales. 
Ritter is aware, however, that tax loss selling cannot alone explain the January anomaly. 
This arises from the result in Constatinides (1984) that investors as a set may find it 
advantageous to swap losers for losers to realise capitallosses41 • To explain the January 
anomaly investors would have to 'park the proceeds' of these loser sales, keeping prices 
further depressed and then reinvest, in January, providing additional upward impetus. 
Ritter identifies three requirements for his parking the proceeds hypothesis to work: 
Individual investors be overweight in lower value small stocks, the price of these small 
stocks must be affected by selling pressure, and investors who act to realise their tax 
losses in December do not immediately reinvest the proceeds of sales. The first and 
second are well accepted 42, so his analysis is to concentrate on the third. By analysing 
the selling-buying behaviour of a set of individual brokerage account customers, he 
demonstrates a clear seasonal effect. From regression of the small finn return for the 
first nine days of January on the buy/sell ratio, over the 15 Januarys in his sample Ritter 
demonstrates a positive and significant relationship. 
The tax loss based explanations are not fully convincing however. If there is a tax-based 
explanation for the January effect then countries where the end of the calendar and the 
end of the tax year do not coincide should show no January anomalies. Rather they 
should show a strong return around the tax year-end. We have seen already (page 46) 
that one of the very earliest studies of the January anomaly was on Australian data by 
Officer (1975). Others have examined the existence or otherwise of a January anomaly 
41 This result as a result of the distinction between short -term and long-term tax provisions in the US over the period. 
The interested reader is referred to Appendix I of the paper. 
42 Eakins and Sewell (1993) show that there is a strong positive relationship between firm size and percentage 
institutional ownership. 
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in the US before the introduction there of taxes on capital gains in 1917. One such study 
is that of Schultz (1985). He looks at the period 1900-1917, when the US was without a 
tax on capital gains, versus 1918-1929. In the latter period, but not the former, he fmds 
a January effect. In contrast, Jones, Pearse and Wilson (1987) reject the tax induced 
January effect as they study the period from 1871 to 1917, and find evidence of 
abnormally large January returns. Similar results are to be found in Pettengill (1986), 
Jones and Wilson (1989) and Jones, Lee and Apenbrink (1991). 
A more direct test of the of the tax loss selling approach can be taken by examining 
countries where there is a significant January return but the tax year end is not end 
December and / or there are no capital gains taxes. This does not of course eliminate the 
need to pay tax on trading gains. This can be seen from a number of studies, such as 
Brown, Keirn, Kleidon et al. (1983), Berges, McConnell and Schlarbaum (1984), 
Gultekien and Gultekien (1983), Kato and Schallheim (1985), Tinic, Barone-Adesi and 
West (1987)& Lee (1992). All of these examine countries where the conditions above 
hold but there is evidence of a January effect. Prior to 1972, Capital gains were not 
taxed in Canada, and both Berges et al and Tinic et al report the existence of a January 
anomaly in that period. In the case of Hong Kong, where a zero tax rate on capital gains 
should imply no tax loss selling pressure, Lee (1992) and Cheung, Ho and Wong (1994) 
both report a January return that is significantly above other months. 
In the case of the UK, Reinganum and Shapiro (1987), Corhay, Hawawini and Michel 
(1987), , Gultekien and Gultekien (1983) & Draper and Paudyal (1997) have all found 
evidence of a January and April seasonal. The UK tax year ending in April provides 
some evidence in favour of a tax-based effect for the April seasonal. McKillop and 
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Hutchinson (1989), Donnelly (1991), & Lucey (1994)all find April seasonality m 
Ireland where again the tax year ends in April. 
Among recent work for the UK, the paper by Baker and Limmack (1998) indicates that 
a size-January effect appears in the UK. On examination of an average of over 1800 
stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange over the 1956-1991 period, they fmd, 
using parametric and norrparametric methods, that the mean return to smaller 
capitalisation portfolios exceeds that of larger. This was however concentrated at the 
extremes (the smallest of the 10 size sorted portfolios versus the largest, for example) 
with little evidence of a size effect in the middle portfolios. They also fmd that this is 
persistent over sub-periods. January and April returns, across all portfolios and all 
periods of analysis dominate all other months, with this dominance being greater in the 
smaller portfolios. Consistent with the results of Levis (1985), they also note that the 
effect has changed, with April returns exceeding January in the early years, while the 
reverse becomes true in the latter periods. Forming the data into portfolios based on 
previous returns, they find that the portfolios that exhibited the worst previous 
performance (with a number of alternative time-spans used) performed best in the 
subsequent periods. In particular, the poorest performing portfolios performed better in 
January than those that had performed best. This persisted across the sub-periods of the 
sample. Results for April were mixed. Interpreting these results in the light of the 
different tax codes on investment income, capital gains and corporate reporting, and in 
the light of the composition of the investment community in the UK they conclude that 
while the results do offer some support for tax loss seIling (and window dressing, more 
fully discussed in section 3.1.10 below) the magnitude of the excess return earned in 
January (and April, to a lesser extent) by the poorest performing stock portfolio is of a 
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relatively small magnitude and is unlikely to offer a full explanation of the high returns 
earned by UK stocks in January and April 
3.1.10. PORTFOLIO REBALANCING ("WINDOW DRESSING") 
Haugen and Lakonishok (1988), Lakonishok and Smidt (1988), Ritter (1988), 
Athannasakos (1997) and Athannasakos and Schnabel (1994) all hypothesise that as the 
year progresses managers of pension and investment funds hold progressively less and 
less proportions of risky (usually small) stocks. When the year ends there is a 
rebalancing by mamgers towards their desired holdings. The presupposed reason for 
this is that managerial remuneration has a substantial package based on calendar year 
returns. A variant on this is the window dressing hypothesis, which is essentially an 
institutional versim of the tax loss selling approach outlined on page 59 seq. 
Haugen and Lakonishok (1988) look at both the historical roots and possible 
explanations adduced for the January effect. Rejecting the tax loss selling approach, 
they develop the rebalancing argument. An implication of the hypothesis is that there 
should exist a positive correlation between the stock price changes in January of firms 
and the percentage of such firm's shares under the control (not necessarily under the 
ownership) of such professionals. Ligon (1997) rejects this in favour of a liquidity 
based approach, casting doubt on the validity of the hypothesis, while Ritter (1988) 
reject the tax loss selling approach in favour of the window dressing approach. 
Athannasakos (1997) & Athannasakos and Schnabel (1994), provide some evidence 
supportive of the window dressing hypothesis for Canadian equities. Overall therefore 
the rebalancing/window dressing mechanisms, developments of the at best partial 
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explanation of the tax loss selling theory, do not provide encompassing explanations of 
the January-small ftrm regularity 
3.1.11. LIQUIDITY 
A potential explanatory mechanism has however been identifted through the work of 
Ogden (1990), Chen and Fishe (1994)& Gamble (1993). Ogden puts two empirical 
regularities together towards his explanation. The ftrst is the work by Ariel (1987), 
which recognised that the return in a month occurs primarily in the early part of the 
month. The second regularity is that while this effect exists in each month, it is much 
more pronounced in January. Ogden's hypothesis is that both of these can be 
explained by reference to liquidity conditions. 
In short, Ogden's hypothesis is that the standardization of payments towards the end 
of the month leads to a surge in both corporate and individual liquidity. Good treasury 
management practice indicates that corporates should demand securities that mature 
towards the end of the month (the sale of trese leading to downward pressure on these 
markets) and demand investible securities when they have excess liquidity, such as at 
the commencement of the month (leading to upward price pressure on these markets 
at that time). Ogden notes that not only are liquidity conditions systematically eased 
in December, in the run up to Christmas, but also corporate liquidity is enhanced due 
to Christmas and new year related spending. Ritter (1988) had noted that year-end 
bonuses and cash incentive payments 43 also occur at this period, which enhances the 
purchasing power of individuals. Using federal funds spreads as a measure of 
liquidity, Ogden finds support for his hypothesis regarding the liquidity effect of the 
4J Paid perhaps to successful portfolio rebalancers and creative window dressers? 
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turn of the month, regardless of whether a value or equally weighted index IS 
examined. 
Chen and Fishe (1994) are subtly different in a number of ways to Ogden, but a clear 
descendent thereof. The major difference is that Chen & Fishe couch their analysis in 
terms of inflationary and other expectations. For Ogden's hypothesis to work agents 
would have to be surprised at the end of each month. Chen & Fishe close this reality 
gap, whose basic mechanism is that excess (unanticipated over and above expectations) 
liquidity has an effect on stock prices. 
In the US, from late November onwards, the Federal Reserve acts to allow increases in 
liquidity. Chen & Fishe point out that historically the Federal Reserve progressively 
removes this seasonal increase during January. The easing in liquidity in December acts 
to depress stock prices, as there is at least the possibility that this will not be fully 
unwound in January and that thus there will be an increase in inflation. With the 
January reversal the fear of inflation recedes and stock prices rebound. Thus the Chen 
& Fishe and Ogden hypotheses are directly opposed to one another. 
Testing this hypothesis reqUires that it be distinguished from Ogden's liquidity 
hypothesis and from the tax loss selling approach. For tax loss selling to be the cause of 
the January effect Chen & Fishe note that prices should rebound rapidly after December 
31, the end of the US tax year. Separating the first week of trading into days when there 
is and is not a monetary policy amouncement tests their seasonal monetary policy 
approach. Chen & Fishe show that the tax loss effect is dominated by the seasonal 
money hypothesis. A further conclusion of the paper is that monetary policy seasonality 
and expectations causes the January effect per se, while other effects are related to the 
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small finn effect. The work of Chen and Fishe (1994) bears a close relationship with 
that of Bell and Levin (1998) for the UK. 
Gamble (1993) provides a twist on the liquidity issue, arguing that the January effect is 
consistent with individuals, particularly parents and grandparents, granting monetary 
gifts to other generations. These other generations, modelled as rational economic 
maximisers (or maxi misers), resist the temptation to spend this liquidity on transient 
consumption opportunities (parties and drink for example) and instead invest it in 
equities, causing a rise in equity prices in the early part of the New Year. In other 
words, Gamble's argument is that Santa Claus causes the January effect. This paper 
provides a classic example of a special case theory of the type consistent with a 
degenerative research programme. It should not however detract from the powerful 
explanations offered particularly from Chen & Fishe. This paper stands a; a good 
example of how an empirical regularity initially classed as an anomaly can be 
incorporated into the protective' belt of the research programme. 
3.2. TURN OF THE MONTH SEASONALITY 
Chang and Kim (1988) and Chang, Pinegar and Ravichandran (1993) attribute the 
January effect to being a particularly severe manifestation of the turn of the month 
effect as identified fonnally by Ariel (1987). It is argued that the rise in the markets 
noted in January is in fact concentrated in the first half of the month, indeed in the first 
week (see for instance Ariel (1987), Haugen and Lakonishok (1988) and Lakonishok 
and Smidt (1988». A general turn of the month effect is also seen in Jaffe and 
Westerfield (1985) and also in Agrawal and Tandon (1994). No explanation has been 
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offered, although it would appear that the liquidity arguments of Ogden and Chen & 
Fishe could provide a potential basis for explanation. 
3.3. FRIDAY 13nf 
Kolb and Rodriguez (1987), Dyl and Maberly (1988) & Chamberlain, Cheung and 
Kwan (1991), addressed the issue of superstition in the stock market, via an 
examination of the putative Friday 13th effect. Friday the 13th has a long history of 
being seen as an unfavourable day for activities, at least in the Judaeo-Christian 
world. Explanations as to why this might be so are many, ultimately drawing from a 
conflation of Christian numerology, cabalistic philosophy and Norse myth. Further 
information is found in most encyclopaedias of mythology, folklore and superstition, 
such as Pickering (1991). The Kolb & Rodriguez hypothesis was that if the markets 
are in fact affected by superstition, then this might be reflected in asset prices. 
Based on an examination of the CRSP equal and value weighted indices, over the 
period July 1962-December 1985, they concluded that the mean return for Friday 13th 
was significantly lower than that for other Fridays. However, this finding was quickly 
disputed with Dyl & Maberly's and Chamberlain-Cheung-Kwan examination of the 
S&P 500 index. Over the period 1940-1987 and 1930-1985 respectively, Dyl & 
Maberly concluded that the mean return on Friday 13th was in fact higher than that of 
other Friday's, while Chamberlain-Cheung-Kwan concluded that the statistical 
evidence for differential Friday returns is a function of the turn of the month effect of 
Ariel (1987). However, it is worth noting that they also show, but do not comment 
(Table I, panel A) that Friday 13th returns are in fact negative. 
# An abridged version of this review appears in Lucey. B. M. (2001). "Friday the 13th; International Evidence." 
Applied Economics Letters 8(9); 577·79 
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Since then, the Friday the 13th issue has not been re-examined in any detail. Agrawal 
and Tandon (1994) present a chart (Figure 5, p 101) showing Friday 13th versus other 
Fridays, for their sample of 20 countries across a wide range of dates. They state, 
without presentation of statistical evidence that while the typical Friday 13th return is 
positive it is statistically insignificant. Of their 20 indices, 1144 show higher mean 
returns on Friday 13th . They also note that the standard deviations of the two sets of 
Fridays are similar. More recently, Mills and Coutts (1995) examining the FTSE 
indices over the 1986-1992 period and Coutts and Hayes (l999)examining the FT-30 
index over the period 1935-1994, find a higher mean return on Friday 13th as compared 
to all other Fridays. No convincing explanations, neither of the original fmdings by 
Kolb & Rodriguez, or subsequent refutations of this, have been adduced in the 
literature. Lucey (2000) and Lucey (2001) addresses the issue over an international 
dataset, finding that the 'reverse Friday the 13th " that is the anomalous rise in stocks on 
this day, persists internationally. 
3.4. NON DAILV CALENDAR ANOMALIES REVIEWED 
The evidence above provides mixed evidence as to the ability of researchers in financial 
economics to accommodate anomalous data. The January-small firm regularity is 
explicable, more or less. This explanation requires some deviation from the perfect 
world of the CAPMI APT models, requiring that the costs of transactions in the smaller 
firms be sufficiently large, and the liquidity in these firms sufficiently small to induce a 
small firm premium, while simultaneously there exist macroeconomic policies that 
induce a bounce to asset returns in January. The joint effect of these is then the small 
44 Brazil, France, Germany, Hong-Kong, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the 
S&P 500 index in the USA 
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finn-January effect. However, this explanation has not been tested outside the USA and 
so has difficulty with being a full explanation. In the case if the turn of the month and 
Friday the 13th regularities there are no explanations forthcoming from the literature. 
Accordingly, the evidence indicates that as of now financial economics cannot easily 
accommodate non-daily calendar anomalies. 
The next section of this work examines the daily calendar regularities, and then outlines 
the explanations posed. 
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4. In Search Of Explanations For Daily Seasonality 
The literature on daily seasonality noted above has concentrated almost exclusively on 
the part of the literature that provides some evidence on the existence of the 
phenomenon. Literature also exists of course that has taken the existence as given and 
attempted to formulate explanations. We may discern at least five main strands of 
potential explanation 
1. Daily seasonality arises because of market specific procedures. 
ll. Daily seasonality is induced because of systematic measurement issues 
lll. Daily seasonality is induced because of the differential behaviour of 
individual and institutional investors. 
IV. Daily seasonality is induced because of the markets reaction to news 
v. Daily seasonality is induced because of Psychological factors 
The sections below provide an examination of each of these. 
4.1. MARKET SPECIFIC PROCEDURES 
For the most part, the examination of factors specific to individual stock markets that 
exhibit a daily seasonality in returns has concentrated on settlement procedures. 
Researchers such as Gibbons and Hess (1981), Lakonishok and Levi (1982) and Dyl 
and Martin (1985) have shown that settlement procedures can induce seasonality, albeit 
of a particular kind. Some, those following the line of inquiry commencing in Gibbons 
and Hess, have attributed this to the settlement procedures themselves, while others, 
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following the line of research begun by Lakonishok & Levi have examined the induced 
interest effects arising from such procedures 
4.1.1. SEfTLEMENTDELAYS 
Gibbons and Hess (1981 )45 is an important paper in the study of daily seasonality, as 
it represents one of the earlier attempts at explanation rather than simple exposition. 
In relation to the possibility of settlement effects, their argument runs as follows: 
Stock prices are in fact forward prices (prices are agreed today but delivery of the 
payment and instrument are not effected for a number of days- the settlement period). 
Thus, by analogy with pure future markets the cost of carry model, which is the spot 
plus an interest premium, will determine the price for a stock. In consequence, any 
settlement period that is not an exact multiple of 5 days will induce a day of the week 
effect. Using the fact that in the US the settlement period changed in 1968 from 4 to 5 
days 46, which by their reasoning should have led to at least a diminution of daily 
seasonality, they proceed to test this. Before this change, Monday prices would have 
been inclusive of 4 days interest, Tuesday through Friday prices inclusive of 6 days 47. 
This would have the effect of making Monday prices less than those of the other days 
of the week. By excluding one day of the week from a regression of daily returns on a 
set of dummy variables representing the remaining days, the Monday and Tuesday 
coefficients (representing deviations from the excluded day of Wednesday in this 
instance) should be equal if the difference between the prices is due to the induced 
4' They find a negative Monday return of ·0.134% for the S&P 500 over the 1962·1978 period against an all day 
average of 0.02%, this result also holding in all sub periods. 
46 As we will see in 6.3.3 and Error! Reference source not found. a change in the Irish equity settlement system 
allows a similar natural experiment to proceed in this research! 
47 The 4 days settlement plus the 2 days of the weekend. 
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interest cost. This was not so, leading the authors to conclude that the settlement 
effect cannot explain the negative Monday return. 
Theobald and Price (1984) examine the settlement system in the UK. Before the 
introduction of rolling settlement in 1994, account settlement worked by dividing the 
year into twenty-two two-week and two three-week account periods. Accounts began 
on Monday and ended on the Friday week (or fortnight). Settlement occurred on the 
second Monday (Settlement day) after the account period, 10 working days after the last 
day of the account. Purchasers had to provide funds and sellers stock in time for the 
stockbroker to settle on the settlement day. Buying and selling within the settlement 
period resulted in the investor only settling the net gain or loss on the settlement day, 
without any cash investment having been required. An individual buying on the last 
day of a settlement period and selling at the end of the following Monday will pay for 
shares on the settlement day relating to the Friday and receive payment on the 
settlement day relating to the Monday. Thus, the investor would have had to carry the 
cost of the transaction for two, or possibly three, weeks. Consequently, the first Monday 
of an account period would have inbuilt in it the greatest amount qf implicit interest and 
thus the price on this Monday should be higher. Purchases made on the last day of an 
account period would have the shortest credit period. This implies that the first 
Monday of an account period should ha\e a substantially higher return compared to 
other Mondays. 
Theobald and Price found to be the case in their analysis, with the first Monday of an 
account showing positive but insignificant returns, but the other Mondays remaining 
negative. Thus, along with Jaffe and Westerfield (1985) they find that although he 
settlement system manifests itself in the data it cannot fully explain negative Monday 
returns and thus cannot be a full explanation of daily seasonality. Donnelly (1991) 
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found essentially the same results for Ireland. Other studies which have examined the 
UK settlement system and have concluded that it is at best a partial explanation for the 
daily seasonal include Board and Sutcliffe (1988), Yad~.v and Pope (1992) and Coutts 
and Hayes (1999). Clare, Ibrahaim and Thomas (1998) examine the effect of settlement 
changes on the Kuala Lumpur stock market on daily seasonality. Before 1990, a fixed 
settlement day existed, of the Wednesday following a trade. After 1990, the settlement 
system changed to an account week system. Before the settlement change, an ind uced 
Thursday effect was present as was a negative and significant Monday; after, although 
still negative, Monday returns are not statistically significant. Solnik and Bousquet 
(1990) find that the settlement system for the Paris bourse cannot fully explain the daily 
seasonality they find there. In general therefore the evidence on the settlemett system 
as a cause of the daily seasonal is weak. This is perhaps not unexpected as the induced 
seasonality of particular settlement systems will always be particular to the system and 
market under investigation48 and as such cannot provide a generalisable explanation 
across different regimes. 
4.1.2. SETTLEMENT INTEREST EFFECTS 
Lakonishok and Levi (1982) invoke a somewhat different aspect of settlement 
procedure, that of the cheque settlement or clearing system of one day typically. They 
point out, again noting the 1968 settlement change in the US, that purchase of stocks on 
any day other than Friday gives eight days usage of funds. Purchase on Friday gives ten 
days usage. Purchasing on say Wednesday requires settlement on the following 
Thursday (Thursday, Friday, two weekend days of Saturday & Sunday, Monday, 
48 See for example the work in Jaffe and Westerfield (1985) 
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Tuesday and Wednesday). Purchase on a Friday gives all the following week, two 
weekends and then next Monday week. Thus, mean returns on a -Friday should be 
higher by the additional two days interest The meal!, returns on a Monday should, they 
argue, be lower by the two days interest. Over the 1962-1979 period they examine this 
hypothesis, explicitly adjusting CRSP Equal Weighted Index prices for Monday and 
Friday by the interest rate, and noting that while the disproportional negative Monday 
and positive Friday returns declined they continued to exist. Thus, trey conclude that 
the settlement interest effect is not sufficient to account for the weekend effect. 
The proposal to use appropriate interest rate adjustments as noted in Table 1 of 
Lakonishok and Levi (1982) as the interest rate adjustments that should be made to data 
is one that is carried out by Dyl and Martin (1985) and Degennaro (1990). Dyl & 
Martin examine the S&P 500 from 1957 to 1981, and they partition the sample on the 
change of settlement procedure in 1968 and. They conclude that settlement effects have 
little effect on the day of the week effect. DeGennaro produces similar results. This 
study fmds that the risk free rate is the appropriate rate to adjust for the settlement 
delay, but that the adjustment for this delay is not responsible for the day of the week 
effect. 
Bell and Levin (1998) extend this approach of implied interest for the UK, over the 
period 1980-1992, including in their analysis a series of variables to account for the 
liquidity effects of cheques and wire transfers impacting on traders accounts around 
settlement day. They conclude that allowing for these effects and for the reduction in 
money demand around weekends, the calendar effects disappear. 
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4.2. TRADING MEASUREMENT ISSUES 
If stocks prices are assigned as opposed to beiQg actually realised, through thin trading 
perhaps, this, some have argued, could induce seasonality. Gibbons and Hess (1981) 
suggest that if this is so, then the deviation of Monday prices from the average should 
be offset by that of Friday. Testing this on S&P 500 and on the CRSP equal- and value-
weighted indices they find trading measurement issues not to be a potential source of 
the Weekend effect. Keirn and Stambaugh (1984) also tested as to whether thin trading 
can adequately explain the Weekend effect. They show those if measurement issues are 
important, then Friday returns suffer from mean positive errors (are biased upwards) 
while Monday returns from mean negative errors (are biased downwards). There should 
then be negative autocorrelation between Friday and Monday returns. Examining the 30 
compone nts of the DJIA, for the period 1962-1982, the correlation between Friday and 
Monday was in fact positive and indeed the largest of any pair of days. Replication of 
their test for the UK by Jaffe and Westerfield (1985) and Board and Sutcliffe (1988) 
also refutes the suggestion that the weekend effect is because of systematic 
measurement errors in closing prices 
Pettengill and Jordan (1988) & Fishe, Gosnell and Lasser (1993) both examine trading 
issues through volume. Pettengill & Jordan examine the S&P 500 and the CRSP equal 
weight index from 1962-1985. They fmd calendar anomalies in the volume data of 
similar patterns to returns. Volume data displays turn of the month, day of the week, 
January and intra- month seasonals. They also demonstrate a positive and significant 
causal relationship between volume and return. Fishe, Gosnell & Lasser fmd similar 
results, in addition, finding that the Monday anomaly is particularly prevalent during 
high volume - negative return environments. Jaffe, Westerfield and Ma (1989) examine 
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the international CEpect of this, looking at Monday returns for six stock markets (US, 
Japan, Canada, Australia and the UK) over a variety of periods. They find that, 
partitioning their datasets on advancing L declining weeks, negative Monday returns 
follow declines, with little evidence of a significant effect on the Monday return if the 
previous week was an advance. This effect carries across all markets and all sub 
periods. This may be evidence of momentum trading, with investors expecting further 
declines. 
Some support 5 given to this by Abraham and Ikenberry (1994) who indicate that 
Friday declines are followed in 80% of cases by Monday declines; Friday advances are 
typically followed by Monday advances. However, the relationship is asymmetric, with 
a negative prior Friday having a stronger effect on the following Monday tmn a 
positive Friday. 
A number of other papers have commented on this. Evidence has accumulated that two 
factors are in operation. First, seasonality is typically measured as being stronger when 
the markets are in decline. Second, the relationship between Monday and Friday is 
asymmetric with regard to positive and negative Friday returns. Liano and Gup (1989) 
classify months into those that fall in expansionary and contractionary periods. 
Contractions, in their analysis begin on the first trading day of the first contractionary 
month and end on the last trading day of the last contractionary month. Examining both 
the equal and value weighted CRSP indices, for 1963-1986 they fmd that the 
contractionary Mondays are more strongly negative than expansionary Mondays are 
positive. This is very similar to the results found by Abraham and Ikenberry (1994) and 
Jaffe and Westerfield (1985) .Fishe, Gosnell and Lasser (1993) partition their dataset, as 
do Liano and Gup (1989) on positive and negative return environments, on a daily 
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basis. Again, they fmd that Monday in the negative return environment is significantly 
different to positive environment Monday. In the negative return set, Monday exhibits 
both the lower average returns of aU days. Kohers and Patel (1996) who look with the 
same methodological lenses at the period 1987-1993 find contradictory results to Liano 
and Gup (1989). 
4.3. THE ROLE OF INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS 
Miller (1988), Lakonishok and Maberly (1990) & Abraham and Ikenberry (1994) have 
all noted the tendency for the weekend effect to be more robust in smaller stock indices 
and deciles. While this may reflect thin trading, if we accept the analysis of Theobald 
and Price (1984) we would expect to see more pronounced seasonal patterns in indices 
and portfolios that contain a higher proportion of thinly traded stocks. Some authors 
have seen this as also being a potential indicator that individual investors may be 
playing an important part in the propagation of the phenomena. 
Miller (1988) focuses his research on individual investors. There are two main 
assumptions underlying the notion that individual investors may have a role to play. 
The first is that individuals, sellers of stock on balance, will make decisions over market 
closures as well as market openings. The second that they make these decisions without 
benefit of expert advise. Miller hypothesises that individuals make sales decisions every 
day, causing an imbalance of sell orders to occur on Monday, the markets being closed 
over the weekend. Brokers and investment advisors typically generate buy orders49 , 
regardless of whether they are for individuals or institutions. As these work a standard 
5-day week, this exacerbates the imbalance noted above. Miller notes that this 
49 M iller gives evidence that buy recommendations can be up to 26 times the number of sell recommendations 
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hypothesis is congruent with the post-holiday and post-market closure evidence. He 
. 
does not however attempt to test the hypotheses on any datasets, the paper being 
entirely theoretical. Dyl and Holland (1990) do provide direct evidence on the Miller 
hypothesis. They examine odd-lot trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange 
from 1978-1987, explicitly assuming odd-lot trades are an adequate proxy for 
individual trades. They find that both net sales and odd-lot volume are higher on 
Monday than on any other day, evidence in favour of Miller's hypothesis. This 
evidence is robust to the exclusion of the week around the 1987 market crash. 
Lakonishok and Maberly (1990) approach the issue based on the research that sell 
recommendations are far less likely than buy. Thus, those wishing to sell must make 
the decision essentially alone, the weekend providing time to think the matter over. 
This should lead to an imbalance of sell orders over buy on Monday. Based on odd-lot 
data from 1962-1986, they conclude that odd-lot dealings on Monday are indeed 
substantially higher than on any other day of the week. In addition, block sales (sales of 
10,000 shares or more) make up the least proportion of all volume on Mondays 
compared to other days. Analysing the transactions of Merrill Lynch Glsh account 
customers, these also show a sell imbalance on Monday. This evidence is consistent 
with, but not necessarily causal of, the day of the week effect. Abraham and Ikenberry 
(1994) analyse deciles of stocks, ranked by size, to investigate the possibility that 
smaller stocks, wherein individual investors are assumed to be disproportionally 
represented, exhibit more pronounced daily seasonality. They find that, conditional on 
the previous trading day return being negative, smaller stocks exhibit a more 
pronounced negative Monday when compared to larger. Conditional on the previous 
day being positive, the smaller decile portfolios exhibit lower (albeit positive) returns 
when compared to larger. This is consistent with the CRSP equal weighted index 
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information, which shows that Monday declines follow Friday declines in 80% of cases 
and that Friday raises result in a smaller Monday rise than any other pair of days. 
Again, odd-lot trades sUpJlPrt the notion that individuals are more active on Monday 
than any other day. For Finland, Kallunki and Martikainen (1997), finds evidence in 
favour of the ind ividual investors playing a significant role in driving a weekend effect. 
Sias and Starks (1995), and Kamara (1997) turn this argument on its head, and argue 
that in fact the weekend effect arises from the influence not of individuals but of 
institutions. This starting point seems reasonable, as their studies are prompted a 
number of facts. By the 1990's in excess of 70% of volume on the New York Stock 
Exchange was from institutional traders. There is also evidence of a low level of 
activity of institutional traders on Monday (a mirror image of the high level of 
individual activity). Institutional traders receive the same level and balance of broker 
recommendation asymmetries as individuals. Combined with the fact that 
autocorrelations in returns are higher in institutional dominated portfolios, these facts 
lead Sias & Starks to judge that institutional traders, not individuals, have the dominant 
role in the weekend effect. They fmd that size adjusted portfo lios comprising stocks that 
have high institutional holdings have a Monday volume that is lower than similar sized 
portfolios with low institutional holdings. They also fmd that, adjusting for size and 
conditioning on the previous Friday return being negative (positive), high institutional 
holding portfolios have a lower (higher) return than low institutional holding portfolios. 
They add an additional argument in favour of the institutional holders to be the 
dominant source of the Weekend effect. This is the existence of a Tuesday effect in 
Japan, being they claim a reflection by institutional holders of the Weekend effect in the 
US. Finally, Kamara (1997) notes that as institutional holdings of stocks have, 
proportionally, increased, the weekend effect has declined. One problem with this 
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argument however is the evidence that the measured weekend effect in rising markets is 
lower than in falling markets. As the US market was, generally speaking, in an upward 
phase from 1989 this needs to be taken into account in any examination. 
Clearly, the issue of individuals versus institutions cannot provide a full explanation of 
the daily seasonal, as it is particular and ad hoc. It is particular to the asset under 
investigation, equities, and ad hoc in that it fits the US data of a Monday decline, but 
has nothing to say as to the other patterns found internationally. 
4.4. REACTION TO NEWS 
In economic terms, news 5 a term that is used to denote unanticipated or unforeseen 
changes in variables of interest to the actors under investigation. The assumptions of 
the EMH do not include perfect forecasts by agents. Consequently, these agents will 
be 'surprised', that is their forecasts will not be perfectly accurate and they will be 
forced to react to not just the forecast variables but also to the news, the forecast error, 
in these variables. In the context of daily seasonality, two different types of news are 
considered. The first is news that acts on more than anyone firm, macroeconomic or 
market news, the second news that, in principle, acts on individual firms. Examples of 
such studies are those by authors Liano and Gup (1989) & Steeley (1999) on 
macroeconomic news, Wilson and Jones (1993) on market news and Penman (1987) 
on firm specific news 
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4.4.1. MACROECONOMIC NEWS 
Liano and Gup J 1989), Kohers and Patel (1996) & Steeley (1999) all purport to 
examine the effect of macroeconomic news50, such as GNP figures, inflation or 
industrial production, on the daily pattern of returns. 
However, of these, only Steeley examines the effect of macroeconomic news directly. 
The others, as we have seen, in reality examine the differences in seasonality across 
different returns regimens. 
A detailed study in the tradition of Liano and Gup (1989) is that of Chang, Pinegar 
and Ravichandran (1993), which attempts to look at macroeconomic news 
announcements as such. However, their proxy for macroeconomic news is changes in 
large firm's stock prices. Substantial methodological sophistication (use of GJR-
ARCH models to capture asymmetries and norrnormality in the data, the use of 
posterior odds ratios to c~pture large sample effects and attempts to control 
survivorship bias) in this paper makes it an improvement on the previous papers. 
What they find however is that there is a size effect as well as a Weekend effect, with 
small stocks being more moved by changes in large stock prices (macroeconomic 
news) on Monday than on any other day. This, they hypothesise, is due to information 
processing asymmetries as between Monday and any other day. Investigation of lags 
and contemporaneous returns indicate that this is true not only for information (large 
stock price changes) 'released' on Friday but also for information released on 
Monday. 
so The role of news in the 1987 crash was examined by Shiller (1987). who dismissed macroeconomic news as a 
contributory cause. 
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Steeley (1999) represents an attempt to examine directly the issue of the effect of 
macroeconomic news release~ on the daily seasonal. Using UK data (FTSE 100 index) 
from 1991 tQ 1998, he finds that major macroeconomic variables arrive more frequently 
in the middle of the week than on Friday or Monday. This inverted U shape allows 
investors to take time over the weekend to consider their reaction to the news 
announcements which they receive on Tuesday-Wednesday-Thursday, and to trade on 
the Monday or Friday with little chance of announcements requiring additional 
processing of information, making them lower cost trading days. Although on average 
he finds no significant daily seasonality, when partitioned by market direction the 
returns show is a weekend (lower Monday higher Friday) pattern. Abraham and 
Ikenberry (1994) show that this partitioning is important for the US, with negative 
Monday and Friday returns significantly more negative for those days when 
announcements occur. 
4.4.2. MARKET SPECIFIC NEWS 
Wilson and Jones (1993) examine whether different US stock markets exhibit different 
manifestations of well-known daily seasonal effects. This they test by means of an 
integrated study of the AMEX, New York Stock Exchange (value weighted), Standard 
& Poor 500 index and NASDAQ index from January 1973 to August 1991. The study 
incorporates day of the week, tum of the month, January and holiday effects, and 
incorporates adjustments to account for nOlrnormalities and autocorrelation They fmd 
that the negative Monday return is present across all four indices studied, even after 
taking account of the various other potential anomalies. The effect was strongest, both 
in absolute and in statistically significant terms, in the NASDAQ index, which at that 
time would have been, relatively speaking, composed of smaller capitalization stocks 
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than the other indices. Exactly what the market specific characteristics or news that 
caused these differential'effects might be was not examined however. 
One problem that researchers had not solved was how to cistinguish between effects 
caused by firms and those general to the market as a whole. Pettengill and Buster 
(1994) provide a mechanism to distinguish between an effect caused by firm specific 
news to one caused by news that affects the entire market. They compare the standard 
daily pattern in return indices with the daily proportion of securities that show positive, 
negative or zero returns. If market news caused daily seasonality then the two patterns 
(indices and proportions of returns signs) would be similar. If there were daily 
seasonality in the proportions of return signs, with a high proportion of negative 
Monday and positive Friday returns, that would also indicate market specific 
information. If the pattern across days of the week in the proportions shows no especial 
daily seasonality that would indicate that the Monday and day of the week anomalies 
resulted from negative news· announcements after close of business on Friday. The 
study fmds that there was daily seasonality in the proportion series. This indicates a 
market wide rather than firm specific phenomena 
4.4.3. FIRM SPECIFIC NEWS 
Three major studies, focused on the US, have looked at the issue of whether the release 
of firm specific news to the market can induce a day of the week effect. These are Patell 
and Wolfson (I 982),Penman (1987) & Damodaran (1989). Patell & Wolfson test the 
hypothesis advanced in French (1980) that the release of negative information takes 
place during non-trading hours. They classify news in relation to earnings and 
dividends according to the effect that the release has on the stock price after release 
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(does the stock price rise or fall) and relative to their level in previous years (are the 
accounting data higher or lower than previous years). Studying the dividends and 
~amings announcements of 96 firms for the three years 1976, 1977 and 1979, they find 
that good news (information after whose release stock prices rise, or information whose 
level is above previous levels) is released during trading hours and bad news after 
hours. However, the link to daily seasonality is left unspecified, but could be 
conjectured to work based on bad news being released after trading hours on Friday, 
leaving the weekend for investors to decide to act on this. This mechanism is similar to 
that of Abraham and Ikenberry (1994). Penman takes the relationship between 
information releases and daily seasonality a step further, looking at a much larger 
sample of over 70,000 announcements. He shows that there is a dual seasonality in the 
announcement set. Again, the news is categorised as good or bad according to the 
market reaction after its announcement. Firms appear to release good news in the first 
two weeks of the quarter, and bad news on a Monday and to a lesser extent on Friday. 
This clearly does not totally solve the issue of the relative Monday decline, as investors 
would have to fully incorporate the bad Friday news into their sell orders, but then 
further react instantly to the other bad news on Monday. As news tends to be released 
outside trading hours this induces some problems. 
Damodaran integrates the two strands of argument above, testing for the joint 
hypothesis that bad news is released after trading hours, specifically after Friday close, 
and that there is a processing delay. He studied 30,000 dividend and earnings reports 
over a four-year period. The data were for all firms that COMPUSTAT listed 
continuously from 1981 to 1985. Damodaran admits the poss ibility that survivorship 
bias may be important. Deleted firms that were so due to being bankrupt by definition 
have released bad news. Their exclusion therefore biases the study against finding that 
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finns delay bad news until the weekend. Damodaran looks not just at the stock price 
effect but also at Earnings per share and Dividend per share surprises 51 • He finds that 
earnings and dividend announcements on Fridays are more likely to be bad news (show 
declines) than announcements on any other day. He also finds that abnonnal returns are 
negative not only on the announcement day (Friday) but also strongly & significantly, 
on the following day (Monday). Comparing the Weekend effect with and without 
Friday announcements shows that the Friday announcements explain only a small 
proportion of the effect, 3.4% according to Damodaran. 
Aggarwal and Schatzberg (1997) examine the potential role that the pattern of earning 
and dividend announcements may have in explaining daily seasonality. They 
investigate the possibility that the release of infonnation affects the higher order 
moments (specifically kurtosis) and the mean returns of securities. They fmd that, 
consistent with. Peterson and Damodaran most information (earnings or dividends) is 
released in the middle of the week, with up to twice as many announcements being 
made on each Tuesday-Wednesday-Thursday than on Monday or Friday. Nor is there a 
distinct pattern as to 'good' or 'bad' news being release on Monday or Friday. 
Consequently, the release of significant information on these days would not seem to be 
a likely contender for a cause of daily seasonality. 
Peterson (1990) looks at the issu: of announcement induced daily seasonality via 
another method. His contention is that if announcements induce seasonality, then 
indices composed of finns that announce results on any given day should show stronger 
seasonality than indices of finns not reporting on that day. His study takes in all finns 
reporting on the NYSE or the AMEX over the period 1980-1986, and indicates that 
51 These are defined not as the residuals or forecast errors from a fonnal model but rather simply as the percentage 
change from quarter to quarter. 
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there is no discernible difference between reporting period indices and non-reporting 
period' indices. He thus concludes that earnings announcements cannot be a full 
explanation for daily seasonality. 
A study by Defusco, Mccabe and Y ook (1993) also looks at the issue of infonnation 
timing. Analysing stock returns around a 20-day window centred on the board meeting 
of a company, they fmd that the Monday return in this high news potential period is 
more negative, while other days tend to be more positive than during lower news 
potential periods. This is consistent with finns releasing bad news over a weekend. 
A further branch of investigation related to finn specific news has examined the 
potential problem caused by omission of dividends from the indices examined. For the 
most part, studies have used return data generated from prices. This implicitly assumes 
that the daily dividend component 5 small, relative to the price. If however Monday 
were to be the preferred day for companies to go ex-dividend (the process by which a 
date is set, shareholders registering thereafter being ineligible for payment of the next 
dividend), then there would be a perfectly simple explanation for the relative decline. 
Phillips-Patrick and Schneeweis (1988) examine this; they adjust the CRSP indices for 
dividends, and find the Weekend effect almost disappears. Branch and Echevarria 
(1991) extend this analysis, finding that stocks that go ex-dividend on Monday do not 
exhibit a strong Weekend effect. Schatzberg and Datta (1992) examined 138,824 
dividend announcemerts made from 3484 firms over 26 years. Their findings, akin to 
those of Aggarwal and Schatzberg (1997) were that dividend announcements were 
more than twice as likely on Tuesday-Wednesday-Thursday than on Monday or Friday. 
Thus, they find no support for the contention that information releases drive daily 
seasonality. Corhay (1991) finds that 40% of dividend distribution for firms quoted on 
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the Brussels stock exchange takes place on Tuesday, but although a negative Tuesday 
return had been found, with which a dividend distribution of Tuesday would be 
consistent, dividend adjustment could not completely eliminate the daily seasonal. For 
Australia, Japan, Canada, USA and UK, Chang, Pinegar and Ravichandran (1993) 
dismiss the role of information release, as do Yadav and Pope (1992) for the UK. 
Again, the role of information release, especially the microeconomic release, is only at 
best a partial explanation for the daily seasonal. While the microeconomic infonnation 
release hypotheses are founded on the supposition (unproven) that flnns release bad 
news on the weekend and thus are a particular explanation for the US pattern, the 
macroeconomic release hypothesis is potentially more general. It is not linked to any 
individual market or indeed any individual asset, and indeed has the potential to provide 
an explanation congruent with any given pattern of daily seasonality. 
4.5. PsYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS 
A flnal set of papers examines whether human psychological traits can be invoked to 
explain the Monday effect. Rystrom and Benson (1989) report that the psychology 
literature supports the contention that investors' perceptions differ systematically over 
days of the week. They hypothesise that this may lead investors to conclude that their 
market situation is poorer on Monday than it really is, thus triggering a desire to sell. 
However, a problem with this is that we have seen that for individual investors at least 
these sell decisions may be made over the weekend. However, the psychological 
evidence in Rystrom and Benson indi;ates that perceptions are over-optimistic on 
weekends. Thus, an argument can be made equally as strongly that the investors would 
have a desire to purchase on Monday. However, this is inconsistent with the facts that 
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individual investors are net sellers of equities on Monday. Coursey and Dyl (1990) 
construct an artificial, or experimental market. They report that this is essentially the 
same as that constructed in a previous experiment, wherein they found. 
" .. patterns of price disturbances associated with trading interruptions 
that were very similar to the so-called weekend effect" p347 
Unfortunately, the 1990 paper does not go further into detail than this. A further 
experimental market is discussed in Pettengill (1993). Analysing the portfolio 
allocations (among investments with different levels of risk and return) of the 
participants in an artificial market, he finds lower levels of allocation to riskier 
securities (equities in this market) on Mondays compared to all other days, ceteris 
paribus. 
A recent work by Kamstra, Kramer and Levi (2000) investigates a further potential 
psychological basis for the weekend effect. They point out that the changes in human 
sleep patterns concomitant on moving to and fom daylight savings time have well 
known deleterious effects. As these changes occur over a weekend, they posit that the 
Mondays immediately after these changes may be unusually negative. This is found to 
be so, with the 'daylight savings' effect being found (in the USA, UK and Germany) to 
be several hundred percent the weekend effect. Allowing for this however does not 
fully remove the effect. 
A more recent survey of psychology and asset pricing Hirshleifer (2001), has a major 
study on non calendar regularities and 'anomalies'. While he sees great potential for 
psychologically based explanations of these, the paper has little if anything to say about 
calendar regularities. 
90 
5. Anomalous Returns Around Market Closings: 
Holiday Effects 
A final category of calendar regularity, the Holiday effect, is one of the more 
perplexing, persistent and important, with one study (Lakonishok and Smidt (1988» 
attributing fully 50% of the cumulative change over a century in the Dow Jones to 
returns on days preceding holidays. 
Despite its importance, there is a lack of research relative to the daily and monthly 
seasonal. Like them, it is neither a newly discovered or newly arrived anomaly. The 
Holiday, or more correctly, the pre-holiday effect, refers to the fact that share returns 
exhibit consistent patterns around holidays, with high and consistent returns on days 
before major holidays. Holidays in this literature includes what are commonly seen as 
holidays, such as public holidays, and also exchange closing days, where although 
general economic activity continues the stock exchange is not open for business S2. 
Initially examined in the context of the US, there is a body of evidence that the holiday 
effect, like the January and weekend effects, is international. This precludes the 
possibility of it reflecting the idiosyncratic market characteristics of anyone exchange. 
As will become evident from the literature, the pre-holiday effect is not a retlection of 
the weekend/Monday regularity. While in many countries holidays fall predominantly 
on Monday, this is not universally the case. 
One striking characteristic of the literature is that exposition rather than explanation 
dominates. Whereas we have seen that there exist well-grounded testable theoretical 
explanations for monthly and daily regularities, there has been little if any effort made 
52 A good example of exchange holidays is Wednesdays in 1968 when the New York Stock Exchange closed to allow 
for back office processing backlogs be cleared). 
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to fonnulate explanations for the holiday anomaly and even less in testing these. There 
are exceptions to this rule, notably Pettengill (1989), Ariel (1990) and Fabozzi, Ma and 
Briley (1994). The theoretical issues raised by these fonn the basis for work to the 
present day. 
5.1. US EVIDENCE ON THE HOLIDAY EFFECf 
Like the daily seasonal, the evidence on the preholiday regularity is not new. Fields 
(1934) finds a disproportionally large ratio of advances to declines in the Dow Jones on 
days prior to long weekends. His dataset comprised daily returns from 1901 to 1932. 
Other works addressing pre-holiday returns prior to the middle '80's include works by 
Merrill (1966), Fosback (1976) & Hirsch (1986). These three books, by market 
participants, discuss well known market pattern-recognition behaviour, noting among 
these that stocks returns prior to the major US holidays are predominantly positive and 
abnonnally highly S053. 
In the academic literature on stock returns, early contributions include Lakonishok and 
Smidt (1988), Pettengill (1989) and Ariel (1990). Lakonishok & Smidt examine a wide 
range of regularities, the preholiday regularity among these. They do not count the 
special 1968 Wednesday closings as a holiday, nor do they note which days are 
counted, stating only that they count a holiday as any day when trading would nonnally 
have occurred but did not. Looking at a ninety-year dataset (the Dow Jones Industrial 
average from Jan 4 1897 to June 11 1986) they fmd that the average pre-holiday daily 
return is 0.22% (the average post-holiday return being somewhat smaller at -0.017%) 
compared to 0.0094% for other days. 63.9% of pre-holiday days show positive returns. 
S3 Fosback indicates that a strategy of holding stocks for the two days prior to recurrent holidays yields a cumulative 
return of 800% over a 50-year period. 
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This statistically significant difference persists across all sub-samples examined. They 
note that one can attribute fully 50% of the cumulative change in the Dow Jones to 
returns on days preceding holidays. Lakonishok and Smidt posit that there is a different 
causal mechanism as between weekend and holiday rettms. This they deduce from the 
observation that although the two sets of returns share a characteristic that the exchange 
is closed, the pre-holiday returns are between two and five times larger than pre-
weekend returns. Thus they posit that an additional factor is at work on the days 
preceding holiday that is not there on the days preceding weekend closings. 
Pettengill examines a smaller dataset (S&P 500 and a CRSP small firm index, July 
1962 - December 1986) but in greater detail than Lakonishok & Smidt. He confirms 
that a small firm effect is present in the holiday return, with the small stock index 
showing more pronouncedly anomalous pre-holiday returns. He fmds that small firms 
show an average pre-holiday return of 0.46%, large firms 0.26%, as opposed to 0.066% 
and 0.018% respectively for non-holiday trading. Further partitioning the dataset by day 
of the week reveals that the increased return achieved on pre-holiday days persists 
across days of the week. Pettengill states, without going into detail, tmt while the 
returns vary according to the holiday under examination, in general every holiday, 
regardless of firm size, exhibits the anomaly. Only for one holiday (Presidents Day) and 
for large firms is the average return for the trading day preceding bebw the average for 
all trading days. Also reported is that 24 of the 30 stocks that comprise the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average show a statistically significant pre-holiday return. 
Pettengill adduces two explanations for the holiday effect. The first is an application of 
the calendar time hypothesis of French (1980). This states that price information is 
generated continually across all days, regardless of trading or otherwise. Consequently, 
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Pettengill's test is whether the post holiday returns encompass returns for a two-day 
period. Comparing the post holiday return for any weekday with the average two-day 
accumulated return for the two reevant days, Pettengill cannot validate the time 
diffusion hypothesis. A problem with the time diffusion hypothesis however is that 
while it offers a convincing, albeit not empirically validated, mechanism, it in reality 
addresses the post holiday as opposed to the pre-holiday return. A body of evidence 
exists that indicates that the last trading period prior to closing tends to have high 
returns. Examples include Jaffe and Westerfield (1985) and Keirn and Stambaugh 
(1984) in relation to the last trading day of the week, and Harris (1986) on intra-day 
data. If this is the case then non-holiday related closings should be observationally 
equivalent to holiday closing. Pettengill examines the 1968 special closes of the NYSE, 
fmding that the pre-closing returns are statistically significantly different to, and lower 
than, public holiday closings. 
Further evidence against the closing effect is the fact that holidays with no associated 
market closings exhibit significant returns. Fosback (1976) indicates that St Patrick's 
Day, and Pettengill (1989) that Rosh Hashanah (a major Jewish holiday ending in Yom 
Kippur) are associated with significant rises on the New York Stock Exchange 54. 
Ariel (1990) presents very similar results to Lakonishok & Smidt and Pettengill. He 
examines the 1963-1982 period. Looking at the same holiday set as Pettengill, the eight 
regular US public holidays that are associated with stock market closings, he finds that 
the average return pre-holiday is 0.528% (equally weighted CRSP index) and 0.364% 
(value weighted CRSP index) as opposed to 0.059% and 0.026% respectively. In terms 
of proportions of advances and declines, the situation is even starker. Pre-holiday 
S4 Given the high proportion of New York inhabitants who are of Irish or Jewish descent this is an interesting result. 
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trading days that are positive are 85.6% (in the equally weighted index) and 75% (in the 
value weighted index) as opposed to 55.8% and 53.8% of days positive for non-holiday 
returns. Ariel finds that 34.7% of the cumulative returns over the period are attributable 
to the 3% of days that precede holidays. These differences persist across sub-sampes, 
and, like Pettengill, Ariel finds that while different holidays have different returns there 
is a statistically valid assumption of homogeneity in the returns for holidays. Standard t 
and non-parametric Mann-Whitney tests indicate, that these differences in mean returns 
are statistically significant. Ariel explicitly tests and rejects the hypothesis that the 
holiday regularity is driven by monthly or daily seasonality. He also rejects the 
hypothesis that this is a small firm effect, while accepting that small firm portfolios do 
show higher but statistically insignificant pre-holiday returns 55. This is in contrast to 
Pettengill. The size issue is unresolved however, as Brockman and Michayluk (1997) 
draw upon the work of Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) to test for the effect of share price 
as opposed to firm size. They find that, correcting for weekend and January, price is at 
least as important as size in explaining returns pre holidays. 
Recent work by Brockman (1995) and Brockman and Michayluk (1997, (1998)) 
demonstrates the resilience of the holiday effect, showing its persistence across market 
types (auction v dealer) and size portfolios. Brockman and Michayluk (1997) extend the 
Kim and Park (1994) US analysis from 1986 to end 1993. Partitioning by price and 
separately by firm size they find that they duplicate the Kim & Park findings of a 
holiday effect, and that this continues in the 1987-1993 period. This finding is robust to 
adjustment for monthly seasonality. Although not tested formally, they show that there 
55 Without testing, he states that the 'clientele' hypothesis, that there exist classes of stock market participants that 
preFerentially avoid (or seek out) holidays, is consistent with the data. 
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is a tendency for the holiday effect to be concentrated in the smaller / lower priced 
portfolios. 
Financial assets other than stocks show preholiday effects. Fabozzi, Ma and Briley 
(1994) examine the futures market. They demonstrate a significantly higher return pre-
holiday compared to other days. This is confined mainly however to domestic (US) 
exchange closed holidays, as opposed to exchange open public holidays or international 
holidays. They also see lower trading volume before exchange-closed holidays. They 
hypothesise that this may be due to inventory adjustments. Traders may be more 
reluctant to take a short position before a non- trading period. This would be consistent 
with reduced downward pressure (increased returns) and depressed volumes. 
5.2. INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE ON THE HOLIDAY EFFECT 
Internatimal evidence indicates that the holiday effect, like other calendar regularities 
examined, is found worldwide. 
Cadsby and Ratner (1992) examine the Canadian, Japanese, Italy, French, German, UK, 
Australian, Swiss and Hong Kong markets. They find that pre-holiday effects are 
evident for US, Canada, Japan, Australia, and Hong Kong. Unlike later studies, UK 
returns (here the FT-500 from 83 to 88) do not exhibit a holiday effect. Perhaps the 
main contribution of this paper, one that is later confirmed by Kim and Park, is that the 
holiday effects, where they exist, appear to be local phenomena. They are not 
reflections of the US, with the possible exception of the Hong Kong Market. There is 
some evidence that joint Local I US holidays exhibit higher returns. 
Kim and Park (1994) examine the NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX markets, the S& P 
500 index as well as the UK (FT-30) and Japan (Nikkei-Dow). For the US, their dataset 
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is 1963 (start of the CRSP dataset) to end 1986. For Japan and the UK, the data extend 
from 1972 to June 1987, with the S&P 500 index also examined over the same period. 
Kim & Park confmn the Cadsby & Ratner fmding that norrUS holiday regularities are 
not reflections of the US experience. The holiday returns experiences of the countries 
analysed are independent of the US. They also test the closing effect hypothesis 
national and exchange holiday closings for Japan. They find, consistent with Pettengill, 
that national holiday closings have a greater effect than exchange holiday closings. 
Further Japanese evidence comes from a study on Japanese ADR's by Fatemi and Park 
(1996). Although not statistically significant, the preholiday returns on these ADR's are 
consistent with the general stock return evidence. Returns on days before US or 
Japanese holidays are greater than on other days, with the greatest returns coming on 
days before common Japanese and US holidays. It is anomalous that there should be 
returns on the ADR's that are high before Japanese holidays, as these are not US 
holidays and are days on which there are no trades on the underlying (Japanese based) 
stocks. 
Agrawal and Tandon (1994) examine stock returns in 18 countries (Australia, Belgium, 
Brazil, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, the USA and the 
g) over the 1970's and 80's. They concentrate on the pre Christmas and pre new year 
holiday period, finding that the pre-holiday returns are significantly higher than the 
average daily return in eleven of the eighteen countries. Only New Zealand shows a pre 
Christmas holiday decline while only Brazil shows a pre New Year holiday decline. 
Barone (1990) finds that the Italian stock market exhibits a strong pre-holiday effect, 
with an average return of 0.27% versus an average norrholiday return of -0.01%. He 
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also shows that this is not risk related, as the standard deviation of these pre-holiday 
returns is lower than that of other days. 
Lauterbach and Ungar ( 1991, (1992) examine Israeli stock market data. Examining data 
from 1977 to 1990, they find a statistical significant difference between the post holiday 
and other daily return. 56 This result is unusual; the majority of the evidence is that the 
post-holiday return is lower than the pre-holiday, sometimes negative. This result is 
however consistent with that found in Asian markets by Lee, Pettit and Swankoski 
(1990) and for Sri Lanka by Elyasiani, Perera and Puri (1996). A larger scale study of 
south east Asian stock market data was undertaken by Chan, Khanthavit and Thomas 
(1996). Malaysia, India, Singapore and Thailand provide a large set of local, religious 
and worldwide holidays. In addition, the degree of intemationalisation of the markets 
varies from India at the lowest level to Singapore at the highest. They find that while 
state and cultural holidays both show, in general, positive pre-holiday returns, the 
effects of cultural holiday are stronger. Arsad and Coutts (1997) have found evidence of 
a significant and positive pre-holiday effect in the UK, in support of the evidence found 
by Mills and Coutts (1995). Arsad and Coutts reject the closing effect argument as an 
explanation of the holiday effect. No published work exists examining the holiday 
effect for the Irish market. 
56 They find a pre-holiday return of .296%, a post-holiday return of .587%, with all other days showing a return of 
.256%. There is 
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6. The Irish Stock Market 
6.1. EARLY BEGINNINGS AND HISTORY To 1990's 
An excellent account of the development and growth of the Irish stock exchanges to the 
early 1980's is Dund in Thomas (1986). 
The Irish Stock exchange was first fonned in 1793. Prior to this, control of all Irish 
governmental expenditure rested with the Brit ish exchequer. The passing of the 
Consolidation Funds Act of 1793 transferred this responsibility to the Commons of the 
Irish Parliament. The parliament then adopted a contractor system akin to that then 
existing in London to regulate and administer the large number of debenture and loan 
stocks outstanding. The Act for the Better Regulation of Stock Brokers of 1799 (one of 
the last acts of the Irish Parliament prior to the Act of Union of 1800) stipulated licence 
requirements and schedules of charges chargeable by stockbrokers. 
Initially housed in a coffee house, the Exchange moved to Commercial Buildings and 
finally to a purpose built building incorporating trading floors in 1878. This building in 
Anglesea Street still serves as the home of the Stock Excha nge. In 1886 the Cork Stock 
exchange was fonned along similar lines to that of the Dublin Stock Exchange. Belfast 
also had an exchange by 1897, and a number of brokers in other Irish towns operated as 
part of The Provincial Brokers Stock Exchange (PBS E). 
Activity in equities was limited in the early years, with only Bank of Ireland and two 
canal companies stocks being listed in 1799. Over the ensuing quarter century the 
numbers of equities quoted remained small, until the advent of railway construction 
from 1825 on requiring much larger sums of capital than would have heretofore been 
the nonn. The collapse of the railway shares boom of 1843-45 depressed the market, a 
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slump that lasted to mid-century. The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856 and the 
Companies Act of 1862, which introduced and codified limited liability and facilitated 
the easy trading of shares in enterprises prompted a surge in company formation in 
Ireland, centring on finance and public utility companies initially, thereafter brewing, 
hotel and leisure, distribution and transport related enterprises. By 1880 economic 
recovery was in full flight and the stock exchange witnessed a large number of larger 
enterprises seeking quotations with substantial funds raised. 
The first decade and a half of the 20th century witnessed increasing prosperity and this 
was reflected in the stock exchange. The economic dislocation which resulted from 3 
years of war with the UK, 2 years of civil war thereafter, partition and emigration 
(sometimes forced) of many industrialists left the economy and the stock exchange 
weak, the exchange losing 20%p. a. of its value in the 1922-1926 period. Autarkic 
economic policies, the Great Depression and WWII ensured that by the 1950's, Ireland 
was impoverished, its population in decline and its stock market, despite occasional 
short-lived booms, was not an attractive source of investible funds nor an attractive 
investment for shareholders. 
Changes in government thinking and a focus on international trade and inward 
investment began in the early 1960's, with the economy beginning to grow rapidly 
thought the period leading to the first oil crisis of 1973. 
The entry to the EEC (sic) in 1973 marked a major turning point in Irish economic and 
financial activities. It also, coincidentally, marked the culmination of a process of 
integration and consolidation in stock exchanges. 
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Throughout its history substantial collaboration had been evident between the London 
and Dublin exchanges. 1965 saw the formation of the Federation of Stock Exchanges in 
Great Britain and Ireland, with the (successfully realised) aim of harmonising, 
streamlining and making more efficient issues such as membership criteria, settlement 
procedures and quotation requirements. In 1971 the Cork and Dublin Exchanges 
amalgamated and admitted the members who had been trading as part of the PBSE, 
creating the Irish Stock Exchange. In 1973 the Federation was admitted to membership 
of what was then called the International Stock Exchange of Great Britain and the 
Republic of Irela nd (ltd). Membership was highly attractive, as apart from being then 
the largest organised market in the EEC, non membership would have resulted in Irish 
brokers being forced to trade as outside members and thus losing many concessions and 
ultimately trade. 
The Dublin exchange retained effective independence, some essential differences 
persisting. Thus, while London employed single capacity membership, Dublin allowed 
for broker-broker transactions. The difference has persisted, the Irish market remaining 
quote driven while the London market has become essentially order driven with market 
makers. No market makers in equities exist in the Dublin system. 
Throughout the 1970's and 80's the number of member firms in the Dublin market 
continued to consolidate, with 4 main players (National City Brokers, J&E Davy, Riada 
and Goodbody) dominating the trade. 
The exchange continued to grow in volume over this period. The breaking of the parity 
linkage between the Irish Punt and the Pound Sterling in 1979 stimulated muc h of this 
growth. The consequent introduction of exchange controls made it relatively more 
attractive to invest in and raise funds from the Irish exchange than from London. Much 
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of this growth however was in the fonn of government-gilt trades rather than a:J.uity 
issues or trading. 
6.2. THE 1990's, RELATIVE PERFORMANCE AND HISTORY 
Clearly, having two countries with separate legal establishments and divergent 
traditions and rules, especially in the area of company law and take-overs, with but a 
single exchange for equities carried with it potential for confusion and uncertainty. The 
Company Act (Part 5) 1990 provided the Irish Stock Exchange with powers of self 
regulation (removing this from the ambit of the regulatory regimen set in place by the 
Financial Services Act 1986). In conjunction with the Central Bank of Ireland, the 
Department of Industry and Commerce (sic) and the Department of Finance, the Irish 
Stock Exchange set up the Capital Markets Advisory Group. This provided both a 
forum for exchange of views relating to the new regulatory regimen and provided a core 
basis of agreed practice for the implementation of the provisions of the then 
forthcoming EU investment services directive 
The adoption of the Investment Services Directive and its implementation in Ireland as 
the Stock Exchange Act 1995 transferred regulation from the self-regulation described 
above to the fonnal regulation of the Central Bank of Ireland. Since the introduction of 
Central Bank regulation, it is interesting to note that whereas from 1965 to 1995 only 
one stock exchange member finn was found to be in default, a Cork based company 
which was tmable to meet its obligations in the late 1970's, since 1995 the imposition of 
sanctions and direct regulatory control has been more frequent. Thus, MMI 
stockbrokers were suspended and subsequently liquidated while two smaller brokers, 
FEXCO and BCP, specialising in execution only trading, were instructed by the Central 
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Bank to cease taking new business for a period of time during which they were required 
to enhance their back office procedures. 
During the latter half of the 1990's, and especially from 1998 onwards, the issue of 
electronic trading versus the traditional floor method used became a topic of 
considerable concern to Irish market participants. This issue seems to have been 
resolved with a decision by the Irish exchange to participate in the XETRA system of 
the Frankfurt Bourse as of mid 2000. Further details on this are contained in the section 
on trading and execution 
The level of listing activity on the market during the 1990's was low, with only 4 
companies obtaining a full listing on the official list between 1990 and 1996 (Golden 
Vale, Irish Life, DCC and Irish Permanent) 
Table 3 below indicates the relative performance of the Irish market against a number 
of benchmark indices over· the last number of decades. As can be seen, the overall 
performance has been impressive. The Irish stock market is represented by the Central 
Statistics Office Month End Share Price Index, which, at a monthly level, is the data 
series with the longest run of availability, being a consistent series from 1933 to 
present. 
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TABLE 3: IRELAND, THE UK AND THE USA: RELATIVE PERFORMANCE, LoCAL 
CURRENCY, OF S ELECTED STOCK INDICES; JANUARY 1970-DECEMBER 1998 
A verage annual Ireland USA: S&P 500 USA:DJlA UK:FfA UK: Ff30 
return by decade 
1970-1998 8.35% 7.28% 6.63% 7.81% 5.30% 
1970-1979 4.94% 0.26% -1.28% 2.23% -2.02% 
1980-1989 13.22% 10.96% 10.69% 14.83% 13.32% 
1990-1998 6.74% 11.00% 10.91% 6.22% 4.51% 
Standard Deviation of returns by Ireland USA: S&P 500 USA: DJIA UK: FfA UK: FT30 
decade 
1970-1998 0.286 0.149 0.153 0.258 0.248 
1970-1979 0.377 0.177 0.188 0.408 0.392 
1980-1989 0.200 0.109 0.115 0.092 0.079 
1990-1998 0.238 0.121 0.105 0.107 0.088 
A number of lessons can be drawn from this long-term performance. 
First, over the period January 1970 - December 1998, an investor (in local currency 
terms) would have achieved a superior return in the Irish market compared to an 
investment designed to mirror the major market indices in the USA (DJIA or S&P 
500) or the UK (FTA or FT30). 
Second, this has been achieved partially perhaps due to the higher risk associated with 
the Irish market, as evidenced by the higher standard deviations associated with the 
Irish market. This relative strength has not survived entry into EMU however, with 
Irish markets falling in 1999, against a trend worldwide of a continuing bull market. A 
number of factors conspired to produce this: The Irish exchange has not reached the 
importance in the national economy of other exchanges. Details in Table 8 indicate 
that in terms of importance in the economy as measured by total market capitalisation 
%GDP, it shares an intermediate position along with nations such as Belgium, 
Finland, Australia and France, but ahead of other countries such as Germany and 
Austria and Portugal. At end 1998, the market capitalisation to GDP ratio stood at 
67%. This is well below figures for the USA, the UK and Sweden. 
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The Irish market, with a market capitalisation of $67b at end 1998 was the 30th largest 
in the world and the 14th largest in the Europe-Middle East-Africa time zone. Thus, 
while extremely srmll in absolute terms, it is not insignificant internationally. Indeed, 
the market capitalisation at end 1998 was larger than Lisbon, Oslo or Vienna. 
6.3. ORGANISATION OFTHE EXCHANGE 
6.3.1. MARKETSANDLISTING 
The number of separate levels at which a listing could take place on the Irish market 
reached a peak in 1994-5, with 5 separate levels. 
The Official List: this is the highest level of listing, with the most stringent level of 
listing requirements. The stringency of these requirements, the perception that the Irish 
exchange was particularly rigid in their application, along with the costs of listing led to 
a decline in the number of companies listed on this market from the mid 1960's. The 
number halved between 1965 and 1975, stabilising thereafter at around 60-70 
companies. As already pointed out the level of listing in the early 1990s was low From 
1997 to 1999 5 companies (Ryanair, Marlborough, Donegal Creameries, Iona 
Technologies, Athlone Extrusions and Viridain) listed on the official list, nearly as 
many as in the previous 6 years. 
The Unlisted Securities Market (USM): This was launched in London in 1980, and 
therefore also in Dublin57 . This was designed with a the major aim of being both a 
bridge between and an intermediate market to the then existing rule 4.2 and Official 
" The Irish exchange at that time being an element of the International Stock Exchange of Great Britain and the 
Republic of Ireland (ltd). 
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List. Despite high hopes for this market it met with little success. After an initial flush 
of enthusiasm, with listing rising in London to 103 in 1988, the market declined. In 
Dublin, only 15 companies were members of the USM by 1995. In December 1995, the 
USM closed, with companies allowed to move to either the Rule 4.2 or Official Lists. 
Rule 4.2/ Third Market: No Irish companies had taken the rule 4.2 route. The 
Alternative Investment Market has now essentially replaced this market. A small 
number of companies had operated on the Third Market, since its time as Rule 535.3. 
These however transferred to the Exploration Securities Market on its inception in 1991 
Smaller Companies Market (SCM): launched in 1986 this market was unique to 
Ireland. The aim was to foster a flow of investible capital to smaller, indigenous 
companies. With less stringent rules again than the USM it was expected that there 
would be great interest in this market among corp orates seeking funds. This did not 
materia lise however, with only eight companies taking a listing. 
Exploration Securities Market: The 1970's and 80's saw a large number of minerals 
and petroleum exploration companies formed in Ireland. Requiring large sums of 
capital but being unsuitable for lis ting on any of the existing markets, a separate set of 
regulations was put in place from with rules similar to the Rule 4.2 market. This market 
reached a peak in 1994 with 13 listings. The 'crisis' in smaller equity trading 
manifested in the problems experienced by the USM and the SCM, in Dublin and 
London, was partially alleviated by the creation of the Alternative Investment Market. 
In parallel with this, the Irish exchange created the Developing Companies Market. 
Developing Companies Market: started in January 1997 this market carried the 
possibility of companies having a dual AIM/DCM listing. This market has not proven 
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popular, at the time of writing having only 5 listings, all companies with a dual 
AIM/DCM listing. These companies were as of end 1999 lTG, BCO, Rapid 
Technologies, Pan-Andean Resources and African Gold. Two companies transferred ~ 
from the DCM to the Official list, Ryanair and Marlborough. 
In addition to listing domestic firms, equity trading in Dublin also takes place on 
Northern Ireland egistered companies, and a number of UK companies with larger 
operations in Ireland, such as Tesco, Guinness and Ashquay. Very little trading in the 
shares of these companies actually takes place. 
Clearly, there has been a relative failure on the part of the Irish Stock Exchange in terms 
of attracting small companies to listing. A number of for a and reports have debated this 
issue. The most recent was a report on the strategic development of the Irish market, 
produced by a former president of the exchange. According to Bacon Associates (1999) 
section 4, the main elements that have led to this failure can be summarized as 
• The preponderance of family ownership among Irish SME's, with consequent 
lack of familiarity with and perhaps suspicion of third party and external 
shareholders.; 
• A general perception of the regulatory and disclosure requirements of an 
exchange listing as being oppressive and onerous; 
• A perception of lower than fair value for small companies, consequent on the 
small weight of the Irish market in international terms. This of course rapidly 
becomes a vicious circle of self-fulfilling prophecies. Coupled with an 
increasing shift in the makeup of the economy towards high-tech and IT based 
businesses, the attractiveness of a NASDAQ flotation in particular, as opposed 
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to a floatation on the Irish market with its lack of familiarity regarding these 
company types, this has accelerated in the latter half of the 1990's. 
• The relatively lack, until the mid 1970's at earliest, of indigenous companies 
sufficiently large to actually warrant a listing. This implies that the current 
ownership structure is predominantly first or second generation. Tax provisions 
relating to quoted and unquoted shares act as a disincentive. 
• Inherited family businesses must be held for a minimum of 6 years to avail of 
relief from Capital Gains and Capital Acquisitions Tax. This acts as a bar on 
rapid floatation of larger family businesses, even with the widening of 
ownership bases that typically accompanies intergenerational transfers. 
Table 4, Table 5 & Table 6 provide some detail on the stock market over the 1990's. 
The most striking feature is the relative stability of the largest firms, with much the 
same companies dominating in 1998 as had done in 1990. Another feature immediately 
evident is that the concentration of top companies in terms of market capitalization has 
increased over the decade. Also evident is the relative stagnation of the exchange in 
terms of both money raised and number of companies. 
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TABLE4: Top 15 COMPANIES By MARKET CAPITALISATION, 1990, 1994 & 1998. 
Rank Company 1990 Market Company 1994 Market Capitalisation 1994 Company 1998 Market Capitalisation 1998 
CaEitalisation 1990 
Smurfit 1088 Allied Irish Banks 2007 Allied Irish Banks 10,324 
2 Allied Irish Banks 975 Smurfit 1497 Bank ofIreland 7,683 
3 CRR 641 Bank of Ireland 1428 Irish Life 2,009 
4 Bank of Ireland 556 CRR 1311 Irish Permanent 950 
5 Fyffes 273 Elan Corporation 949 Elan Corporation 6,109 
6 Woodchester Investments 261 Irish Life 672 CRR 4,476 
7 Elan Corporation 171 Kerry Group 442 Kerry Group 1,573 
8 lames Crean 168 Independent 353 Smurfit 1,307 
9 Waterford Glass 148 Waterford Glass 330 Ryanair 803 
10 Power Corporation 145 Woodchester 312 Independent Group 672 
II PI Carroll 114 Greencore 293 AWG 611 
12 Clondalkin Group 93 Fyffes 292 Greencore 593 
\3 Independent 90 Golden Vale 170 Fyffes 509 
14 Fitzwilton 88 Hibernian Group 124 First Active 461 
15 Golden Vale 85 IWP 124 Waterford Group 419 
Top 5 % Concentration 56% 59"10 58% 
Top 10 % Concentration 70% 76% 77% 
Top 15 % Concentration 77% 84% 82% 
All Shares 6339 12228 46707 
All Data End December, All Data £M 
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TABLE 5: NUMBER OF COMPANIES By LISTING TypE, IRISH STOCK EXCHANGE 
Listing Level 1990 1992 1994 
The Official List: 59 61 62 
The Unlisted Securities Market (USM): 25 18 13 
Smaller Companies Market (SCM) 6 4 3 
Exploration Securities Market (ESM) 13 13 
Developing Companies Market (DCM) 
Third Market / Rule 4.2 12 
Source: Irish Stock Exchange Annual Reports; AU Data End December. 
TABLE 6: 1tJRNOVER AND MONEY RAISED 
Turnover 
Money Raised (New issues and Seasoned Equity 
Offerings) 
























The Irish market has also shown substantial concentration of market capitalisation and 
turnover, a trend that has increased over the 1990's. 
With few exceptions, turnover concentrations follow the pattern of market 
capitalisation. The relationship is not one-one, as typically there tends to be a high 
degree of turnover in companies quoted on the Exploration Companies Market. 
Stripping these out, the relationship between overall annual rankings in terms of 
turnover and market capitalisation is much closer. 
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While these concentration ratios are high, comparing especially unfavourably to the 
UK 58, they are not especially out of line with the majority of other EU exchanges. Table 
7 and Table 8 indicate that the Irish market ranks in about the middle tier in terms of 
concentration by turnover and by market value. Note that the data in Table 7 differ from 
the data in Table 4 due to differences in calculation. The trends are however clear. 
S8 Compare for example the FTSE-IOO top 10 concentration level of32% at end 1998 
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TABLE 7: MARKET CAPITALISATION AND SHARE TuRNOVER CONCENTRATION 1998. 
Time zone Exchange % Of Market % Of Turnover % Of Market % Of Turnover 
Capitalisation of top 5% attributable to top 5% of Capitalisation of top 5% attributable to top 5% of 
of companies companies of companies companies 
North America American 63.2 NA Europe, Africa Amsterdam 73.3 67.1 
Chicago 44.2 NA Middle East Athens 62.8 50.1 
Mexico 50.2 63.2 Barcelona 63.7 82.1 
Montreal 38.8 37.5 Bilbao 65.7 82.4 
NASDAQ 75.2 78.8 Brussels 56.5 54.9 
NYSE 63.8 51.4 Copenhagen 69.1 67.4 
Toronto 67.7 48.3 Deutsche Borse 77.8 85.5 
Vancouver 41.8 63.9 Helsinki 47.7 55.7 
Irish 64.2 60.6 
South Buenos Aires 67.5 75.6 Istanbul 54.9 NA 
America Lima 69.3 74.3 Italy 59.6 60.0 
Rio de Janeiro 43.7 18.8 Johannesburg ·62.8 53.3 
Santiago 51.7 65.5 Lisbon 52.8 59.9 
Sao Paulo 60.8 73.4 Ljubljana 53.3 65.0 
London 80.7 59.8 
Asia, Pacific Australian 77.4 83.6 Luxembourg 33.1 61.9 
Colombo 42.5 32.3 Madrid 66.9 93.5 
Hong Kong 81.4 76.6 Oslo 55.7 49.2 
Jakarta 67.4 63.5 Paris 68.6 63.4 
Korea 67.5 50.5 Stockholm 64.0 72.7 
Kuala Lumpur 54.9 59.7 Switzerland 82.3 72.1 
New Zealand 55.8 68.4 Tehran 41.6 67.9 
Osaka 57.8 79.7 Tel-Aviv 63.9 72.2 
Philippine 63.2 47.8 Vienna 36.7 44.4 
Singapore 67.1 43.4 Warsaw 67.1 38.7 
Taiwan 33.5 NA 
Thailand 64.5 49.0 
Tokyo 58.1 62.0 
Source: International Federation of Stock Exchanges 
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CountrY_n Market Cap as % of GDP __ Country Market Cap as % of GDP 
Canada 92% Europe, Africa Austria 18% 
Mexico 39"10 Middle East Belgium 57% 











New Zealand 45% 
Philippines 38% 
Singapore 113% 










































(Source: Federation International des bourses des Valour) 
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6.3.3. SETTLEMENT & EXECUTION 
As a secondary as well as a primary market, liquidity is an essential prerequisite to 
successful operation of the Irish stock exchange. The structure of the market influences 
the ease with which the investor perceives that she can enter and leave the market. 
Having the ability to trade easily allays the fears of being caught holding a security that 
has deviated in price either from its perceived fundamental value IT from the price 
prevailing at the time of the decision to trade. The fonn of the market has also 
implications regarding the method of execution. 
Also known as auction markets, order driven markets exist in a number of fonns. The 
auctioneer does not take positions in the commodity being traded, merely announces the 
prices at which clearing of the aggregated buying and selling orders can occur. The 
classic fonn of such markets is the Call Auction, where there exists a price-setting 
auctioneer who periodically announces these prices and thus facilitates clearing of the 
market. A batch auction market by contrast, such as the Milan bourse, has an auction 
for each commodity, in this case stock, at a different time for each commodity. A 
continual auction system allows continual clearing by pennitting dealers, usually 
electronically, to execute their orders against the orders of other dealers placed in the 
system. These can be limit (dealing only in a certain price range) or market (best price) 
orders. Sequential execution occurs in these cases, earlier placed orders being executed 
prior to later placed orders. 
In contrast, the quote driven market systems pennit continual trading via a market 
maker. This is a specialist who takes positions in securities and quotes bid (prices at 
which securities will be purchased) and offer (prices at which securities are offered for 
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sale) for each security. The bid/ask spr~ad can be seen as the price of immediacy, 
offering the opportunity of certain dealing, albeit perhaps at an unfavourable price 
compared to what may be possible after a delay (but maybe also at a favourable price). 
6.3.4. EXECUTION ON THE IRISH EXCHANGE 
The Irish stock exchange, an auction or order driven market, lies between a continual 
and batch auction. Unlike the situation in the government bond (gilt) market, member 
firms have never been permitted to take positions in equities on their own behalf. Firms 
may take up to £2,000 worth of stock onto their own account for a private (non member 
firm) client when there is no matching deal available with another firm. This clearly 
improves the liquidity of smaller transactions, guaranteeing in effect that a small trade 
investor is able to trade. Effectively therefore market makers in individual stocks do not 
exist. 
Over the 1990's the number of stockbroking firms licensed to operate by the relevant 
authorities has remained at or around a dozen firms. Of these, 4, J& E Davy, NCB, 
Goodbody and Riada are pre-eminent in equity trading. These have moved from private 
ownership to ownership by major retail banks as part of the banks move to provide full 
service banking. J & E Davy are owned by Bank of Ireland, Riada by ABN-AMBRO., 
Goodbody by Allied Irish Banks and NCB by Ulster Bank 
The commissions charged by the Irish stockbrokers ha ve historically been high 59. Table 
9 shows the commission rates charged as of Mid 1994. Despite the addition to the 
exchange of three new members since 1994, Dolmen Butler Brisco, FEXCO and TIR, 
with FEXCO operating primarily as an execution only dealer, there has not been either 
59 Source; World Federation of Stock Exchanges 
115 
a reduction in charges nor a widening of differentials in charges. Prima facia, it seems 
that there is little price competition between Irish stockb'rokers. Excluded from the table 
are a number of UK based institutions which are members of the stock exchange for the 
purpose of government gilt dealing, and which do not deal in equities. 
TABLE 9: COMMISSION CHARGES OF IRISH STOCKBROKERS 
Company Minimum Transactions up to Next £10-20,000 Balance 
Commission £ £10,000 
BCP £35 1.5% 1% 1% 
Bloxham £30 1.65% 1% .5% 
Campbell O'Connor £15 1.65% .55% .5% 
Davys £30 1.65% 1% .5% 
Dolmen Butler £40 1.65% 1% .5% 
Briscoe 
FEXCO £15 1.65% 1% .5% 
Goodbody £40 1.65% 1% .5% 
MMI £40 1.65% 1% .5% 
Murrogh £15 1.5% 1% .5% 
NCB £40 1.65% 1.25% .75% 
Riada £30 1.5% 1% .5% 
TIR £35 1.5% 1% .5% 
Source: Finance Magazine, various issues. 
Two forms of trade typically occur. The first is the normal trade, where the order is 
matched with another member firm. The second is a put-through, which is where a 
member firm is able to match a buying and selling client at the same price. This is 
permitted by the exchange only where there is no advantage to either client to be 
accrued by dealing with another firm. Special forms of Put-through, where the buyer 
and seller are the same, occur in the form of 'bed-and-breakfast' trades. These are used 
to allow investors to utilise their full capital gains allowance prior to the end of the tax 
year. 
The market, as I have noted, falls between the continuous and batch auction. Brokers 
deal with one another over the telephone on a continuous basis, but the actual legal 
trades are executed on the floor of the stock exchange. There are two floor-trading 
sessions per day, 0930-1030 and 1415-1515. Each member firm is obliged to have a 
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representative on the exchange floor at these sessions, and orders previously agreed by 
telephone are communicated to the floor representatives who then execute them. When 
a deal is struck tre price is -noted on a chalkboard. Orders thus filled are then 
communicated back to the member firms by a 'blower' system, a telephone based 
system over which the exchange clerk informs all members of the details of the deals 
made. Sequential execution of orders occurs. 
In 1995 a book on financial management practices in Ireland was published(Kennedy, 
Maccormac and Teeling (1995»). The authors were an accounting professor with a 
background in financial services industries and two businessmen, both of whom had 
extensive experience as directors, chairmen and chief executives ofIrish pic's 
Writing in chapter 8 they state in relation to the batch auction element of the stock 
exchange they note: "it is expected that this ancient method of marking deals will 
disappear in coming years ". 6 years on from the writing of this quote the system 
remains in place. In January 2000 the Deutche Bourse and the Irish Stock Exchange 
agreed that Irish listed <;:ompanies would be quoted as part of the XETRA system. This 
came into effect in June 2000. 
6.3.5. SETILEMENT 
Settlement on the Irish Stock Exchange has mirrored that in place in the London 
exchange, for reasons that are obvious from the previous sections. In summary, the 
major methods and changes in settlement procedures are as laid out below. 
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Up to July 1994 the stock exchange operated an accounts settlement system. This has 
potentially important implications for the examination of daily seasonality. An account 
system can induce daily seasonality into a system. 
Account settlement worked by dividing the year into twenty two two-week and two 
three-week account periods. Accounts began on Monday and ended on the Friday week 
(or fortnight). Settlement was effected on the second Monday (Settlement day) after the 
account period, 10 working days after the last clay of the account. Purchasers had to 
provide funds and sellers stock in time for the stockbroker to settle on the settlement 
day. Buying and selling within the settlement period results in the investor only settling 
the net gain or loss on the settlement day, without any cash investment being made. An 
individual buying on the last day of a settlement period and selling at the end of the 
following Monday will pay for shares on the settlement day relating to the Friday and 
receive payment on the settlement day relating to the Monday. Thus, the investor will 
have to carry the cost of the' transaction for two, or possibly three, weeks. Consequently, 
the first Monday of an account period would have inbuilt in it the greatest amount of 
implicit interest and thus the price on the Monday should be higher. Purchases made on 
the last day of an account period would have the shortest credit period. This implies that 
the first Monday of an account period should have a substantially higher return, rather 
than lower. Clearly, this would be in direct conflict with the typical pattern of a lower 
return on Monday compared to other days of the week. A number of papers, particularly 
Jaffe and Westerfield (1985),Condoyanni, O'hanlon and Ward (1987),Theobald and 
Price (1984) & Donnelly (1991) discuss the settlement effect. Generally the first 
Monday of the account period has a higher return than the other Mondays. 
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In July 1994 the exchange introduced a rolling settlement system, initially on a 10-day 
cycle. In July 1995 this moved to a S-day cycle. All deals are settled, initially 10, and 
from July 1995, 5 working days after tre deal are struck. 
6.4. POLICY ISSUES AFFECTING THE STOCK EXCHANGE 
A number of important policy elements unique to the Irish market are also worth 
noting. Over the 1990's the main policy issues that have had an impact on the equity 
market have been in relatio n to exchange controls and exchange rates, capital gains 
taxation, and other tax biases against equity trading. 
6.4.1. EXCHANGE CONTROLS AND EXCHANGE RATES 
Exchange controls were introduced in Ireland in 1979 following the entry in the 
European Monetary System md the consequent breaking of the parity link with 
sterling. 
During the early and mid 1980's very large exchequer borrowing requirements and 
poor economic performance resulted in very few new issues of equity. As reported in 
Jones (1993) & Devine (1996), domestic institutional portfolios became overweight in 
fixed interest securities The consequent relative overvaluation of Irish equities, caused 
by the difficulty in investing outside the Irish pound zone, drove price/earnings ratios 
and dividend yields of Irish equities above international peers. The relaxation and 
subsequent removal of exchange controls in 1989 and 1991 led to a considerable bear 
market as money flowed out, pension and other funds readjusting their asset mix. 
Having risen nearly 50% from the 1987 crash to 1990, the market fell rapidly and 
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consistently over the 1990-1993 period, ending up in a range not much above the 
1987 low. 
6.4.2. ~ eAPIT AL GAINS TAX 
Capital gains tax was first introduced to Ireland in 1975. The Capital Gains Act made 
realised gains a taxable charge. No distinction was made between short-term and 
long-term holdings. This distinction was introduced in 1978, with reduced rates 
applying when the asset had been held for three or more years. The longer the holding 
period the lower the tax rate that would arise. This also introduced inflation 
adjustments. The capital tax regimen on equities was further changed in 1992 with the 
introduction of favourable treatment for realised gains on equities of small and 
medium sized companies where the shares had been held prior to listing. Further 
changes were made in the 1997 and 1998 budgets, reducing the capital gains tax to 
20% from the 40% which had applied since 1978. Capital gains tax legislation is the 
same for companies (whose main business is not trading securities for profit) and 
individuals. 
6.4.3. OTHER TAX B lASES AGAINST EQUITIES 
A number of other taxes bias have existed against investment in Irish equities. 
• Stamp Duty. Stamp duty on purchases of Irish shares is 1%, while purchases of 
non-Irish quoted shares is 0.5%. This is a clear disincentive to trade on the Irish 
market, is a source of long standing disagreement between the investment 
community and the government, and does not seem likely to be resolved. This 
general level of stamp duty is the highest in the world among developed 
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exchanges (although 1.25% i chargeable on foreign securities by the Swiss 
exchanges, compared to 0.75% on Swiss). In terms of attempts to realise 
supernormal profits from any anomaly such as a weekend effect, clearly this 
will be made more difficult. When combined with the high rates of commission 
which Irish stockbrokers charge the possibilities become more difficult 
• Special Savings schemes: In common with other countries, the Irish government 
has operated special tax concessions for 'small' investors. Interest income from 
deposits held in Irish banks by Irish resident taxpayers has tax deducted at 
source, that rate being the lowest marginal income tax rates operating at the 
time. This does not absolve the recipient of tax liability: the interest has to be 
declared and tax paid at the appropriate marginal rate, with the withholding tax 
carried as a tax credit. The marginal lowest and highest tax rates over the 1980's 
and 1990' varied from 25-35% at the lowest rate and 45-65% at the higher. The 
special savings schemes carried special tax rates of 10-15%, this being deducted 
at source and no further tax liability being leviable on that income. Indeed, the 
income was not even declarable to the tax authorities. Coupled with deposit 
insurance limits which were above the maximum permissible investment in 
these schemes, this promised an effectively riskless (the deposit insurance 
scheme being state backed) low tax return to savings. Recognising that these 
essentially riskless returns were acting as a disincentive to equity market 
investment, Special Portfolio Investment Accounts were introduced in 1993. 
These schemes provided for similar tax concessions to investors who held a 
basket of securities heavily weighted towards Irish companies. While the tax 
reduction was som degree of equalisation as between the special savings 
schemes and investment in domestic equities, the inherent riskiness of equity 
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returns as compared to the effective guarantee on capital when making an 
investment' in the special savings schemes was a major disadvantage. These 
were not the success in attracting small investors to the equity market that had 
been hoped, and were discontinued. 
• Interest Relief: While monies borrowed to purchase shares in unquoted 
companies attract full tax relief on the interest, this is not the case for 
borrowings to purchase shares in quoted companies. This implies in particular 
that companies, which have gone from family shareholdings to wider ownership 
by MBO, are unlikely to corne to the market. To do so would imply forfeiture of 
the tax relief by the owners. 
6.5. PREVIOUS ECONOMETRIC STUDIES ON THE IRISH MARKET 
Despite the considerable administrative linkages between the Irish and London 
exchanges, the evidence is not overwhelming that the two markets are fully integrated 
over the period under investigation. Relatively little has been written about this issue, 
a situation not uncommon in the financial economics literature relating to Ireland. 
Cooper (1982) finds that the Irish market, at monthly frequencies, displayed 
significant serial correlation and was non-random. Lucey (1994) finds significant 
deviations from normality, using a variety of parametric tests, over the 1987-1991 
period, using daily data for the official index of the stock exchange 
Although not primarily focused on. integration per se, Kearney (1998)finds that the 
main determinant of market volatility in Dublin was the contemporaneous volatility in 
the London market. However, Kearney looks at a long time period in capital market 
terms, with monthly data. Thus, high frequency dynamics are not captured. In 
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addition, although using a \'.ell tried and trusted method, that of GLS, this method 
used by Kearney cannot easily cope with significant deviations from normality in the 
dataset. 
A higher frequency dataset is examined by Gallagher (1995). In addition, he examines a 
shorter, more focused period, that of 1979-1994. He finds, using both co integration and 
granger causality methods, that the Irish market, had not been fully integrated with the 
UK or the German market over the period. Gallagher also examined sub periods, 
broken according to pre and post 1987 and also according to the exchange rate 
experience in the ERM. Again, the evidence is mixed and not indicative of integration 
over the long-term. Finally, Howlett (1998) examines a more focused dataset again, 
consisting of the daily returns to five stocks with dual listing on the London and Dublin 
exchanges over the January 1995- June 1998 period. These stocks were those wth the 
largest average daily turnover over the two years prior to the start of the dataset., 
accounting for over half of. total average turnover. She finds, again using cointrgration 
methods, that the markets for these shares are integrated. 
A major problem with these studies is that in general they do not take adequate account 
of the time series properties of the data. There is considerable evidence that the Irish 
market is characterised by non-normality. This should therefore temper any results 
found using method such as OLS, a cornerstone of simple cointegration and ECM 
modelling as used in Gallagher and Howlett 
6.6. SUMMARY & REVIEW 
The Irish market has grown considerably in terms of market value over the 1990's. 
However, this has come about with increasing concentration of market value and 
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trading. There has been a failure to attract a steady (or indeed, almost any) stream of 
. 
small companies to listing. This has a number of reasons rooted in history and in the tax 
system. The outlook for the market in the EU is uncertain, with expectations of 
increasing concentration and consolidation among exchanges. This has been the 
historical experience in Ireland and the UK. The market is also very illiquid, and 
investors face considerable transactions costs and potentia I delays in execution of trade. 
This will mitigate against the possibility of any identified anomaly actually being 
exploitable. 
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7. Methodological Issues In The Investigation Of 
Seasonality 
We have seen that although systemic differences in the mean return of stocks across 
predictably recurring calendar events such as holidays, days of the week and months 
of the year, have been found, no wholly satisfactory explanation exist in many cases. 
In the absence of this confirmation and compounded by the absence of a theoretical 
reason for such regularities, methodological considerations are even more important 
than otherwise. Social science research is always at best an imprecise undertaking, 
and as such, anything that decreases the degree of uncertainty is welcome. Many 
social science research methodology texts and guides, for example, urge triangulation, 
in some form, as a possible route to ensure optimal results. A number of forms of 
triangulation can be identified. 
Data Triangulation: The collection of data on the same phenomena at different times 
or from different sources is data triangulation. In the case of finance research, this 
implies that searches for daily seasonal patterns should proceed on different databases 
(not simply relying on CRSP tapes in the US for example), such as data from a series 
of different stock exchanges, from different regulatory regimens, and using different 
aggregation and index number approaches. This form of triangulation is perhaps the 
most easily applied to financial research, with the growth of stock markets around the 
world and with the growth of electronically readable data from these. 6o This work 
makes a contribution to the data triangulation in a number of different ways, as will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
60 A subset 0 f data triangulation may be of particular interest for financial research in asset retums. This is moment 
triangulation. By this, I mean that the same phenomena, that of systemic variation in the first moment of asset 
prices across the calendar may also manifest itself in other moments such as the second (proxying for risk), third 
(Skewness) and fourth (Kurtosis). We have seen already that evidence exists both for the usefulness of higher 
moments to the investor and for the existence of calendar anomalies in these higher moments. 
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Investigator Triangulation: Different investigators at work on the same set of data 
pertaining to phenomena, or replication, is investigator triangulation. While this 
triangulation method would be immediately beneficial in primarily qualitative research, 
where the perceptions of the intervening researchers may reasonably be assumed to 
have a mediating influence on the results, it is not clear that investigator triangulation 
will assist greatly in quantitative research. An over-reliance on investigator 
triangulation can lead to misleading results. This issue is well addressed in Lakonishok 
and Smidt (1988). There, they claim 
'Data snooping is sometimes thought of as an individual sin. 
However, it is also a collective sin. A hundred researchers using the 
same data test a hundred different hypotheses. The JOJ'st derives a 
theory after studying the previous results and tests <the> theory using 
more or less the same data. The best remedy for data snooping is new 
data.' P405 
They point out that in examining seasonal patterns there exist a multitude of potential 
hypotheses to be tested. In testing these, even if there is not a single actual real 
pattern, there exists a non-trivial probability that one or more of the tests will show 
statistically significant results at the 5% level61 • 
Methodological Triangulation: Qualitative and QuaI1itative methods used in the 
investigation of phenomena gives methodological triangulation. Probably this is the 
most underused method of triangulation adopted in finance research. For the purposes 
of investigation of daily seasonal anomalies, one could consider evidence drawn from 
psychology (are there issues in the psychology of market participants that manifest on 
particular days, the pattern of manifestation being symmetric or asymmetric to the 
observed daily patterns of returns) or sociology (do different sets of market participants 
61 There are (2N -2) hypotheses for N periods: this is 30 (5 periods) for days of the week and 4094 for months of the 
year. Testing these hypotheses, the Bonferroni inequality gives the significance level of the induced test as 
[1-(1- pj"-lli' In the case of days of the week with a 5% level of significance this equates to 0.79, giving a 21 % 
probability that one or more of the t -statistics will exceed 5%, by chance, even ifno such pattern exists. More detail 
is given in Footnote 2 of Lakonishok and Smidt (\988). 
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act, from social biases, in different ways such as to perhaps cause markets to act in daily 
patterns). 
Theory Triangulation: When theory from one discipline is used to assist in the 
explanation of a phenomenon under investigation within another discipline we have 
theory triangulation. Again, an example that comes readily to mind might be that there 
is (at least popular) psychological opinion that Mondays and days following holidays 
are generally 'bad' compared to other days of the week. If market participants are 
subject to the same psychological effects as the rest of the population, we might expect 
to see Monday and post holiday effects. While this is so, a fully specified test would 
require that we include quantitative measures of the 'badness' of various days to test for 
their explanatory power. A major problem with psychological measures is that in 
general we cannot observe these states. Instead, we measure either outcomes or other 
measures. These, we predicate, correlate with these states. This raises that possibility 
that we are in fact not observing an effect from the psychological state but an effect 
from the proxy variable. Separating the effects can be difficult. At least one fonn of 
theoretical triangulation can assist us directly however. In tenns of statistical testing, the 
basis for inference usually used is the so-called 'classical' theory of statistics. Using 
Bayesian theory, or non-parametric tests, or a combination of these, one can include 
theory triangulation and thus, it is claimed, reasonably hope to gain greater explanatory 
power. 
Such methodological and theory triangulation might provide what Karl Popper has 
called falsification. Falsification requires a refutable hypothesis. The more methods that 
can be deployed in refutation, it may be said the more 'falsified' the hypothesis is. This 
is well discussed in Saunders (1994). The basic issue is that, as we have seen in Chapter 
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1, testing the efficient markets hypothesis in any form relies on a dual hypothesis of 
market efficiency and a model of market equilibrium. Using different methodologies 
drawn from different theoretical approaches might allow for .findings that directly 
contradict, falsify, the theory or theories under investigation. 
In the finance area, the dangers of relying on a single methodology and a single source 
can give rise to charges of data srooping or data mining. The dangers of this have been 
pointed out clearly in Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) , who declare 
"The statistical tests routinely used in financial economics are usually 
interpreted as if they were being applied to new data. But the data 
employed in finance are seldom new. When new data are not available, 
significance levels on tests .,. must be adjusted if multiple tests are 
performed on the dame data. " 
P405 
Thus, ideally we need to test the predictions or hypotheses derived from one theory on 
data that have not been used in the formulation (most probably inductive) of the 
theory. 
7.1. METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN GENERAL 
Researchers have deployed a wide variety of approaches, classifiable into three broad 
categories, in their search for seasonality. These three families are: 
• Simple, usually OLS based, dummy variable based methodologies; 
• Methods that rely on Bayesian or non-parametric methods of inference, 
including papers that adopt a stochastic dominance approach; 
• Methods that explicitly incorporate higher moments and known statistical 
properties of the data, typically using one of the ARCH family. 
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It is unusual for papers to mix these methodological approaches, although such papers 
do exist, notably Aggarwal and Rivol (l989),Chang and Pinegar (1989);Connolly 
(1989) & Easton and Faff (1994). Within these families~ some further subdivision 
occurs. This section overviews these approaches, and concludes with some 
methodological suggestions for future work. It mainly concentrates on the issues 
involved in daily seasonality, although in all cases, unless otherwise noted, the issues 
are gennane to the investigation of monthly seasonal patterns. 
Many of the works cited in previous sections are not here examined, as the emphasis 
now is on outlining and evaluating the statistical methodologies used to detect 
seasonality. Papers, such as Lakonishok and Maberly (1990), DeGennaro (1990), Chen 
and Fishe (1994), Kallllnki and Martikainen (1997) or Ligon (1997) which have as their 
primary focus the search for an explanation, as opposed to an elucidation, of 
seasonality, are not examined in detail. Their main contribution is to suggest lines of 
inquiry for further work, presupposing that there actually exists a substantial, robust, 
statistically well- founded pattern for investigation. 
7.2. TESTING DISTRIBUTIONAL AsSUMPTIONS 
Underlying the testing of most fonns of seasonality is an assumption regarding the 
distributional characteristics of the dataset. Thus tests that rely for example on the ~ 
statistic implicitly assume either that the distribution of the data approximates that of a 
nonnal distribution or that the law of large numbers will allow this approximation to be 
invoked. Papers that rely on OLS models implicitly or explicitly assume that the data 
are such that the OLS estimates of parameters are Best Linear Unbiased Estimates of 
the true population parameters. Tests that rely on the Kolmogorov-Smimov staticitic rely 
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on the full a priori specification of the distribution being known. The purpose of this 
section is to outline methods that can be deployed to investigate tHe assumptions 
underlying the appropriateness of using parametric- tests and to outline both the 
modifications that may be made to these and the non-parametric alternatives available. 
7.2.1. THE KOLMOGOROV-S MIRNOV TEST FOR EQUALITY OF 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test is most commonly used to decide if a sample of 
data comes from a specific distribution. Thus it can be used to test the hypothesis that 
the data approximate the normal, cauchy, or any other distribution. It can also be used 
to test whether two series come from the same distribution (test the equality of 
distributions). The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test is based on the empirical 
cumulative distribution function (ECDF). Given N data points YI. J1. ...• YN, the ECDF 
is defined as EN = n~ where n(i) is the number of points less than ri. This step 
function increases by lIN at the value of each data point. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
statistic is then calculated as 
EQ. 7: D = MAXIF(Y; »)- iJ 
l:5i:5N N] 
where F is the theoretical cumulative distribution of the distribution being tested (which 
must be a cortinuous distribution62 i.e., no discrete distributions such as the binomial or 
Poisson), and it must be a priori fully specified (i.e., the location, scale, and shape 
parameters cannot be estimated from the data). The hypothesis regarding the 
62 But this distribution can of course be another set of data points. in which case the KS test is on of the equality of 
two distributions 
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distributional form is rejected if the test statistic, D, is greater than the critical value. An 
attractive feature of the test is that the distribution of the K-S test statistic itself does not 
depend on the underlying cumulative distribution function being tested. Another 
advantage is that it is an exact test. Despite these advantages, the K-S test has several 
important limitations: 
• It only applies to continuous distributions. 
• It tends to be more sensitive near the centre of the distribution than it is at the 
tails. 
• Perhaps the most serious limitation is that the distribution against which the data 
are being compared must be fully specified. That is, if location, scale, and shape 
parameters are estimated from the data, the critical region of the K-S test is no 
longer valid. It typically must be determined by simulation. In the case of the 
normal distribution this problem does not, of course, arise. 
7 .2.2. ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTIONAL TESTS 
Alternatives to the KS test exist. In particular, one test that is very commonly used it 
financial econometrics is that based on the Jarque-Bera statistic. This tests the joint 
hypotheses that the skewness and excess kurtosis of the (empirical) distribution are 
zero. It is therefore a test of the normal distribution 
The statistic, based on the empirical estimates of skewness and kurtosis, is given as 
T-k( s l( )2) Eq. 8JB =-6- S +4" K-3 
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where S is skewness, K kurtosis and k the number of parameters estimated. The JB 
statistic is distributed as a X2 with 2 degrees of freedom urider the hypothesis of 
normality. 
7.3. INVESTIGATING FIRST MOMENTS 
The majority of studies that have addressed the phenomenon of seasonality in the 
returns to equity assets have concentrated on the search for seasonal variations h the 
first moment of the series, that is to say in the mean. This is somewhat inexplicable 
when one considers the key role that the second moment, the variance of a series, plays 
in financial economics. In addition, as we have noted earlier there are good reasons why 
investors should have well expressed preferences for moments above the first two. Thus 
the concentration seems misplaced. Regardless, that is the case. As noted earlier there 
are a number of routes to the testing of such moment conditions. 
7.3.1. SIMPLE DuMMY VARIABLES 
The majority of the papers that have examined whether there exists differential 
seasonality in the first moment have used a statistical specification that incorporates 
dummy variables. Other methods exist, but the predominant method is for the 
utilisation of a statistical procedure that investigates the significance under a given set 
of statistical assumptions of a series of dummy variables. The family of approaches 
that use dummy variables, in the form of a regression of the returns of an index or 
portfolio on a selection of dummy variables, as per the equations below, can be 
further divided into a number of main areas of analysis. 
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The most common fonn of regression, used by French (1980) in his paper that begun 
the modem era of investigation in to the existence of daily seasonalities and by Brown, 
Keim, Kleidon and Marsh (1983) on nnnthly seasonality, is one of the returns on a 
series dummy variables, each for a particular realisation of a calendar event. In these 
cases, the typical research focus is on evaluating the hypothesis of equality of means 
across the calendar events. Testing is typically by means of an F or X2 test. The fonnal 
regression is then 
n 
£0. 9:R, = La,D, +£, 
,=1 
where the number of 0, dummy variables, corresponds to the number of seasonal 
patterns (months of the year, days of the week) in the market under investigation. 
Testing proceeds by means of a standard F test, examining the hypothesis that the 
individual coefficients on the dummy variables are equal to one another. Typically the 
individual coefficients ~statistics are reported, to assist evaluation of the extent to 
which they differ from zero. If the expected return was the same across the calendar 
periods for which the dummy variables proxy, then the dummy coefficients should be 
individually close to zer063 and the explanatory power of the equation as a whole as 
measured by the F test would be weak. Taking this approach imposes little in the way 
of predetermined structure on the expected pattern of returns beyond the assumption 
that returns are generated in trading time. Such an imposition seems reasonable, as there 
exists no paper that provides support to the calendar time hypothesis. Applications of 
this approach include French (1980), Brown, Keirn, Kleidon et a/. (1983), Schultz 
63 This being a one-sample t test, the test being whether the mean (here the estimated coefficient on a particular 
dummy variable) is equal to a specified constant, here zero. The alternative is a two sample t test, testing the 
equality of a pair of means, or estimated coefficients 
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(1985), Santesmaes (1986), Athannasakos and Schnabel (1994), Haugen and lorion 
(1996), Coutts and Hayes (1999) & Coutts and Sheik (2000), 
Investigation of the holiday effect typically also proceeds along the line of dummy 
variable analysis, with dummy variables usually representing the day immediately prior 
to the holiday. The null examined is that these dummies add nothing to the explanatory 
power of the equation, and testing proceeds by means of standard parametric tests. The 
form of the regression then is 
with the intercept measuring the average return on days that are not a pre- holiday and 
the dummy variable measuring pre-holiday returns. 
A subset of this approach takes as given the existence of a seasonal pattern in the 
daily returns. These use a variant of equation 1, with the dummy variable for the 
calendar regularity hypothesised to be 'the seasonal' omitted and the equation 
estimated with an intercept. This gives an equation of the following type in the case of 
a search for daily seasonality. 
Thus the intercept measures the mean return on the daily seasonal, and the other 
coefficients measure the difference in mean returns between this seasonal and the 
individual days. Again, an F test is used to determine equality of the dummy variable 
coefficients. The day represented by the intercept coefficient need not in this case be 
restricted to Monday. Corhay (1991), on finding that there appears to be a Tuesday 
effect in the Brussels market, employs an analysis suppressing the dummy variable 
for Tuesday, Elyasiani, Perera and Puri (1996) test for Friday effects while Connolly 
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(1989)tests for weekend effects with a Monday dummy. A large variety of papers 
adopt this approach for monthly seasonality, 'especially when examining the US, 
where the generally accepted evidence is of a January seasonal, such as Ramcharran 
(1997) and Tong (1992). 
The F statistic reported in the papers quoted above is typically the regression F statistic, 
as opposed to the ANOVA F statistic. The regression F is used to test the hypothesis 
that there is no linear relationship between the dependent variable and the independent 
variable(s). The total variation in the dependent variable is divided into two components 
- one that can be attributed to a particular regression model and one that cannot. The 
ANOVA F Test is a test used to test the hypothesis that several means are equal. This 
technique is an extension of the two-sample t test. One key assumption here is that each 
group is an independent random sample from a normal population although ANOV A is 
robust to departures from normality. A second is that the groups should come from 
populations with equal variances. The F statistic produced is the ratio of the between 
group and within group mean squared differences. The key issue of ANOV A is that like 
the regression F test it is a joint test - what is being tested is that all the means are equal 
one to another. 64 The F statistic produced is the ratio of the between group and within 
group mean squared differences. The between group differences measure the variation 
in the dependent variable that is accounted for by differences in group means, while the 
within groups measures that part which is accounted for by errors in the fitted values. 
More formally, let 
64 If the significance value of the F statistic obtained indicates that there do e)(ist differences in means, there are a 
variety of tests, the most common being Tukey's and Tarnhane's T 2 Test which allows the researcher to determine 
e)(actly which means differ and from which they differ. 
13S 
Then the sum of squared differences between the groups is given as 
k r( IXi Y (tXT Y 
EQ.13 SSbg=~  ~ 
~ 
and those within groups as 
Thus, the mean squares estimates of variance are given as the ratios of the sums of 
squared expressed as a ratio to their respective degrees of freedom, and the ~s statistic 
as the ratio of the between and within group mean squares. This ratio is of course 
distributed as an F statistic. 
Eo. 16 dfbg = k -1,dfwg = nT -l 
MS 




If we find, using ANOYA, that there is a statistically significant calendar effect, this 
does not inform us as to which calendar events differ from which. A variety of so called 
65 Called so by Sir Ronald Fischer. 
136 
post-hoc tests are available to assist. Some, such as Scheffe's, test for all possible 
interactions. Others adopt a Bayesian approach, relying on the investigator to specify 
priors relating to the as~umed relationship. 
7.3.2. TUKEY'S HONESTLY SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT T TEST 
An alternative approach to using the standard t-test to examine mean differences is to 
use Tukey's HSD test. The "Honestly Significantly Different" (HSD) test is based on 
the studentized range distribution. It allows the researcher to test all pairwise 
comparisons among means, in this case the mean return by day of the week. In using 
the Tukey HSD one computes ts for each pair of means using the formula: 
where Mi - Mj is the difference between the h and jth means, MSE is the Mean Square 
Error, and Ili is the harmonic mean of the sample sizes of groups i and j. The critical 
value of 15 is determined from the distribution of the studentized range. The number of 
means in the experiment, here 5 as there are 5 days in the week, is used in the 
determination of the critical value, and this critical value is then used for all 
comparisons among means. Typically, the researcher compares the largest mean with 
the smallest mean first. If that difference is not significant, no other comparisons will 
be significant either, so the computations for these comparisons can be skipped. The 
advantage of the Tukey HSD procedure is that it keeps the experimentwise error rate 
(EER) at the specified significance level66 . This advantage comes at a cost, however: 
66 Another post-hoc procedure that controls the EER is the Neuman-Keuls test, although the control is not as tight as 
in the HSD test. 
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the Tukey HSD is less powerful than other methods of testing all pairwise 
comparisons. 
The experimentwise error rate (EER) is the probability that one or more of the 
significance tests results in a Type I error. Two kinds of errors are possible in 
significance testing: (1) a true null hypothesis can be rejected incorrectly and (2) a false 
null hypothesis can fail to be rejected. The former error is called a Type I error and the 
latter error is called a Type II error. A Type II error is only an error in the sense that an 
opportunity to reject the null hypothesis correctly was lost. It is not an error in the sense 
that an incorrect conclusion was drawn since no conclusion is drawn when the null 
hypothesis is not rejected. 
If the comparisons are independent, then the experimentwise error rate is: 
aew = 1- (l-a per where aew is experimentwise error rate ap)s the per-comparison 
error rate, and c is the number of comparisons. For example, if 5 independent 
comparisons, such as comparing the mean return of a stock index across each of the 
days of the week, were each to be done at the 0.05 level, then the probability that at 
least one of them would result in a Type I error is: 1 - (1 - 0.05i = 0.226. If the 
comparisons are not independent, then the experimentwise error rate will be less 
than 1- (1-a pc t. Finally, regardless of whether the comparisons are independent, 
a
ew 
~ (c)(apJ. For the days ofthe week example, 0.226 < (5)(.05) = 0.25 
The studentized range distribution may be used for testing all differences among pairs 
of means. It is similar to the t distribution, differing only in that it takes into account the 
number of means under consideration. The more means under consideration, the larger 
the critical value of ts (studentized t). This makes sense since the more means there are, 
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the greater the likelihood that at least some differences between pairs of means will be 
large due to chance alone. 
First, consider the case in which there are only two means. The formula for t used to 
compare two sample means is: 
where i Me! = MI - M2,the difference in the two means, J,.II- 112 is the value specified by 
the null hypothesis (almost always zero), and 
EQ. 20: SM ~J2MSE 
d n
h 
where MSE is the means square error and ll1 is the harmonic mean of the two sample 
sizes. If the null hypothesis is that III - 112 = 0, then the formula for t can be written as 
Md EQ.2l:t=~ 2MSE 
nh 





The only difference between the formulas is that "2" in tre denominator of the t-test is 
not present in the formula for the studentized t. The value of Is is therefore the square 
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root of 2 = 1.414 times the value of t. The significance test using the studentized t 
compensates for the difference in the formulas by using a critical value of t that is 
1.414 times the critical value of t. If an experiment were conducted with two groups 
and 13 subjects per group, then a t either less than - 2.06 or greater than +2.06 would 
be needed to be significant at the 0.05 level. Since 1.414 x 2.06 = 2.91, at s either less 
than -2.91 or greater than 2.91 would be needed to be significant. 
Since the computed value ofts is always 1.414 times the value oft, the tests using ts and 
t are identical whenever there are only two means it an experiment. The difference 
between the t and the studentized t distributions occurs when there are more than two 
means. Naturally, the more means, the higher the critical value of t. 
7.3.3. T AMHANE'S T2 TEST 
An assumption underlying the Tukey's HSD Test is that the variance across the sub 
samples is constant. If this 'does not hold, then an alternative, Tamhane's f test most 
commonly, may be used. This test assumes that both the sample sizes (number of 
occurrences of each day of the week) and variances of returns by day of the week are 
unequal. The test defmes two means to be unequal if 
( 
2 2 } - - (j. (j. Eq.23:IXj-Xil~ -' +_1 FyIJ, ( .1( 
. n. n . . . r=d- I-erA 
, 1 
where e is the experiment error rate and k the number of possible effects, 5 here for 
the 5 days of the week, or 12 fo r the months of the year. 
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7.4. NON PARAMETRIC APPROACHES To THE FIRST MOMENT 
Using~ OLS methods, there is an underlying assumption that the data are 
independently, identically distributed, drawn from a nonnally distributed population, 
with constant variance and no serial correlation. It has been well accepted for many 
years however those these are assumption that, for the most part, stock data do not 
follow. Papers that have addressed this issue are many, with some of the more 
relevant being Mandlebrot (1964),Fama (1963), & Fama (1965). In the Irish context 
Lucey (1994) and Cotter (1998) have shown that these assumptions are questionable 
in the Irish context. 
There are attempts in the literature to address this issue. Indeed, one of the first papers 
on daily seasonality n the modem era, Cross (1973) used a pair-wise comparison of 
days using a Mann-Whitney U test. This fonn of test was also employed by Pettengill 
(1986) in his examination of the pre-1917 behaviour of monthly equity returns. In 
general, at the simplest, such as in Theobald and Price (1984), Elyasiani, Perera and 
Puri (1996; Theobald and Price (1984 ),Arsad and Coutts (1997) Baker and Linunack 
(1998)or Steeley (1999),the use of non-parametric methods involves the use of an 
alternative to the standard F test. The papers above employ the Kruskal-Wallis H 
statistic and note that the results in terms of equality of returns across all calendar 
frequencies are invariant to the nature of the test statistic employed, i.e. the results are 
the same regardless of whether parametric or non-parametric methods are employed. In 
tenns of triangulation mentioned earlier, this theoretic triangulation, by deploying 
statistical methodologies differing fundamentally in their assumptions about how the 
data are generated, provides us with greater subjective confidence that a daily seasonal 
anomaly exists, it being continned by different methodologies using different 
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theoretical bases for acceptance or rejection of a hypothesis. Non-Parametric tests may 
be used in place OJ their parametric counterparts when certain assumptions about the 
underlying population are questionable. For example, when comparing two independent 
samples, the Mann Whitney U test does not assume that the difference between the 
samples is normally distributed whereas its parametric counterpart, the two-sample t 
test does. Non-Parametric tests may be, and often are, more powerful in detecting 
population differences when certain assumptions are not satisfied. All tests involving 
ranked data, i.e. data that can be put in order, are non-parametric. 
7.4.1. THE KRUSKAL-WALLIS TEST 
The Kruskal- Wallis test is a non-parametric alternative to ANOV A. It is an extension 
to many samples of the Mann-Whitney U Test. The Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney Test is 
one of the most powerful of the non-parametric tests for comparing two populations. 
It is used to test the null hypothesis that two populations have identical distribution 
functions against the alternative hypothesis that the two distribution functions differ 
only with respect to location (median), if at all. 
Let R:be the average rank of observations (returns to the index in this work) in the 1h 
group (in this work each day of the week will form one group) and nj be the number 
of observations in the .lh group. Then with k groups and N observations in total the 
Kruskal -Wallis H statistic is then 
( 
12 k R2) 
Eq. 24:H = ( )L-' -3(N +1)). 
N N +1 /=1 nj 
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The H Statistic is distributed as a X2 distribution with N-I degrees of freedom. 
7.5. INVESTIGATING SECOND MOMENTS. 
7.5.1. THE LEVENE TEST FOR EQUALITY OF VARIANCES 
The Levene test is an alternative to the well-known Bartlett test for equality of variance. 
Although it is more commonly used, the Bartlett test is sensitive to departures from 
nonnality. The Levene test is less sensitive to norrnonnality than the Bartlett test. The 
Levene test tests the following hypotheses: 
Ho: (J = (JVi,) ,Ha: (J,. :F- (J). at least one ~ j pair 
I ) • 
The test statistic is defined as in Eq. 25 
Eq.25: 
(N - k)± Nj (z:- -zy 
W= ;=1 where 
(k-I)± ±(Zij _Zj)2 
;=1 j=; 
I Zij =1Y;j - Y;"] J; the mean of subgroup 1, or 
2 Zij = IYij - r; I, y; the median of subgroup ~ or 
The three choices for defining which Zij to utilise in any situation detennine the 
robustness and power of Levene's test. The definition based on the median is the choice 
that provides good robustness against many types of non-nonnal data and is more in 
keeping with the nature of non-parametric testing. Using the median retains good 
power, and is the one used hereafter unless specified elsewhere. The Levene test rejects 
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the hypothesis that the variances are homogeneous if W > ~I-a.k-I.N-I) where 
~I-a.k-I.N-I) is the upper critical value of the F distribution with k - 1 and N - 1 degrees 
of freedom at a significance level of a 
7.5.2. ARCH TVPEMODELS AND THE SECOND MOMENT 
A number of papers in the literature employ statistical methods that allow for 
deviation from the OLS assumptions. These papers fall into two families: adjusting 
the statistical procedures and adjusting the estimated equation. Those that adjust the 
equation to be estimated typically employ GARCH specifications (for example 
Connolly (1989),Clare, Ibrahaim and Thomas (1998) or Lucey (2000a». The 
advantages of a GARCH specification are many. In addition to parsimoniously 
capturing the autocorrelation dynamics of a stock return series, they allow for time 
varying volatility and are robust to underlying non-normality. Expanded versions of 
the GARCH model allow for non normal distribution of the ronditional errors, and 
allow for examination of whether the abnormally fat-tailed distribution of stock 
returns is due to a combination of time varying volatility and non- normality of the 
returns, or simply due to the time varying volatility. IGARCH models are part of a set 
of statistical models that exhibit persistence in variance, where the current information 
remains important as an element of future estimates of volatility for all time - this 
contrasts sharply with the ideas of efficient capital markets, especially the view that 
nothing is really forecastable. Crucially, the use of an ARCH type model allows us 
not only to investigate the existence of seasonal patterns in the second moment but 
also to pinpoint the source of these regularities. 
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ARCH Models also allow the incorporation of a number of residual dynamics. The 
most' important of these is the ability to adjust for a particular form of autocorrelation. 
This is required for two reasons. From a statistical perspective the presence of 
autocorrelation in the series will cause difficulties in interpreting the estimated 
parameters and their economic significance. From an economic perspective the 
presence of autocorrelation in asset returns can be attributed to thin trading. Thin 
trading implies that the daily return to an asset may in fact be a statistical artefact and as 
such this should be taken into account in any investigation of seasonal factors. This is 
well summarised in Atchinson, Butler and Simonds (1987), who state (p Ill) 
"Market index autocorrelation by itself is of limited interest. However, 
knowledge concerning the source of price-adjustment delays causing 
this is very significant for a better understanding of the price formation 
" process 
Thin trading gives rise to autocorrelation in an equity returns series due to the ind uced 
averaging which it imparts. The knowledge of this dates back at least to Working 
(1960)If we consider an index composed of a number of shares, one of which is thinly 
traded. Thus on the close of Friday the index consists of an average of those shares 
traded on Friday and on Monday, at least one share not having tmded since Monday. 
The no rmal practice in the construction of indices is to pad data series where this 
occurs - the price of the asset at the last trade is deemed to be the price of the asset on 
all subsequent trading sessions until a new price is set. The index then is an average of 
some sort not over all occurrences on Friday but over the period Monday-Friday. 
Therefore it is tautological that there will be some degree of positive serial correlation 
between the index and itself. This can easily occur not simply at daily frequencies, but 
depending on the extent and duration of thin trading can manifest itself over higher, 
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weekly and monthly, frequencies. Further details and examples can be found in 
Gfficer (1975). 
Standard ARCH models (Engle (1982)) rely on the assumption that the conditional 
variances of residuals from a regression are themselves an AR(q) process. Typically 
the assumption modelled is that the squared residuals are denoted as an AR( q) 
process. This system can be denoted as 
Y, = ao +aIY,_1 +£, 
VAR(Y,IY,_I)= Et-I [(y, -ao +aIY,_1 +£Y] 
£0.26: =E ';2 '-I~' 
A finding of ARCH type errors in the residuals of a day of the week equation indicates 
that time varying hetroskedasticity may indeed be a problem. It is a relatively simple 
task to add exogenous elements to the ARCH model. 
GARCH methods (deriving from the works of Bollerslev (1986)) can assist in dealing 
with volatility in returns as they generalise the process above to allow the conditional 
variance to be an ARMA process. Consider the specification common to Beller and 
Nofsinger (1998), Clare, Ibrahaim and Thomas (1998) and Lucey (2000b). The mean 
equation is given as 
n 
Eq. 27 Rr =ao +a1h,o.5 +a2Rt-I + Lf.1;D; +~, 
;=1 
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where hi refers to the conditional variance, Dd is a dummy variable corresponding to 
a particular calendar event such as the day preceding holidays, weekdays or months of 
the year, while the conditional variance itself is given by the representation 
n P q 
Eq. 28 hi =Yo + IJ.1;*D; + Iyjh,-j + IYic;,~; 
d;; j;\ ;;1 
Here both the mean equation Eq. 27 and the equation for the conditional variance Eq. 
28 contain dummy variables to take account of the interrelationship between risk, return 
and these calendar events. There is no agreemett in the literature as to which dummy 
variables should be included. Clare, Ibrahaim and Thomas (1998) and Lucey (2000a) 
include daily dummies for those days that have been shown, from a standard OLS 
regression, to have significant coefficients. Glosten, Jagannathan and Runkle (1993) 
include dummies for January and October, on similar justification. Beller and Nofsinger 
(1998) test all calendar variables. 
Another issue is the rrnde of propagation of calendar effects. As Beller and Nofsinger 
(1998) points out, there are of course three places where such dummies can go. The 
equations above make the implicit assumption that the effect on the conditional 
variance of calendar effects is through the intercept terms, in effect assuming that trere 
is a different form of conditional variance for each day of the week etc. Alternatively, it 
could be the case that the relationship is propagated through the variance itself (Eq. 29) 
or through the unexpected returns (residual;) (Eq. 30). 
n P q 
EQ.29 hi =Yo + IJ.1;*D;Irjhl-j++LYI~'~; 
d;j j=1 ;=1 
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P n 4 
EQ. 30 hi = Yo + L r jh l _ j + LJ1; Dj Lyj~/~j 
j=\ d=; ;=\ 
Indeed, it is possible that the effects could propagate through more than one channel. 
However, the number of parameters to estimate rises rapidly as more terms are added, 
and may make convergence towards a solution difficult. Interpretation of the 
equations is relatively straightforward: If the dummies included in the mean equation 
are significant, despite the inclusion of the conditional volatility terms, then we may 
conclude that seasonality is not due to calendar variation in equity risk as proxied by 
the conditional variance term. If the dummies are insignificant in the mean equation 
but significant in the conditional variance equation, we can conclude that there is 
seasonality in market risk. 
Clearly the ARCH type methods allow for a considerable amount of investigation as 
to the source of potential seasonalities. However, they cannot in themselves provide 
evidence of these seasonalities, rather playing a part when seasonalities are suspected 
One problem with the standard ARCHIGARCH models is that there is a symmetry 
imposed on the conditional variance. Nelson (1991) showed that the EGARCH, or 
Exponential GARCH model overcame this. In this parameterisation, as shown in Eq. 
31, the EGARCH model is given as below, with 8 A representing the ARCH in 
Mean Term, and X and V represent vectors of potential explanatory variables, such as 
calendar or other dummies, for the mean and variance equations respectively. The A. 
coefficient is referred to as the leverage coefficient and shows the degree of 
asymmetric response of the conditional variance to negative versus positive 
innovations. More details of this element of the EGARCH model can be found in 
Henry (1998). 
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7.5.3. STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE TESTS FOR THE SECOND MOMENT 
An alternative non-parametric technique, potentially promising but little used, is the 
technique of Stochastic Dominance. Few papers have used this technique; Wingender 
and Groff (1989) examined the daily seasonal, while Sehun (1993) investigated the 
monthly seasonal. 
Stochastic dominance is a non-parametric method to compare sets of returns. It allows 
simple choice among risky alternatives. As an example, consider two risky assets, A & 
B. Disregarding the actual distribution of (per money unit) returns, we can say that if 
the returns to A always exceed those to B, non-satiated investors will always choose A 
over B. This is a particular case of first order stochastic dominance (FSD). In general, 
first order stochastic dominance would be the instance where the probability that returns 
less than or equal to x is greater for B than A for any return x, in which case A FSD B. 
In terms of cumulative density functions (CDF) the CDF of A must not cross that of B, 
at any stage and must always lie to the right of B. Second order stochastic dominance 
(SSD) refers to the areas under the CDF of the two distributions of the assets returns. If 
the area under the CDF of A is greater than that of B then A SSD B. Note that unlike 
FSD, SSD allows that the CDF intersect, so long as the areas differ. Also note that FSD 
implies SSD, while the reverse is not the case. 
More formally, given two distributions, the condition that F; (x) ~ F2 (x), 'Vx is described 
as the first order stochastic dominance (FSD) of ~ (x) over F2 (x). Applied to the case 
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of return distributions of equity assets, a return distribution that first order dominates 
another is preferred by any wealth rna ximisers regardless of their utility function. A less 
stringent condition then is second order stochastic dominance (SSD), with F; (x) said to 
x x 
dominate F3 (x) by SSD if and only if J F, (y )dy ~ J F3 (y)dy, Vx 
Stochastic dominance allows us to answer the question: is the higher (lower) return to 
this asset (or day) due to higher (lower) risk? If so, then the higher risk is expected to 
manifest itself in the form of more outliers, and so the higher (lower) return asset will 
not dominate the other. 
Plotting, followed by visual inspection, of the realised CDF's is an easily implemented 
but informal operationalisation of stochastic dominance tests, although a two-sample 
Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test can also be applied. Sehun (1993) provides a good example 
of this approach within the context of searching for an explanation of monthly 
seasonality. For more complex situations there are a number of algorithms available to 
formally investigate stochastic dominance, such as that of Aboudi and Thon (1994) 
Wingender and Groff (1989) find that Wednesday FSD Monday, while all other days 
SSD Monday. In other words, there is an unambiguous, non-parametric, statistical 
reason for investors with reasonable preferences to avoid Monday: the negative return 
generated on average cannot be explained by increased risk. 
One criticism that can be levied against stochastic dominance analysis is that a single 
larger negative outlier (such perhaps as that associated with either of the stock market 
crashes of 1929 or 1987) can result in the prevention of dominance by a distribution 
everywhere else dominant. Trimming the distribution of outliers allows a simple check 
150 
on the robustness of the results. When this is done, even with a trim discarding of the 
top and bottom 25% of the distribution, Wingender and Groff (1989) find that their 
results are robust to outliers. This provides strong, non-parametric evidence of the 
significance of negative Monday returns and also some evidence of an important 
Wednesday effect. 
7.6. INVESTIGATING HIGHER MOMENTS# 
The testing procedures described above all involve testing, either singly or as a pair, the 
distributional characteristics of the first two moments of the return distribution. Testing 
the two higher moments is more problematic however. In the absence of knowledge of 
the sample distribution of skewness or kurtosis no parametric test is possible. 
Tang (1997) proposes a solution, although using his proposed approach; it is not 
possible to distinguish between seasonality in skewness and that of kurtosis. Relying on 
the fact that the standard scores of a variable preserve skewness and kurtosis he 
proposes the use of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to compare whether the distribution, 
of standard scores, as between each day of the week and each other, is equal. Testing 
involves partitioning each index according to the day of the week and standardizing on 
this day. The KS test tests the maximum vertical difference between the two observed 
cumulative distributions (standard scores of day I and standard scores of day j). 
EQ. 32 KS = M4r\SCDm (i) - SCDn (j)1 ISiSN 
# Part of this section appears in Lucey, B. M. "Market Direction and Moment Seasonality ", Evidence from Irish 
Equities" ADDned Finqncial Economics 2002 (Forthcoming) 
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The asymptotic test statistic is KSvn. 
7.7. ROBUST INVESTIGATION: INCORPORATING DISTRIBUTIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE 
One major difficulty with OLS lies in the manner in which it treats outliers. By its 
nature OLS deals with squared deviations from the mean. Thus large deviations become 
squared to even larger deviations. Outliers are not problems with the data- they 
represent realisations of the data generation process that must in some way be 
accounted for. The difficulty with OLS in the presence of outliers is that, at the limit, a 
single large enough outlier can render the estimates unreliable. Alternative approaches 
exist to dealing with this. Two approaches are the estimation of the first moment by 
means of Least Absolute Deviation and by Trimmed Least Squares (TLS). As shown in 
Koenker (1982), TLS is essentially the same as censoring the data and running OLS on 
the censored sample. A detailed discussion of Least Absolute Deviation regression is 
contained in Connolly (1989, Section IV).!t is also discussed in Doan (2000,Section 
5.7). In brief, if v.e consider the standard equation y = {3X + £ , the LAD estimator is 
fi = Minimize IJy - tn'1· This however is computationally complex. An approach, 
fJ 
implemented III the RATS programming language, uses the fact that 
min L, (c2 + e( f3)2 r.s approaches LAD as c~ O. This can be estimated with consistency 
using iterative weighted least squares. This approach is used here. 
A series of papers that employ adjusted methods of estimation include those by 
Connolly (1989) ,Chang, Pinegar and Ravichandran (1993),Easton and Faff 
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(l994),Mills and Coutts (1995) and Peiro (1994). These papers use estimation methods 
such as Trimmed Least Squares, Mean Absolute Deviation Estimation and also proceed 
by adjusting the estimated parameters by means of Whites procedure for hetroskedastic 
disturbances. These 'robust' estimates are presented alongside simpler 'non robust' 
estimates, in Connolly, Easton and Faff, and Chang, Pinegar and Ravichandran, again 
allowing for direct analysis of the benefits of triangulation. Like the studies that utilise 
both parametric and non-parametric methods to test the statistical significance of 
equations, these papers provide results on the daily anomalies using methods that differ 
fundamentally in how they treat the non-normality of the asset returns series. Connolly 
finds that, using robust estimators, the negative Monday average returns found in the 
US, while still present into the 1980' s are no longer statistically significant. This is in 
contrast to the work of the other two sets of authors, who find that the anomalous daily 
seasonality survives in Australia and in seven European countries (including the UK but 
not Ireland). Mills and Coutts and Peiro find mixed results across time periods. 
Relatively little work in the area of monthly seasonality has used these approaches. 
More detailed discussion on the various approaches can be found in Connolly (1989). 
7 .8. BAYESIAN INFERENCE 
The interpretation of classical statistics is to compare the computed F or t value 
against a table showing the critical values at various levels of significance, usually 
0.05 or 5%. While this is customary and convenient, it has no well- founded economic 
or statistical justification over any other significance level. Bayesian analysis on the 
other hand incorporates directly into the critical values the fact that as the sample size 
rises there is a need to adjust downward the critical values (whose initial choice is still 
perhaps arbitrary). This problem has been recognised since Lindley (1957). 
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For example, consider a simple test (t-test), where the question (or null hypothesis) is: 
is the mean of the population under investigation equal to k. 
More formally, the test is 
1-10: f1. = k and the alternative hypothesis of HI: f1. ? k, where k is an arbitrary constant. 
Hence, the simple test is t = ( x ~ k F where x is the mean, S is the Standard 
deviation, and n is the sample size. Hence, t can be increased (and hence the 
associated P-value decreased) by increasing either x - k -or ~. But as n 
increases, then x - k and S will tend to constants - their true values. Hence, a large 
value of n directly translates into a large value of t, and hence a small value of P. 
More formally, as n -? 00, X - k -? constant ,S -? constant ,t -? 00, P -? 0 Hence, it can 
be stated that P has a strong dependence on the sample size, and its value is almost 
independent of the existence, or not, of an effect, when the sample size is large. 
Chang, Pinegar and Ravichandran (1993), in addition to the use of robust estimators, 
employ explicit Bayesian adjustments, in the spirit of Connolly (1991) and French 
(1980). Their paper is noteworthy for apparently being the only paper that combines 
Bayesian methods with robust estimation procedures. This is especially interesting as 
it allows the relative 'robustness' of the results to the various alternative estimation 
procedures, adjustments to the classical error term, and Bayesian inferences to be 
seen. 
As pointed out, the use of Bayesian inference in this area is not new, having been 
adopted by French. While both he and Connolly (1991 )used a posterior odds approach, 
Connolly (1989) and Chang, Pinegar and Ravichandran (1993) utilise the fact that one 
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can adjust the standard F and t tests to incorporate the effect of increased amounts of 
data. 
The interpretation of classical statistics is to compare the computed F or t value against 
a table showing the critical values at various levels of significance, usually 0.05 or 5%. 
While this is customary and convenient, it has' no well- founded economic or statistical 
justification over any other significance level. Bayesian analysis on the other hand 
incorporates directly into the critical values the fact that as the sample size rises there is 
a need to adjust downward the critical values (whose initial choice is still perhaps 
arbitrary) Connolly (1991) discusses the Bayesian approach to daily seasonality in 
detail while Connolly (1989) (p 140)provides formulae for adjusted, or Bayesian, t and 
F statistics. These are easily calculated from the classical OLS F and t statistics being 
and 
where k = number of parameters to be estimated, subscripted 0 and I for the 
alternative and null hypotheses and T is the number of observations. Clearly, these are 
simply calculated, and thus a Bayesian t and F statistic calculated. As the number of 
observations in the sample size increases so too do the Bayesian t and f statistics 
155 
7.9. RESAMPLING ANALYSIS 
A radically different approach to statistical inference has more recently become 
available, taking the older concept of Monte Carlo Simulation and using the power of 
modem computing to allow it be used for inference. 
A wide variety of introductions to the resampling methodology exist; not surprisingly, 
given the computer intensive nature of these approaches, many of these are web 
based. Two in particular which this section draws heavily upon are Yu (2002) and 
Simon (1997). 
In classical statistics, including here the Bayesian families, the mode of inference is to 
compare observed to theoretical. In financial economics the vast majority of theoretical 
distributions that are used for inference purposes are, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, normal distributions Using the resampling approach allows one to 
dispense with the need to assume either that a particular distribution is the one that the 
series should follow in theory or is the most likely candidate to describe the actual 
distribution. Inference is based on the observed sample itself, using a large number of 
reshufflings, permutations, and resampling from the data. It is important to realize that 
in this respect the resampling school shares a key assumption or commonality with the 
classical school. Both rely on the observed sample for inferen:e. If the observed sample 
is truly a poor reflection or sample of reality then both schools of analysis will return 
poor inferences about the population. Resampling is closely tied to Monte Carlo 
simulation. In the latter the data that are under investigation (for example the power of a 
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test for heteroskedasticity under non-linearity) could equally validly be real or 
constructed. The same is not the case for resampling, which properly is only used in real 
world datasets. 
A number of types of resampling can be identified. 
• Randomization Exact Tests. Developed by R A Fisher, this approach involves 
taking all possible permutations of observations from the data. Take a case 
where we have 3000 daily observations of stock returns and are interested in the 
first nnment of the daily distributions. There are approximately 600 Monday, 
Tuesday etc observations in the sample (ignoring for the moment days for which 
returns are missing due to exchange closings etc). In reality there is one vector 
of 600 Monday returns. A RET would require taking all possible combinations 
of 600 days from the 3000, calculating their first moment and thus having a 
distribution of means against which the observed mean of the Monday returns 
can then be calculated. This is an immense number of vectors, and a full 
analysis of daily seasonality in the first moment would require 5 of these 
analyses. Not surprisingly this approach is not commonly used in cases with 
large numbers as above. More detail on exact tests can be found in Edgington 
(1995). 
• Jacknife. Also known as the Quenouille-Tukey Jacknife, Tukey considered it to 
be a useful tool in all circumstances, hence the name. Developed initially by 
Quenouille (1949) and modified by Tukey (1958), it is also known as Leave-
one-out. Jacknife can be seen as a step further from cross validation. In 
Jacknife, the same test is repeated by leaving one subject out each time. This 
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procedure is especially useful when the dispersion of the distribution is wide or 
extreme values are present in the data set. 
• Bootstrap: Using the analogy of 'pulling oneself up by one's own bootstrap', 
this approach was introduced and refined by Efron and Tibshirani (1993). The 
key difference between the bootstrap and other methods noted above is that the 
sample is duplicated many times and the parameter estimates from this are used 
as an empirical sampling distribution. Thus instead of drawing all possible 
combinations of 600 days from the 3000 in the example above we might instead 
draw, at random, 1000, or 10000 samples of 600 days. A distinction can be 
drawn between permutation bootstrapping (more commonly called 
randomization analysis) and bootstrapping. With bootstrapping there is typically 
replacement of each data point drawn into the larger sample, while with 
randomisation analysis there is no replacemeI1. The rationale for this is that 
each observation has a unitary probability of appearing in reality (there is only 
one day every day) and so this should be reflected in the virtual populations. 
Resampling and bootstrapping has been advocated in a number of situations, some of 
which are relevant to this study. These include 
• Population uncertainty: where we are not sure of the exact extent of the 
population or the population is itself ill-defined then Diaconis and Efron (1983) 
and Peterson (1991) advocate resampling. In the case of financial economics, 
for the most part we are fairly sure as to the extent of the population. For 
example, this work is concerned with the distribution of equity returns in the 
Irish market across calendar periods. To that extent the popUlation is precise. 
However, we may often find ourselves in a situation in finance where the entire 
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population of price changes in an asset is not known, either through investigator 
uncertainty or lack of adequate recording of such data. 
• Small Samples: Finance does not typi::ally suffer from small sample sizes, 
except in cases of either new series (a new asset or a new market) or in 
historical investigations. Where there are small datasets and/or these do not 
conform to the theoretical distributions Diaconis and Efron (1983) suggest 
resampling. 
• Non-random sample: Classical procedures require random sampling to 
validate the inference from a sample to a population. Resampling is valid for 
any kind of data, including random and non-random data, as discussed in 
Edgington (1995). In finance, this is important, as often the analysis of data is of 
a national or regional or industrial sample of data from an overall universe of 
asset returns. 
• Large sample size: Although resampling is a remedy for small sample size, it 
can also be applied to the situation of overpowering. Given a very large sample 
size, one can reject virtually any null hypothesis. A very large sample can be 
subdivided into smaller samples allowing cross validation, and also allowing 
resampling to act as a check on the 'population' inferences. 
• Replications: Chssical procedures do not inform researchers how likely the 
results can be replicated. Repeated experiments in resampling such as cross-
validation and bootstrap can be used as internal replications (Thompson and 
Snyder (1997)) 
Resampling is not without its criticisms however. Some of these include: 
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• Generalization: Some critics (Ludbrook and Dudley (1998)) argue that 
resampling is based on one safllJle and therefore the generalization cannot go 
beyond that particular sample. 
• Bad data: Some critic's challenge that when the collected data are biased, 
resampling repeats and magnifies the same mistake. Rodgers (1999) admitted 
that the potential magnification of unusual features of the sample is certainly 
one of the major threats to validity of conclusion derived from resampling 
procedure. 
Although increasingly being used in biomedical, engineering and general statistical 
literature the use of randomiza tion in analysis of calendar regularities is negligible. An 
analysis of EconLit and ABI-Inform databases reveals that only Larsen and Resnick 
(1995), Sullivan, Timmerman and White (1999) and Sullivan, Timmermann and White 
(2002) have incorporated bootstrapping or randomization into their works. 
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8. Data To Be Analysed 
This !Ection of the work describes the data sources and provides basic information 
regarding the distribution of the moments of the data. 
8.1. DATA To BE ANALYSED 
The dataset consists of a variety of indices, of varying constructions and covering 
various time perbds, covering the Irish equity market. To overcome the problem of a 
significant outlier, such as the 1987 market crash, distorting the results the data are 
trimmed. This operates by discarding the extreme 2.5% positive and negative changes, 
giving a 5% trim. In addition, as discussed, this allows a robust analysis to be carried 
out of the first moment by means of Trimmed Least Squares. 
8.2. THE IRISH STOCK ExCHANGE OFFICIAL INDICES 
8.2.1. PRICE AND RETURN INDICES 
Wholly reliable, daily, consistent stock indices are available in Ireland only from the 
start of January 1988 with the start of publication of the ISEQ index by the Irish Stock 
Exchange. Longer run monthly indices do exist, calculated by the Central Statistic 
Office, providing a monthly share price index back to the early 1930's. However, these 
are available only on a monthly basis and as such are unsuited to the analysis of daily 
seasonality. The Stock Exchange subsequently back calculated the ISEQ data to 
January 1983. This index is available both as a price index and as a total return index, 
with dividends included. Other indices available from the stock exchange consist of the 
stock exchange general and financial series of indices. The availability of the dividend 
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inclusive index is auspicious, as it allow.; the hypotheses of the Phillips-Patrick and 
Schneeweis (1988) contention that adjusting for dividends reduces any daily seasonal 
effects. All ISEQ indices are market capitalization weighted indices. More detail is 
available on http://www.ise.ie/marketinfo/isegcalculation. pdf. 
The stock exchange data thus gives eight indices: the official market index, ISEQ and 
its 5% trimmed version, TISEQ; the stock exchange official index with dividends 
included, ISEQR and its 5% trimmed version, TISEQR; the stock exchange financial 
sector index, ISEFIN and its 5% trimmed version TISEFIN; the stock exchange general 
market index, ISEGEN and its 5% trimmed version, TISEGEN. 
8.2.2. VOLUME AND TURNOVER DATA 
One of the difficulties facing those who would investigate equity market activities in the 
Irish stock exchange is the lack of volume data. Communication with the stock 
exchange ascertained that only after 1997 was a consistent electronic recording of 
volume on a stock-by-stock basis established. Prior to this, stock level transactions data 
is available only from hardcopy records issued daily. In all cases this is total daily net 
trade however, rather than total daily trade overall. 
8.3. AUTHOR CREATED INDICES 
This set of data consists of indices created by the author, in response to the non-
existence of a series of indices that would permit comparison between the dynamics 
of returns for small and large firms over the time period under investigation. 
Gibbons and Hess (1981), Rogalski (1984) and Kohers and Kohers (1995) for the USA 
and Theobald and Price (1984) for the UK find size effects in various indices. Since 
162 
January 1999, the Irish stock exchange has compiled and published an official index of 
small capitalisation stocks, defined as stocks with a market capitalisation of less than 
£400m. However, they have not made available any back-calculated data for this index 
and there are, it appears, no plans by the stock exchange to so do. In addition, as noted 
earlier, this work examines the period between the breaking of the link between the 
Irish pound with sterling, in 1979, and entry to EMU in 1999. 
The numbers of firms on the Irish stock market have varied between 80 and 130 over 
the period of analysis. Thus, the formation of value-weighted deciles would have 
resulted in small numbers of firms in each decile, carrying with it the probability that 
the smallest deciles might have extremely thin trading. The Stock Exchange and Riada 
Stockbrokers provided the author with a dataset consisting of the monetary amount of 
each stock's aggregate daily transactions, market value and daily closing price, for the 
years 1993-1998. From this dataset were then excluded three sets of stocks. I first 
excluded those with their primary listing in the UK and with only a secondary listing on 
the Dublin exchange (companies such as Tesco or Ashquay, who list on the exchange 
but in whose shares no trading takes place on the Irish market). The second set of 
excluded data consisted of the equities of companies engaged in oil or gas exploration 
(such as Pan-Andean Resources or GIencar Holdings). The final set consisted of the 
equities of government owned companies, where those companies held an exchange 
listing but in which trading was not possible (such as ICC Bank). 
While the rationale fir the first and last are self evident, the reasoning behind the 
exclusion of the petrochemical exploration companies perhaps requires more 
explanation. We have seen that throughout the 1970's and 80's a large number of such 
companies obtained full or partial listings on the exchange. Many of these have been 
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characterised by very small volumes of trade, very low capitalisation, and very volatile 
price histories. I therefore decided, mainly on pragmatic grounds, to exclude these from 
the analysis. Certain of these firms were, at times, highly valued and highly capitalised, 
and attained a full official listing on the exchange. Thus, inter alia they would have 
been included in the ISEQ index. 
I ranked the firms according to the December 31 market value. I then divided them into 
quartiles based on these market values. Firms hold their place, in terms of the quartile in 
which they place based on the 31 December market value, during the subsequent year, 
regardless of how the market value evolves. For each quartile, I then calculate equal-
and value- weighted daily price indices, as well as an overall equal or value weighted 
index. The process is repeated each 31 December. 
20 indices arise from this: for each quartile an equal weighted index (EWQi) and a 
value weighted price index (VWQi), an overall equal or value weighted index (EQUAL 
WEIGHTED TOTAL & VALUE WEIGHTED TOTAL), as well as trimmed indices 
(EQUAL WEIGHTED TOTAL TRiMMEDi, VALUE WEIGHTED TOTAL 
TRiMMEDi, etc.). Table 10 shows the numbers of companies per quartile per annum, 
quartile 1 containing those firms ranked in the lowest quartile by market capitalisation, 
quartile 4 those ranked in the largest. 
TABLE 10: NUMBER OF FIRMS IN EACH QUARTILE By YEAR. 
Quartile 93 94 95 96 97 98 
I 16 17 19 19 17 19 
2 15 15 13 14 13 12 
3 13 II 11 12 II 12 
4 IS 15 16 15 15 17 
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8.4. DAT ASfREAM INTERNATIONAL INDICES 
Datastream international produce other sets of indices, and they represent the longest 
consistent daily series available for the Irish market. They comprise indices for the 
market as a whole in price and total return forms; Datastream have also calculated 
four sectoral indices. As noted, the Irish market has been characterised by a high level 
of speculative issues, chiefly related to exploration stocks. While the market indices 
include these, the sectoral indices, as do the authors own constructions, exclude them. 
These Datastream indices are for the market as a whole; for financial services 
companies, useful in the light of the high weighting of fmancial firms in the Irish 
stock market; for industrial firms defined as the market less financial and less 
resource extractive firms) and; the market excluding resource extraction firms. All 
data are value-weighted indices. The availability of sectoral indices allows in 
principle replication of the work of Pena (1995)and Kamath, Chakompipat and 
Chatrath (1998) on sectoral indices and daily seasonality. 
A major problem with these indices exists however. The construction method of the 
indices is such as to induce a considerable, but unknown, amount of survivor bias. 
Firms that existed on the market at I January 1988 formed the basis for back 
calculation of the indices. From 1 January 1988, firms that obtained listings on the 
market, either in full or in part are included in the appropriate sectoral index. This 
issue in the Irish case has been analysed by Ryan and Donnelly (1998) who carried 
out an analysis of such survivor bias and concluded that the effects were potentially 
serious, and accordingly I have therefore decided not to use them. Table 11 provides 
summary details of the indices on which I carry out preliminary analyses. From these, 
as discussed in the next chapter, a sample set is chosen for more detailed examination. 
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8.S. INDICES FOR MONTIll..Y ANALYSES 
Analysis of monthly seasonality requires different considerations to that of daily 
seasonality. In particular, the frequency of data collected imposes limits on the 
statistical techniques that are deployable. For example, when daily data are collected 
(such as for the ISEQ) then there are, on average, 20+ data points in each month and 
therefore even a few years of data will yield well over 100 data points for reach of the 
12 months in the year. Consequently, partitioning the data on these months will still 
leave enough usable data in each 'bin'. By contrast, if data are available only on higher 
frequencies correspondingly longer runs of data are needed to obtain enough data points 
to allow any meaningful analysis. 
As noted earlier (section 8.2) the longest run of daily data for the Irish market extends 
only to 1988. However, this provides over 10 years an average of in excess of 200 data 
points in each month, more than enough for any statistical analyses. Longer run data 
does exist however. From January 1934 to the mid-1980s the Irish Central ~atistics 
Office (CSO) compiled a capital return index of Irish companies, the CSO Price Index 
of Ordinary Stocks and Shares of Companies incorporated in Ireland (except Railways) 
(the CSO Index). Details on the construction of the index are rather scant wth, for 
instance, official sources such as the CSO itself, the annual Statistical Abstract of 
Ireland or its forerunner, the Irish Trade Journal, providing minimal descriptions. 
However, Geary (1944) describes it as an arithmetic, market-capitalisation weighted 
index with (at that time) complete coverage of the 88 non-railway Irish registered stocks 
listed on the two Irish exchanges of Dublin and Cork. This method of construction, was 
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unusual for that time with, for instance, the Dow Jones Industrial Average being a 
unweighted arithmetic average of 30 share prices or the British FT Ordinary Share 
Index being an unweighted geometric average of again just 30 share prices. 
The CSO Index was calculated from share prices quoted on the Irish Stock Exchange 
on the first trading day of each month. There have been a few changes in its method 
of construction since 1934. Each January beginning in January 1958, the index was 
adjusted to include only those shares that had been dealt in the previous twelve 
months. This entailed a reduction of the number of companies covered from 118 in 
January 1957 to 101 in January 1958 (Murray (1960». In 1967 the index was again 
adjusted to include only companies with a market capitalisation in excess of IR£0.5 
million (Kirwan and Mcgilvray (1983». Finally, the index was later superseded in the 
January 1988 (Statistical Abstract 1988) by the more comprehensive Irish Stock 
Exchange Equity (ISEQ) series of indices. The statistical properties and monthly 
seasonal pattern of the CSO index is discussed in a number of publications, notably 
Whelan (1999) and Lucey and Whelan (2002). 
8.6. INDEX SELECflON 
In total the indices above represent 40 indices, a considerable amount of data for 
analysis. To achieve focus on the moments of the distribution, the main aim of this 
work, I choose a reduced sample of the 40 indices. With rare exceptions, all the 
indices are highly correlated with one another across the time periods under 
investigation. In particular, all of the Datastream and Irish stock exchange indices are 
highly correlated with each other, and as the segmentation of the market represented 
by the indices is similar, I decided that only the Irish stock exchange indices should be 
retained. The quartile indices are not highly correlated (although many still retaining 
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statistical significance) with the Irish Stock Exchange indices, nor with one another. 
Accordingly, these represent a set of data whose movements are not mirrored in otrer 
indices. The final selection of data therefore comprises the following; 
• The Irish Stock Exchange Official Index, ISEQ and its total returns variant, 
ISEQR; 
• The Irish stock exchange Financial index ISEFIN 
• The Irish stock Exchange general industrial companies index ISEGEN and 
• The quartile indices created by the author 
Graphs of the data are appended to the end of this chapter. 
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TABLE 11 : INDICES ANALYSED 
Index Type Description Mnemonic Construction Method Coverage Sample Period 
Own 
Indices 
Equal EWPI Equal Weighted All stocks with the Jan I 1993 - Dec 
Weighted exception ofNI 31 1998 
Quartile I and UK stocks 
Equal TEWI Equal Weighted, All stocks with the Jan I 1993 - Dec 
Weighted Trimmed exception ofNI 31 1998 
Quartile I and UK stocks 
Trimmed 
Equal EWP2 Equal Weighted All stocks with the Jan I 1993 - Dec 
Weighted exception ofNI 31 1998 
Quartile 2 and UK stocks 
Equal TEW2 Equal Weighted, All stocks with the Jan I 1993 - Dec 
Weighted Trimmed exception ofNI 31 1998 
Quartile 2 and UK stocks 
Trimmed 
Equal EWP3 Equal Weighted All stocks with the Jan I 1993 - Dec 
Weighted exception ofNI 31 1998 
Quartile 3 and UK stocks 
Equal TEW3 Equal Weighted, All stocks with the Jan I 1993 - Dec 
Weighted Trimmed exception ofNI 31 1998 
Quartile 3 and UK stocks 
Trimmed 
Equal EWP4 Equal Weighted All stocks with the Jan 1 1993 - Dec 
Weighted exception ofNI 31 1998 
Quartile 4 and UK stocks 
Equal TEW4 Equal Weighted, All stocks with the Jan 1 1993 - Dec 
Weighted Trimmed exception ofNI 31 1998 
Quartile 4 and UK stocks 
Trimmed 
Equal EWP Equal Weighted All stocks with the Jan I 1993 - Dec 
Weighted exception ofNI 31 1998 
Total and UK stocks 
Equal TEW Equal Weighted, All stocks with the Jan I 1993 - Dec 
Weighted Trimmed exception ofNI 31 1998 
Total and UK stocks 
Trimmed 
Value VWPI Value Weighted All stocks with the Jan I 1993 - Dec 
Weighted exception ofNI 31 1998 
Quartile I and UK stocks 
Value TVWI Value Weighted, All stocks with the Jan 1 1993 - Dec 
Weighted Trimmed exception ofNI 31 1998 
Quartile I and UK stocks 
Trimmed 
Value VWP2 Value Weighted All stocks with the Jan I 1993 - Dec 
Weighted exception ofNI 31 1998 
Quartile 2 and UK stocks 
Value TVW2 Value Weighted, All stocks with the Jan 1 1993 - Dec 
Weighted Trimmed exception ofNI 31 1998 
Quartile 2 and UK stocks 
Trimmed 
Value VWP3 Value Weighted All stocks with the Jan I 1993 - Dec 
Weighted exception ofNI 31 1998 
Quartile 3 and UK stocks 
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Index Type Description Mnemonic Construction Method Coverage Sample Period 
Value TVW3 Value Weighted, All stocks with the Jan I 1993 - Dec 
Weighted Trimmed exception ofNI 31 1998 
Quartile 3 and UK stocks 
Trimmed 
Value VWP4 Value Weighted All stocks with the Jan I 1993 - Dec 
weighted exception ofNI 31 1998 
quartile 4 and UK stocks 
Value TVW Value Weighted, All stocks with the Jan I 1993 - Dec 
weighted Trimmed exception of NI 31 1998 
quartile 4 and UK stocks 
trimmed 
Value VWP Value Weighted All stocks with the Jan I 1993 - Dec 
Weighted exception ofNI 31 1998 
Total and UK stocks 
Value TVW Value Weighted, All stocks with the Jan I 1993 - Dec 
Weighted Trimmed exception of NI 31 1998 






ISEQ ISEQ Value Weighted All Stocks Jan I 1988- Dec 
31 1998 
ISEQ TISEQ Value Weighted, All Stocks Jan I 1988- Dec 
Trimmed Trimmed 31 1998 
ISEQTotal ISEQR Value Weighted, All Stocks Jan I 1988- Dec 
Returns Dividend Inclusive 31 1998 
ISEQTotal T1SEQR Value Weighted, All Stocks Jan 1 1988- Dec 
Returns Trimmed, Dividend 31 1998 
Trimmed Inclusive 
ISE Financial ISEFIN Value Weighted All Financial Feb 17 1989-
Sector Index Stocks Dec 31 1998 
ISE Financial TISEFIN Value Weighted, All Financial Feb 17 1989-
Sector Trimmed Stocks Dec 31 1998 
Trimmed 
ISE Industrial ISEGEN Value Weighted All Stocks less Feb 17 1989-
Companies Financial Dec31 1998 
ISE Industrial TISEGEN Value Weighted, All Stocks less Feb 17 1989-
Companies Trimmed Financial Dec 31 1998 
Trimmed 
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8.7. LoWER MOMENTS 
Details of the daily and monthly moments of the indices are contained in Table 12 & Table 
13. Concentrating initially on the daily distribution, certain patterns are evident. First, there 
appears, at least in the indices from the Irish stock exchange, to be a Wednesday effect. The 
literature internationally demonstrates a Monday or occasionally a Tuesday minimum with 
a Friday maximum, while the previous Irish literature offers contradictory results. For the 
ISEQ, ISEQ total returns, Irish stock exchange financial and general indices, and for the 
trimmed variants of the ISEQ and the ISEQ total returns index, a Wednesday maximum 
occurs when the data are looked at in aggregate, while for the ISE Financial and general 
indices, in their trimmed variants, the maximum occurs on Tuesday. A Monday minimum 
is also observed in 6 of these 8 indices, with only the ISEQ Total Returns index showing, 
both in trimmed and original versions, a Friday minimum. 
The situation is much more confused in the quartile indices. Recall however that these are 
not highly correlated with the Irish stock exchange indices. Each day is, at least once, the 
day on which the highest mean return occurs, and the lowest. The pattern of maximum-
minimum days also shifts considerably from the original to the trimmed indices, in contrast 
to the situation found in the stock exchange indices. The most stable set of relationships is 
in the value weighted indices, for the largest companies and overall, where both in the 
original and trimmed indices the pattern of Tuesday being the maximum and Thursday the 
minimum is maintained. The only other sets of common daily duos are for the small 
companies indices where both the value and equal weighted indices show a Tuesday 
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maximum and Friday minimum, and for micro companies where the trimmed indices show 
a Monday-Wednesday paring. Such regularity as does appear therefore is minimal. 
Second, this pattern of returns seems not to be related to risk patterns. Examination of the 
relationship between the days on which the maximum and minimum means occur versus 
those for standard devia tion reveals little empirical support for the contention of the 
standard paradigm that high returns accompany higher risk. In only a very small number of 
cases does the day on which the highest, or lowest, mean return occur, match that of the 
days on which the highest or lowest standard deviation. For the stock market indices the 
ISEQ and ISEQ Total return index, trimmed, shows a match between the highest mean 
return and standard deviation on a Wednesday, while the ISEQ total return shows a match 
for the lowest on a Friday. In the equal weighted indices only the medium companies index 
provides a match between the highest mean and standard deviation on a Friday, while the 
matches are for the lowest on. the equal weighted all companies index, for Thursday, and 
also for a lowest Thursday on the value weighted largest and all companies indices. 
An analysis of the mean and standard deviation of the returns by year also displays a 
number of interesting patterns that help refine the results above. For the Irish stock 
exchange indices, the pattern that they display overall, in terms of the days on which the 
highest and lowest mean returns occur, is not entirely stable across the 10 years of 
observations. Thus, the ISEQ shows the overall pattern in only 4 individual years, the 
total returns index only in 2 years and the financial index in only I of the years. However, 
while the pattern of the two days taken as a pair may be less stable, the frequency with 
which that day, which, overall, provides the highest or lowest mean return, is greater. 
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Thus the ISEQ total return has 3 Wednesdays (they being the highest) and 5 Fridays (they 
being the lowest), the general index 4 Wednesdays and 5 Fridays, and so forth. This 
general tendency is also evident in the quartile indices, a~in, the particular pattern of 
days that, overall, are maximal or minimal, being rare, but the frequency of such days 
individually being high. Certain 'islands of stability' are apparent however. For the 
trimmed equal weighted indices, for the smaller capialization portfolios the minimum 
return days tend to be Monday through Wednesday, while the lowest return days for the 
largest capitalisation portfolios tend to be Thursday and Friday. An examination of the 
pattern of standard deviations by year yields similar results. Regardless, this indicates that 
the stability of the daily seasonal relationship is not immediately obvious. 
In terms of the monthly data, a number of patterns are also evident. January mean return 
is typically high, being the highest in three of four ISEQ indices (the exception being the 
ISEFIN, the highest month being December followed by February and then January. 
There is some difference however in the pattern as between the equal and value weighted 
indices; while the value weighted indces typically show January as being the highest 
(save for the value weighed quartile I index, the smallest), this is not the case for the 
equal weighed indices. In the trimmed indices this pattern is changed somewhat. January 
is typically the highest mean re.turn for the smaller quartile portfolio indices across the 
equal and value weighed indices. In general there does not appear to be a relationship 
across months between risk and return; the rank correlation coefficients of the mean-
standard deviation set of data are negative for the ISEQ, ISEQR, ISEGEN, EWP2, 
EWP3, EWP, and VWP indices, and is below 0.5 for the majority of the trimmed indices, 
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the clear exception being the TISEFIN. Thus on a risk-return basis the pattern is not as 
predicted. 
Using the Leve ne test for equality of variance, we can see that, in general and with few 
exceptions, it is not possible to reject conclusively the hypothesis of equality of variances. 
At the 5% significance level the Value weighted large companies, trimmed, value 
weighted all companies, trimmed, and the ISEQ Trimmed indices reject the hypothesis. 
For the ISEQ itself the acceptance or rejection of the hypothesis varies across time-
periods. A number of other indices at other times reject the hypothesis of variance 
equality, but at lower significance levels. The results in Table 12 show that the ISEQ 
indices, when analysed on a year-by-year basis, typically cannot reject the hypothesis of 
equality of variance. 
Finally, significant departure from normality is the norm for the indices under 
investigation. Under all the measures provided, only for the trimmed variants of the ISEQ 
indices do we seem to have some evidence of normality of the indices. Shown in 
Appendix I are the histograms of the data with normal curves superimposed. 
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TABLE 12: ~MENTS OF THE DISTRIBUTION FORALLINDICES, ByDA y. 
N Mean Median Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
ISEQ Monday 511 0.002 -0.010 0.450 0.045 10.445 
Tuesday 565 0.031 0.020 0.411 ·0.957 10.992 
Wednesday 568 0.052 0.020 0.385 0.420 2.538 
Thursday 568 0.032 0.030 0.369 • 1.014 8.495 
Friday 567 0.008 0.010 0.353 0.019 3.444 
Total 2779 0.025 0.010 0.394 ·0.301 8.170 
ISEQR Monday 510 0.033 0.010 0.449 0.154 10.365 
Tuesday 565 0.032 0.020 0.414 ·0.906 10.168 
Wednesday 568 0.051 0.010 0.378 0.462 2.499 
Thursday 568 0.031 0.030 0.370 ·1.033 8.524 
Friday 567 0.006 0.010 0.354 0.068 3.256 
Total 2778 0.030 0.020 0.393 ·0.247 8.028 
ISEFIN Monday 462 ·0.011 -0.040 0.575 0.763 5.871 
Tuesday 512 0.054 0.Q25 0.551 ·0.570 7.636 
Wednesday 514 0.057 0.010 0.538 ·0.088 2.860 
Thursday 515 0.044 0.030 0.569 ·0.761 7.093 
Friday 513 0.008 0.010 0.494 ·0.254 5.130 
Total 2516 0.031 0.000 0.546 ·0.186 5.779 
ISEGEN Monday 462 0.004 0.000 0.429 • 1.235 25.160 
Tuesday 512 0.009 0.000 Q.400 ·0.394 12.629 
Wednesday 514 0.D35 0.010 0.371 0.396 2.857 
Thursday 515 0.016 0.020 0.328 ·0.798 7.010 
Friday 513 0.013 0.020 0.330 0.229 2.637 
Total 2516 0.016 0.000 0.372 ·0.450 13.364 
EWPI Monday 274 0.008 0.000 0.490 ·2.028 14.313 
Tuesday 309 ·0.054 0.000 l.301 ·7.811 97.872 
Wednesday 310 0.045 0.000 0.592 2.658 33.973 
Thursday 309 0.041 0.000 1.072 13.0ll 211.738 
Friday 309 0.D71 0.000 0.573 4.759 39.676 
Total 1511 0.022 0.000 0.874 ·0.062 200.091 
EWP2 Monday 274 0.003 0.000 0.349 - 5.844 64.389 
Tuesday 309 0.055 0.010 0.728 3.364 52.897 
Wednesday 310 0.019 0.020 0.245 - 3.919 35.895 
Thursday 309 0.036 0.010 0.202 1.208 9.204 
Friday 309 -0.018 0.000 1.063 • 15.751 268.121 
Total 15ll 0.020 0.010 0.618 • 15.428 500.479 
EWP3 Monday 274 -0.025 0.000 0.744 ·14.324 225.543 
Tuesday 309 0.038 0.010 0.601 2.604 96.292 
Wednesday 310 0.036 0.010 0.223 0.847 5.316 
Thursday 309 0.023 0.010 0.223 0.797 10.683 
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N Mean Median Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Friday 309 0.054 0.000 1.132 12.637 218.022 
Total 1511 0.026 0.000 0.675 9.036 422.509 
EWP4 Monday 274 0.093 0.000 0.667 8.359 98.669 
Tuesday 309 0.020 0.030 0.459 - 3.150 22.190 
Wednesday 310 0.061 0.040 0.484 1.680 16.751 
Thursday 309 0.024 0.030 0.511 -4.044 38.324 
Friday 309 0.024 0.000 0.538 - 0.375 39.395 
Total 1511 0.043 0.020 0.533 2.014 63.731 
EWP Monday 274 0.033 0.030 0.424 - 3.865 84.882 
Tuesday 309 0.029 0.030 0.245 - 3.056 27.625 
Wednesday 310 0.044 0.040 0.229 0.872 6.477 
Thursday 309 0.028 0.030 0.220 -2.477 24.017 
Friday 309 0.030 0.020 0.221 -1.549 17.787 
Total 1511 0.033 0.030 0.274 - 3.320 94.707 
VWPI Monday 274 0.077 0.000 0.618 1.760 12.423 
Tuesday 309 0.056 0.000 1.098 - 6.050 102.742 
Wednesday 310 0.020 0.000 0.589 3.753 39.307 
Thursday 309 0.272 0.000 3.772 16.974 294.597 
Friday 309 - 0.217 0.000 4.097 - 17.150 299.041 
Total 1511 0.041 0.000 2.596 - 3.235 650.223 
VWP2 Monday 274 0.032 0.010 0.358 - 3.193 43.561 
Tuesday 309 0.098 0.030 0.733 8.059 83.970 
Wednesday 310 0.045 0.010 0.267 2.424 25.799 
Thursday 309 0.020 0.010 0.551 - 12.186 191.924 
Friday 309 -0.004 0.000 0.426 - 5.943 55.369 
Total 1511 0.038 0.010 0.497 1.070 150.460 
VWP3 Monday 274 0.008 0.000 0.270 - 0.965 6.926 
Tuesday 309 0.079 0.030 0.424 4.270 36.356 
Wednesday 310 0.035 0.Q25 0.257 0.836 12.511 
Thursday 309 -0.001 0.000 0.905 - 6.847 143.052 
Friday 309 0.108 0.030 1.140 13.757 212.134 
Total 1511 0.047 0.020 0.705 9.123 377.960 
VWP4 Monday 274 0.051 0.040 0.400 0.135 20.575 
Tuesday 309 0.067 0.040 0.399 0.783 4.021 
Wednesday 310 0.050 0.Q35 0.394 - 0.970 7.997 
Thursday 309 0.007 0.010 0.390 - 2.332 16.865 
Friday 309 0.056 0.010 0.396 2.022 14.664 
Total 1511 0.046 0.030 0.396 - 0.044 12.615 
VWP Monday 274 0.046 0.040 0.345 - 0.156 18.717 
Tuesday 309 0.069 0.050 0.347 0.635 3.746 
Wednesday 310 0.048 0.050 0.338 - 1.199 9.203 
Thursday 309 0.013 0.010 0.327 - 1.815 13.481 
Friday 309 0.054 0.010 0.359 2.574 19.950 
Total 1511 0.046 0.030 0.344 0.157 13.149 
TlSEQ Monda): 454 0.007 0.000 0.253 0.344 0.078 
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N Mean Median Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Tuesday 516 0.034 0.000 0.255 0.150 - 0.312 
Wednesday 519 0.048 0.000 0.278 0.164 - 0.500 
Thursday 525 0.037 0.010 0.239 - 0.033 - 0.179 
Friday 526 0.015 0.000 0.252 0.040 -0.149 
Total 2540 0.029 0.000 0.256 0.142 - 0.231 
TISEQR Monday 446 0.020 0.000 0.243 0.123 
- 0.120 
Tuesday 506 0.034 0.000 0.245 0.169 - 0.399 
Wednesday 509 0.042 0.000 0.262 0.151 - 0.546 
Thursday 523 0.039 0.010 0.238 0.008 -0.281 
Friday 516 0.011 0.000 0.241 0.004 - 0.334 
Total 2500 0.029 0.000 0.246 0.099 - 0.342 
TISEFIN Monday 412 -0.020 0.000 0.347 0.370 - 0.104 
Tuesday 460 0.056 0.000 0.337 0.119 - 0.384 
Wednesday 456 0.051 0.000 0.362 0.158 - 0.497 
Thursday 463 0.051 0.000 0.326 0.064 - 0.152 
Friday 473 0.018 0.000 0.337 0.127 - 0.267 
Total 2264 0.032 0.000 0.343 0.163 - 0.316 
TISEGEN Monday 413 -0.001 0.000 0.220 0.069 - 0.060 
Tuesday 460 0.025 0.000 0.234 0.083 - 0.462 
Wednesday 454 0.011 0.000 0.241 0.055 
- 0.462 
Thursday 476 0.025 0.000 0.230 0.096 
- 0.413 
Friday 461 0.015 0.000 0.221 - 0.059 - 0.375 
Total 2264 0.015 0.000 0.230 0.054 - 0.366 
TEWI Monday 250 0.040 0.000 0.196 0.598 0.836 
Tuesday 274 0.030 0.000 0.218 0.506 0.855 
Wednesday 278 0.016 0.000 0.195 0.162 1.056 
Thursday 277 0.017 0.000 0.192 0.58\ 1.447 
Friday 280 0.022 0.000 0.171 0.254 1.859 
Total 1359 0.025 0.000 0.195 0.442 1.206 
TEW2 Monday 246 0.017 0.000 0.119 0.631 0.805 
Tuesday 272 0.023 0.000 0.117 0.210 0.307 
Wednesday 282 0.039 0.000 0.130 0.160 0.219 
Thursday 281 0.027 0.000 0.119 0.255 0.320 
Friday 278 0.026 0.000 0.119 0.511 0.650 
Total 1359 0.027 0.000 0.121 0.347 0.408 
TEW3 Monday 244 0.020 0.000 0.130 0.490 0.493 
Tuesday 273 0.021 0.000 0.143 0.198 0.093 
Wednesday 280 0.029 0.000 0.129 0.529 0.338 
Thursday 287 0.024 0.000 0.140 0.189 0.253 
Friday 275 0.021 0.000 0.132 0.270 0.278 
Total 1359 0.023 0.000 0.135 0.313 0.275 
TEW4 Monday 251 0.030 0.000 0.200 0.420 0.248 
Tuesday 277 0.058 0.010 0.217 0.124 
- 0.471 
Wednesday 269 0.042 0.000 0.214 0.163 
- 0.478 
Thursda~ 280 0.033 0.000 0.201 0.210 - 0.081 
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Friday 282 0.D25 0.000 0.213 0.360 0.073 
Total 1359 0.038 0.000 0.209 0.252 -0.192 
TEW Monday 242 0.031 0.010 0.112 - 0.022 0.472 
Tuesday 280 0.041 0.020 0.126 0.091 -0.321 
Wednesday 274 0.040 0.015 0.123 -0.009 - 0.333 
Thursday 283 0.028 0.010 0.118 0.078 - 0.424 
Friday 280 0.027 0.000 0.122 0.175 -0.371 
Total 1359 0.033 0.010 0.121 0.075 - 0.253 
TVW1 Monday 238 0.047 0.000 0.266 0.540 0.756 
Tuesday 272 0.039 0.000 0.269 0.254 0.547 
Wednesday 284 0.006 0.000 0.262 0.450 0.906 
Thursday 281 0.012 0.000 0.262 0.426 1.093 
Friday 284 0.016 0.000 0.255 0.332 0.478 
Total 1359 0.023 0.000 0.263 0.398 0.732 
TVW2 Monday 247 0.048 0.000 0.141 0.267 -0.221 
Tuesday 277 0.040 0.000 0.135 0.221 0.199 
Wednesday 278 0.036 0.000 0.150 0.399 - 0.047 
Thursday 277 0.030 0.000 0.142 0.414 0.283 
Friday 280 0.028 0.000 0.147 0.479 0.225 
Total 1359 0.036 0.000 0.143 0.360 0.066 
TVW3 Monday 250 0.008 0.000 0.173 0.188 - 0.326 
Tuesday 272 0.039 0.000 0.162 0.262 - 0.139 
Wednesday 282 0.032 0.000 0.153 0.189 - 0.007 
Thursday 271 0.026 0.000 0.169 0.214 - 0.205 
Friday 284 0.041 0.020 0.157 0.158 -0.106 
Total 1359 0.030 0.000 0.163 0.185 - 0.163 
TVW4 Monday 249 0.047 0.000 0.221 0.151 - 0.314 
Tuesday 268 0.054 0.000 0.233 0.174 - 0.551 
Wednesday 278 0.048 0.010 0.233 0.091 - 0.421 
Thursday 284 0.033 0.000 0.238 0.136 - 0.570 
Friday 280 0.035 0.000 0.204 0.307 - 0.127 
Total 1359 0.043 0.000 0.226 0.166 - 0.413 
TVW Monday 251 0.047 0.010 0.196 0.190 - 0.290 
Tuesday 269 0.054 0.010 0.207 0.118 -0.614 
Wednesday 276 0.052 0.015 0.198 0.129 - 0.427 
Thursday 282 0.029 0.000 0.202 0.107 - 0.559 
Friday 281 0.037 0.000 0.174 0.403 - 0.092 
Total 1359 0.044 0.000 0.195 0.178 -0.414 
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[SEQ January 2330.108 0.441 0.879 1.579 
February 222 0.064 0.393 0.917 7.882 
March 231 0.042 0.365 0.107 0.464 
April 2280.029 0.319 - 0.320 1.976 
May 2390.015 0.307 0.975 6.672 
June 2250.005 0.264 0.471 1.103 
July 243 0.042 0.312 -0.764 1.958 
August 233-0.056 0.484 - 0.939 5.226 
September 236-0.019 0.420 - 0.11 0 5.198 
October 232 0.015 0.592 - 1.129 10.231 
November 236- 0.005 0.350 0.066 3.386 
December 221 0.066 0.344 0.112 2.069 
Total 2779 0.025 0.394 - 0.30 I 8.170 
ISEQR January 2320.112 0.437 0.814 1.391 
February 2220.068 0.393 0.972 8.332 
March 231 0.049 0.365 0.114 0.448 
April 228 0.035 0.319 - 0.145 1.806 
May 2390.028 0.304 0.913 6.853 
June 225 0.01 I· 0.269 0.447 1.127 
July 2430.039 0.322 - 0.494 2.222 
August 233- 0.048 0.472 - 0.900 5.206 
September 236- 0.013 0.422 - 0.076 4.639 
October 232 0.017 0.595 - 1.005 9.917 
November 2360.005 0.352 0.058 3.294 
December 221 0.067 0.341 0.095 2.098 
Total 2778 0.030 0.393 - 0.247 8.028 
(SEFIN January 2030.084 0.604 0.378 3.445 
February 201 0.091 0.540 0.772 5.586 
March 2090.030 0.467 - 0.056 0.563 
April 2080.045 0.446 0.008 2.647 
May 217-0.016 0.415 0.031 1.446 
June 204 0.004 0.347 0.833 2.810 
July 2220.059 0.488 - 0.566 2.514 
August 211- 0.097 0.636 -0.617 4.617 
September 214-0.004 0.588 -0.216 4.535 
October 2120.061 0.787 -0.800 5.736 
November 2140.032 0.502 - 0.472 3.333 
December 201 0.095 0.576 0.621 6.154 
Total 25160.031 0.546 -0.186 5.779 
179 
N Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
ISEGEN January 203 0.101 0.432 0.735 1.977 
February 201 0.056 0.347 0.915 7.930 
March 2090.038 0.361 0.323 1.131 
April 2080.022 0.305 - 0.033 1.087 
May 217-0.001 0.251 - 0.502 1.932 
June 204-0.019 0.270 - 0.365 2.351 
July 222 0.028 0.288 - 0.689 2.232 
August 211- 0.023 0.468 - 0.376 7.082 
September 214-0.045 0.372 -0.377 4.285 
October 212-0.011 0.593 - 1.485 17.427 
November 2140.000 0.314 0.755 2.716 
December 201 0.048 0.309 0.109 -0.142 
Total 25160.016 0.372 - 0.450 13.364 
EWPI January 1250.096 2.425 -0.290 39.321 
February 121-0.044 0.581 - 1.175 12.617 
March 126 0.068 0.526 3.524 22.920 
April 124- 0.020 0.291 - 1.699 8.101 
May 127 0.024 0.218 - 0.004 3.995 
June 123 0.039 0.895 1.023 24.622 
July 133 0.032 0.698 2.917 37.870 
August 126- 0.051 0.585 -2.206 11.465 
September 130-0.D\8 0.449 - 1.409 6.762 
October 126- 0.026 0.514 -1.440 13.629 
November 128 0.090 0.599 4.236 42.910 
December 122 0.076· 0.399 2.201 15.141 
Total 1511 0.022 0.874 -0.062 200.091 
EWP2 January 125- 0.003 1.883 - 6.679 70.317 
February 121 0.063 0.423 8.317 80.367 
March 126- 0.000 0.436 -6.805 57.306 
April 1240.059 0.277 - 1.763 11.493 
May 1270.073 0.185 2.848 13.780 
June 1230.015 0.204 0.030 7.720 
July 133 0.039 0.244 2.644 19.582 
August 126-0.035 0.248 - 2.542 16.254 
September 130- 0.011 0.416 1.815 36.662 
October 126- 0.020 0.446 - 3.589 46.544 
November 128 0.024 0.179 0.141 2.493 
December 1220.035 0.195 0.531 2.712 
Total 15110.020 0.618 - 15.428 500.479 
EWP3 January 1250.319 1.850 7.475 72.831 
February 121- 0.001 0.250 - 0.547 5.553 
March 126· 0.059 1.058 ·10.875 120.738 
April 1240.060 0.200 0.626 4.151 
May 1270.031 0.176 ·0.559 1.685 
June 1230.018 0.198 ·0.129 1.640 
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July 133·0.008 0.214 0.192 6.876 
August 126·0.036 0.257 • 1.125 6.503 
September 130· 0.047 0.243 · 1.671 7.499 
October 126·0.002 0.226 ·1.396 8.511 
November 128 0.034 0.666 ·8.522 88.625 
December 122 0.009 0.213 ·0.137 2.240 
Total 1511 0.026 0.675 9.036 422.509 
EWP4 January 125 0.042 1.010 3.576 45.882 
February 121 0.046 0.511 ·1.003 18.980 
March 1260.057 0.431 3.978 27.888 
April 1240.064 0.351 0.851 4.648 
May 1270.020 0.323 ·0.582 5.216 
June 123 0.076 0.381 2.794 15.781 
July 133 0.029 0.367 ·0.229 2.537 
August 126· 0.045 0.349 · 1.909 10.864 
September 130· 0.000 0.569 ·2.286 20.537 
October 1260.101 0.714 0.309 10.173 
November 128 0.063 0.638 0.339 44.087 
December 122 0.069 0.290 ·0.082 1.254 
Total 1511 0.043 0.533 2.014 63.731 
EWP January 1250.122 0.366 6.248 55.897 
February 121 0.034 0.220 1.133 7.910 
March 1260.008 0.484 ·8.499 88.920 
April 124 0.052 0.177 0.594 2.912 
May 127 0.035. 0.172 ·1.223 5.848 
June 123 0.045 0.187 1.104 6.947 
July 1330.020 0.173 ·0.196 1.419 
August 126·0.040 0.229 ·2.399 11.885 
September 130·0.017 0.299 ·3.579 27.024 
October 126 0.039 0.344 ·0.526 8.921 
November 128 0.051 0.246 ·3.091 28.656 
December 1220.047 0.168 ·0.360 2.221 
Total 1511 0.033 0.274 ·3.320 94.707 
VWPI January 125 0.050 8.841 ·1.026 58.694 
February 121 0.019 0.548 0.339 2.912 
March 1260.051 0.597 1.853 21.278 
April 1240.007 0.379 ·0.793 6.280 
May 1270.002 0.310 ·0.914 4.948 
June 123 0.068 0.406 1.888 8.294 
July 133·0.005 0.421 0.542 3.018 
August 126· 0.067 0.427 ·0.705 4.583 
September 130 0.073 0.873 4.367 30.525 
October 126·0.030 0.576 ·1.680 12.564 
November 128 0.170 0.833 4.102 24.563 
December 1220.151 0.755 4.187 26.058 
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Total 1511 0.041 2.596 - 3.235 650.223 
VWP2 January 1250.114 1.313 0.801 33.154 
February 121 0.015 0.503 - 3.149 25.593 
March 1260.062 0.196 1.107 2.092 
April 124 0.065 0.229 0.752 3.665 
May 1270.064 0.203 0.557 2.121 
June 123 0.027 0.214 0.398 2.734 
July 133 0.D35 0.227 0.400 2.412 
August 126-0.D32 0.246 - 2.784 19.156 
September 130- 0.022 0.424 -4.644 38.882 
October 126- 0.020 0.475 -6.512 60.625 
November 1280.104 0.515 6.603 54.377 
December 122 0.049 0.202 0.723 3.412 
Total 1511 0.D38 0.497 1.070 150.460 
VWP3 January 1250.299 1.014 5.894 39.629 
February 121 0.006 0.405 - 1.288 17.578 
March 1260.032 0.184 - 0.342 0.525 
April 124 0.068 0.217 1.062 4.166 
May 127 0.041 0.216 0,408 3.134 
June 123- 0.001 0.205 - 0.334 0.773 
July 133 0.012 0.252 0.324 5.885 
August 1260.149 1.702 9.811 103.819 
September 130- 0.042 0.245 - 0.894 6.342 
October 126- 0.072 1.169 - 10.152 109.896 
November 128 0.041. 0.343 - 2.274 18.918 
December 122 0.033 0.221 0.468 2.381 
Total 15110.047 0.705 9.123 377.960 
VWP4 January 1250.104 0.554 1.614 13.881 
February 121 0.037 0.325 0.436 2.749 
March 1260.019 0.302 0.123 1.352 
April 1240.072 0.292 0.322 0.756 
May 127 0.023 0.301 -0.298 1.708 
June 1230.050 0.282 0.853 1.997 
July 1330.036 0.423 - 1.127 11.100 
August 126-0.071 0.444 - 2.015 10.159 
September 1300.040 0.396 - 0.007 5.149 
October 1260.084 0.624 - 0.482 7.528 
November 128 0.063 0.309 - 0.308 0.518 
December 122 0.099 0.292 1.057 2.192 
Total 1511 0.046 0.396 - 0.044 12.615 
VWP January 1250.126 0.399 2.437 11.901 
February 121 0.032 0.290 0.125 2.797 
March 126 0.023 0.256 0.102 1.571 
April 1240.070 0.253 0.298 0.655 
May 127 0.027 0.259 -0.430 1.968 
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June 123 0.043 0.240 0.652 1.500 
July 133 0.031 0.354 - 1.168 10.904 
August 126- 0.041 0.485 0.770 17.624 
September 130 0.029 0.340 - 0.103 5.034 
October 126 0.060 0.538 - 0.682 6.227 
November 128 0.064 0.274 - 0.326 1.189 
December 122 0.092 0.257 1.012 2.333 
Total 1511 0.046 0.344 0.157 13.149 
TISEQ January 2020.050 0.294 0.176 - 0.609 
February 2020.044 0.252 0.096 - 0.188 
March 211 0.053 0.285 0.159 -0.367 
April 211 0.054 0.238 0.232 -0.024 
May 228 0.018 0.234 0.198 0.064 
June 216- 0.007 0.221 0.133 
- 0.271 
July 232 0.064 0.254 -0.160 -0.114 
August 204-0.010 0.256 0.202 0.035 
September 211- 0.008 0.256 0.089 - 0.473 
October 1990.028 0.257 0.199 
- 0.402 
November 2170.006 0.243 0.163 -0.016 
December 2070.050 0.266 0.009 
- 0.390 
Total 2540 0.029 0.256 0.142 -0.231 
TISEQR January 1920.033 0.270 0.084 - 0.707 
February 1990.038 0.239 - 0.054 - 0.311 
March 2040.057 0.266 0.146 - 0.376 
April 2100.043· 0.233 0.152 -0.235 
May 2280.031 0.229 0.119 0.096 
June 2150.001 0.222 0.113 -0.247 
July 2270.056 0.244 - 0.181 -0.187 
August 202- 0.005 0.247 0.154 -0.263 
September 2070.008 0.248 0.199 - 0.487 
October 1960.020 0.254 0.204 - 0.598 
November 2140.014 0.235 0.120 -0.044 
December 2060.054 0.261 0.023 -0.451 
Total 2500 0.029 0.246 0.099 - 0.342 
TISEFIN January 1740.042 0.361 0.161 -0.754 
February 1840.035 0.369 0.023 - 0.502 
March 1900.054 0.355 0.136 - 0.232 
April 1940.027 0.335 0.161 - 0.189 
May 201- 0.009 0.312 0.176 0.120 
June 197-0.015 0.277 0.388 0.151 
July 2020.087 0.345 0.064 - 0.441 
August 181-0.023 0.328 0.398 0.401 
September 1880.011 0.345 0.045 -0.514 
October 181 0.091 0.376 0.003 - 0.729 
November 1940.037 0.347 0.159 - 0.345 
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December 178 0.049 0.345 0.106 - 0.12.8 
Total 2264 0.032 0.343 0.163 - 0.316 
TISEGEN January 171 0.047 0.254 -0.066 - 0.707 
February 183 0.040 0.220 0.086 - 0.208 
March 183 0.026 0.246 0.058 
- 0.472 
April 1890.025 0.218 -0.109 0.055 
May 2080.012 0.203 0.017 -0.062 
June 194- 0.011 0.217 0.147 - 0.4\0 
July 2090.048 0.223 -0.045 - 0.583 
August 182 0.017 0.243 0.173 - 0.431 
September 195- 0.038 0.235 0.197 -0.314 
October 175- 0.004 0.226 0.163 -0.231 
November 194- 0.006 0.215 -0.039 - 0.236 
December 181 0.029 0.246 - 0.040 - 0.459 
Total 2264 0.015 0.230 0.054 - 0.366 
TEWI January 1020.080 0.212 0.565 0.523 
February 104 0.008 0.185 0.355 1.011 
March 1170.016 0.202 0.398 1.619 
April 1170.019 0.183 0.294 1.560 
May 1220.029 0.165 0.456 2.241 
June 1120.038 0.201 0.547 1.057 
July 1220.003 0.180 0.546 0.984 
August 1090.006 0.203 0.340 1.670 
September 1130.027 0.204 0.363 0.777 
October 113- 0.004 0.183 0.112 1.001 
November 1170.037 0.206 0.594 0.820 
December III 0.041 0.205 0.433 1.578 
Total 1359 0.025 0.195 0.442 1.206 
TEW2 January 1020.051 0.121 0.286 0.129 
February 1150.013 0.114 0.204 0.781 
March 115 0.020 0.116 0.254 0.600 
April 1090.044 0.123 0.827 0.722 
May 1200.047 0.112 0.446 0.767 
June 1140.026 0.127 0.015 0.153 
July 122 0.038 0.143 0.318 - 0.458 
August 1130.001 0.118 0.285 0.631 
September I I3 0.016 0.111 0.177 0.245 
October 1120.008 0.110 0.355 0.206 
November 118 0.029 0.127 0.607 0.890 
December 106 0.031 0.116 0.177 0.496 
Total 1359 0.027 0.121 0.347 00408 
TEW3 January 99 0.058 0.148 0.148 -0.245 
February 1080.005 0.147 0.472 0.151 
March 121 0.037 0.131 0.223 0.069 
April 114 0.037 0.129 0.184 0.048 
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May 1200.051 0.140 0.270 .0.271 
June 113 0.032 0.142 0.243 - 0.063 
July 1200.008 0.116 0.626 0.767 
August 113-0.006 0.120 0.235 - 0.005 
September 116-0.010 0.138 0.201 0.627 
October 1170.017 0.138 0.297 0.640 
November 113 0.036 0.143 0.378 0.451 
December 1050.015 0.111 0.318 1.051 
Total 1359 0.023 0.135 0.313 0.275 
TEW4 January 113 0.053 0.224 0.207 - 0.600 
February 112 0.039 0.214 0.532 0.018 
March 116 0.022 0.206 0.174 0.142 
April 1120.041 0.213 0.158 - 0.060 
May 1170.047 0.212 0.294 
- 0.296 
June 112 0.045 0.194 0.057 - 0.054 
July 112 0.045 0.208 0.249 
- 0.220 
August lIS 0.005 0.207 0.031 - 0.509 
September 1160.019 0.213 0.411 0.042 
October 102 0.030 0.200 - 0.025 - 0.547 
November 1220.052 0.209 0.285 - 0.130 
Deceniler 110 0.055 0.211 0.539 0.025 
Total 1359 0.038 0.209 0.252 -0.192 
TEW January 110 0.063 0.138 -0.151 - 0.874 
February 1090.020 0.122 0.316 0.147 
March 1170.D35 0.115 0.004 - 0.099 
April 110 0.043 0.115 - 0.180 - 0.038 
May 1200.044 0.120 0.047 - 0.343 
June 112 0.D35 0.113 0.130 - 0.000 
July 1180.028 0.119 0.063 - 0.354 
August 111 0.008 0.120 0.130 - 0.336 
September 1160.014 0.119 0.210 - 0.277 
October 1060.030 0.119 0.387 0.321 
November 1170.035 0.114 - 0.220 0.024 
December 113 0.046 0.128 0.019 - 0.067 
Total 1359 0.033 0.121 0.075 - 0.253 
TVWI January 106 0.064 0.285 0.283 - 0.026 
February 1040.024 0.298 0.279 0.545 
March 116 0.045 0.292 0.487 0.745 
April 1160.023 0.253 0.027 0.094 
May 122 0.029 0.236 0.442 1.411 
June 1140.026 0.253 0.341 0.469 
July 121 0.011 0.273 0.605 0.719 
August 114- 0.030 0.234 0.057 0.168 
September 112- 0.014 0.225 - 0.246 0.257 
October 1140.002 0.260 0.535 1.109 
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November 113 0.053 0.283 0.613.. 0.968 
December 1070.048 0.251 0.643 1.344 
Total 1359 0.023 0.263 0.398 0.732 
TVW2 January 109 0.062 0.147 0.176 0.049 
February 1090.049 0.151 0.503 0.004 
March 1180.042 0.151 0.488 
- 0.241 
April III 0.052 0.147 0.470 -0.146 
May 1160.049 0.140 0.149 0.257 
June 109 0.028 0.129 0.378 0.030 
July 118 0.028 0.142 0.295 - 0.306 
August 114- 0.009 0.133 0.409 0.379 
September 1170.025 0.137 0.124 0.703 
October III 0.023 0.137 0.435 0.255 
November 113 0.050 0.145 0.402 0.105 
December 114 0.033 0.150 0.318 0.196 
Total 1359 0.036 0.143 0.360 0.066 
TVW3 January 99 0.073 0.188 - 0.152 -0.614 
February 1020.010 0.182 0.231 - 0.718 
March 123 0.045 0.167 0.071 - 0.299 
April 1190.058 0.170 0.208 - 0.554 
May 116 0.035 0.147 0.201 0.002 
June 114 0.025 0.161 0.015 
- 0.332 
July 121 0.010 0.149 -0.041 -0.061 
August 1070.017 0.168 0.368 0.138 
September 118-0.008 0.143 0.298 0.577 
October 113 0.036 0.146 0.186 0.228 
November 1150.031 0.168 0.257 0.063 
December 112 0.028 0.155 0.351 0.590 
Total 1359 0.030 0.163 0.185 - 0.163 
TVW4 January III 0.062 0.248 0.233 - 0.631 
February 113 0.042 0.244 0.337 - 0.473 
March 1170.032 0.228 0.178 - 0.234 
April 115 0.054 0.229 0.191 - 0.011 
May 1170.046 0.217 0.097 - 0.576 
June 1160.025 0.213 0.085 - 0.585 
July 115 0.060 0.214 0.207 - 0.706 
August 1070.008 0.235 0.309 - 0.256 
September 116 0.026 0.225 0.249 - 0.135 
October 1020.059 0.206 0.063 0.051 
November 1190.062 0.256 - 0.105 - 0.855 
December III 0.043 0.193 0.116 - 0.273 
Total 1359 0.043 0.226 0.166 - 0.413 
TVW January 1090.058 0.207 0.112 - 0.569 
February 1130.040 0.213 0.319 - 0.401 
March 1170.035 0.190 0.211 -0.241 
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April 112 0.059 0.187 0.284 - 0.084 
May 1180.044 0.190 0.013 - 0.600 
June 1160.023 0.184 0.037 - 0.617 
July 120 0.049 0.203 0.161 - 0.372 
August 1070.015 0.209 0.358 - 0.330 
September 116 0.034 0.192 0.326 - 0.316 
October 101 0.055 0.175 0.176 - 0.308 
November 118 0.066 0.217 - 0.052 - 0.776 
December 1120.047 0.174 0.233 0.053 
Total 1359 0.044 0.195 0.178 - 0.414 
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TABLE 14: NORMALITY TESTS OF INDICES 
N z· Sig JB6 Sig Epc Sig 
ISEQ 2778 4.050 .000 8.51 0.01 1292.843 .000 
ISEQR 2778 3.951 .000 8.85 0.01 1249.293 .000 
ISEFIN 2516 3.843 .000 9.18 0.01 1002.49~ .000 
ISEGEN 2516 3.888 .000 9.51 0.01 1077.96i .000 
EWPI 1512 10.592 .000 6.89 0.00 3.09~ .000 
EWP2 1512 11.086 .000 5.66 0.00 1.82: .000 
EWP3 1512 11.088 .000 5.86 0.05 1.694 .000 
EWP4 1512 6.558 .000 6.19 0.04 8548.315 .000 
EWP 1512 5.926 .000 6.52 0.04 8662.134 .000 
VWP1 1512 13.619 .000 6.85 0.03 1.l08C .000 
VWP2 1512 8.834 .000 7.18 0.03 2.59~ .000 
VWP3 1512 10.016 .000 7.52 0.02 1.0713 .000 
VWP4 1512 3.669 .000 7.85 0.02 2057.138 .000 
VWP 1512 3.737 .000 8.18 0.01 2243.924 .000 
TISEQ 2454 1.197 .114 17.17 0.00 1.961 .37 
T1SEQR 2430 1.223 .100 17.50 0.00 1.304 .52 
TISEFIN 2192 1.577 .014 17.84 0.00 4.26C .12 
TISEGEN 2172 1.218 .103 18.17 0.00 1.685 .43 
TEWI 1033 2.196 .000 13.84 0.00 95.891 .000 
TEW2 1173 2.001 .001 14.17 0.00 37.603 .000 
TEW3 1244 1.907 .001 14.51 0.00 26.505 .000 
TEW4 1303 1.363 .049 14.84 0.00 25.443 .000 
TEW 1284 1.108 .172 15.17.0.00 6.781 .000 
TVW1 1103 1.151 .141 15.51 0.00 62.611 .000 
TVW2 1180 1.430 .034 15.84 0.00 49.441 .000 
TVW3 1272 1.459 .028 16.17 0.00 16.043 .000 
TVW4 1306 1.102 .176 16.50 0.00 17.708 .000 
TVW 1301 1.285 .074 16.84 0.00 22.568 .000 
a: Kolmogorov-Smimoff Z Statistic; b: Jarque-Bera Statistic; c: Doomik-Hansen Ep Statistic: 
In all cases Ho = Nonnality 
The graphs below show the various indices. What is immediately obvious is that, not 
unexpectedly, the trimming introduces a much less volatile pattern to the data, and that the 
portfolio indices are more voatile than the more complete indices. In all cases the y-axis is 
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9. Is Daily Seasonality Present In Irish Equity 
Indices#? 
9.1. PARAMETRIC INVESTIGATION OF THE FIRST MOMENT 
From the tables above, it would seem prima facia, that there exists a possible daily 
seasonal. Wednesday returns appear high, with no obvious relationship to risk. We have 
seen that the parametric examination of such a seasonal takes two main threads. The 
first is a testing for the significance of individual daily dummy coefficients, the second 
the testing of the overall significance of a regression, via an F test or its equivalent. 
Table 15 shows the results of an OLS analysis of the first moment. 
• An abridged version of this chapter appears in Lucey. B. M. (2002). "How Robust was the daily seasonal in the Irish 
equity market J 988-J 998 ... Revise and Resubmit Economic and Social Revjew 2002 
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TABLE 15: INITIAL EsTIMATES OF DAILY SEASONALITY IN THE IRISH MARKET 
Variable Coeff t-stat Sig 
ISEQ Monday 0.00 0.11 0.95 
Tuesday 0.03 1.85 0.06 
Wednesday 0.05 3.11 0.00 
Thursday 0.03 1.91 0.06 
Friday 0.01 0.49 0.00 
# 2,778 
F(4,2773) 6.11 0.00 
ISEQR Monday 0.03 1.88 0.06 
Tuesday 0.03 1.96 0.05 
Wednesday 0.05 3.07 0.00 
Thursday 0.03 1.87 0.06 
Friday 0.01 0.35 0.73 
# 2,778 
F(4,2773) 0.95 0.44 
ISEFIN Monday -0.01 -0.42 0.67 
Tuesday 0.05 2.25 0.03 
Wednesday 0.06 2.36 0.02 
Thursday 0.04 1.82 0.07 
Friday 0.01 0.35 0.73 
# 2,516 
F(4,25 I I) 1.49 0.20 
ISEGEN Monday 0.00 0.23 0.82 
Tuesday 0.01 0.57 0.57 
Wednesday 0.04 2.10 0.04 
Thursday 0.02 0.99 0.33 
Friday 0.01 0.79 0.43 
# 2,516 
F(4,25 I I) 0.49 0.74 
EWPI Monday 0.01 0.15 0.89 
Tuesday -0.05 -1.09 0.28 
Wednesday 0.05 0.91 0.36 
Thursday 0.04 0.82 0.41 
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Variable Coeff t-stat Sig 
Friday 0.07 1.42 0.16 
# 1,511 
F(4,1506) 0.94 0.44 
EWP2 Monday 0.00 0.09 0.93 
Tuesday 0.06 1.57 0.12 
Wednesday 0.02 0.55 0.58 
Thursday 0.04 1.04 0030 
Friday -0.02 -0.51 0.61 
# 1,511 
F(4,1506) 0.65 0.63 
EWP3 Monday -0.03 -0.62 0.54 
Tuesday 0.04 0.98 0033 
Wednesday 0.04 0.93 0035 
Thursday 0.02 0.60 0.55 
Friday 0.05 1.41 0.16 
# 1511 
F(4,1506) 0.57 0.69 
EWP4 Monday 0.09 2.88 0.00 
Tuesday 0.02 0.65 0.52 
Wednesday 0.06 2.02 0.04 
Thursday 0.02 0.79 0.43 
Friday 0.02 0.79 0.43 
# 1,511 
F(4,1506) 1.03 0.39 
EWP Monday 0.03 1.97 0.05 
Tuesday 0.03 1.83 0.07 
Wednesday 0.04 2.81 0.01 
Thursday 0.03 1.80 0.07 
Friday 0.03 1.92 0.06 
1,511 
# F(4,1506) 0.17 0.95 
VWP1 Monday 0.08 0.49 0.62 
Tuesday 0.06 0.38 0.71 
Wednesday 0.02 0.14 0.89 
Thursday 0.27 1.84 0.D7 
Friday 
-0.22 -1.47 0.14 
# 1,511 
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Variable Coeff t-stat Sig 
F(4,1506) 1.39 0.23 
VWP2 Monday 0.03 1.05 0.29 
Tuesday 0.10 3.47 0.00 
Wednesday 0.05 1.60 0.11 
Thursday 0.02 0.70 0.48 
Friday 0.00 -0.13 0.90 
# 1,511 
F(4,1506) 1.80 0.13 
VWP3 Monday 0.01 0.19 0.85 
Tuesday 0.08 1.98 0.05 
Wednesday 0.04 0.86 0.39 
Thursday 0.00 -0.02 0.99 
Friday 0.11 2.70 0.01 
# 1,511 
F(4,1506) 1.33 0.26 
VWP4 Monday 0.05 2.13 0.03 
Tuesday 0.07 3.00 0.00 
Wednesday 0.05 2.24 0.03 
Thursday 0.Ql 0.31 0.76 
Friday 0.06 2.48 0.01 
# \,511 
F(4,1506) 1.05 0.38 
VWP Monday 0.05 2.22 0.03 
Tuesday 0.07 3.52 0.00 
Wednesday 0.05 2.44 0.02 
Thursday 0.Ql 0.67 0.50 
Friday 0.05 2.79 0.01 
# 1,511 
F(4,IS06) 1.l0 0.36 
From this we can see a number of interesting facts emerge. 
It would seem to be the case that daily seasonality does not pose a major issue, as only 
for the ISEQ index can we see a significant F statistic, indicating overall seasonality. 
There would also appear not to be a Monday effect: Monday returns are positive in all 
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indices although rarely significant. Instead we seem to find here a midweek seasonal, 
with Wednesday and / or Tuesday having significant t-statistics. 
However, the equation is not well specified, as shown by the results of a number of 
regression diagnostic procedures detailed in Table 16. 
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TABLE 16: REGRESSION RESIDUAL DIAGNOSTICS FOR DAY OF THE WEEK OLS MODEL 
Autocorrelation Tests Heteroskedasticit~ Tests Nonnality 
Q6 ARCHIe ARCH2 ARCH3 ARCH4 ARCH5 White's Jarque-Bera 
ISEQ 182.10 120.36 54.02 46.86 26.99 27.86 8.29 24.17 
O.OOf 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
ISEQR 168.23 125.98 64.73 29.23 23.36 21.86 8.53 24.18 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
ISEFIN 116.84 125.98 64.73 29.23 23.36 21.86 3.31 24.50 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.65 0.00 
ISEGEN 146.02 129.75 14.38 3.28 0.49 1.65 7.17 24.56 
0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.66 0.99 0.90 0.72 0.00 
EWPI 2.82 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 4.11 34.83 
0.80 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
EWP2 4.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 3.22 35.70 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
EWP3 21.40 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 3.35 33.50 
0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
EWP4 82.00 95.82 0.00 0.16 0.04 0.04 2.54 24.51 
0.36 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 \.00 1.00 0.00 
EWP 150.00 0.18 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.00 8.77 34.83 
0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
VWPI 6.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.78 36.50 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
VWP2 34.01 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.05 3.65 36.83 
0.56 1.00 1.00 1.00 \.00 \.00 1.00 0.00 
VWP3 44.21 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 3.63 37.11 
0.16 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 \.00 1.00 0.00 
VWP4 94.16 69.89 2.99 23.18 3.94 0.88 0.03 36.83 
0.00 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.56 0.97 1.00 0.00 
VWP 130.18 34.47 3.49 36.61 4.86 0.79 0.38 37.50 
0.00 0.00 0.63 0.00 0.43 0.98 1.00 0.00 
a: Regression Durbin Watson Statistic; b: Ljung-Box Q statistic for serial correlation of up to 36 lags with Ho: No serial Correlation; c: ARCH model of specified lag length; 
d: Whites test for general heteroskedasticity with Ho: No Hetroskedasticity; e Ep Statistic for Univariate nonnality from Doomik and Hansen (1994); f: Marginal Significance of statistic 
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9.1.1. R&ESTIMATION OF THE FIRST MOMENT 
Regression residual diagnostics for the initial regression of the day of the week model 
of Table 15, are show in Table 16. A number of problems emerge which cast some 
doubt on the appropriateness of the OLS procedure. 
Heteroskedasticity: Whites test indicates that in no case is there generalized 
heteroskedasticity. To compute the ARCH Tests, the squared residuals from the OLS 
model are used to compute an autoregression of order n. The test statistic is then 
calculated for each ARCH level as ~N; the test statistic is distributed as a X2 with n 
degrees of freedom. A number of points are evident. The null of no ARCH Effects is 
rejected for the ISEQ, The ISEQ total returns and the ISE Financial Index, with 
rejection at certain lags for the ISE General index, the ISEQ total returns index, the 
Equal weighted-Largest companies at lag 5, Value Weighted Largest companies at lags 
1 and 3, and also at lags 1 and 3 for the Value Weighted Total index. Apart from this 
there appears to be no evidence of ARCH- form heteroskedasticity. Thus what 
hetroskedastic disturbances exist are ARCH form and are thus amenable to direct 
modelling. 
Serial Correlation: There is however substantial evidence of serial correlation in the 
residuals of almost all the regressions, with the exception of the Equal Weighted 
portfolio indices, and the value weighted Micro-Small-Medium indices. This evidence 
on regression correlation is almost identical in pattern with that from the Q statistics for 
the indices themselves. Accordingly, following the lead of Chang, Pinegar and 
Ravicmndran (1993), Easton and Faff(1994),Mills and Coutts (1995) Peiro (1994), the 
data are adjusted where appropriate for autocorrelation. Whites correction for 
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disturbances in the error terms was used. This is discussed in more detail in Hansen 
(1982). In brief, given the regression model Y = X{3 + u the standard assumption 
regarding the distribution of the errors is V = E( uu') = (J 21 . This however is violated 
in the presence of hetroskedastic or autocorrelated disturbances. We can achieve 
consistent estimators of the coefficients, but the estimate S 2X'X- 1 of the variance of 
these coefficients is not consistent. Accordingly, inference based on these estimates will 
be incorrect. Hansen (1982) shows that an estimate of the variance of the form 
t (X'Xtl LLu,X;X,_kU,_*(X'xt, where t} is the number of serially correlated lags, is 
k=-/ I 
consistent. This is implemented in RATS by invoking the ROBUST ERRORS option on 
regression procedures. The degree of serial correlation to be corrected for is estimated 
by an examination of the partial autocorrelation functions of the residuals. These partial 
autocorrelation coefficients are reproduced in Appendix II. The indicated 
autocorrelation lags are: ISEQ 1-3, ISEQ Total Returns 1-4, ISE Financial 1-4, ISE 
General 1-4, Equal Weighted Largest Companies 1-3, Equal Weighted All Companies 
1-4, Value Weighted Largest Companies 1-4. The results of this process are presented 
in Table 17 as the column AR. All other indices had single lag autocorrelation 
adjustments. 
Normality of Residuals: Finally, based on both the Jarque-Bera and Doornik-Hansen 
tests there is clear evidence of non-normality in the residuals. 
A number of alternative specifications of the regression are presented in Table 17, two 
of which are robust to deviations from normality; the initial OLS estimates are also 
presented in order to facilitate comparison, AR are estimates incorporating adjustments 
for autoregression, MAD estimates are from Minimum (Least) Absolute Deviation 
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estimates and TLS are estimates of Trimmed Least Squares; both of these are robust 
estimators in the presence of non-normality. As discussed, TLS can be estimated simply 
by running OLS on trimmed datasets. In addition, a further 'robustness' adjustment is 
also applied. Following the lead of Chang, Pinegar and Ravichandran (l993),Connolly 
(1991) and French (1980), as well as the methods discussed in 7.8, the si~nificance 
levels of the various test statistics are adjusted to allow for Bayesian inference given the 
large number of datapoints being investigated 
While White's procedure allows correction of the covariance matrix for 
heteroskedasticity of an unknown form, we do have evidence as to the particular form 
of ARCH in the error terms. Therefore, Table 18 shows results of an ARCH modelling, 
for those indices for which ARCH heteroskedasticity was indicated, while the 
regression diagnostics for these models are contained in Table 19. In all cases the 
number of autoregression parameters was determined by reference to the partial 
autocorrelations, as noted above, while the number of ARCH terms is determined by the 
regression diagnostics of Table 16. The ARCH models fit the data reasonably well, and 
can be deemed moderately successful, as indicated both by the regression diagnostics 
and the significance of the coefficients67 . In all cases the ARCH and Volatility terms are 
significant, and the values of the daily coefficients, relative to the non-ARCH models, 
are mostly unchanged. Examination of the regression diagnostics indicates that the 
major remaining problem is the non- normality of the residuals. Thus while the ARCH 
models are useful they do not fully take account of the distributional characteristics of 
the data. 
67 Appended to the end of this chapter are graphs of the Partial Autocorrelation Function of ISEQ, (SEQR, (SEFIN 
and ISEGEN. Examination of the residual diagnostics of ARCH( I,q) models, where q is the indicated number of 
ARCH terms, did not show any significant change. Parsimony indicates therefore that in the GARCH models for 
examination of the variance a single lag will be used. 
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TABLE 17: RoBUST EsTIMATES OF DAILY SEASONALITY IN THE IRISH MARKET 
OLS AR LAD TLS 
Bayesian Bayesian 
Variable tI F Coeff t-stat Sig Coeff t-stat Sig Coeff t-stat Sig tI F Coeff t-stat Sig 
ISEQ Monday 2.82 0.00 O.ll 0.95 0.00 0.02 0.53 0.00 0.50 0.62 2.80 0.01 0.53 0.59 
Tuesday 2.82 0.03 1.85 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.69 0.02 2.02 0.04 2.80 0.03 3.01 0.00 
Wednesday 2.82 0.05 3.11 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.07 4.39 0.00 2.80 0.04 4.26 0.00 
Thursday 2.82 0.03 1.91 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.02 3.02 0.00 2.80 0.03 3.33 0.00 
Friday 2.82 0.01 0.49 0.00 0.01 om 0.36 0.01 1.31 0.18 2.80 om 1.36 0.17 
# 2,778 
F(4,2773) 7.97 6.11 0.00 22.70 0.00 34.29 0.00 7.87 3.57 0.01 
ISEQR Monday 2.82 0.03 1.88 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.02 2.34 0.02 2.80 0.02 1.68 0.09 
Tuesday 2.82 0.03 1.96 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.03 3.56 0.00 2.80 0.03 3.10 0.00 
Wednesday 2.82 0.05 3.07 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.04 2.58 0.01 2.80 0.04 3.81 0.00 
Thursday 2.82 0.03 1.87 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.04 4.42 0.00 2.80 0.04 3.61 0.00 
Friday 2.82 0.01 0.35 0.73 0.01 0.02 0.70 0.00 0.81 0.41 2.80 0.01 1.05 0.29 
# 2,778 
F(4,2773) 7.97 0.95 0.44 20.53 0.00 45.18 0.00 7.87 1.41 0.23 
ISEFIN Monday 2.80 -0.01 -0.42 0.67 -0.01 0.03 0.69 -0.03 -2.91 0.00 2.78 -0.02 -1.18 0.24 
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OLS AR LAD TLS 
Bayesian Bayesian 
Variable t / F Coeff t-stat Sig Coeff t-stat Sig Coeff t-stat Sig U F Coeff t-stat Sig 
Tuesday 2.80 0.05 2.25 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.05 4.65 0.00 2.78 0.06 3.50 0.00 
Wednesday 2.80 0.06 2.36 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.05 2.56 0.01 2.78 0.05 3.17 0.00 
Thursday 2.80 0.04 1.82 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.08 0.05 4.48 0.00 2.78 0.05 3.20 0.00 
Friday 2.80 0.01 0.35 0.73 0.01 0.02 0.70 0.01 0.86 0.38 2.78 0.02 1.12 0.26 
# 2,516 
F(4,2511) 7.88 1.49 0.20 14.09 0.02 57.05 0.00 7.77 3.83 0.00 
ISEGEN Monday 2.80 0.00 0.23 0.82 0.00 0.02 0.84 0.00 -0.09 0.92 2.78 0.00 -0.10 0.92 
Tuesday 2.80 0.01 0.57 0.57 0.01 0.02 0.60 om 1.71 0.08 2.78 0.03 2.32 0.02 
Wednesday 2.80 0.04 2.10 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.00 1.58 0.11 2.78 0.01 0.98 0.33 
Thursday 2.80 0.02 0.99 0.33 0.02 0.01 0.26 0.00 2.44 0.01 2.78 0.03 2.35 0.02 
Friday 2.80 0.01 0.79 0.43 0.01 0.02 0.37 0.00 1.63 0.09 2.78 0.02 1.39 0.16 
# 2,516 
F(4,251 I) 7.88 0.49 0.74 6.84 0.23 14.18 0.01 7.77 0.98 0.42 
EWPI Monday 2.70 0.01 0.15 0.89 0.008 0.030 0.80 0.03 2.65 0.00 2.69 0.04 3.21 0.00 
Tuesday 2.70 -0.05 -1.09 0.28 (0.054) 0.074 0.46 0.02 1.71 0.09 2.69 0.03 2.56 0.01 
Wednesday 2.70 0.05 0.91 0.36 0.045 0.034 0.18 0.03 1.77 0.08 2.69 0.02 1.35 0.18 
Thursday 2.70 0.04 0.82 0.41 0.041 0.061 0.50 0.00 0.61 0.53 2.69 0.02 1.48 0.14 
Friday 2.70 0.07 1.42 0.16 0.071 0.033 0.03 0.03 3.54 0.00 2.69 0.02 1.85 0.07 
# 1,511 
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OLS AR LAD TLS 
Bayesian Bayesian 
Variable t I F Coeff I-slat Sig Coeff I-stat Sig Coeff t-stat Sig II F Coeff t-stat Sig 
F(4,1506) 7.39 0.94 0.44 7.574 0.18 26.09 0.00 7.29 0.68 0.60 
EWP2 Monday 2.70 0.00 0.09 0.93 0.003 0.021 0.87 0.02 1.91 0.05 2.69 0.02 2.27 0.02 
Tuesday 2.70 0.06 1.57 0.12 0.055 0.041 0.18 0.03 3.52 0.00 2.69 0.02 3.18 0.00 
Wednesday 2.70 0.02 0.55 0:58 0.019 0.014 0.16 0.03 2.12 0.03 2.69 0.04 5.43 0.00 
Thursday 2.70 0.04 1.04 0.30 0.036 0.011 0.00 0.03 4.50 0.00 2.69 0.03 3.79 0.00 
Friday 2.70 -0.02 -0.51 0.61 (0.018) 0.060 0.77 0.03 3.73 0.00 2.69 0.03 3.65 0.00 
# 1,511 
F(4,1506) 7.39 0.65 0.63 13.919 0.02 54.90 0.00 7.29 1.15 0.33 
EWP3 Monday 2.70 -0.03 -0.62 0.54 (0.025) 0.045 0.57 0.02 1.93 0.05 2.69 0.02 2.26 0.02 
Tuesday 2.70 0.04 0.98 0.33 0.038 0.034 0.27 0.03 3.37 0.00 2.69 0.02 2.57 0.01 
Wednesday 2.70 0.04 0.93 0.35 0.036 0.013 0.00 0.03 2.20 0.02 2.69 0.03 3.63 0.00 
Thursday 2.70 0.02 0.60 0.55 0.023 0.013 0.07 0.02 2.66 0.00 2.69 0.02 3.02 0.00 
Friday 2.70 0.05 1.41 0.16 0.054 0.064 OAO 0.02 2.24 0.02 2.69 0.02 2.54 0.01 
# 1511 
F(4,1506) 7.39 0.57 0.69 13.485 0.02 32.13 0.00 7.29 0.23 0.92 
EWP4 Monday 2.70 0.09 2.88 0.00 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.03 3.74 0.00 2.69 0.03 2.27 0.02 
Tuesday 2.70 0.02 0.65 0.52 0.02 0.03 0.45 0.05 5.27 0.00 2.69 0.06 4.59 0.00 
Wednesday 2.70 0.06 2.02 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.04 2.69 0.00 2.69 0.04 3.31 0.00 
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OLS AR LAD TLS 
Bayesian Bayesian 
Variable 1/ F Coeff I-stal Sig Coeff t-stat Sig Coeff t-stat Sig tI F Coeff t-stat Sig 
Thursday 2.70 0.02 0.79 0.43 0.02 0.03 0.41 0.03 4.16 0.00 2.69 0.03 2.63 0.01 
Friday 2.70 0.02 0.79 0.43 0.02 0.03 0.44 0.02 2.90 0.00 2.69 0.03 2.01 0.05 
# 1,511 
F(4,1506) 7.39 1.03 0.39 12.15 0.03 74.95 0.00 7.29 1.05 0.38 
EWP Monday 2.70 0.03 1.97 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.20 0.03 4.99 0.00 2.69 0.03 4.03 0.00 
Tuesday 2.70 0.03 1.83 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.04 5.97 0.00 2.69 0.04 5.67 0.00 
Wednesday 2.70 0.04 2.81 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.04 3.46 0.00 2.69 0.04 5.54 0.00 
Thursday 2.70 0.03 1.80 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 5.06 0.00 2.69 0.03 3.94 0.00 
Friday 2.70 0.03 1.92 0.06 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.03 4.90 0.00 2.69 0.03 3.70 0.00 
1,511 
# F(4,1506) 7.39 0.17 0.95 3.21 0.01 122.57 0.00 7.29 0.86 0.49 
VWPI Monday 2.70 0.08 0.49 0.62 0.077 0.037 0.04 0.06 4.07 0.00 2.69 0.05 2.78 0.01 
Tuesday 2.70 0.06 0.38 0.71 0.056 0.062 0.37 0.06 4.02 0.00 2.69 0.04 2.45 0.01 
Wednesday 2.70 0.02 0.14 0.89 0.020 0.033 0.55 0.00 0.27 0.78 2.69 0.01 0.39 0.69 
Thursday 2.70 0.27 1.84 0.07 0.272 0.214 0.20 0.05 4.01 0.00 2.69 0.01 0.76 0.45 
Friday 2.70 -0.22 -1.47 0.14 (0.217) 0.233 0.35 0.00 -0.01 0.99 2.69 0.02 1.00 0.32 
# 1,51 I 
F(4, I 506) 7.39 1.39 0.23 7.930 0.16 48.97 0.00 7.29 1.24 0.29 
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OLS AR LAD TLS 
Bayesian Bayesian 
Variable t / F Coeff t-stat Sig Coeff t-stat Sig Coeff t-stat Sig tI F Coeff t-stat Sig 
VWP2 Monday 2.70 0.03 1.05 0.29 0.032 0.022 0.14 0.04 4.75 0.00 2.69 0.05 5.24 0.00 
Tuesday 2.70 0.10 3.47 0.00 0.098 0.042 0.02 0.05 6.13 0.00 2.69 0.04 4.65 0.00 
Wednesday 2.70 0.05 1.60 0.11 0.045 0.015 0.00 0.04 2.80 0.00 2.69 0.04 4.18 0.00 
Thursday 2.70 0.02 0.70 0.48 0.020 0.031 0.53 0.03 4.61 0.00 2.69 0.03 3.51 0.00 
Friday 2.70 0.00 -0.13 0.90 (0.004) 0.024 0.88 0.02 2.92 0.00 2.69 0.03 3.23 0.00 
# 1,511 
F(4,1506) 7.39 1.80 0.13 16.970 0.00 98.01 0.00 7.29 0.83 0.51 
VWP3 Monday 2.70 0.01 0.19 0.85 0.008 0.016 0.62 0.01 1.19 0.23 2.69 0.01 0.82 0.41 
Tuesday 2.70 0.08 1.98 0.05 0.079 0.024 0.00 0.05 6.00 0.00 2.69 0.04 4.00 0.00 
Wednesday 2.70 0.04 0.86 0.39 0.035 0.015 0.02 0.03 2.21 0.03 2.69 0.03 3.28 0.00 
Thursday 2.70 0.00 -0.02 0.99 (0.001) 0.051 0.99 0.02 2.02 0.04 2.69 0.03 2.65 0.01 
Friday 2.70 0.1l 2.70 0.01 0.108 0.065 0.09 0.04 4.97 0.00 2.69 0.04 4.25 0.00 
# 1,511 
F(4,1506) 7.39 1.33 0.26 19.514 0.00 71.22 0.00 7.29 1.70 0.15 
VWP4 Monday 2.70 0.05 2.13 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.05 5.71 0.00 2.69 0.05 3.31 0.00 
Tuesday 2.70 0.07 3.00 0.00 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.05 6.13 0.00 2.69 0.05 3.89 0.00 
Wednesday 2.70 0.05 2.24 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.05 3.50 0.00 2.69 0.05 3.56 0.00 
Thursday 2.70 0.01 0.31 0.76 0.01 0.02 0.75 0.02 2.31 0.02 2.69 0.03 2.45 om 
Friday 2.70 0.06 2.48 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03 4.32 0.00 2.69 0.04 2.59 0.01 
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OLS AR LAD TLS 
Bayesian Bayesian 
Variable t / F Coeff t-stat Sig Coeff t-stat Sig Coeff t-stat Sig tI F Coeff t-stat Sig 
# 1,511 
F(4,1506) 7.39 1.05 0.38 24.64 0.00 106.64 0.00 7.29 0.45 0.78 
VWP Monday 2.70 0.05 2.22 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.05 5.75 0.00 2.69 0.05 3.84 0.00 
Tuesday 2.70 0.07 3.52 0,00 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.06 7.30 0.00 2.69 0.05 4.57 0.00 
Wednesday 2.70 0.05 2.44 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.05 3.69 0.00 2.69 0.05 4.40 0.00 
Thursday 2.70 0.01 0.67 0.50 0.01 0.02 0.48 0.02 2.67 0.00 2.69 0.03 2.46 0.01 
Friday 2.70 0.05 2.79 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.03 4.76 0.00 2.69 0.04 3.18 0.00 
# 1,511 
F(4,1506) 7.39 1.l0 0.36 30.87 0.00 129.92 0.00 7.29 70.90 0.00 
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TABLE 18: ARCH MODEllING OF DAY OF THE WEEK EFFECf. 
ISEQ ISEQR ISEGEN 
Variable Coeff T-Stat Sig Coeff T-Stat Sig Coeff T -Stat Sig 
AR(l) 0.228 11.562 0.000 0.242 12.333 0.000 0.198 8.456 0.000 
AR(2) 0.012 0.551 0.581 0.014 0.709 0.478 0.046 1.896 0.058 
AR(3) 0.035 1.599 0.110 0.024 1.115 0.265 0.019 1.111 0.267 
AR(4) 0.030 1.364 0.173 0.041 2.199 0.028 
Monday - 0.010 - 0.746 0.456 0.018 1.388 0.165 -0.005 - 0.311 0.755 
Tuesday 0.036 2.698 0.007 0.039 3.648 0.000 0.007 0.457 0.647 
Wednesday 0.044 3.396 0.001 0.035 2.938 0.003 0.024 1.589 0.112 
Thursday 0.044 2.874 0.004 0.033 2.154 0.031 0.019 1.161 0.246 
Friday 0.007 0.471 0.638 0.007 s 0.489 0.625 0.019 1.365 0.172 
Constant (Volatility) 0.073 34.397 0.000 0.064 28.366 0.000 0.093 64.280 0.000 
ARCHI 0.112 5.777 0.000 0.129 6.214 0.000 0.162 6.715 0.000 
ARCH2 0.104 6.339 0.000 0.069 3.521 0.000 0.135 10.198 0.000 
A RCH3 0.131 7.876 0.000 0.170 10.407 0.000 
ARCH4 0.167 8.650 0.000 0.244 13.332 0.000 
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ISEFIN VW4 VEW 
Variable Coeff T-Stat Sig Coeff T -Stat Sig Coeff T-Stat Sig 
AR(I) 0.145 6.654 0.000 0.168 7.813 0.000 0.200 9.710 0.000 
AR(2) 0.009 0.441 0.659 
AR(3) 0.006 0.309 0.757 
AR(4) 0.008 0.335 0.738 
Monday -0.016 -0.825 0.410 0.059 3.010 0.003 0.056 3.202 0.001 
Tuesday 0.059 3.179 0.001 0.062 4.038 0.000 0.052 3.486 0.000 
Wednesday 0.040 2.336 0.020 0.064 4.063 0.000 0.062 4.487 0.000 
Thursday 0.045 2.347 0.019 0.001 0.038 0.970 0.032 2.770 0.006 
Friday -0.001 - 0.035 0.972 0.026 1.871 0.061 0.035 2.755 0.006 
Constant (Volatility) 0.122 26.533 0.000 0.095 39.100 0.000 0.072 34.660 0.000 
ARCH I 0.180 8.929 0.000 0.442 15.275 0.000 0.470 11.875 0.000 
ARCH2 0.144 9.335 0.000 
ARCH3 0.132 8.495 0.000 
ARCH4 0.155 7.587 0.000 
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TABLE 19: REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS FOR ARCH MODELLING OF DAY OF THE WEEK 
ISEQ ISEQR ISEGEN ISEFIN VW4 VWT 
Stat. Sig. Stat. Sig. Stat. Sig .. Stat. Sig. Stat. Sig. Stat. Sig. 
Ljung-Box Q Test for Serial Correlation of Residuals· 
LB(4) 2.39 0.12 16.45 0.00 24.07 0.00 
LB(8) 4.79 0.44 4.59 0.33 4.37 0.36 5.20 0.27 20.61 0.00 27.09 0.00 
LB(12) 12.16 0.20 23.91 0.01 30.28 0.00 
LB(16) 16.27 0.23 15.88 0.20 18.04 0.11 11.60 0.48 24.51 0.06 31.33 0.01 
LB(20) 20.04 0.27 27.05 0.10 34.74 0.Q2 
LB(24) 25.94 0.21 26.29 0.16 31.05 0.05 20.05 0.45 38.06 0.03 40.75 0.01 
larque-Bera Test for Nonnality of Residuals b 
Sig: 0.00 Sig: 0.00 Sig: 0.00 Sig: 0.00 Sig: 0.00 Sig: 0.00 
ARCH Test for ARCH Effects in Residuals C 
ARCH(4) 0.57 0.68 0.56 0.69 0.16 0.96 1.03 0.39 1.18 0.32 0.78 0.54 
ARCH(8) 0.36 0.94 0.32 0.96 0.12 1.00 1.11 0.35 13.38 0.00 0.89 0.52 
ARCH(12) 0.36 0.98 0.53 0.90 O.II 1.00 1.28 0.22 10.09 0.00 0.90 0.55 
ARCH(16) 0.28 1.00 0.43 0.97 0.08 1.00 1.26 0.22 8.13 0.00 0.90 0.57 
ARCH(20) 0.26 1.00 0.38 0.99 0.09 1.00 1.57 0.05 7.02 0.00 0.79 0.73 
ARCH(24) 0.24 1.00 0.35 1.00 0.09 1.00 1.61 0.03 5.96 0.00 0.74 0.81 
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ISEQ ISEQR ISEGEN ISEFIN VW4 VWT 
Stat. Sig. Stat. Sig. Stat. Sig. Stat. Sig. Stat. Sig. Stat. Sig. 
Ljung-Box Q Test for Serial Correlation of Squared Residuals' 
LB(4) 2.26 0.13 4.74 0.19 3.13 0.37 
LB(8) 2.93 0.71 2.62 0.62 0.99 0.91 9.44 0.05 103.51 0.00 7.47 0.38 
LB(12) 4.28 0.89 119.19 0.00 11.56 0.40 
LB(16) 4.58 0.98 6.94 0.86 lAO 1.00 . 20.22 0.06 125.14 0.00 16.37 0.36 
LB(20) 5.46 1.00 128.81 0.00 17.87 0.53 
LB(24) 6.04 1.00 8.87 0.98 2.30 1.00 40.16 0.00 132.10 0.00 20.67 0.60 
a: Ho=no serial correlation; b:Ho=nonnality, c:Ho = ARCH effects 
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9.1.2. OVERALL SIGNIFICANCE As A TEST OF DAILY SEASONALITY 
Examination of the results of Table 17 indicates that we cannot with certainty say 
that daily seasonality is a persistent and consistent feature of the Irish stock market. 
First, the issue of whether or not we find the existence overall of daily seasonality 
is dependent on the estimation procedure used. Standard OLS estimation indicates 
by means of the regression F test that the only index that exhibits daily seasonality 
is the ISEQ. Correcting for autocorrelation makes a substantial differen:e, 
resulting in almost all the indices, with the exception of the lSEQ General index 
and the smaller equal weighted indices showing daily seasonality. However, with 
correction for the non- nonnality of the data by means of a robust estimator this 
changes - while the LAD estimator indicates that all indices are seasonal at the 
daily level this is not the case for the TLS estimator. 
The ISEQ appears to have a daily seasonal under all the estimators, the ISEQ total 
return under adjustment for autocorrelatio n and LAD, the lSE Financial index 
under all except the initial OLS, and the ISE General index only under LAD 
estimation Apart from this set a number of indices show daily seasonality under 
correction for autocorrelation and under LAD, these being Value Weighted 
Quartiles 2-4 and Total and Equal Weighted Quartiles 2-4 and Total. Thus, at least 
an initial assessment that there may be daily seasonality in the Irish stock market 
indices is possible, but this appears to be confined to larger indices and to those for 
which we have a longer run of data. That we have found no strong evidence of 
seasonality in the smaller capitalization stocks is unusual, and in contrast to the 
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theoretical fmdings of Theobald and Price (1984), and to numerous empirical 
results since. 
Correcting for the number of observations we find that in the majority of cases 
where tre overall significance was evident that this is also the case with 
adjustment. The exceptions are Equal Weighted Total index (under autocorrelated 
correction) and the ISEQ and ISE Financial under TLS, and the ISEQ under OLS. 
If we place more subjective weight on the 'corrected' indices and the LAD 
estimator we therefore find that daily seasonality appears to be significant and 
widespread. However, this tells us little as to the actual pattern of this seasonality 
9.1.3. STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT DAYS 
As noted above the tests of overall significance are joint tests that the daily 
coefficients are jointly and severally equal to zero. Finding that they are not so 
leads to a requirement to examine which days, if any are non-zero. 
There are two alternative parametric approaches to this. The simplest approach 
relies on the interpretation of the individual t-statistics from the regressions 
reported in Table 17. Under this approach we find that there appears to be two sets 
of daily coefficients the significance of which differs markedly from previous 
results reported in the literature. 
Examining Monday for example, we find that only in three indices, Equal 
weighted Quartile 4, Value Weighted Quartile 4 and Value Weighted Total, does it 
appear as statistically significant regardless of the method of estimation. In general 
these are also only significant when no account is taken of the number of data 
213 
points used in the investigation. For two indices, the ISEQ and the Value Weighted 
Quartile 2 index, Monday is not significant under any fonn of adjustment or 
estimation. For the other indices there is some tendency for Monday returns to·be 
more significant under robust (TLS/LAD) estimation than otheIWise, but this 
appears to be dependent on the number of observations, significance declining 
under adjustment for data points. Monday is however significant when we account 
for ARCH disturbances in the Value Weighted Quartile 4 and Value Weighted 
Total indices. 
By contrast, Wednesday appears significant in all bar the Equal and Value 
Weighted Quartile I indices. For the ISEQ it is significant across all estimation 
methods and , with the exception of LAD estimation, this does not appear to be an 
artefact of the number of data points. For the ISEQ total returns and the Financial 
index it is also significant across all estimators, although more so under classical 
than Bayesian assumptions. The ISE general index does not have a significant 
Wednesday effect under robust estimation, nor under Bayesian assumptions in the 
norrrobust estimates. For the quartile indices (bar the quartile I indices as noted) 
as the size of the finns increases the significance of Wednesday remains, and 
emerges not only under classical but also under Bayesian adjustment. This holds 
more under robust estimation than norrrobust. Tuesday is the only day for which, 
under at least one estimator and under at least one of classical or Bayesian 
assumptions, the coefficient is statistically significant for all indices. However, in 
many indices this 5 a result that only emerges from the robust estimators, showing 
the importance of adjusting the data for non-nonnalities. A pattern similar to that 
of Tuesday also holds for Thursday, although weaker. Wednesday's significance 
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disappears however when we account for ARCH type heteroskedasticity in the 
ISEQ General index. 
Given that the significance of Wednesday extends across estimation methods, 
indices, and adjustments for data points, it seems reasonable to conclude that there 
is a Wednesday effect in the Irish stock market. It also seems reasonable to 
conclude that there is not a Monday effect. This is in marked contrast to the 
international literature. 
An alternative to the standard t-test for differences between means that allows for a 
detailed examination of whether differences do in fact exist between individual 
mean daily returns is given by Tukey's Honestly Significant Difference (HSD) 
test. However, while Steeley (200 I) uses this test, with a finding tmt no significant 
difference in means exists in the FfSE 100 index, it has the potential drawback 
that it incorporates the assumption of equality of variances across the categories. 
As we will see in section 9.5, this is not tenable in the data for a small number of 
indices. An alternative, which does not assume such equality, is Tarnhane's 
(Adjusted) i statistic.68 This is the statistic applied to the indices, ISEQ, ISEQR, 
TVW4 and TVW, which display a second moment effect. Table 20 shows the 
results of these tests. 
68 A difficulty with these tests is that they arise as post-hoc restrictions on an ANOVA model. We have seen 
that OLS estimates alone are not reliable and require at a minimum a robust estimator such as TLS. There 
are no robust analogs of the T2 statistic or Tukeys' HSO test. A partial solution to this problem can be found 
by applying these tests to the Trimmed data rather than the original data. 
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TABLE 20: DFffiRENCES IN MEANS BY DAY OF THE WEEK: TAMHANE'S T2 TESTS 
Tamhane ISEQ TISEQ TVW4 TVW 
Difference Sig. Difference Sig. Difference Sig. Difference Sig. 
Monday Tuesday -0.029 0.960 -0.028 0.652 -0.005 1.000 -0.005 1.000 
Wednesday -0.050 0.423 -0.043 0.150 0.001 1.000 -0.003 1.000 
Thursday -0.030 0.936 -0.031 0.442 0.016 0.997 0.021 0.947 
Friday -0.006 1.000 -0.009 1.000 0.013 0.999 0.010 1.000 
Tuesday Wednesday -0.021 0.991 -0.015 0.992 0.006 1.000 0.002 1.000 
Thursday -0.001 1.000 -0.004 1.000 0.021 0.979 0.026 0.793 
Friday 0.023 0.979 0.019 0.941 0.017 0.990 0.016 0.987 
VVednesday Thursday 0.020 0.991 0.011 0.999 0.015 0.998 0.024 0.857 
Friday 0.043 0.387 0.034 0.394 0.012 1.000 0.013 0.996 
Thursday Friday 0.023 0.959 0.022 0.816 -0.003 1.000 -0.010 1.000 
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TABLE 21 : OFFERENCES IN MEANS BY DAY OF THE WEEK: 1tJKEY'S HONESTLY SIGNIFICANT DIFFFEREN CE TESTS 
ISEQR ISEF ISEGEN TISEQR TISEFIN TISEGEN 
Difference Sig. Difference Sig. Difference Sig. Difference Sig. Difference Sig. Difference Sig. 
Monday Tuesday 0.000 1.000 -0.065' 0.334 -0.005 0.999 -0.014 0.911 -0.078 0.009 -0.027 0.454 
Wednesday -0.018 0.946 -0.068 0.296 -0.031 0.702 -0.023 0.647 -0.073 0.019 -0.012 0.946 
Thursday 0.002 1.000 -0.055 0.515 -0.012 0.986 -0.020 0.743 -0.073 0.019 -0.027 0.448 
Friday 0.027 0.797 -0.020 0.981 -0.009 0.996 0.008 0.987 -0.040 0.462 -0.017 0.846 
Tuesday Wednesday -0.018 0.936 -0.002 1.000 -0.025 0.817 -0.008 0.984 0.005 1.000 0.015 0.879 
Thursday 0.001 1.000 0.010 0.998 -0.007 0.998 -0.006 0.996 0.005 0.999 0.000 1.000 
Friday 0.026 0.789 0.046 0.662 -0.003 1.000 0.022 0.621 0.039 0.451 0.010 0.965 
Wednesday Thursday 0.020 0.917 0.013 0.996 0.018 0.934 0.003 1.000 0.000 1.000 -0.015 0.877 
Friday 0.045 0.309 0.048 0.616 0.022 0.880 0.031 0.299 0.034 0.592 -0.005 0.999 
Thursday Friday 0.025 0.821 0.035 0.836 0.004 1.000 0.028 0.386 0.033 0.597 0.010 0.965 
EWPI EWP2 EWP3 EWP 
Difference Sig. Difference Sig. Difference Sig. Difference Sig. Difference Sig. 
Monday Tuesday 0.062 0.914 -0.052 0.850 -0.063 0.797 0.073 0.465 0.004 1.000 
Wednesday -0.037 0.986 -0.016 0.998 -0.061 0.814 0.031 0.955 -0.011 0.988 
Thursday -0.033 0.991 -0.033 0.966 -0.049 0.909 0.068 0.536 0.005 1.000 
Friday -0.063 0.908 0.021 0.994 -0.079 0.617 0.068 0.534 0.003 1.000 
Tuesday Wednesday -0.099 0.621 0.036 0.952 0.002 1.000 -0.042 0.866 -0.015 0.956 
Thursday -0.095 0.660 0.019 0.996 0.014 0.999 -0.005 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Friday -0.125 0.390 0.073 0.581 -0.017 0.998 -0.005 1.000 -0.002 1.000 
Wednesday Thursday 0.004 1.000 -0.017 0.997 0.012 0.999 0.037 0.911 0.016 0.954 
217 
Friday -0.026 0.996 0.037 0.944 -0.019 0.997 0.037 0.910 0.014 0.970 
Thursday Friday -0.030 0.993 0.055 0.807 -0.031 0.980 0.000 1.000 -0.002 1.000 
TEWI TEW2 TEW3 TEW4 TEW 
Difference Sig. Difference Sig. Difference Sig. Difference Sig. Difference Sig. 
Monday Tuesday 0.010 0.991 -0.006 0.989 -0.001 1.000 -0.026 0.661 -0.007 0.964 
Wednesday 0.029 0.676 -0.024 0.272 -0.009 0.961 -0.010 0.986 -0.007 0.972 
Thursday 0.026 0.764 -0.011 0.903 -0.004 0.998 -0.001 1.000 0.005 0.990 
Friday 0.020 . 0.899 -0.010 0.925 -0.001 1.000 0.006 0.998 0.007 0.971 
Tuesday Wednesday 0.019 0.905 -0.018 0.527 -0.008 0.965 0.016 0.912 0.000 1.000 
Thursday 0.016 0.949 -0.005 0.994 -0.004 0.998 0.025 0.649 0.013 0.753 
Friday 0.010 0.992 -0.004 0.997 -0.000 1.000 0.032 0.419 0.015 0.651 
Wednesday Thursday -0.003 1.000 0.014 0.777 0.005 0.996 0.009 0.988 0.012 0.780 
Friday -0.009 0.993 0.014 0.748 0.008 0.970 0.016 0.912 0.014 0.682 
Thursday Friday -0.006 0.999 0.001 1.000 0.003 0.999 0.007 0.996 0.002 1.000 
VWPI VWP2 VWP3 VWP4 VWP 
Difference Sig. Difference Sig. Difference Sig. Difference Sig. Difference Sig. 
Monday Tuesday 0.021 1.000 -0.066 0.491 -0.071 0.738 -0.017 0.986 -0.023 0.929 
Wednesday 0.057 0.999 -0.014. 0.997 -0.027 0.991 0.000 I .000 -0.002 1.000 
Thursday -0.195 0.895 0.012 0.999 0.009 1.000 0.043 0.675 0.033 0.778 
Friday 0.294 0.650 0.035 0.914 -0.100 0.425 -0.005 1.000 -0.009 0.998 
Tuesday Wednesday 0.035 1.000 0.053 0.682 0.045 0.933 0.017 0.983 0.021 0.939 
Thursday -0.216 0.839 0.Q78 0.291 0.080 0.621 0.060 0.318 0.056 0.258 
Friday 0.272 0.688 0.101 0.083 -0.029 0.987 0.012 0.996 0.014 0.986 
Wednesday Thursday -0.252 0.747 0.025 0.969 0.035 0.972 0.043 0.655 0.034 0.723 
Friday 0.237 0.788 0.049 0.738 -0.074 0.692 -0.006 1.000 -0.007 0.999 
Thursday Friday 0.488 0.132 0.023 0.977 -0.109 0.308 -0.049 0.540 -0.042 0.561 
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TVWl TVW2 TVW3 
Difference Sig. Difference Sig. Difference Sig. 
Monday Tuesday 0.010 0.997 0.010 0.956 -0.032 0.214 
Wednesday 0.051 0.377 0.016 0.803 -0.025 0.470 
Thursday 0.044 0.544 0.023 0.506 -0.019 0.719 
Friday 0.040 0.609 0.024 0.470 -0.035 0.137 
Tuesday Wednesday 0.041 0.571 0.006 0.994 0.007 0.98'8 
Thursday 0.034 0.745 0.013 0.894 0.013 0.908 
Friday 0.030 0.804 0.014 0.868 -0.003 1.000 
Wednesday Thursday -0.007 0.999 0.007 0.987 0.006 0.996 
Friday -O.OIl 0.994 0.008 0.979 -0.010 0.954 
Thursday Friday -0.003 1.000 0.001 1.000 -0.016 0.815 
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Little evidence is present from these tests of statistically significant daily 
differences. Only for the ISE Financial index do we find some, between Monday 
and Tuesda~ Wednesday-Thursday. ThiS" generalised rejection, under a more 
robust parametric statistical approach, of significant daily differences in returns, 
echoes the findings of Steeley (1999). 
9.2. NON-PARAMETRIC ANALYSISOFTHE FIRSTMOMENf 
We have already seen that non-parametric approaches exist to allow tsting of 
daily seasonality, but that surprisingly little use has been made of these in the 
published literature. This is despite the evidence of significant non-normality in 
stock returns and stock indices. The results in Table 22 show non-parametric 
analyses as to the day of the week effect. The effect of the day of the week on the 
indices were analysed by means of a Kruskal-Wallis H test, which is the non-
parametric equivalent to one-way ANOV A. It tests whether several independent 
samples, in this case the individual daily returns are from the same population. It is 
distributed as a chi-squared statistic with n-l degrees of freedom, where n is the 
number of possible distributions from which the sample can be drawn. The null 
hypothesis, which can be rejected of the significance level is below a pre-set 
critical value, is that the data are from the same distributions. 
In this case, the null therefore is that the data, the indices, do not differ as to the 
day of the week. A fmding of a low significance therefore would indicate a 
rejection of the null, and an indication that a day of the week effect is present, the 
distributions of the index differing by the day of the week. The Kruskal-Wallis test 
therefore allows the parametric F tsts to be augmented. Testing for a day of the 
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week effect using both the regression F and Kruskal- Wallis test, Elyasiani, Perera 
and Purl (1996) in their examination of Sri Lankan data found that the two tests 
were in agreement, indicating no day of the week effect. This agreement between 
the two forms of tests was also found in Arsad and Coutts (1997) and Steeley 
(1999). 
TABLE 22: NON-PARAMETRIC TEST FOR DAY OF THE WEEK EFFECT; KRUSKAL-
WALLIS H TEST. 
Chi-Sguare Si&nificance. Chi-Sguare Significance. 
ISEQ 14.222 .007 TISEQ 9.978 .041 
ISEQR 4. lOS .392 TISEQR 4.0S2 .399 
ISEFIN IS.337 .004 TISEFIN 16.648 .002 
ISEGEN 1.993 .737 TISEGEN 3.606 .462 
EWPI 1.804 .772 TEWI 1.281 .86S 
EWP2 3.419 .490 TEW2 6.236 .182 
EWP3 .51S .972 TEW3 .584 .965 
EWP4 1.735 .784 TEW4 4.280 .369 
EWT 1.392 .846 TEW 3.680 .451 
VWPI 4.S68 .335 TVWl 4.532 .339 
VWP2 4.061 .398 TVW2 4.831 .30S 
VWP3 5.750 .219 TVW3 6.848 .144 
VWP4 2.992 .SS9 TVW4 1.827 .767 
VWT 4.150 .386 . TVW 3.214 .523 
From this analysis the evidence in favo ur of daily seasonality found under 
parametric analyses is weakened considerably. While the majority of indices 
show such a seasonal under parametric analyses, under non-parametric analysis 
this does not hold. Only for the ISEQ and the ISE financial index, trimmed and 
original, would a non-parametric test hold out the possibility of a daily seasonal. 
The ISEQ and ISEFIN indices are the only indices from Table 12 that showed 
negative medians for any day of the week. 
While the ISEQ index displayed overall seasonality under all fonns of 
estimation the ISE Financial index did not so display under OLS (analogous to a 
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H test on the original series) but did under the TLS estimator (analogous to a H 
test on the trimmed series). 
9.3. STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE ANALYSIS 
Table 23 shows the results of another non-parametric method of analysis, that of 
stochastic dominance. In order to implement the stochastic dominance algorithm 
of Aboudi and Thon (1994), only those weeks wherein each day was represented 
could be chosen. Thus, weeks with a holiday are necessarily excluded from the 
analysis as the number of days taken as holidays need not be 1 in all cases. 
TABLE 23: STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE ANALYSIS 
Index Second Order Stochastic Dominance 
. EWPT-----------------------------F~id;y-dorci~ates Thursday 
EWP2 Friday dominates Wednesday 
TEW2 Friday dominates Thursday 
EWP3 Friday dominates Wednesday 
EWP Friday dominates Thursday 
VWP2 Friday dominates Thursday 
TVW2 Friday dominates Thursday 
TVW4 Friday dominates Thursday 
ISEFIN Friday dominates Thursday 
ISEGEN Friday dominates Thursday 
ISEQR Friday dominates Thursday 
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Clearly, there is no significant evidence of widespread day of the week effects 
from a stochastic dominance perspective. This is in significant contrast to the 
findings of the regression results presented above, regardless of the particular 
methodology used. What is also evident is that the results that are achieved are, 
unlike those of Wingender & Groff, not robust to trimming - thus the issue of 
normality of the indices arises again. 
Only for the equally and value weighted indices for the second smallest quartile of 
firms does the stochastic dominance of Friday over Thursday returns hold after 
trimming. In all other cases the results are eliminated on a 5% trim. Fridays are the 
most common days to achieve dominance, usually being dominant over 
Wednesday. In none of the indices does first order stochastic dominance arise. The 
stochastic dominance analysis seemingly contradicts the other evidence, with for 
example the ISEQ index, which demonstrates a daily seasonal both from 
parametric and non-parametric tests showing no stochastically dominant pairs. 
This result is strikingly at variance with the other results. The implication is that 
there is no universal preference, from a risk-return perspective, to avoid Mondays 
or to prefer any other day of the week. In consequence, we can infer that the 
Stochastic Dominance results indicate a widespread lack of presence of day of the 
week effects in the Irish market. 
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9.4. RESAMPLING ANALYSES 
Shown in Table-.24 are the results of a series of resampling analyses. 
In all cases 1000 random draws were made from the actual data, the daily returns 
to the index in question, each of N, where N equalled the number of actual 
occurrences of the day in question. For each day which was identified as being 
highest or lowest, for both the first and second moment, the table shows the 
percentage of drawings where the moment of the random draw exceeded or was 
lower than the moment of the empirical distribution. 
TABLE 24: RESAMPLING ANALYSIS OF DAILY SEASONALITY 
(SEQ (SEQR ISEFIN ISEGEN 
Maximum Mean Wednesday Wednesday Wednesday Wednesday 
% Above Mean 6.3% 6.3% 15.3% 12.4% 
MaxilUlm St Dev Monday Monday Monday Monday 
% Above St Dev 1.8% 2.0% 19.0% 5.5% 
Minimum Mean Monday Friday Monday Monday 
% Below Mean 9.7% 13.9% 4.3% 22.6% 
Minimum St Dev Friday Friday Friday Thursday 
% Below St Dev 6.2% 6.7% 5.3% 6.4% 
EWPI EWP2 EWP3 EWP4 EWP 
Maximum Mean Friday Tuesday Friday Monday Wednesday 
% Above Mean 15.1% 12.4% 17.6% 5.9% 22.7% 
Maximum St Dev Tuesday Friday Friday Monday Monday 
% Above St Dev 6.1% 14.5% 8.7% 14.5% 3.0010 
Minimum Mean Tuesday Friday Monday Tuesday Thursday 
% Below Mean 4.4% 12.0% 7.2% 20.8% 36.1% 
Minimum St Dev Monday Thursday Wednesday Thursday Thursday 
% Below St Dev 13.4% 2.6% 10.2% 31.3% 33.1% 
VWPI VWP2 VWP3 VWP4 VWP 
Maximum Mean Thursday Tuesday Friday Tguesday Tuesday 
% Above Mean 6.1% 2.6% 9.1% 17.5% 12.0010 
Maximum St Dev Friday Tuesday Friday Monday Friday 
% Above St Dey 18.0% 6.8% 9.7% 42.7% 30.7% 
Minimum Mean Friday Friday Thursday Thursday Thursday 
% Below Mean 4.7% 6.5% 8.3% 4.7% 4.6% 
Minimum St Dey Wednesday Wednesday Wednesday Thursday Thursday 
% Below St Dey 26.1% 11.3% 5.9% 49.8% 30.9% 
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Take the ISEQ as an example. There are 510 Mondays in the sample. Monday is 
the day that has the highest standard deviation but aso has the lowest mean -
contrary to the predictions of the mean-variance framework. Thus 1000 drawings 
each of 510 data points were made and the average and standard deviation 
calculated for each of the 1000 sets of 510 points. In only 97 cases out of 1000 
random drawings each of 510 returns from the ISEQ was a mean found which was 
lower than the mean Monday return of the ISEQ. 
It is not strictly possible to interpret the percentages here as marginal probabilities. 
This arises as a result of the fact that to do so we would be required to know the 
precise sampling distribution of the resampled statistic. If the distribution of these 
statistics, the means for example, were to be of a recognised distribution, normal, 
binomial, Poisson or whatever, then we would be able indeed to estimate the 
probability of observing a particular value. However, in general the histograms of 
the resampled statistics are non-normal, by inspection. Thus a t- or Z. test is not 
possible. In the absence of this we are therefore redu::ed to stating the percentage 
of trials in which a particular statistic of interest is exceeded or not. 
Thus we can conclude that the low mean return on Monday is probably not, at a 
level of around 9%, an artefact or due to chance alone. Similarly, for Wednesday 
the ISEQ high mean return is also probably not an artefact, at a significance level 
of around 6%. For the second moment we find that only in 18 drawings, 1.8%, do 
we find a standard deviation above that of Monday, the highest observed, and only 
in 62, 6.2%, cases is there a standard deviation less than that of Friday. From the 
table it seems possible to conclude that the pattern of maximum first and second, 
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and minimum second moments, is not attributable to chance in the case of the 
ISEQ. 
Less certainty can be attributed to the measured moments of the ISEFIN and 
ISEGEN indices. The evidence for a Wednesday seasonal is weakened 
considerably, although the evidence indicates that the low Monday mean return in 
ISEFIN is not as a result of chance. ISEGEN Wednesday mean results are 
considerably out of line with the other ISE indices, but this was also the case with 
regard to the ISEGEN under robust and under Bayesian estimation. In general the 
results are similar to other non-parametric approaches. The evidence tends also to 
be stronger for the minimum than the maximum. The evidence also seems stronger 
for the value than the equal weighted indices 
9.5. ANALYSISOFTHESECONDMoMENT 
The evidence presented in Table 20 results in part from the analyses in this section. 
The results of a Levene test are displayed in Table 25. 
TABLE 25: TEST OF HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCE By DA Y OF THE WEEK. 
Levene dfl df2 Sig. Levene dfl df2 Sig. 
Statistic Statistic 
ISEQ 2.404 4 2773 0.048 TISEQ 3.97 4 2449 0.003 
ISEQR 2.145 4 2773 0.073 TISEQR 2.286 4 2425 0.058 
ISEFIN 1.083 4 2511 0.363 TISEFIN 1.785 4 2187 0.129 
ISEGEN 1.782 4 2511 0.13 TISEGEN 1.355 4 2167 0.247 
EWPI 1.725 4 1507 0.142 TEWI 2.348 4 1028 0.053 
EWP2 1.949 4 1507 0.100 TEW2 0.657 4 1168 0.622 
EWP3 1.376 4 1507 0.24 TEW3 0.744 4 1239 0.562 
EWP4 0.165 4 1507 0.956 TEW4 0.93 4 1298 0.446 
EWT 0.582 4 1507 0.676 TEW 1.153 4 1279 0.33 
VWPI 0.946 4 1507 0.436 TVWl 0.118 4 1098 0.976 
VWP2 0.837 4 1507 0.502 TVW2 0.929 4 1175 0.446 
VWP3 1.363 4 1507 0.244 TVW3 2.103 4 1267 0.078 
VWP4 0.88 4 1507 0.475 TVW4 2.409 4 1301 0.048 
VWT 0.891 4 1507 0.469 TVW 2.527 4 1296 0.039 
Ho: (J i - (J j 'Vi, j . Calculated with SPSS for Windows Analyze Means: ANDV A procedure 
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The evidence from Table 25 is that only in a small number of indices can we 
reject the null of equality of variance across the day of the week. These indices 
are the ISEQ and indices in both trimmed am original forms, and the trimmed 
value weighted indices for largest and all companies. This is not surprising, as 
for the untrimmed ISEQ ARCH effects were detected in the residuals of the 
parametric regression. As noted earlier, a GARCH type model specification 
allows for the simultaneous estimation of the mean and conditional variance of a 
series. Thus, it allows us in principle to focus in on those days that have a 
significant influence on the variance. However, there is no justification for 
testing a series, using EGARCH or other specifications, which has not 
demonstrated ARCH effects. Bollerslev (1986) indicates tmt for the majority of 
financial series a GARCH( 1, I ) specification , indicating that the variance 
equation has an ARMA( 1,1) process, is sufficient. However, it is clear from 
Table 18 that the ARCH lags specificatio n is appropriate. Therefore the final 
GARCH models are of the form GARCH(p,q,r) where p=number of AR terms in 
the mean equation decided according to an examination of the P ACF function in 
Appendix II, ,q=number of AR terms in the variance equation and r=number of 
MA terms in the variance equation (always here 1). The finals specification 
therefore is: ISEQ(3,1,4). Following the lead from Beller and Nofsinger (1998) 
to reduce the probability of non-convergence only 4 of the 5 daily dummies are 
included in the variance equation (Monday through Thursday). Thus the constant 
in the variance equation can be seen as the effect of Friday on volatility and the 
individual daily dummies then become the differential effect from Friday on 
volatility of the individual days. An ARCH-In Mean term (Engle, Lilien and 
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Robins (1987» is also included to allow the returns to depend on their own 
conditional variance, reflecting the presupposition in financial economics that 
investors are risk averse and require compensation for risk. To ensure that the 
conditional variance is strictly positive, and also to allow for potential 
asymmetries in the volatility transmission mechanism, an EGARCH 
specification is used. 
Results for these analyses are contained in Table 26 and regression diagnostics 
in Table 27. The regression diagnostics indicate that the residuals are non-
normally distributed and that the variance is non-explosive, the coefficients of 
the ARCH terms in the variance equation summing to less than I. However, 
unlike the results of the ARCH models presented earlier there still exists serial 
correlation in the normalised residuals, although not in the squared residuals. No 
ARCH effects are present. As all daily dummies in the variance equation are 
significant (indicating that the daily risk pattern represented by each differs from 
that of Friday), we are no further in attributing variation in volatility to individual 
days of the week. The ARCH-in-Mean term is not statistically significant, 
indicating that there is not a trade-off between risk and returns at the daily 
frequency. 
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TABLE 26: EGARCH EsTIMATION OF DAY OF THE WEEK EFFECTS IN VARIANCE 
OF SELECTED INDICES 
Variable Coeff T-Stat Signif 
AR(I) 0.02 1.17 0.24 
AR(2) -0.00 0.00 1.00 
AR(3) 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Constant Va riance -1.l9 -21.28 0.00 
ARCH] 0.33 ]0.89 0.00 
ARCH2 -0.08 -1.99 0.05 
ARCH3 -0.16 -5.33 0.00 
ARCH4 0.71 22.78 0.00 
AR-Variance 0.72 63.18 0.00 
Leverage Term 0.22 7.53 0.00 
Monday \.19 13.83 0.00 
Tuesday 0.S7 10.84 0.00 
Wednesday 3.42 39.25 0.00 
Thursday -1.03 -11.28 0.00 
ARCH-in-Mean 0.00 0.00 1.00 
TABLE 27: REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS FOR EGARCH M:)DELLING OF THE DAY 
OF THE WEEK EFFECT ON VARIANCE 
Stat Sig 
The Ljung-Box Q-Test for Serial Correlation in Normalized Residuals· 
LB(4) 34.65 0.00 
LB(S) 46.33 0.00 
LB(12) 70.03 0.00 
LB( 16) 77.92 0.00 
LB(20) 78.50 0.00 
LB(24) 83.07 0.00 
The Ljung-Box Q-Test for Serial Correlation in Squared Normalized Residuals· 
LB(4) 3.57 0.06 
LB(8) 3.70 0.59 
LB(12) 10.15 0.34 
LB(16) 18.02 0.16 
LB(20) 19.93 0.28 
LB(24) 20.S9 0.47 
The Jarque-Bera Normality Test for Normalized Residuals b 






















9.6. TESTING HIGHER MOMENTS 
The evidence presented in Table 28 regarding higher moments is clear; for the 
trimmed indices there is no evidence of daily seasonality, while significant 
evidence exists in the untrimmed data. There is almost always a difference 
between Wednesday and Friday, and also as between Monday and Wednesday, 
further reinforcing the hypothesised Wednesday effect seen already in the other 
moments. These results are not surprising. 
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TABLE 28: DAy OF THE WEEK EFFECTS IN HIGHER MOMENTS 
Pairs of Da~s ISEQ ISEQR ISEFIN ISEGEN EW1 EW2 EW3 EW4 EW VW1 VW2 VW3 VW4 VW 
Monday -Tuesday K-S Stat" 0.781 0.782 0.787 1.021 3.529 2.792 3.21 2.906 2.291 3.261 2.702 1.505 0.798 1.006 
Sig 0.576 0.574 0.566 0.248 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.022 0.548 0.264 
Monday-Wednesday K-S Stat 1.408 1.302 1.041 1.452 2.532 1.432 4.3 1.908 2.157 2.186 2.338 0.652 0.549 0.522 
Sig 0.038 0.067 0.228 0.029 0 0.033 0 0.001 0 0 0 0.789 0.923 0.948 
Monday -Thursday K-S Stat 0.878 1.062 0.948 1.398 2.846 2.868 3.687 2.282 2.072 4.081 1.735 2.806 0.74 0.862 
Sig 0.424 0.21 0.33 0.04 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.005 0 0.644 0.448 
Monday -Friday K-S Stat 1.24 1.401 1.166 1.376 3.509 2.693 3.865 2.178 2.189 6.325 2.164 3.596 1.37 1.399 
Sig 0.092 0.04 0.132 0.045 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.047 0.04 
Tuesday-Wednesday K-S Stat 1.284 1.314 0.832 1.105 4.928 2.926 2.523 1.395 0.873 1.788 2.482 1.553 0.611 0.787 
Sig 0.074 0.063 0.493 0.174 0 0 0 0.041 0.431 0.003 0 0.016 0.849 0.566 
Tuesday-Thursday K-S Stat 0.712 0.623 0.81 0.915 4.706 3.178 1.931 1.167 0.845 3.54 2.856 3.741 0.965 0.724 
Sig 0.69 0.832 0.528 0.372 0 0 0 0.131 0.473 0 0 0 0.309 0.671 
Tuesday -Friday K-S Stat 1.046 1.055 1.202 0.994 5.27 4.626 1.81 1.529 1.046 5.873 3.821 3.339 1.126 1.167 
Sig 0.223 0.216 0.111 0.277 0 0 0.003 0.019 0.224 0 0 0 0.158 0.131 
Wednesday-Thursday K-S Stat 1.305 1.216 1.065 0.919 3.077 2.832 1.228 1.636 0.639 3.6 3.201 3.001 0.705 0.773 
Sig 0.066 0.104 0.206 0.367 0 0 0.098 0.0090.808 0 0 0 0.704 0.588 
Wednesday-Friday K-S Stat 1.559 1.589 1.358 1.514 2.832 4.047 4.049 1.475 0.639 6.055 2.919 3.768 1.633 1.754 
Sig 0.015 0.013 0.05 0.02 0 0 0 0.026 0.808 0 0 0 om 0.004 
Thursday -Friday K-S Stat 0.928 1.016 1.232 0.907 3.982 5.39 3.459 1.006 0.764 7.965 1.689 2.936 1.529 1.609 
Sig 0.356 0.253 0.096 0.383 0 0 0 0.264 0.603 0 0.007 0 0.019 0.011 
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TISEQ TISEQR TISEFIN TISEGEN TEWI TEW2 TEW3 TEW4 TEW TVWI TVW2 TVW3 TVW4 TVW 
Monday-Tuesday K-S Stat 0.758 0.624 0.626 0.651 0.965 0.851 0.689 0.876 0.84 0.784 0.674 0.565 0.482 0.412 
Sig 0.614 0.831 0.827 0.79 0.31 0.464 0.73 0.427 0.481 0.571 0.754 0.907 0.974 0.996 
Monday-Wednesday K-S Stat 0.746 0.628 0.624 0.7 1.165 0.739 0.766 0.735 0.869 1.126 0.79 0.614 0.432 0.465 
Sig 0.634 0.825 0.832 0.711 0.133 0.646 0.6 0.653 0.437 0.158 0.56 0.846 0.992 0.982 
Monday-Thursday K-S Stat 0.876 0.611 0.6 0.722 0.94 0.78 0.567 0.607 0.83 0.943 0.61 0.56 0.445 0.447 
Sig 0.426 0.849 0.864 0.675 0.34 0.577 0.905 0.856 0.496 0.336 0.851 0.912 0.989 0.988 
Monday-Friday K-S Stat 1.021 0.756 1.148 1.101 1.499 0.872 0.557 0.448 1.013 1.197 0.647 0.737 1.027 0.828 
Sig 0.249 0.616 0.143 0.177 0.022 0.433 0.915 0.988 0.256 0.114 0.797 0.649 0.242 0.499 
Tuesday-Wednesday K-S Stat 0.639 0.746 0.529 0.597 1.117 0.539 0.998 0.46 0.593 0.644 0.919 0.783 0.516 0.467 
Sig 0.809 0.634 0.942 0.868 0.165 0.934 0.272 0.984 0.873 0.801 0.368 0.572 0.953 0.981 
Tuesday-Thursday K-S Stat 0.608 0.472. 0.55 0.618 0.5 0.844 0.644 0.687 0.672 0.56 0.742 0.606 0.491 0.468 
Sig 0.854 0.979 0.922 0.84 0.964 0.474 0.801 0.732 0.757 0.913 0.64 0.856 0.969 0.981 
Tuesday-Friday K-S Stat 0.918 1.079 0.743 1.204 1.123 0.944 0.749 0.803 0.709 0.733 1.028 0.997 0.828 0.728 
Sig 0.368 0.195 0.64 0.11 0.16 0.335 0.629 0.539 0.696 0.656 0.241 0.273 0.499 0.664 
Wednesday-Thursday K-S Stat 0.704 0.844 0.524 0.574 0.74 0.564 0.894 0.906 0.724 0.518 0.494 0.606 0.599 0.636 
Sig 0.704 0.474 0.946 0.897 0.644 0.908 00401 0.385 0.672 0.951 0.968 0.856 0.865 0.814 
Wednesday -Friday K-S Stat 1.025 1.082 0.948 0.81 0.701 0.719 0.61 0.696 0.974 0.468 00462 0.6 1.019 1.107 
Sig 0.244 0.193 0.329 0.528 0.71 0.68 0.851 0.717 0.299 0.981 0.983 0.864 0.25 0.172 
Thursday -Friday K-S Stat 0.614 0.69 0.839 0.779 0.679 0.621 0.681 0.531 0.637 0.551 0.578 1.085 1.024 0.854 
SiS 0.845 0.728 0.483 0.579 0.746 0.835 0.743 0.941 0.812 0.922 0.892 0.19 0.245 0.46 
a: Ko)mogorov-SmimotfTest statistic. 
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9.7. EcONOMICVS STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
It is perhaps worth reminding ourselves of the difference between statistical and 
economic significance. This is best summed up in the words of Jensen (1978) who 
summarize s the issue as 
" a market is efficient with respect to an information set Q if it is impossible to 
make economic profits by trading on the basis of D By economic profits we mean the 
risk adjusted rate afreturn, net of all costs" 
Thus, while there is some statistical evidence presented above that the Irish market, in 
particular the ISEQ and the ISE Financial index show daily seasonality in their first 
second and higher moments, there is no guarantee that this provides a profitable trading 
opportunity. This issue was examined in a number of papers. French (1980) and Kim 
(1988), Mills and Coutts (.l995)and Arsad and Coutts (1997) among others have 
concluded that there is little profit to be gained, after trading costs, from a weekday 
trading strategy. One problem with the Irish indices that does not appear in other indices 
is that there is a paucity of negative mean returns. For example, in Kim (1988) each of 
the 5 indices examined had at least one day when the index mean return was negative. 
Traders and investors will of course wish to avoid negative mean returns and gain 
positive mean returns. In the case of the indices that demonstrated daily seasonality 
across the parametric and norrparametric methods only the ISE Financial index has a 
negative mean return, on a Monday. Moreover, this is not statistically significant from 
zero! 
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However, as the return that is being avoided is smaller than the cumulative costs which 
would be incurred then there is little economic rationale to so do. Thus, as a trading 
strategy this daily seasonal in the ISE Financial index will not yield superior economic 
performance. However, for trades which were in any case going to be made then there is a 
timing performance which can be achieved. 
9.8. CoNCLUSION AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 
The evidence above may be summarised simply - there is some evidence that indices of 
Irish quoted equities exhibit daily seasonality. This seasonality is however at once more 
complex than the typical pattern, with more than one day appearing to be significant, and 
unusual, in that Wednesday seems to be an important day. 
Evidence from such as Jaffe and Westerfield (1985),Board and Sutcliffe (1988), Coutts and 
Hayes (1999) and Agrawal and Tandon (1994) on the UK equity market, with which the 
Irish market is closely allied and linked as we have seen, is that a negative Monday effect, 
with Monday risk showing as high, is commonly found. This UK evidence mirrors that 
found consistently in the USA, by authors from French (1980), through Lakonishok and 
Levi (1982), Lakonishok and Smidt (1988) and Agrawal and Tandon (1994). No UK 
research of which I am aware finds a significant Wednesday effect. It would seem highly 
unlikely, prime facia, that the negative Monday in the UK is translated as a positive in the 
Irish market. There is no guide in the literature as to a mecha nism by which this may occur. 
Looking at smaller markets that may be classifiable, like the Dublin market, as satellites of 
larger, we find that there is no pattern quite like the one noted above. In Brussels for 
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example, Corhay (1991) finds a negative Tuesday; Lee, Pettit and Swankoski (1990) show 
a negative Tuesday for Singapore; Alexakis and Xanthakis (1995) for Greece and Pena 
(1995) for Spain show a negative Tuesday return. Nowhere is there a positive significant 
Wednesday return as the dominant feature. 
In another point of dis-congruence with the literature, the majority of the coefficients are 
positive in the parametric analysis. In broad, this is the pattern found in Taiwan by Ho 
(1990), Lee (1992) and Wong, Hui and Chan (1992), However, while these researchers all 
found all positive coefficients, they also found no evidence, under parametric analysis, of 
daily seasonality. While there are a number of negative mean returns evident in the analysis 
above, none are significant. 
The evidence regarding the daily seasonal in higher moments also diverges from the 
international practice. As noted, the extent of such evidence, as opposed to reportage of 
differential variances, is not high internationally. We have already seen that the pattern of 
these moments does not neatly mirror that of the lower moments. In the case of variance, 
our proxy for risk, there is limited evidence that a day of the week effect exists for some 
indices. For the four indices in which at least on daily variance estimate is different to that 
of others a GARCH specification finds evidence only in two cases. Finally, the evidence 
for higher moments is similar to that of Tang (1997) , who finds evidence for individual 
pairs of days to have differences in their higher moments. 
We have also seen that these daily seasonal are probably not economically significant in 
that a trading strategy based on them may not profitable. A timing strategy will however 
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10. Are Pre-Holiday Effects Evident In The Irish 
Data#? 
Table 29 shows means and standard deviations for days preceding and following 
two different types of holidays. Initially, holidays are defined as those days when 
the Irish stock exchange was closed. Over the periods of analysis all such days 
represented official state holidays. No special closings were affected. However, 
as we have seen a number of major equities have in fact a dual or triple listing on 
the Irish, UK and US markets. Accordingly, Unique Irish holidays are defined as 
those days on which the Irish market is closed but the US and UK markets are 
open. If any pre- holiday effects were in fact driven by the known pre- holiday 
effects of these markets, we would expect to see the days preceding unique Irish 
holidays as not being statistically different from days which were not such. Kim 
and Park (1994) & Cadsby and Ratner (1992) have demonstrated that the 
anomalous positive pre-holiday returns of their data sets are local, rather than 
reflections of international, phenomena. An analysis of the data here reveals a 
number of facts. 
First, the majority of the indices show a positive pre-holiday return, however 
holidays are defined. The mean return on days preceding unique Irish holidays are 
less likely to be positive, with the major indices, the ISEQ, and its dividend 
inclusive version showing small negative returns. Excess Pre-holiday is defined as 
Pre-Holiday Mean Return + Post-Holiday Return. If this is positive it indicates that 
the pre-holiday returns, typically positive, are not fully eroded by the post-holiday 
return, typically negative. Excess Pre Unique Irish Holiday is defined analogously 
U The results of this chapter also appears in abridged fonn in Lucey. B.M. (2002) "Are Local Or International 
Influences Responsible For The Pre-Holiday Behaviour Of Irish Equities" Aoplied Financjal Economics 
(jorthcoming), and in Lucey. B.M. (2001) "Pre-Holiday Calendar Regularities In Ireland" ~ 
Economic Review. 29(4) 
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for uniquely Irish holidays. While some indices show negative Excess pre-holiday 
I excess pre-unique Irish holiday, indicating that the holiday period overall results 
in a decline in the market, this disappears almost totally in the trimmed data series. 
Second, a number of indices do in fact show negative pre-holiday returns. For 
holidays in general, the equally weighted quartile 4 and overall indices, and the 
value weighted quartile I and 2 indices, both in trimmed and untrimmed forms, 
show negative pre-holiday returns. For unique Irish holidays, there are a greater 
number of negative pre-holiday returns. Interestingly, these are concentrated 
outside the quartile indices. The ISEQ index shows a negative return prior to 
unique Irish holidays. In general, the negative returns are not carried through to the 
trimmed series. Internatioml evidence is overwhelmingly in favour of a positive 
pre-holiday effect, with only Agrawal and Tandon (1994) finding a negative return 
in Brazil, and then only for days preceding the Christmas I N ew Year period. 
Third, there would seem to be unusual relationships between pre-holiday returns 
and regular daily returns. It is highly unusual in the literature to fmd pre-holiday 
returns as lower than regular returns. All the value weighted quartile indices show 
this for unique Irish holidays, as do the official market indices. 
Finally, the standard deviations, acting as a proxy for risk, of the pre-holiday 
returns, both for general holidays and unique Irish holidays, are almost always 
lower than those of regular days. The differential between these daily returns and 
the pre-holiday returns is, as might be expected, much reduced in the trimmed 
series. 
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Testing fonnally for such differences Table 30 and Table 31 show that neither for 
the general nor for the uniquely Irish holidays can we accept, for any index bar 
one, the total equal weighted index, the equality of mean returns as between days 
preceding holidays in general or uniquely Irish holidays as against days that are not 
preceding holidays. There is a pre-holiday effect in the Irish market. In addition, 
the statistical significance of uniquely Irish pre-holidays seems to indicate that the 
holiday effects are of a local rather than an international origin. However, the 
variances of a number of indices, both for general and uniquely Irish holidays, as 
between p-e- holiday and regular days, seem to be statistically similar in many 
cases. This further strengthens the anomaly - if the risk profiles were similar one 
might expect the returns to be so also. The evidence indicates that, like what has 
been found previously, local effects dominate international effects in pre-holiday 
returns. 
The evidence on the pre-holiday effect is that firstly the typical index shows a 
positive pre-holiday return, this return not being eroded by an equal or greater post 
holiday decline, and that these returns are locally derived rather than 
internationally derived. The evidence presented here is that while the Irish market 
confonns to the second prescription, the first cannot be as easily accepted. A 
number of major indices, including among them the official stock market indices 
show negative pre-holiday returns, this effect however disappearing in the trimmed 
indices. Coupled with the results of Lucey (2000), this indicates that the data 
genemting process for stocks in the Irish market results in a pattern of returns that 
is significantly different to that found in other markets. 
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TABLE 29: MOMENTS OF THE DISTRIBUTION: Q.\ YS PRECEDING AND POST HOLIDAYS 
ISEQ ISEQR ISEFIN ISEGEN TISEQ TISEQR TISEFIN TISEGEN 
Pre Holiday Mean 0.035 0.048 0.082 0.054 0.058 0.079 0.094 0.066 
N 115 80 73 73 112 77 69 68 
Std. Deviation 0.268 0.278 0.407 0.276 0.232 0.234 0.294 0.221 
Kurtosis 1.838 1.404 4.213 0.575 0.645 (0.007) 0.415 (0.434) 
Skewness (0.440) (0.547) (0.770) (0.224) 0.342 0.263 0.162 0.087 
Post Holiday Mean (0.003) 0.043 0.061 0.041 0.043 0.037 0.068 0.013 
N 114 79 72 72 92 56 59 56 
Std. Deviation 0.606 0.666 0.792 0.609 0.222 0.225 0.331 0.217 
Kurtosis 9.453 7.657 8.112 11.892 1.909 0.799 0.201 1.119 
Skewness (1.696) (1.437) (0.864) (0.990) 0.728 0.388 0.427 0.388 
Pre Unique Irish Holiday Mean (0.005) (0.003) 0.002 0.010 0.017 0.041 0.059 0.053 
N 78 53 48 48 76 50 46 45 
Std. Deviation 0.249 0.284 0.410 0.274 0.213 0.223 0.304 0.224 
Kurtosis 2.272 1.266 4.584 0.356 0.861 (0.300) 0.562 (0.579) 
Skewness (0.782) (0.791) (1.380) (0.527) (0.033) 0.077 0.159 0.103 
Post Unique Irish Holiday Mean (0.030) 0.Q35 0.043 0.019 0.051 0.051 0.052 (0.005) 
N 64 44 40 40 50 30 31 31 
Std. Deviation 0.735 0.800 0.952 0.745 0.244 0.273 0.362 0.262 
Kurtosis 7.079 6.349 6.695 9.471 1.398 (0.142) (0.151) (0.028) 
Skewness (1.662) (1.562) (0.880) (1.001) 0.613 0.060 0.139 0.272 
Total Mean 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.016 0.028 0.029 0.032 0.015 
N 4041 2778 2516 2516 3637 2500 2264 2264 
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Std. Deviation 0.457 0.393 0.546 0.372 0.232 0.246 0.343 0.230 
Kurtosis 17.214 8.028 5.779 13.364 0.448 (0.342) (0.316) (0.366) 
Skewness (0.550) (0.247) (0.186) (0.450) 0.238 0.099 0.163 0.054 
Excess Pre-holiday Mean 0.033 0.091 0.143 0.095 0.101 0.116 0.162 0.079 
Excess Pre Unique Irish Holiday Mean (0.035) 0.031 0.045 0.029 0.068 0.092 0.111 0.048 
EWPI EWP2 EWP3 EWP4 EWP VWPI VWP2 VWP3 VWP4 VWP 
Pre Holiday Mean 0.059 0.058 0.018 (0.030) 0.004 (0.100) 0.007 0.056 0.077 0.070 
N 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 47 
Std. Deviation 0.177 0.369 0.199 0.606 0.228 0.309 0.130 0.174 0.455 0.372 
Kurtosis 4.758 37.560 . 2.905 21.936 16.151 8.287 0.956 9.318 11.214 10.896 
Skewness 2.117 5.807 0.014 3.571 2.725 (2.530) 0.110 1.837 (0.346) 0.080 
Post Holiday Mean (0.039) (0.231) 0.518 (0.093) 0.083 (0.223) 0.140 0.548 0.116 0.160 
N 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Std. Deviation 3.942 3.074 3.027 1.039 0.213 14.647 2.147 1.586 0.652 0.346 
Kurtosis 14.974 26.382 27.180 10.835 2.592 21.341 11.939 15.363 10.200 2.843 
Skewness (0.080) (4.123) 4.628 (3.046) 0.760 (0.582) 0.478 3.892 0.165 1.037 
Pre Unique Irish Holiday Mean 0.042 0.087 (0.014) 0.048 0.030 (0.028) 0.011 0.Q38 0.001 0.011 
N 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Std. Deviation 0.176 0.451 0.176 0.727 0.270 0.220 0.122 0.119 0.502 0.412 
Kurtosis 8.215 26.222 2.550 15.765 12.395 10.859 2.139 2.274 12.245 12.199 
Skewness 2.634 4.982 (1.328) 3.098 2.491 (2.434) 0.046 (0.310) (0.312) 0.199 
Post Unique Irish Holiday Mean 0.008 (0.016) 0.024 0.187 0.089 0.107 (0.020) 0.126 0.155 0.139 
N 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 
Std. Deviation 0.153 0.158 0.169 0.434 0.225 0.639 0.138 0.207 0.377 0.302 
Kurtosis 1.625 1.157 4.231 2.933 3.724 7.295 3.164 0.795 0.077 (0.100) 
Skewness 0.996 (0.391) 1.449 (0.255) 0.503 1.418 (1.108) 1.177 0.507 0.349 
Total Mean 0.022 0.020 0.026 0.043 0.033 0.041 0.038 0.047 0.046 0.046 
N 1511 1511 1511 1511 1511 1511 1511 1511 1511 1511 
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Std. Deviation 0.874 0.618 0.675 0.533 0.274 2.596 0.497 0.705 0.396 0.344 
Kurtosis 200.091 500.479 422.509 63.731 94.707 650.223 150.460 377.960 12.615 13.149 
Skewness (0.062) (15.428) 9.036 2.014 (3.320) (3.235) 1.070 9.123 (0.044) 0.157 
Excess Pre-holiday Mean 0.020 (0.173) 0.536 (0.122) 0.087 (0.323) 0.147 0.603 0.192 0.230 
Excess Pre Unique Irish Holiday Mean 0.050 0.072 0.010 0.235 0.119 0.080 (0.008) 0.164 0.156 0.150 
TEWI TEW2 TEW3 TEW4 TEW TVWI TVW2 TVW3 TVW4 TVW 
Pre Holiday Mean 0.045 0.015 0.027 (0.001) (0.003) (0.033) 0.007 0.038 0.031 0.042 
N 46 45 42 40 44 44 47 46 42 43 
Std. Deviation 0.149 0.105 0.114 0.187 0.113 0.160 0.130 0.128 0.153 0.149 
Kurtosis 4.005 1.869 0.954 0.664 0.202 1.299 0.956 1.404 0.770 2.036 
Skewness 1.916 0.514 0.080 0.541 0.010 (0.336) 0.110 (0.521) 0.915 1.419 
Post Holiday Mean 0.006 (0.002) 0.004 0.124 0.055 0.020 0.034 0.053 0.105 0.104 
N 38 39 40 36 40 37 40 38 38 39 
Std. Deviation 0.171 0.118 0.125 0.200 0.103 0.220 0.132 0.156 0.260 0.219 
Kurtosis 1.574 1.127 1.657 0.176 (0.220) 1.093 (0.017) 0.929 (0.539) (0.458) 
Skewness 0.619 0.251 (0.077) 0.355 0.483 0.497 0.388 0.496 (0.027) (0.134) 
Pre Unique Irish Holiday Mean 0.018 0.007 0.020 0.033 0.010 0.004 0.011 0.038 0.005 0.010 
N 29 29 28 26 28 29 30 30 28 28 
Std. Deviation 0.123 0.111 0.122 0.208 0.119 0.136 0.122 0.119 0.135 0.111 
Kurtosis 7.819 2.447 0.574 (0.284) (0.209) 2.410 2.139 2.274 2.696 2.469 
Skewness 2.192 0.923 (0.215) 0.431 0.197 0.585 0.046 (0.310) 1.007 1.235 
Post Unique Irish Holiday Mean 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.131 0.065 0.033 (0.001) 0.082 0.085 0.086 
N 24 23 23 20 21 21 23 22 20 20 
Std. Deviation 0.153 0.137 0.127 0.198 0.097 0.229 0.104 0.151 0.242 0.200 
Kurtosis 1.625 0.809 2.625 0.590 0.247 1.936 (0.738) 0.51 I (0.483) (0.659) 
Skewness 0.996 0.157 0.378 0.161 0.274 0.445 0.317 0.895 0.332 0.228 
Total Mean 0.025 0.027 0.023 0.038 0.033 0.023 0.036 0.030 0.043 0.044 
N 1359 1359 1359 1359 1359 1359 1359 1359 1359 1359 
Std. Deviation 0.195 0.121 0.135 0.209 0.121 0.263 0.143 0.163 0.226 0.195 
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Kurtosis 1.206 0.408 0.275 (0.192) (0.253) 0.732 0.066 (0.163) (0.413) (0.414) 
Skewness 0.442 0.347 0.313 0.252 0.075 0.398 0.360 0.185 0.166 0.178 
Excess Pre-holiday Mean 0.051 0.013 0.031 0.123 0.053 (0.012) 0.041 0.091 0.136 0.145 
Excess Pre Unique Irish Holiday Mean 0.027 0.009 0.021 0.164 0.075 0.038 0.010 0.120 0.090 0.096 
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TABLE 30: TESTING FOR EQUALITY OF VARIANCE AND EQUALITY OF MEANS, DAYS 
PRECEEDING HOLIDAY VS. OTHER DAYS. 
Levene's Test for Sig t-test for Sig (2-tailed) 
equality of variance equality of means 
EWP 0.444 0.505 0.875 0.386 
EWPl 2.032 0.154 -1.098 0.274 
EWP2 0.108 0.742 -0.705 0.484 
EWP3 0.386 0.535 0.245 0.807 
EWP4 0.043 0.835 0.84 0.405 
ISEFIN 4.263 0.039 -0.809 0.419 
ISEGEN 1.887 0.17 -1.191 0.237 
ISEQ 5.805 0.016 -0.135 0.893 
ISEQR 4.343 0.037 -0.413 0.68 
TEW 1.434 0.231 2.152 0.037 
TEW1 3.655 0.056 -0.932 0.356 
TEW2 2.85 0.092 0.763 0.449 
TEW3 2.126 0.145 -0.204 0.839 
TEW4 4.214 0.04 1.179 0.239 
TISEFIN 3.419 0.065 -1.769 0.081 
TISEGEN 0.21 0.647 -1.926 0.058 
TISEQ 0 0.99 -1.405 0.163 
TISEQR 0.696 0.404 -1.888 0.063 
TVW 7.592 0.006 0.065 0.948 
TVWl 9.325 0.002 1.429 0.153 
TVW2 3.664 0.056 1.54 0.13 
TVW3 5.863 0.016 -0.357 0.721 
TVW4 12.177 0 0.351 0.726 
VWP 0.271 0.603 -0.451 0.654 
VWPl 0.377 0.539 1.758 0.079 
VWP2 2.362 0.125 1.393 0.167 
VWP3 1.239 0.266 -0.289 0.773 
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TABLE 31: TESTING FOR EQUALITY OF VARIANCE AND EQUALITY OF MEANS, DAyS 
PRECEEDING UNIQUE IRISH HOLIDAYS VERSUS OTHER DAYS 
Levene Sig 2-tailed Sig 
Statistic t-test 
EWP 0.444 0.505 0.875 0.386 
EWPI 2.032 0.154 -1.098 0.274 
EWP2 0.108 0.742 -0.705 0.484 
EWP3 0.386 0.535 0.245 0.807 
EWP4 0.043 0.835 0.84 0.405 
ISEFIN 4.263 0.039 -0.809 0.419 
ISEGEN 1.887 0.17 -1.191 0.237 
ISEQ 5.805 0.016 -0.135 0.893 
ISEQR 4.343 0.037 -0.413 0.68 
TEW 1.434 0.231 2.152 0.037 
TEWI 3.655 0.056 -0.932 0.356 
TEW2 2.85 0.092 0.763 0.449 
TEW3 2.126 0.145 -0.204 0.839 
TEW4 4.214 0.04 1.179 0.239 
TISEFIN 3.419 0.065 -1.769 0.081 
TISEGEN 0.21 0.647 -1.926 0.058 
TISEQ 0 0.99 -1.405 0.163 
TISEQR 0.696 0.404 -1.888 0.063 
TVW 7.592 0.006 0.065 0.948 
TVWI 9.325 0.002 1.429 0.153 
TVW2 3.664 0.056 1.54 0.13 
TVW3 5.863 0.016 -0.357 0.721 
TVW4 12.177 0 0.351 0.726 
VWP 0.271 0.603 -0.451 0.654 
VWPI 0.377 0.539 1.758 0.079 
VWP2 2.362 0.125 1.393 0.167 
VWP3 1.239 0.266 -0.289 0.773 
VWP4 0.121 0.728 -0.469 0.641 
TABLE 32: NON PARAMETRIC TESTING FOR EQUALITY OF MEANS, DAYS PRECEDING 
IRISH HOLIDAYS VS. OTHER DAYS. 
Mann-Whitne~ U Wilcoxon W As~mI!' Sig. ~2-tailed~ 
EWPI 32032.5 1104413 0.418235 
EWP2 32757 33885 0.575579 
EWP3 34278 1106658 0.965863 
EWP4 27537 28665 0.019689 
EWP 28501 29629 0.044985 
VWPI 28821 29949 0.057412 
VWP2 31301 32429 0.291731 
VWP3 31494 1103874 0.322991 
VWP4 33484.5 1105865 0.754825 
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VWP 33933.5 1106314 0.873045 
ISEQ 216866 7925567 0.469472 
ISEQR 101237 3742188 0.344525 
ISEFIN 79528 3064874 0.114929 
ISEGEN 80821 3066167 0.17225 
TEWI 28522.5 891163.5 0.518762 
TEW2 27872 28907 0.5126 
TEW3 26832 894735 0.741733 
TEW4 23068 23888 0.175585 
TEW 23725 24715 0.042091 
TVWI 25505 26495 0.17978 
TVW2 27729 28857 0.240185 
TVW3 28024 890665 0.405772 
TVW4 26449.5 27352.5 0.629612 
TVW 27333.5 28279.5 0.704481 
TISEQ 182767 6397342 0.178283 
TISEQR 82666 3019342 0.088567 
TISEFIN 66003 24761 I3 0.068942 
TISEGEN 65138 2477444 0.072763 
TABLE 33: NON PARAMETRIC TESTING FOR EQUALITY OF MEANS, DAYS PRECEDING 
UNIQUE IRISH HOLIDAYS YS. OTHER DAYS. 
Mann-Whitney Asymp. Sig. (2-
U Wilcoxon W tailed) 
EWPI 22018.5 1-l19440 0.933478 
EWP2 20480 20945 0.462984 
EWP3 20953.5 21418.5 0.59387 
EWP4 20299 20764 0.418052 
EWP 19931 20396 0.334381 
VWP1 20771 21236 0.540799 
VWP2 20644 21109 0.50651 
VWP3 20857 1118278 0.565987 
VWP4 20059.5 20524.5 0.362287 
VWP 19912.5 20377.5 0.330482 
ISEQ 150360 153441 0.679446 
ISEQR 70124.5 71555.5 0.718069 
ISEFIN 58369 3105115 0.86255 
ISEGEN 58218 3104964 0.838806 
TEW1 18786.5 19221.5 0.810258 
TEW2 16799 17234 0.233851 
TEW3 18457.5 904903.5 0.931549 
TEW4 16830 17181 0.801207 
TEW 16336 16742 0.263497 
TVWl 18556 18991 0.726561 
TVW2 18364 18829 0.459592 
TVW3 18577 902362 0.522904 
TVW4 16478.5 16884.5 0.294259 




















11. Is Monthly Seasonality Present In Irish 
Equity Indices#? 
11.1. PARAMETRIC INVESTIGATION OF THE FIRST MOMENT 
From the moments show in Table 13 we can see a number of stylised facts. First, there 
appears to be some evidence of a January effect in the Irish data. Second, that this is not 
obviously risk related, and third, that in general there does not appear to be the predicted 
or expected risk-return relationship across months of the year. Table 34 shows the 
results of an OLS analysis of the first moment. 
TABLE 34: INITIAL EsTIMATES OF MONTIll.. Y SEASONALITY IN THE IRISH MARKEr 
Variable Coeff T-Stat Signif 
ISEQ JAN 0.108 4.209 0.000 
FEB 0.064 2.422 0.015 
MARCH 0.042 . 1.626 0.\04 
APRIL 0.029 1.128 0.259 
MAY 0.015 0.591 0.554 
JUNE 0.005 0.195 0.845 
JULY 0.042 1.667 0.096 
AUG (0.056) (2.196) 0.028 
SEP (0.019) (0.736) 0.462 
OCT 0.015 0.594 0.553 
NOV (0.006) (0.221) 0.825 
DEC 0.066 2.508 0.012 
N 2,778 
F(II,N-II) 2.845 
Sig F 0.001 
ISEQR JAN 0.112 4.357 0.000 
FEB 0.068 2.582 0.010 
MARCH 0.049 1.912 0.056 
APRIL 0.Q35 1.351 0.177 
MAY 0.027 1.080 0.280 
JUNE 0.011 0.416 0.677 
II The results of this chapter also appears in abridged form in Lucey, B and Shane Whelan (2002) "A Promising timing 
strategy in Equity Markets: Ireland 1933-2000" J.IJ.Yl11glIJ.Lrilr:. SJ.,Ui.r.!ik{jl gad. ,s,1J.'igllall.lli~ ,s,1J.'i&:~ u.llc&:liI.ad. 
(forthcoming) 
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Variable Coeff T-Stat Signif 
JULY 0.040 1.578 0.115 
AUG (0.048) (1.884) 0.060 
SEP (0.013) (0.518) 0.605 
OCT 0.017 0.653 0.514 
NOV 0.005 0.198 0.843 
DEC 0.067 2.533 0.011 
N 2,778 
F{lI,N-II) 2.628 
Sig F 0.002 
ISEFIN JAN 0.083 2.180 0.029 
FEB 0.091 2.366 0.018 
MARCH 0.030 0.797 0.426 
APRIL 0.045 1.196 0.232 
MAY (0.017) (0.450) 0.653 
JUNE 0.004 0.107 0.915 
JULY 0.059 1.620 0.105 
AUG (0.097) (2.581) 0.010 
SEP (0.004) (0.108) 0.914 
OCT 0.061 1.644 0.100 
NOV 0.032 0.861 0.389 
DEC 0.095 2.468 0.014 
N 2,516 
F(lI,N-I1) 2.103 
Sig F 0.017 
ISEGEN JAN 0.101 3.864 0.000 
FEB 0.056 2.148 0.032 
MARCH 0.038 . 1.491 0.136 
APRIL 0.022 0.857 0.392 
MAY (0.001) (0.033) 0.974 
JUNE (0.019) (0.740) 0.459 
JULY 0.027 1.088 0.277 
AUG (0.023) (0.886) 0.376 
SEP (0.045) (1.768) 0.077 
OCT (0.011) (0.445) 0.657 
NOV 0.000 0.018 0.985 
DEC 0.048 1.842 0.066 
N 2,516 
F(lI,N-II) 2.482 
Sig F 0.004 
EWPI JAN 0.096 1.227 0.220 
FEB (0.045) (0.562) 0.574 
MARCH 0.069 0.881 0.378 
APRIL (0.020) (0.257) 0.798 
MAY 0.024 0.304 0.761 
JUNE 0.039 0.492 0.622 
JULY 0.032 0.424 0.672 
AUG (0.051) (0.658) 0.511 
SEP (0.018) (0.23 I) 0.817 
OCT (0.026) (0.332) 0.740 
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Variable Coeff' T-Stat Signif 
NOV 0.091 1.170 0.242 
DEC 0.076 0.963 0.336 
N 1,512 
F(II,N-II) 0.463 
Sig F 0.926 
EWP2 JAN (0.003) (0.055) 0.956 
FEB 0.063 1.125 0.261 
MARCH (0.000) (0.009) 0.993 
APRIL 0.059 1.065 0.287 
MAY 0.073 1.332 0.183 
JUNE 0.015 0.272 0.785 
JULY 0.039 0.719 0.473 
AUG (0.036) (0.648) 0.517 
SEP (0.012) (0.215) 0.830 
OCT (0.021 ) (0.378) 0.705 
NOV 0.024 0.444 0.657 
DEC 0.035 0.619 0.536 
N 1,512 
F{lI,N-II) 0.404 
Sig F 0.955 
EWP3 JAN 0.317 5.304 0.000 
FEB (0.000) (0.007) 0.995 
MARCH (0.059) (0.981) 0.327 
APRIL 0.060 0.992 0.322 
MAY 0.031 0.520 0.603 
JUNE 0.018 0.290 0.772 
JULY (0.008) . (0.133) 0.894 
AUG (0.036) (0.603) 0.547 
SEP (0.047) (0.806) 0.420 
OCT (0.002) (0.035) 0.972 
NOV 0.034 0.570 0.569 
DEC 0.009 0.155 0.877 
N 1,512 
F(II,N-II) 2.684 
Sig F 0.002 
EWP4 JAN 0.042 0.884 0.377 
FEB 0.046 0.955 0.340 
MARCH 0.057 1.208 0.227 
APRIL 0.064 1.327 0.185 
MAY 0.020 0.431 0.667 
JUNE 0.076 1.569 0.117 
JULY 0.029 0.630 0.529 
AUG (0.045) (0.938) 0.348 
SEP (0.001) (0.013) 0.990 
OCT 0.101 2.123 0.034 
NOV 0.062 1.321 0.187 




Variable Caeff T-Stat Signif 
Sig F 0.777 
EWP JAN 0.121 4.973 0.000 
FEB 0.034 1.357 0.175 
MARCH 0.008 0.327 0.744 
APRIL 0.053 2.157 0.031 
MAY 0.035 1.442 0.150 
JUNE 0.045 1.826 0.068 
JULY 0.020 0.859 0.391 
AUG (0.041) (1.670) 0.095 
SEP (0.017) (0.711) 0.477 
OCT 0.D38 1.562 0.119 
NOV 0.051 2.136 0.033 
DEC 0.047 1.906 0.057 
N 1,512 
F(lI,N-II) 2.710 
Sig F 0.002 
VWPI JAN 0.050 0.21S 0.830 
FEB 0.019 0.081 0.935 
MARCH 0.051 0.221 0.825 
APRIL 0.007 0.030 0.976 
MAY 0.002 0.009 0.993 
JUNE 0.068 0.291 0.771 
JULY (0.005) (0.023) 0.981 
AUG (0.067) (0.289) 0.773 
SEP 0.074 0.323 0.746 
OCT (0.030) (0.128) 0.898 
NOV 0.171 . 0.741 0.459 
DEC 0.151 0.641 0.522 
N 1,512 
F(II,N-II) 0.089 
Sig F 1.000 
VWP2 JAN 0.114 2.568 0.010 
FEB 0.014 0.318 0.750 
MARCH 0.062 1.408 0.IS9 
APRIL 0.06S 1.460 0.144 
MAY 0.063 1.436 O.ISI 
JUNE 0.027 0.612 0.541 
JULY 0.034 0.796 0.426 
AUG (0.032) (0.730) 0.466 
SEP (0.022) (0.505) 0.614 
OCT (0.019) (0.437) 0.662 
NOV 0.104 2.362 0.018 
DEC 0.049 1.093 0.274 
N 1,512 
F(II,N-II) 1.151 
Sig F 0.317 
VWP3 JAN 0.296 4.733 0.000 
FEB 0.006 0.089 0.929 
MARCH 0.032 0.515 0.606 
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Variable Coeff T -Stat Signif 
APRIL 0.068 1.074 0.283 
MAY 0.041 0.661 0.508 
JUNE (0.001) (0.018) 0.986 
JULY 0.012 0.194 0.846 
AUG 0.149 2.381 0.017 
SEP (0.042) (0.677) 0.498 
ocr (0.072) (1.153) 0.249 
NOV 0.041 0.669 0.504 
DEC 0.033 0.514 0.608 
N 1,512 
F(II,N-ll) 2.343 
Sig F 0.007 
VWP4 JAN 0.104 2.950 0.003 
FEB 0.037 1.042 0.298 
MARCH 0.019 0.553 0.580 
APRIL 0.072 2.031 0.042 
MAY 0.024 0.677 0.498 
JUNE 0.050 1.404 0.161 
JULY 0.035 1.027 0.305 
AUG (0.071) (2.008) 0.045 
SEP 0.040 1.152 0.250 
OCT' 0.083 2.362 0.Q\8 
NOV 0.064 1.822 0.069 
DEC 0.100 2.789 0.005 
N 1,512 
F(II,N-ll) 1.729 
Sig F 0.062 
VWP JAN 0.125 4.102 0.000 
FEB 0.032 1.043 0.297 
MARCH 0.023 0.752 00452 
APRIL 0.070 2.289 0.022 
MAY 0.027 0.886 0.376 
JUNE 0.043 10403 0.161 
JULY 0.031 1.040 0.298 
AUG (0.041) (1.355) 0.176 
SEP 0.029 0.960 0.337 
ocr 0.059 1.938 0.053 
NOV 0.064 2.103 0.036 
DEC 0.092 2.974 0.003 
N 1,512 
F(11,N-I1) 1.822 
Sig F 0.046 
We seem to have significant evidence of overall monthly seasonality as indicated by the 
F statistics. For the ISE indices the F statistic is highly significant, as it is for the larger 
value and equal weighted portfolio indices. Only for E(V)WPl, E(V)WP2 and 
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E(V)WP4 can we reject the concept of monthly seasonality as measured by the equality 
of monthly dummy variable coefficients. 
Picking up on what we have found earlier, we also find that January effects are 
prominent. The coefficient on the January dummy is significant in all save EWP1, 
EWP2, EWP4 and VWPI. Only for EWP1, EWP2 and VWPI do we fmd no monthly 
coefficient with statistical significance. Other months that appear significant with some 
regularity are February (all the ISE indices); August (ISEQ, ISEFIN, VWP, VWP4, but 
with a negative coefficient save for VWP4); October (EWP4, VWP4) and December 
(ISEQ, ISEQR, ISEFIN, VWP4, VWP) 
Despite previous evidence of an April seasonal in the Irish market (\1ckillop and 
Hutchinson (1989), Donnelly (1991) & Gahan (1993» this stylised fact does not seem 
to carry through to this analysis. Only for EWP4, EWP, VWP4 and VWP do we find an 
April dummy coefficient with statistical significance. 
However, the equation is not well specified, as shown by the results of a number of 
regression diagnostic procedures detailed in Table 35. 
11.1.1. R& ESTIMATION OF THE FIRST MOMENT 
Regression residual diagnostics for the initial regression of the month of the year 
model of Table 34, are show in Table 35. A number of problems emerge which cast 
some doubt on the appropriateness of the OLS procedure. 
253 
TABLE 35: REGRESSION RESIDUAL DIAGNOSTICS FOR MONTH OF THE YEAR OLS 
MODEL 
Autocorrelation Tests Heteroskedastici!1 Tests Normalit~ 
Q(36) b ARCHIe ARCH2 ARCH3 ARCH4 ARCH5 White's larque-Bera 
Test Statistic 
ISEQ 26,206.50 2,614.69 2,369.68 2,185.50 2,003.08 1,853.67 64.72 7,585.84 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.00 
ISEQR 3,513.17 2,361.81 2,049.08 1,845.10 1,687.51 1,402.83 64.50 7,309.04 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.00 
ISEFIN 18,730.34 976.73 806.06 1,009.86 985.16 712.30 59.21 3,513.17 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
ISEGEN 2,561,662.86 849.59 590.79 976.06 736.48 720.26 53.75 18,730.34 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
EWPI 3.66 0.01 0.04 0.01 7.21 0.00 30.10 2,561,662.86 
0.96 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.21 1.00 1.00 0.00 
EWP2 0.90 0.01 0.01 om 0.01 0.00 18.39 15,891,815.17 
0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
EWP3 0.54 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 15.80 10,847,964.39 
0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
EWP4 12.00 om 0.36 0.37 0.01 0.01 18.20 260,486.36 
0.29 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
EWP 25.67 0.00 0.09 1.48 0.01 0.05 9.92 570,953.35 
0.00 1.00 1.00 0.92 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
VWPI 0.21 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 23.01 26,745,944.66 
0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
VWP2 3.18 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.05 32.74 1,446,940.99 
0.97 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
VWP3 0.59 0.01 0.00 0.02 om 0.02 11.56 9,105,286.17 
0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
VWP4 4.37 0.17 0.99 0.08 0.01 3.63 39.34 9,805.57 
0.92 1.00 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.60 1.00 0.00 
VWP 6.39 0.03 0.12 0.12 0.23 3.04 37.06 11,281.52 
0.78 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.69 1.00 0.00 
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Heteroskedasticity: Whites test indicates that in no case is there generalized 
heteroskedasticity. Investigation of ARCH effects reveals however that the null of no 
ARCH effects is rejected for ISE indices Thus what hetroskedastic disturbances exist 
are ARCH form and are thus amenable to direct modelling. 
Serial Correlation: There is however substantial evidence of serial correlation in the 
residuals of the ISE indices. Again, following the lead of Chang, Pinegar and 
Ravichandran (1993), Easton and Faff(1994), Mills and Coutts (1995) Peiro (1994), the 
data are adjusted where appropriate for autocorrelation. Whites correction for 
disturbances in the error terms was used. Despite the absence of measured serial 
correlation in the equal and value weighted portfolios, the knowledge that these contain 
significant numbers of thinly traded stocks indicates that modelling these indices 
without any adjustment for this would make little sense. Accordingly, for these indices 
a single lag adjustment was used. For the ISE indices the choice of lag structure is as 
already discussed in 9. 1.1 
Normality of Residuals: Finally, based on the Jarque-Bera test there is clear evidence of 
non-normality in the residuals. 
While White's procedure allows correction of the covariance matrix for 
heteroskedasticity of an unknown form, we do have evidence as to the particular form 
of ARCH in the error terms. Therefore, Table 37 shows results of an ARCH modelling, 
while the regression diagnostics for these models are contained in Table 38. The ARCH 
modelling here do not fit the data as well as the ARCH modelling of the day of the 
week effects. The evidence is that the ARCH model does not account for the non-
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nonnality of the data, and there is some evidence that the specification here does not 
account for the serial correlation which remains a problem. In addition, the values and 
signs of the monthly coefficients are changes substantially from that of the initial OLS 
estimate. Accordingly, Table 36 shows robust regression based estimates of the month 
of the year effect. 
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TABLE 36: RoBUST EsTIMATES OF MONTHLY SEASONALITY IN THE IRISH MARKET 
OLS AR LAD TLS 
Variable Bayesian TIF Coeff T-Stat Signif Coeff T-Stat Signif Coeff T-Stat Signif Bayesian T/F Coeff T-Stat Signif 
ISEQ JAN 2.812 0.108 4.209 0.000 0.108 2.809 0.005 0.075 2.793 0.005 2.789 0.051 2.770 0.006 
FEB 2.812 0.064 2.422 0.015 0.064 2.119 0.034 0.052 2.475 0.013 2.789 0.045 2.436 0.015 
MARCH 2.812 0.042 1.626 0.104 0.042 1.<159 0.144 0.039 1.709 0.087 2.789 0.055 3.042 0.002 
APRIL 2.812 0.029 1.128 0.259 0.029 1.188 0.235 0.033 1.778 0.075 2.789 0.058 3.144 0.002 
MAY 2.812 0.015 0.591 0.554 0.015 0.706 0.480 0.010 0.575 0.565 2.789 0.019 1.081 0.280 
JUNE 2.812 0.005 0.195 0.845 0.005 0.243 0.808 (0.003) (0.162) 0.871 2.789 (0.007) (0.414) 0.679 
JULY 2.812 0.042 1.667 0.096 0.042 1.825 0.068 0.056 3.120 0.002 2.789 0.065 3.793 0.000 
AUG 2.812 (0.056) (2.196) 0.028 (0.056) (1.377) 0.168 (0.032) (1.446) 0.148 2.789 (0.011) (0.586) 0.558 
SEP 2.812 (0.019) (0.736) 0.462 (0.019) (0.578) 0.563 (0.022) (0.999) 0.318 2.789 (0.008) (0.443) 0.658 
OCT 2.812 0.015 0.594 0.553 0.015 0.292 0.770 0.024 1.012 0.312 2.789 0.028 1.510 0.131 
NOV 2.812 (0.006) (0.221) 0.825 (0.006) (0.217) 0.828 (0.007) (0.344) 0.731 2.789 0.006 0.349 0.727 
DEC 2.812 0.066 2.508 0.012 0.066 2.520 0.012 0.060 2.859 0.004 2.789 0.055 2.929 0.003 
N 2,778 2,778 2,778 2,454 
F(I\,N-11) 8.052 2.845 28.178 '42.501 7.940 2.553 
SigF 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.003 
ISEQR JAN 2.812 0.112 4.357 0.000 0.112 2.998 0.003 0.080 2.980 0.003 2.787 0.033 1.848 0.065 
FEB 2.812 0.068 2.582 0.010 0.068 2.262 0.024 0.055 2.667 0.008 2.787 0.039 2.186 0.029 
MARCH 2.812 0.049 1.912 0.056 0.049 1.733 0.083 0.046 2.053 0.040 2.787 0.058 3.290 0.001 
APRIL 2.812 0.035 1.351 0.177 0.035 1.428 0.153 0.035 1.854 0.064 2.787 0.046 2.594 0.010 
MAY 2.812 0.027 1.080 0.280 0.027 1.307 0.191 0.024 1.486 0.137 2.787 0.032 1.913 0.056 
JUNE 2.812 0.011 0.416 0.677 0.011 0.514 0.607 0.004 0.230 0.818 2.787 0.001 0.050 0.960 























OLS AR LAD 
Bayesian T/F Coeff T-Stat Signif Coeff T-Stat Signif Coeff 
2.812 (0.048) (1.884) 0.060 (0.048) (1.270) 0.204 (0.027) 
2.812 (0.013) (0.518) 0.605 (0.013) (0.404) 0.686 (0.017) 
2.812 0.017 0.653 0.514 0.017 0.321 0.748 0.019 
2.812 0.005 0.198 0.843 0.005 0.194 0.846 0.004 













2,778 2,778 2,778 
2.628 25.315 45.098 
0.002 0.013 0.000 
0.083 2.180 0.029 0.083 1.617 0.094 0.056 
0.091 2.366 0.018 0.091 2.131 0.033 0.067 
0.030 0.797 0.426 0.030 0.820 0.412 0.031 
0.045 1.196 0.232 0.045 1.313 0.189 0.034 
(0.017) (0.450) 0.653 (0.017) (0.546) 0.585 (0.017) 
0.004 0.107 0.915 0.004 0.146 0.884 (0.012) 
0.059 1.620 0.105 0.059 1.60 I 0.109 0.072 
(0.097) (2.581) 0.010 (0.097) (1.793) 0.073 (0.074) 
(0.004) (0.108) 0.914 (0.004) (0.087) 0.930 (0.004) 
0.061 1.644 0.100 0.061 0.891 0.373 0.085 
0.032 0.861 0.389 0.032 0.822 0.411 0.032 
DEC 2.794 0.095 2.468 
2,516 












ISEGEN JAN 2.794 0.101 3.864 0.000 0.101 2.780 0.005 0.078 
FEB 2.794 0.056 2.148 0.032 0.056 2.072 0.D38 0.048 
MARCH 2.794 0.038 1.491 0.136 0.038 1.309 0.191 0.031 
APRIL 2.794 0.022 0.857 0.392 0.022 0.940 0.347 0.024 
MAY 2.794 (0.001) (0.033) 0.974 (0.001) (0.046) 0.964 0.005 
T -Stat Signif Bayesian T/F 
(1.204) 0.228 2.787 
(0.761) 0.446 2.787 
0.783 0.434 2.787 
0.214 0.830 2.787 
2.942 0.003 2.787 
7.932 
1.524 0.128 2.768 
2.075 0.038 2.768 
1.062 0.288 2.768 
1.259 0.208 2.768 
(0.692) 0.489 2.768 
(0.541) 0.588 2.768 
2.465 0.014 2.768 
(2.494) 0.013 2.768 
(0.126) 0.900 2.768 
2.250 0.024 2.768 
1.084 0.278 2.768 
2.369 0.018 2.768 
7.839 
2.982 0.003 2.767 
2.485 0.013 2.767 
1.360 0.174 2.767 
1.289 0.198 2.767 
0.343 0.732 2.767 
TLS 















0.043 1.617 0.106 
0.035 1.373 0.170 
0.056 2.183 0.029 
0.028 1.090 0.276 
(0.010) (0.385) 0.701 
(0.016) (0.635) 0.525 
0.089 3.616 0.000 
(0.024) (0.919) 0.358 
0.011 0.429 0.668 
0.093 3.567 0.000 























OLS AR LAD TLS 
Variable Bayesian TIF Coeff T-Stat Signif Coeff T-Stat Signif Coeff T-Stat Signif Bayesian T/F Coeff T-Stat Signif 
JUNE 2.794 (0.019) (0.740) 0.459 (0.019) (0.894) 0.371 (0.018) (1.014) 0.310 2.767 (0.011) (0.659) 0,510 
JULy 2.794 0.027 1.088 0.277 0.027 1.236 0.216 0.037 2.037 0.042 2.767 0.048 2.971 0.003 
AUG 2.794 (0.023) (0.886) 0.376 (0.023) (0.595) 0.552 (0.007) (0.305) 0.760 2.767 0.018 1.016 0.310 
SEP 2.794 (0.045) (1.768) 0.077 (0.045) (1.497) 0.134 (0.044) (2.172) 0.030 2.767 (0.039) (2.274) 0.023 
ocr 2.794 (0.01l) (0.445) 0.657 (0.011) (0.218) 0.827 (0.009) (0.376) 0.707 2.767 (0.004) (0.221) 0.825 
NOV 2.794 0.000 0.018 0.985 0.000 0.019 0.984 (0.007) (0.390) 0.697 2.767 (0.006) (0.359) 0.720 
DEC 2.794 0.048 1.842 0.066 0.048 1.939 0.053 0.044 2.051 0.040 2.767 0.032 1.741 0.082 
N 2,516 2,516 2,516 2,172 
F(lI,N-II) 7.963 2.482 24.617 33.183 7.831 2.417 
SigF 0.004 0.017 0.001 0.006 
EWPI JAN 2.698 0.096 1.227 0.220 0.096 0.449 0.654 0.119 3.048 0.002 2.623 0.098 4.024 0.000 
FEB 2.698 (0.045) (0.562) 0.574 (0.045) (0.850) 0.395 (0.023) (0.747) 0.455 2.623 0.010 0.400 0.689 
MARCH 2.698 0.069 0.881 0.378 0.069 1.454 0.146 0.033 1.297 0.195 2.623 0.019 0.859 0.390 
APRIL 2.698 (0.020) (0.257) 0.798 (0.020) (0.782) 0.434 (0.009) (0.438) 0.661 2.623 0.027 1.099 0.272 
MAY 2.698 0.024 0.304 0.761 0.024 1.172 0.241 0.023 1.332 0.183 2.623 0.044 1.781 0.075 
JUNE 2.698 0.039 0.492 0.622 0.039 0.484 0.628 0.030 1.066 0.286 2.623 0.048 2.024 0.043 
JULY 2.698 0.032 0.424 0.672 0.032 0.528 0.598 0.007 0.294 0.768 2.623 0.004 0.176 0.861 
AUG 2.698 (0.051) (0.658) 0.511 (0.051) (1.005) 0.315 (0.017) (0.522) 0.602 2.623 0.008 0.314 0.753 
SEP 2.698 (0.018) (0.231) 0.817 (0.018) (0.461) 0.645 0.002 0.064 0.949 2.623 0.034 1.451 0.147 
ocr 2.698 (0.026) (0.332) 0.740 (0.026) (0.570) 0.569 (0.010) (0.358) 0.720 2.623 (0.005) (0.210) 0.834 
NOV 2.698 0.091 1.170 0.242 0.091 1.720 0.086 0.061 2.290 0.022 2.623 0.050 2.097 0.036 
DEC 2.698 0.076 0.963 0.336 0.076 2.127 0.033 0.058 2.208 0.027 2.623 0.058 2.309 0.021 
N 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,033 
F(II,N-II) 7.515 0.463 14.534 25.241 7.196 1.433 
Sig F 0.926 0.268 0.014 0.152 
EWP2 JAN 2.698 (0.003) (0.055) 0.956 0.317 1.939 0.053 0.075 3.189 0.001 2.649 0.060 4.340 0.000 
FEB 2.698 0.063 1.125 0.261 (OJ)OO) (0.018) 0.986 0.026 1.818 0.069 2.649 0.015 1.136 0.256 
MARCH 2.698 (0.000) (0.009) 0.993 (0.059) (0.626) 0.531 0.033 2.084 0.037 2.649 0.024 1.836 0.067 
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OLS AR LAD TLS 
Variable Bayesian T/F Coeff T-Stat Signif Coeff T-Stat Signif Coeff T-Stat Signif Bayesian TIF Coeff T-Stat Signif 
APRIL 2.698 0.059 1.065 0.287 0.060 3.389 0.001 0.064 3.458 0.001 2.649 0.052 3.889 0.000 
MAY 2.698 0.073 1.332 0.183 0.031 1.939 0.052 0.064 4.843 0.000 2.649 0.056 4.354 0.000 
JUNE 2.698 0.015 0.272 0.785 0.018 0.986 0.324 0.016 1.037 0.300 2.649 0.029 2.230 0.026 
JULY 2.698 0.039 0.719 0.473 (0.008) (0.420) 0.675 0.031 1.858 0.063 2.649 0.042 3.430 0.001 
AUG 2.698 (0.036) (0.648) 0.517 (0.036) (1.571) 0.116 (0.025) (1.476) 0.140 2.649 0.000 0.039 0.969 
SEP 2.698 (0.012) (0.215) 0.830 (0.047) (2.331) 0.020 (0.009) (0.521) 0.602 2.649 0.018 1.411 0.159 
ocr 2.698 (0.021) (0.378) 0.705 (0.002) (0.107) 0.915 (0.006) (0.377) 0.706 2.649 0.008 0.648 0.517 
NOV 2.698 0.024 0.444 0.657 0.034 0.577 0.564 0.023 1.582 0.114 2.649 0.039 2.861 0.004 
DEC 2.698 0.035 0.619 0.536 0.009 0.491 0.623 0.032 1.977 0.048 2.649 0.036 2.648 0.008 
N 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,173 
F(Il,N-Il) 7.515 0.404 41.467 66.758 7.301 2.141 
Sig F 0.955 0.000 0.000 0.016 
EWP3 JAN 2.698 0.317 5.304 0.000 0.042 0.462 0.644 0.138 5.056 0.000 2.660 0.065 4.365 0.000 
FEB 2.698 (0.000) (0.007) 0.995 0.046 1.005 0.315 0.001 0.049 0.961 2.660 0.006 0.404 0.686 
MARCH 2.698 (0.059) (0.981) 0.327 0.057 1.482 0.138 0.029 2.032 0.042 2.660 0.040 3.006 0.003 
APRIL 2.698 0.060 0.992 0.322 0.064 2.048 0.041 0.056 3.471 0.001 2.660 0.041 2.966 0.003 
MAY 2.698 0.031 0.520 0.603 0.020 0.742 0.458 0.033 2.193 0.028 2.660 0.058 4.235 0.000 
JUNE 2.698 0.018 0.290 0.772 0.076 2.119 0.034 0.018 1.076 0.282 2.660 0.033 2.463 0.014 
JULY 2.698 (0.008) (0.133) 0.894 0.029 0.941 0.347 (0.008) (0.481) 0.631 2.660 0.008 0.628 0.530 
AUG 2.698 (0.036) (0.603) 0.547 (0.045) (1.438) 0.150 (0.027) (1.482) 0.138 2.660 (0.006) (0.453) 0.651 
SEP 2.698 (0.047) (0.806) 0.420 (0.001) (0.012) 0.990 (0.038) (2.147) 0.032 2.660 (0.011) (0.850) 0.395 
OCT 2.698 (0.002) (0.035) 0.972 0.101 1.581 0.114 0.004 0.211 0.833 2.660 0.017 1.310 0.190 
NOV 2.698 0.034 0.570 0.569 0.062 1.114 0.265 0.069 3.282 0.001 2.660 0.039 2.839 0.005 
DEC 2.698 0.009 0.155 0.877 0.069 2.549 0.011 0.010 0.576 0.564 2.660 0.017 1.169 0.243 
N 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,244 
F(lI,N-II) 7.515 2.684 30.573 65.895 7.349 3.033 
Sig F 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.001 
















OLS AR LAD 
Bayesian TIF Coeff T-Stat Signif Coeff T-Stat Signif Coeff 



























0.185 0.053 3.370 0.001 0.050 
0.667 0.035 2.324 0.020 0.026 
0.117 0.045 2.533 0.01\ 0.051 
0.529 0.020 1.409 0.159 0.030 
0.348 (0.041) (2.007) 0.045 (0.025) 
(0.00 1) (0.013) 0.990 (0.017) (0:650) 0.515 0.016 
0.101 2.123 0.034 0.038 1.213 0.225 0.054 
0.062 1.321 0.187 0.051 2.382 0.017 0.051 






























































0.045 1.826 0.068 0.068 1.931 0.053 0.037 
0.020 0.859 0.391 (0.005) (0.145) 0.885 0.021 
(0.041) (1.670) 0.095 (0.067) (1.735) 0.083 (0.020) 
(0.017) (0.711) 0.477 0.074 0.971 0.332 0.000 











2.358 0.018 0.053 






Signif Bayesian T/F 
0.059 2.669 
0.305 2.669 
1.993 0.046 2.669 
I. \05 0.269 2.669 
2.185 0.029 2.669 
1.126 0.260 2.669 
(1.041) 0.298 2.669 
0.612 0.540 2.669 
1.686 0.092 2.669 
2.351 0.019 2.669 
2.645 0.008 2.669 
7.388 
5.086 0.000 2.667 
1.661 0.097 2.667 
2.612 0.009 2.667 
3.623 0.000 2.667 
3.217 0.001 2.667 
2.865 0.004 2.667 
1.561 0.119 2.667 
(1.375) 0.169 2.667 
0.025 0.980 2.667 
1.691 0.091 2.667 
4.110 0.000 2.667 











































































































0.050 0.215 0.830 0.050 
0.019 0.081 0.935 0.019 
0.051 0.221 0.825 0.051 
0.007 0.030 0.976 0.007 
0.002 0.009 0.993 0.002 
0.068 0.291 0.771 0.068 
(0.005) (0.023) 0.981 (0.005) 
(0.067) (0.289) 0.773 (0.067) 
LAD 
T-Stat Signif Coeff 
0.000 
0.064 0.949 0.146 
0.380 0.704 0.017 
0.942 0.346 0.043 
0.203 0.839 0.009 
0.074 0.941 0.004 
1.931 0.053 0.062 
(0.145) 0.885 (0.008) 
(1.735) 0.083 (0.064) 
2.698 0.074 0.323 0.746 0.074 0.971 0.332 0.023 
2.698 (0.030) (0.128) 0.898 (0.030) (0.581) 0.561 (0.019) 
2.698 0.171 0.741 0.459 0.171 2.358 0.018 0.119 















































2.568 0.010 0.114 0.980 0.327 0.070 
0.318 0.750 0.014 0.313 0.754 0.039 
1.408 0.159 0.062 3.500 0.000 0.054 
1.460 0.144 0.065 3.208 0.001 0.059 
1.436 0.151 0.063 3.414 0.001 0.059 
0.612 0.541 0.027 1.356 0.175 0.024 
0.796 0.426 0.034 1.774 0.076 0.031 
(0.730) 0.466 (0.032) (1.434) 0.152 (0.022) 
(0.505) 0.614 (0.022) (0.590) 0.555 0.007 
(0.437) 0.662 (0.019) (0.452) 0.651 0.011 
2.362 0.018 0.104 2.305 0.021 0.051 













1.810 0.070 2.637 
(0.216) 0.829 2.637 
(1.768) 0.077 2.637 
0.461 0.645 2.637 
(0.445) 0.656 2.637 
2.336 0.019 2.637 
2.234 0.025 2.637 
7.250 
3.339 0.001 2.650 
1.976 0.048 2.650 
3.296 0.001 2.650 
3.257 0.001 2.650 
3.594 0.000 2.650 
1.415 0.157 2.650 
1.734 0.083 2.650 
(1.381) 0.167 2.650 
0.383 0.702 2.650 
0.586 0.558 2.650 
2.740 0.006 2.650 
2.683 0.007 2.650 
TLS 




















0.013 0.448 0.655 
(0.038) (1.231) 0.219 
(0.017) (0.558) 0.577 
0.003 0.083 0.934 
0.068 2.201 0.028 




0.067 4.416 0.000 
0.056 3.576 0.000 
0.050 3.257 0.001 
0.064 4.011 0.000 
0.059 3.798 0.000 
0.033 2.127 0.034 
0.031 2.107 0.035 
(0.010) (0.657) 0.511 
0.028 1.859 0.063 
0.026 1.696 0.090 
0.060 3.824 0.000 




OLS AR LAD 
Variable 
N 
Bayesian T/F Coeff 
1,512 
T -Stat Signif Coeff 
1,512 




















































0.296 4.733 0.000 0.296 3.271 0.001 0.157 
0.006 0.089 0.929 0.006 0.157 0.875 0.008 
0.032 0.515 0.606 0.032 2.014 0.044 0.034 
0.068 1.074 0.283 0.068 3.459 0.001 0.063 
0.041 0.661 0.508 0.041 2.1.36 0.033 0.039 
(0.001) (0.018) 0.986 (0.001) (0.062) 0.951 0.001 
0.012 0.194 0.846 0.012 
0.149 2.381 0.017 0.149 
(0.042) (0.677) 0.498 (0.042) 
(0.072) (1.153) 0.249 (0.072) 
0.041 0.669 0.504 0.041 







0.547 0.585 0.011 
0.985 0.325 0.001 
(1.941) 0.052 (0.036) 
(0.693) 0.488 0.028 
1.403 0.161 0.048 








0.037 1.042 0.298 0.037 1.264 
0.019 0.553 0.580 0.019 0.726 
0.072 2.031 0.042 0.072 2.805 
0.024 0.677 0.498 0.024 0.867 0.386 0.030 
0.050 1.404 0.161 0.050 1.90 I 0.057 0.037 
0.035 1.027 0.305 0.035 0.958 0.338 0.041 
(0.071) (2.008) 0.045 (0.071) (1.834) 0.067 (0.043) 
0.040 1.152 0.250 0.040 1.160 0.246 0.030 
0.083 2.362 0.018 0.083 1.434 0.151 0.075 
TLS 
















0.570 0.569 2.665 
0.047 0.963 2.665 
(1.997) 0.046 2.665 
1.329 0.184 2.665 
2.190 0.028 2.665 
1.598 0.110 2.665 
7.368 
2.214 0.027 2.670 
1.009 0.31.3 2.670 
0.764 0.445 2.670 
2.617 0.009 2.670 
1.236 0.216 2.670 
1.586 0.113 2.670 
1.565 0.118 2.670 
(1.467) 0.142 2.670 
1.168 0.243 2.670 





















0.010 0.667 0.505 
0.018 1.071 0.284 












































OLS AR LAD TLS 
Variable Bayesian T/F Coeff T-Stat Signif Coeff T-Stat Signif Coeff T-Stat Signif Bayesian TIF Coeff T-Stat Signif 
NOV 2.698 0.064 1.822 0.069 0.064 2.289 0.022 0.069 2.470 0.014 2.670 0.062 2.928 0.003 
DEC 2.698 0.100 2.789 0.005 0.100 3.839 0.000 0.077 3.387 0.001 2.670 0.044 1.994 0.046 
N 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,306 
F(II,N-II) 7.515 1.729 47.253 47.239 7.390 0.645 
Sig F 0.062 0.000 0.000 0.798 
VWP JAN 2.698 0.125 4.102 0.000 0.125 3.506 0.000 0.086 3.344 0.001 2.669 0.058 3.030 0.002 
FEB 2.698 0.032 1.043 0.297 0.032 1.240 0.215 0.027 1.183 0.237 2.669 0.042 2.182 0.029 
MARCH 2.698 0.023 0.752 0.452 0.023 1·905 0.315 0.022 1.074 0.283 2.669 0.036 1.898 0.058 
APRIL 2.698 0.070 2.289 0.022 0.070 3.159 0.002 0.062 2.969 0.003 2.669 0.063 3.225 0.001 
MAY 2.698 0.027 0.886 0.376 0.027 1.142 0.253 0.033 1.595 0.111 2.669 0.048 2.495 0.013 
JUNE 2.698 0.043 1.403 0.161 0.043 1.943 0.052 0.034 1.701 0.089 2.669 0.025 1.297 0.195 
JULY 2.698 0.031 1.040 0.298 0.031 1.012 0.311 0.037 1.629 0.103 2.669 0.051 2.738 0.006 
AUG 2.698 (0.041) (1.355) 0.176 (0.041) (0.966) 0.334 (0.032) (1.220) 0.223 2.669 0.016 0.805 0.421 
SEP 2.698 0.029 0.960 0.337 0.029 0.973 0.330 0.024 1.081 0.280 2.669 0.036 1.897 0.058 
OCT 2.698 0.059 1.938 0.053 0.059 1.182 0.237 0.062 2.382 0.017 2.669 0.056 2.776 0.006 
NOV 2.698 0.064 2.103 0.036 0.064 2.595 0.009 0.067 2.800 0.005 2.669 0.066 3.582 0.000 
DEC 2.698 0.092 2.974 0.003 0.092 4.051 0.000 0.072 3.646 0.000 2.669 0.049 2.560 0.011 
N 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,301 
F(lI,N-II) 7.515 1.822 57.839 60.111 7.387 0.622 
Sig F 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.812 
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TABLE 37: ARCH MODELLING OF 1HE MONTH OF 1HE YEAR EFFECf 
ISEQ ISEQR ISEFIN ISEGEN 
Variable Coeff T-Stat Signif Coeff T-Stat Signif Coeff T-Stat Sign if Coeff T-Stat Signif 
ARI 1.00 44.24 0.00 0.68 72.78 0.00 0.57 25.38 0.00 0.54 20.08 0.00 
AR2 0.\0 3.62 0.00 0.\3 12.19 0.00 0.10 3.29 0.00 0.09 2.96 0.00 
AR3 -0.11 -7.70 0.00 0.07 10.67 0.00 0.26 14.51 0.00 0.29 \0.05 0.00 
AR4 0.06 16.46 0.00 
January 0.00 3.86 0.00 -0.00 -4.66 0.00 0.02 4.73 0.00 0.02 6.65 0.00 
February 0.00 4.14 0.00 -0.00 -10.24 0.00 0.02 5.26 0.00 0.01 2.66 0.01 
March 0.00 4.87 0.00 0.00 7.72 0.00 -0.00 -1.58 0.11 0.00 0.85 0.39 
April 0.00 2.46 0.01 -0.00 -3.97 0.00 O.oJ 4.09 0.00 -0.01 -1.20 0.23 
May 0.00 1.05 0.30 0.02 87.50 0.00 0.01 4.06 0.00 0.01 2.05 0.04 
June 0.00 2.11 0.03 -0.01 -62.05 0.00 -0.00 -0.46 0.65 0.02 7.27 0.00 
July 0.00 4.55 0.00 0.00 0.67 0.50 0.02 5.02 0.00 -0.00 -0.19 0.85 
August 0.00 3.61 0.00 0.02 207.28 0.00 0.04 21.74 0.00 -0.01 -1.90 0.06 
September 0.00 3.41 0.00 0.00 21.32 0.00 0.01 4.21 0.00 -0.01 -1.66 0.10 
October 0.00 5.18 0.00 -0.00 -7.29 0.00 0.03 10.68 0.00 -0.00 -1.24 0.22 
November 0.00 0.66 0.51 0.00 1.72 0.09 0.02 6.16 0.00 -0.01 -2.63 0.01 
December 0.00 1.70 0.09 0.00 1.30 0.19 0.02 10.47 0.00 -0.01 -1.58 0.11 
Variance(Constant) 0.00 16.08 0.00 0.00 13.77 0.00 0.00 4.93 0.00 0.00 12.19 0.00 
ARCH I 0.09 11.53 0.00 7.11 66.88 0.00 1.70 20.16 0.00 1.45 18.64 0.00 
ARCH2 0.09 8.12 0.00 0.11 5.22 0.00 1.65 19.95 0.00 0.36 8.23 0.00 
ARCH3 0.04 6.75 0.00 -0.00 1.00 0.14 4.92 0.00 0.38 8.09 0.00 
ARCH4 0.47 14.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.08 0.94 0.27 10.04 0.00 0.22 4.99 0.00 
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TABLE 38: REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS FOR ARCH MODELLING OF MONTH OF THE YEAR 
ISEQ ISEQR ISEFIN ISEGEN 
Test Signif Test Sign if Test Signif Test Signif 
The Ljung-Box Q-Test for Serial Correlation in NRESIDS 
LB(4) 14.55 . 0.00 11.81 0.00 11.18 0.00 
LB(8) 90.61 0.00 67.21 0.00 13.82 0.02 17.48 0.00 
LB(I2) 157.27 0.00 17.59 0.04 20.07 0.02 
LB(16) 249.88 0.00 149.71 0.00 21.00 0.07 21.20 0.07 
LB(20) 355.03 0.00 29.09 0.03 25.59 0.08 
LB(24) 443.02 0.00 216.82 0.00 32.63 0.05 28.00 0.14 
The Jarque-Bera Nonnality Test, ChiSqr(2), for NRESIDS 
28,730.05 0.00 262,563.47 0.00 7,181.74 0.00 12,484.34 0.00 
F-Test of no ARCH vs. ARCH in NRESIDS 
ARCH(4) 2.71 0.03 0.26 0.90 0.91 0.46 0.99 0.41 
ARCH(8) 2.80 0.00 0.23 0.98 0.94 0.48 0.64 0.74 
ARCH(12) 2.60 0.00 1.85 0.04 0.85 0.60 0.61 0.84 
ARCH(l6) 3.01 0.00 1.41 0.13 0.68 0.81 0.60 0.89 
ARCH(20) 5.34 0.00 1.I6 0.28 1.04 0.42 0.47 0.98 
ARCH(24) 5.26 0.00 1.I4 0.29 0.70 0.85 0.30 1.00 
The Ljung-Box Q-Test for Serial Correlation in SQNRESIDS 
LB(4) 10.19 0.00 6.25 0.01 4.73 0.03 
LB(8) 22.12 0.00 1.78 0.78 9.49 0.09 5.98 0.31 
LB(12) 27.11 0.00 11.02 0.27 6.30 0.71 
LB(16) 43.02 0.00 23.04 0.03 13.53 0.41 21.87 0.06 
LB(20) 103.87 0.00 35.41 0.01 21.93 0.19 
LB(24) 116.82 0.00 27.76 0.12 36.25 0.02 22.29 0.38 
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11.1.2. OVERALL SIGNIFICANCE As A TEST OF MONTIll...Y SEASONALITY 
In the case of the ISE indices it seems reasonable to state that there exists monthly 
seasonality. For ISEQ, ISEFIN, and ISEGEN the F statistic is statistically significant 
under all fonns of adjustment. For ISEQR it is so under all save TLS. This is not 
entirely convincing however, as this finding is weakened when we consider the number 
of observations under consideration. Correcting for this we find that all indices show a 
statistically significant F statistic under adjustment for autocorrelation and under LAD 
estimation, but none do so under OLS or TLS. Thus the choice of estimation method 
and the choice of priors' dictates the result obtained. Only uQder the AR and LAD 
estimators do we find that the F statistic is statistically significant regardless of 
adjusting for number of data points. Similar patterns are obtained when one analyses 
the portfolio indices. In all cases save E (V) WP I the pattern above holds: the AR and 
LAD estimators agree regardless of the statistical criteria, while other estimators gve 
differing results according to the criteria used. 
11.1.3. STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT MONTHS 
The F test is a joint test that all the coefficients are jointly and severally equal to each 
other and zero. We have some evidence that, allowing for the non nonnality of the data 
and the amount of data under analysis, there exist some coefficients that are not so. 
Thus an investigation of which months if any are different is warranted. 
Looking first at the values and significance of the various coefficients on the monthly 
dummies in Table 36, we note a number of points. We have already noted the 
significance of January in the OLS analysis. For the ISE indices this significance is not 
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detennined by the method of analysis; in the ISEQ and ISEGEN iOOices January is 
significant across all methods of analysis, while for ISEQR and ISEFIN only for TLS 
analysis is January not significant. In the portfolio indices, we note that when January is 
not significant under OLS it is so under TLS. January is almost never (save for VWP2 
under LAD) significant under AR or LAD estimation. 
There is an important role here for the number of data points, as was the case in the 
investigation of overall significance. January is never significant under adjustment for 
the data points for the ISEFIN. It is significant regardless of this for the ISEQR under 
all save TLS and for the ISEQ under OLS (which is however a poor modelling 
approach), and under OLS and LAD for ISEGEN. Accepting that the MAD and TLS 
methods are more efficie nt in the presence of deviations from nonnality, we fmd that in 
no case do both of these methods, with and without adjustment for data points, indicate 
that January is statistically significant. Again, a similar result, that the significance of 
the January coefficients is highly dependent on the method of analysis and the degree of 
adjustment pervades the portfolio indices. In no case do we find in any index that any 
month is statistically significant across the range of estimation methods and the choice 
of priors. This indicates that while monthly seasonality may be present it is not 
statistically robust. 
Another approach is to examine the pairs of months that appear different one from the 
other. As noted earlier this can be achieved by using either Tarnhanes j test or 
Tukey's HSD test, depending on whether the variance is or is not homogeneous. We 
can see from the evidence in Table 39 that in almost all cases, the exception being the 
equal weighted total index, EWP, we can reject the null of homogeneity of variance. 
For the trimmed indices the evidence is that for the ISE indices and for the trimmed 
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TVW3 and TVW4 indices there is some evidence of a monthly variation in volatility. 
Table 39 informs us that in many cases we can assume that there is monthly variation in 
the variance. 
TABLE 39: TEST OF HOMOGENEITY OF VARIANCE By MONTH OF THE YEAR 
Levene dfl df2 Sig. Levene dfl df2 Sig. 
Statistic Statistic 
ISEQ 6.962 11 2767 .000 TlSEQ 3.03611 2528.000 
ISEQR 6.931 11 2766 .000 TlSEQR 2.00211 2488.025 
ISEFIN 6.173 11 2504 .000 TlSEFIN 3.28911 2252.000 
ISEGEN 6.386 11 2504 .000 TlSEGEN 2.01111 2252.024 
EWP1 3.725 11 1499 .000 TEW1 .853 11 1347.586 
EWP2 3.183 11 1499 .000 TEW2 1.448 11 1347.145 
EWP3 4.411 11 1499 .000 TEW3 1.510 II 1347.122 
EWP4 2.088 11 1499 .018 TEW4 .434 11 1347.941 
EWP 1.528 11 1499 .115 TEW 1.19611 1347.285 
VWP1 2.883 11 1499 .001 TVWI 1.432 11 1347.152 
VWP2 3.043 11 1499 .000 TVW2 .607 11 1347.824 
VWP3 3.426 11 1499 .000 TVW3 2.213 11 1347 .012 
VWP4 3.355 11 1499 .000 TVW4 1.883 11 1347.038 
VWP 3.531 11 1499 .000 TVW 1.41611 1347.159 
Shown in Table 40are the results of the appropriate test as indicated by the Levene test. 
Very few monthly pairs are show to be significantly different. Those that are so shown 
are January-August for ISEQ and ISEQR, May-August for EWP2, March-August for 
VWP2, January-September and April-September for VWP3 under Tamhane's j test. 
EWP under Tukey's HSD Statistic shows more pairs, January-
Marchi August/September. Again, this generalised rejection of statistically significant 
monthly differences mirrors that found in the analysis of daily seasonality. 
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TABLE 40: IlFFERENCES IN MEANS By MONTH OF THE YEAR 
Tamhane'sT~est 
Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
Diff. Sig. Diff. Sig. Diff. Sig. Diff. Sig. Diff. Sig. Diff. Sig. Diff. Sig. Ditr. Sig. Diff. Sig. Ditr. Sig. Diff. Sig. 
(SEQ Jan -0.04 1.00 -0.07 1.00 -0.08 0.84 -0.09 0.42 -0.10 0.15 -0.07 0.98 -0.16 0.01 -0.13 0.09 -0.09 0.98 -0.11 0.13 -0.04 1.00 
Feb -0.02 1.00 -0.03 1.00 -0.05 1.00 -0.06 0.99 -0.02 1.00 -0.12 0.23 -0.08 0.87 -0.05 1.00 -0.07 0.96 0.00 1.00 
Mar -0.01 1.00 -0.03 1.00 -0.04 1.00 0.00 1.00 -0.10 0.61 -0.06 1.00 -0.03 1.00 -0.05 1.00 0.02 1.00 
Apr -0.01 1.00 -0.02 1.00 0.01 1.00 -0.09 0.82 -0.05 1.00 -0.01 1.00 -0.03 1.00 0.04 1.00 
May -0.01 1.00 0.03 1.00 -0.07 0.98 -0.03 1.00 0.00 1.00 -0.02 1.00 0.05 1.00 
June 0.04 1.00 -0.06 1.00 -0.02 1.00 0.01 1.00 -0.01 1.00 0.06 0.92 
July -0.10 0.46 -0.06 0.99 -0.03 1.00 -0.05 1.00 0.02 1.00 
Aug 0.04 1.00 0.07 1.00 0.05 1.00 0.12 0.12 
Sep 0.03 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.09 0.70 
Oct -0.02 1.00 0.05 1.00 
Nov 0.07 0.85 
(SEQR Jan -0.04 1.00 -0.06 1.00 -0.08 0.87 -0.08 0.64 -0.10 0.18 -0.07 0.94 -0.16 0.01 -0.13 0.11 -0.10 0.97 -0.11 0.22 -0.05 1.00 
Feb -0.02 1.00 -0.03 1.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.06 0.99 -0.03 1.00 -0.12 0.26 -0.08 0.90 -0.05 1.00 -0.06 0.99 -0.00 1.00 
Mar -0.01 1.00 -0.02 1.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.01 1.00 -0.10 0.59 -0.06 1.00 -0.03 1.00 -0.04 1.00 0.02 1.00 
Apr -0.01 1.00 -0.02 1.00 0.00 1.00 -0.08 0.83 -0.05 1.00 -0.02 1.00 -0.03 1.00 0.03 1.00 
May -0.02 1.00 0.01 1.00 -0.08 0.93 -0.04 1.00 -0.01 1.00 -0.02 1.00 0.04 1.00 
June 0.03 1.00 -0.06 1.00 -0.02 1.00 0.01 1.00 -0.01 1.00 0.06 0.98 
July -0.09 0.72 -0.05 1.00 -0.02 1.00 -0.03 1.00 0.03 1.00 
Aug 0.04 1.00 0.07 1.00 0.05 1.00 0.11 0.18 
Sep 0.03 1.00 0.02 1.00 0.08 0.82 
Oct -0.01 1.00 0.05 1.00 
Nov 0.06 0.98 
ISEFlN Jan 0.01 1.00 -0.05 1.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.10 0.97 -0.08 1.00 -0.02 1.00 -0.18 0.20 -0.09 1.00 -0.02 1.00 -0.05 1.00 0.01 1.00 
Feb -0.06 1.00 -0.05 1.00 -0.11 0.80 -0.09 0.98 -0.03 1.00 -0.19 0.08 -0.09 1.00 -0.03 1.00 -0.06 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Mar 0.02 1.00 -0.05 1.00 -0.03 1.00 0.03 1.00 -0.13 0.75 -0.03 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.06 1.00 
Apr -0.06 1.00 -0.04 1.00 0.01 1.00 -0.14 0.43 -0.05 1.00 0.02 1.00 -0.01 1.00 0.05 1.00 
May 0.02 1.00 0.08 1.00 -0.08 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.08 1.00 0.05 1.00 0.11 0.81 
June 0.05 1.00 -0.10 0.95 -0.01 1.00 0.06 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.09 0.98 
July -0.16 0.27 -0.06 1.00 0.00 1.00 -0.03 1.00 0.04 1.00 
Aug 0.09 1.00 0.16 0.79 0.13 0.76 0.19 0.09 
Sep 0.07 1.00 0.04 1.00 0.10 1.00 
Oct -0.03 1.00 0.03 1.00 
Nov 0.06 1.00 
ISEGEN Jan -0.04 1.00 -0.06 1.00 -0.08 0.89 -0.10 0.21 -0.12 0.06 -0.07 0.94 -0.12 0.30 -0.15 0.02 -0.11 0.84 -0.10 0.37 -0.05 1.00 
Feb -0.02 1.00 -0.03 1.00 -0.06 0.98 -0.07 0.65 -0.03 1.00 -0.08 0.97 -0.10 0.25 -0.07 1.00 -0.06 1.00 -0.01 1.00 
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Mar -0.02 1.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.06 0.99 -0.01 1.00 -0.06 1.00 -0.08 0.73 -0.05 1.00 -0.04 1.00 0.01 1.00 
Apr -0.02 1.00 -0.04 1.00 0.01 1.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.07 0.94 -0.03 1.00 -0.02 1.00 0.03 1.00 
May -0.02 1.00 0.03 1.00 -0.02 1.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.01 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.99 
June 0.05 1.00 -0.00 1.00 -0.03 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.Q2 1.00 0.07 0.75 
July -0.05 \.00 -0.07 0.79 -0.04 1.00 -0.03 1.00 0.02 1.00 
Aug -0.02 \.00 0.01 \.00 0.02 \.00 0.Q7 0.99 
Sep 0.03 1.00 0.05 1.00 0.09 0.31 
Oct 0.01 1.00 0.06' 1.00 
Nov 0.05 1.00 
EWPI Jan -0.14 1.00 -0.03 1.00 -0.12 1.00 -0.07 1.00 -0.06 1.00 -0.06 1.00 -0.15 1.00 -0.11 1.00 -0.12 1.00 -om 1.00 -0.02 1.00 
Feb 0.11 1.00 0.02 1.00 0.Q7 1.00 0.08 1.00 0.08 1.00 -0.01 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.Q2 1.00 0.13 0.99 0.12 0.98 
Mar -0.09 1.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.03 1.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.12 1.00 -0.09 1.00 -0.09 1.00 0.02 1.00 0.01 1.00 
Apr 0.04 1.00 0.06 1.00 0.05 1.00 -0.03 1.00 0.00 1.00 -0.01 1.00 0.11 0.99 0.10 0.87 
May 0.02 1.00 0.01 1.00 -0.07 1.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.05 1.00 0.07 1.00 0.05 1.00 
June -0.01 1.00 -0.09 1.00 -0.06 1.00 -0.06 1.00 0.05 1.00 0.04 1.00 
July -0.08 1.00 -0.05 1.00 -0.06 1.00 0.06 1.00 0.04 1.00 
Aug 0.03 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.14 0.98 0.13 0.95 
Sep -0.01 1.00 0.11 1.00 0.09 1.00 
Oct 0.12 1.00 0.10 1.00 
Nov -0.01 1.00 
EWP2 Jan 0.07 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.06 1.00 0.08 1.00 0.02 1.00 0.04 1.00 -0.03 1.00 -0.01 1.00 -0.02 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.04 1.00 
Feb -0.06 1.00 -0.00 1.00 0.01 1.00 -0.05 1.00 -0.02 1.00 -0.10 0.84 -0.07 1.00 -0.08 1.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.03 1.00 
Mar 0.06 1.00 0.07 1.00 0.02 1.00 0.04 1.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.01 1.00 -0.02 1.00 0.02 1.00 0.04 1.00 
Apr 0.01 1.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.02 1.00 -0.09 0.27 -0.07 1.00 -0.08 1.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.02 1.00 
May -0.06 0.75 -0.03 1.00 -0.11 0.01 -0.08 0.91 -0.09 0.88 -0.05 0.90 -0.04 1.00 
June 0.02 1.00 -0.05 1.00 -0.03 1.00 -0.04 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.02 1.00 
July -0.07 0.66 -0.05 1.00 -0.06 1.00 -0.01 1.00 -0.00 1.00 
Aug 0.02 1.00 0.02 1.00 0.06 0.86 0.Q7 0.58 
Sep -0.01 1.00 0.04 1.00 0.05 1.00 
Oct 0.04 1.00 0.06 \.00 
Nov 0.01 1.00 
EWP3 Jan -0.32 0.98 -0.38 0.96 -0.26 1.00 -0.29 1.00 -0.30 0.99 -0.33 0.97 -0.36 0.91 -0.37 0.86 -0.32 0.98 -0.29 \.00 -0.31 0.99 
Feb -0.06 1.00 0.06 0.92 0.03 1.00 0.02 1.00 -0.01 1.00 -0.04 \.00 -0.05 1.00 -0.00 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.01 1.00 
Mar 0.12 1.00 0.09 1.00 0.08 1.00 0.05 1.00 0.02 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.06 1.00 0.09 1.00 0.07 1.00 
Apr -0.03 1.00 -0.04 \.00 -0.07 0.47 -0.10 0.07 -0.11 0.01 -0.06 0.79 -0.03 \.00 -0.05 0.98 
May -0.01 1.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.07 0.67 -0.08 0.20 -0.03 1.00 0.00 \.00 -0.02 \.00 
June -0.03 1.00 -0.05 0.99 -0.06 0.74 -0.02 1.00 0.02 1.00 -0.01 \.00 
July -0.03 1.00 -0.04 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.04 1.00 0.02 1.00 
Aug -0.01 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.Q7 1.00 0.05 1.00 
Sep 0.05 1.00 0.08 1.00 0.06 0.97 
Oct 0.04 1.00 0.01 1.00 
Nov -0.02 1.00 
EWP4 Jan 0.00 1.00 0.02 1.00 0.02 1.00 -0.02 1.00 0.03 1.00 -0.01 1.00 -0.09 1.00 -0.04 1.00 0.06 1.00 0.02 1.00 0.03 1.00 
Feb 0.01 \.00 0.02 1.00 -0.03 1.00 0.03 1.00 -0.02 1.00 -0.09 1.00 -0.05 1.00 0.05 \.00 0.02 \.00 0.Q2 1.00 
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Mar 0.0\ \.00 -0.04 \.00 0.02 \.00 -0.03 \.00 -0.10 0.93 -0.06 \.00 0.04 1.00 0.0\ \.00 0.01 1.00 
Apr -0.04 1.00 0.0\ \.00 -0.03 1.00 -0.11 0.63 -0.06 1.00 0.04 1.00 -0.00 \.00 0.01 1.00 
May 0.06 \.00 0.01 1.00 -0.06 1.00 -0.02 1.00 0.08 \.00 0.04 1.00 0.05 1.00 
June -0.05 1.00 -0.\2 0.48 -0.08 1.00 0.G2 1.00 -0.0\ \.00 -0.01 1.00 
July -0.07 1.00 -0.03 1.00 0.Q7 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.04 1.00 
Aug 0.04 \.00 0.15 0.94 0.11 1.00 0.11 0.31 
Sep 0.\0 \.00 0.06 !.flO 0.07 1.00 
Oct -0.04 \.00 -0.03 1.00 
Nov 0.01 1.00 
VWP\ Jan -0.03 1.00 0.00 1.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.05 \.00 0.02 1.00 -0.06 1.00 -0.12 1.00 0.02 1.00 -0.08 \.00 0.\2 1.00 0.\0 1.00 
Feb 0.03 1.00 -0.0\ 1.00 -0.02 \.00 0.05 1.00 -0.02 \.00 -0.09 \.00 0.05 1.00 -0.05 \.00 0.15 \.00 0.13 1.00 
Mar -0.04 1.00 -0.05 \.00 0.02 \.00 -0.06 \.00 -0.\2 0.99 0.02 \.00 -0.08 \.00 0.\2 \.00 0.10 1.00 
Apr -0.00 \.00 0.06 \.00 -0.01 1.00 -0.07 1.00 0.07 1.00 -0.04 \.00 0.\6 0.95 0.14 0.98 
May 0.07 \.00 -0.01 \.00 -0.07 1.00 0.07 \.00 -0.03 \.00 0.17 0.90 0.15 0.95 
June -0.07 1.00 -0.14 0.52 0.01 \.00 -0.10 1.00 0.\0 1.00 0.08 1.00 
July -0.06 1.00 0.08 1.00 -0.02 \.00 0.18 0.90 0.16 0.95 
Aug 0.14 1.00 0.04 \.00 0.24 0.27 0.22 0.32 
Sep -0.10 1.00 0.10 \.00 0.08 1.00 
Oct 0.20 0.83 0.18 0.91 
Nov -0.02 1.00 
VWP2 Jan -0.10 1.00 -0.05 1.00 -0.05 1.00 -0.05 1.00 -0.09 1.00 -0.08 1.00 -0.15 1.00 -0.14 1.00 -0.13 1.00 -0.01 1.00 -0.07 1.00 
Feb 0.05 1.00 0.05 1.00 0.05 1.00 0.01 \.00 0.02 1.00 -0.05 1.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.03 1.00 0.09 1.00 0.03 1.00 
Mar 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.03 1.00 -0.09 0.05 -0.08 0.94 -0.08 0.99 0.04 1.00 -0.01 1.00 
Apr -0.00 1.00 -0.04 \.00 -0.03 1.00 -0.10 0.08 -0.09 0.94 -0.08 0.99 0.04 \.00 -0.02 \.00 
May -0.04 1.00 -0.03 1.00 -0.\0 0.06 -0.09 0.93 -0.08 0.99 0.04 1.00 -0.01 1.00 
June 0.01 1.00 -0.06 0.95 -0.05 1.00 -0.05 1.00 0.08 1.00 0.02 1.00 
July -0.07 0.80 -0.06 1.00 -0.05 1.00 0.07 1.00 0.01 \.00 
Aug 0.0\ \.00 0.0\ 1.00 0.14 0.40 0.08 0.27 
Sep 0.00 \.00 0.13 0.90 0.07 1.00 
Oct 0.12 0.96 0.07 1.00 
Nov -0.05 1.00 
VWP3 Jan -0.29 0.\9 -0.27 0.26 -0.23 0.6\ -0.26 0.34 -030 0.09 -0.29 0.15 -0.15 \.00 -0.34 0.Q2 -037 0.40 -0.26 0.41 -0.27 0.27 
Feb 0.03 1.00 0.06 1.00 0.04 1.00 -0.01 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.14 1.00 -0.05 1.00 -0.08 1.00 0.04 1.00 0.03 1.00 
Mar 0.04 \.00 0.01 \.00 -0.03 \.00 -0.02 1.00 0.12 \.00 -0.07 0.37 -0.\0 \.00 0.0\ 1.00 0.00 1.00 
Apr -0.03 1.00 -0.07 0.51 -0.06 0.98 0.08 \.00 -0.11 0.01 -0.14 1.00 -0.03 1.00 -0.04 1.00 
May -0.04 1.00 -0.03 \.00 0.11 1.00 -0.08 0.25 -0.11 1.00 0.00 1.00 -0.01 1.00 
June 0.01 1.00 0.15 1.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.07 1.00 0.04 1.00 0.03 1.00 
July 0.14 \.00 -0.05 1.00 -0.08 \.00 0.03 1.00 0.02 1.00 
Aug -0.19 1.00 -0.22 \.00 -0.11 1.00 -0.12 1.00 
Sep -0.03 \.00 0.08 0.83 0.07 0.55 
Oct 0.11 1.00 0.\0 1.00 
Nov -0.01 1.00 
VWP4 Jan -0.07 1.00 -0.08 1.00 -0.03 1.00 -0.08 1.00 -0.05 1.00 -0.07 1.00 -0.17 0.34 -0.06 1.00 -0.02 1.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.00 1.00 
Feb -0.02 1.00 0.03 1.00 -0.01 1.00 0.0\ 1.00 -0.00 1.00 -0.11 0.86 0.00 1.00 0.05 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.06 1.00 
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Mar 0.05 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.02 1.00 -0.09 0.98 0.02 1.00 0.06 1.00 0.04 1.00 0.08 0.90 
Apr -0.05 1.00 -0.02 1.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.14 0.17 -0.03 1.00 0.01 1.00 -0.01 1.00 0.G3 1.00 
May 0.G3 1.00 0.01 1.00 -0.09 0.97 0.02 1.00 0.06 1.00 0.04 tOO 0.08 0.95 
June -0.01 1.00 -0.12 0.52 -0.01 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.05 1.00 
July -0.11 0.97 0.00 1.00 0.05 1.00 0.G3 1.00 0.06 1.00 
Aug 0.11 0.92 0.15 0.81 0.13 0.32 0.17 0.G3 
Sep 0.04 1.00 0.02 1.00 0.06 1.00 
Oct -0.02 1.00 0.02 1.00 
Nov 0.04 1.00 
VWP Jan -0.09 0.91 -0.10 0.65 -0.06 1.00 -0.10 0.73 -0.08 0.96 -0.10 0.95 -0.17 0.18 -0.10 0.92 -0.07 1.00 -0.06 1.00 -0.03 1.00 
Feb 0.04 1.00 -0.01 1.00 0.01 1.00 -0.00 1.00 -0.07 1.00 -0.00 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.06 1.00 
Mar 0.05 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.02 1.00 0.01 1.00 -0.06 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.04 1.00 0.04 1.00 0.07 0.92 
Apr -0.04 1.00 -0.03 1.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.11 0.79 -0.04 1.00 -0.01 1.00 -0.01 1.00 0.02 1.00 
May 0.02 1.00 0.00 1.00 -0.07 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.04 1.00 0.07 0.96 
June -0.01 1.00 -0.08 1.00 -0.01 1.00 0.02 1.00 0.02 1.00 0.05 1.00 
July -0.07 1.00 -0.00 1.00 0.G3 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.06 1.00 
Aug 0.07 1.00 0.10 1.00 0.11 0.90 0.13 0.39 
Sep 0.03 1.00 0.04 1.00 0.06 1.00 
Oct 0.00 1.00 0.03 1.00 
Nov 0.03 1.00 
Tukey'sHSD 
Test 
EWP January 0.09 0.31 0.11 0.04 0.07 0.68 0.09 0.31 0.08 0.53 0.10 0.11 0.16 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.08 0.38 0.07 0.64 0.08 0.57 
February 0.03 1.00 -0.02 1.00 -0.00 1.00 -0.01 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.D7 0.60 0.05 0.95 -0.01 1.00 -0.02 1.00 -0.01 1.00 
March -0.04 0.98 -0.03 1.00 -0.04 1.00 -0.01 1.00 0.05 0.96 0.03 1.00 -0.03 1.00 -0.04 0.98 -0.04 0.99 
April 0.02 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.03 1.00 0.09 0.23 0.07 0.67 0.01 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.01 1.00 
May -0.01 1.00 0.01 1.00 0.08 0.55 0.05 0.93 -0.00 1.00 -0.02 1.00 -0.01 1.00 
June 0.02 1.00 0.09 0.35 0.06 0.80 0.01 1.00 -0.01 1.00 -0.00 1.00 
July 0.06 0.82 0.04 0.99 -0.02 1.00 -0.03 1.00 -0.03 1.00 
August -0.02 1.00 -0.08 0,48 -0.09 0.24 -0.09 0.32 
September -0.06 0.89 -0.07 0.68 -0.06 0.77 
October -0.01 1.00 -0.01 1.00 
November 0.00 1.00 
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11.2. NON-PARAMETRIC ANALYSIS OF MONTHLY SEASONALITY 
As is the case in regard to the investigation of daily seasonality, the use of non-parametric 
approaches has been little used in the investigation of monthly seasonality. The results in 
Table 41 show a non-parametric analysis of monthly seasonality. As with the daily 
seasonality issue here again the Kruskal-Wallis H statistic is employed. 
In this case, the null therefore is that the data, the indices, do not differ as to the month of 
the year. A finding of a low significance therefore would indicate a rejection of the null, 
and an indication that a month of the year effect is present, the distributions of the index 
differing by month. The Kruska~ Wallis test therefore allows the parametric F tests to be 
augmented. Testing for a day of the week effect using both the regression F and Kruskal-
Wallis test, Elyasiani, Perera and Puri (1996) in their examination of Sri Lankan data fOWld 
that the two tests were in agreement, indicating no day of the week effect. This agreement 
between the two fonns of tests was also fOWld in Arsad and Coutts (1997) and Steeley 
(1999). No paper seems to have used these non-parametric tests in conjWlction with 
parametric tests when investigating monthly seasonality. 
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TABLE 41: NON-PARAMETRIC TEST FOR MONTH OF THE YEAR EFFECT 
Chi-Sguare df Significance. Chi-Sguare df Signi ficance. 
ISEQ 28.771 II .002 TISEQ 27.536 11 .004 
ISEQR 24.944 II .009 TISEQR 19.282 II .056 
ISEFIN 26.415 II .006 TISEFIN 24.243 II .012 
ISEGEN 28.892 II .002 TISEGEN 26.729 II .005 
EWPI 21.335 II .030 TEWI 15.495 II .161 
EWP2 33.144 II .000 TEW2 19.108 II .059 
EWP3 59.656 II .000 TEW3 34.208 II .000 
EWP4 8.720 II .648 TEW4 5.248 II .919 
EWP 36.308 II .000 TEW 19.891 II .047 
VWPI 17.954 II .083 TVWI 11.765 II .382 
VWP2 25.531 11 .008 TVW2 22.287 II .022 
VWP3 40.731 II .000 TVW3 22.248 II .023 
VWP4 16.556 II .122 TVW4 7.545 II .753 
VWP 19.011 II .061 TVW 7.737 II .737 
What we note from this is that there is considerable evidence of a monthly seasonal. Only 
for EWP4, VWPI, VWP4 and VWP can we conclude that there is no norrparametric 
evidence of monthly seasonality. These findings are also, at the 10% level, generally robust 
to trimming, with only EWP I showing a difference in conclusions as between the trimmed 
and original data. These fmdings are therefore at variance with the fmdings for norr 
parametric results in daily seasonality. 
11.3. STOCHASTIC DOMINANCE ANALYSIS OF MONTHLY SEASONALITY 
In no case was first order stochastic dominance found in monthly analysis. Considerable 
evidence was found however of second order stochastic dominance. January achieves 
second order stochastic dominance over all other months for ISEQ, ISEQR, ISEGEN, 
EWPI, EWP3, EWP, VWP2-4 and VWP all. Again, as was found in the case of daily 
seasonality this pattern is not robust under trimming. Only for EWP, VWP2 and VWP3 
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does January achieve second order stochastic dominance for both trimmed and untrimmed 
data. 
11.4. RESAMPLING ANALYSES 
Show in Table 42 is the result of a series of resampling analyses. In each case 1000 random 
draws ~re made from the data (the daily returns to the index in question), each of N, 
where N equalled the number of days returns in each month in question. For each month 
therefore for which the mean daily returns was identified as being highest or lowest, for 
both the first and second moment, the table shows the percentage of drawings where the 
moment of the random draw exceeded or was lower than the moment of the empirical 
distribution. 
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TABLE 42: RESAMPLING ANALYSIS OF MONTHLY SEASONALITY 
ISEQ ISEQR ISEFIN ISEGEN 
Maximum Mean January January December January 
% Above Mean 0.1% 0% 2.8% IJI/o 
Maximum St Dev October October October October 
% Above St Dev 0.1% 0% 0"/0 (J1fo 
Minimum Mean August August August September 
% Below Mean 0.1% 0"/0 0"/0 0.3% 
Minimum St Dev June June June May 
% Below St Dev (1'10 0"/0 0"/0 0.2% 
EWPI EWP2 EWP3 EWP4 EWP 
Maximum Mean January May January October January 
% Above Mean 7.0"/0 4.5% 0.0% 3.5% 0.0% 
Maximum St Dev January January January January March 
% Above St Dev IJI/o 0"/0 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 
Minimum Mean August August March August August 
% Below Mean 5.8% 8.6% 1.9% 0.2% 0.0% 
Minimum St Dev May November May December December 
% Below St Dev IJI/o 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.7% 
VWPI WJP2 VWP3 VWP4 VWP 
Maximum Mean November January January January January 
% Above Mean 15.7% 0.7% 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 
Maximum St Dev January January August October October 
% Above St Dev 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0"/0 0.0% 
Minimum Mean August August October August August 
% Below Mean 165% 0.7% 0.1% 0.0"/0 0.0% 
Minimum St Dev May March March June June 
% Below St Dev 0.0"/0 0.3% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 
A number of points are evident. First, there appears to be significant support here for the 
mean daily return in January not to be a statistical artefact. In all cases except that of EWPI 
and VSP 1 the actual January return was not exceeded in 1000 drawings in more than 5% of 




We have already seen in Table 39 that there exists in almost all cases, the exception 
being the equal weighted total index, EWP, evidence that we can reject the null of 
homogeneity of variance. 
In analysing the monthly variation in volatility, there is little if any guidance from the 
literature. As noted earlier, the models that use an ARCH type process either include 
all potential explanatory (calendar, here monthly) variables or else use those that have 
been hypothesised to be important in determining volatility or have been see as 
important determinants of mean returns. 
In the absence of a theoretical guide, the best approach is to appeal to previous 
research, in particular that of Beller and Nofsinger (1998). They advocate the use of 
(n-l) dummy variables directly in the variance equation, an approach that is used 
here. There is no justification for employing ARCH type models, including 
EGARCH, where there is no evidence of such effects. We have seen from Table 35 
that in the ISE indices there is evidence of such effects, allowing the use of ARCH 
models. Thus investigation of those months of the year that drive monthly seasonal 
variation in the volatility is limited to those indices which both show ARCH effects 
and also show a difference between months by the Levene test. In this case this is 
ISEQ, ISEQR, ISEFIN and ISEGEN. 
The results of this approach, using an EGARCH (3,1,4)-M with 11 dummies 
representing January through November specification are contained in Table 43, and 
the diagnostics are contained in Table 44, where we see that the estimated equations 
are well specified in general, with the only potential problem being possible serial 
correlation in the normalised residuals in the ISEGEN equation. 
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TABLE 43: EGARCH ESTIMATION OF MONTH OF THE YEAR EFFECTS IN VARIANCE 
OF SELECTED INDICES 
ISEQ ISEQR ISEGEN ISEFIN 
CoefT T-Stat Sig CoefT T -Stat Sig CoefT T-Stat Sig CoefT T-Stat Sig 
ARCI) 0.22 10.56 0.000.22 10.59 0.000.19 8.28 0.00 0.14 6.12 0.00 
AR(2) 0.00 0.05 0.96 0.03 1.30 0.190.04 1.97 0.05 om 0.50 0.62 
AR(3) 0.04 1.90 0.060.03 1.40 0.16 0.03 1.48 0.14 0.01 0.71 0.48 
Constant Variance 0.02 2.35 0.020.03 3.17 0.00 -0.66 -6.59 0.00 0.03 3.28 0.00 
ARCHI 0.20 8.18 0.000.22 8.30 0.000.31 8.85 0.00 0.24 8.53 0.00 
ARCH2 -0.11 -2.79 0.01 -0.10 -2.91 0.00 -0.06 -1.53 0.\3 -0.06 -1.74 0.08 
ARCH3 0.03 0.74 0.46 -0.05 -1.36 0.17 0.10 2.86 0.00 -0.12 -3.41 0.00 
ARCH4 -0.04 -1.46 0.150.01 0.38 0.700.02 0.68 0.50 0.02 0.81 0.42 
ARV 0.98 302.82 0.00 0.99 359.26 0.00 0.73 20.08 0.00 0.99 441.06 0.00 
Leverage Term 0.26 4.32 0.000.33 4.92 0.000.04 0.70 0.48 0.45 6.69 0.00 
January -0.04 -3.80 0.00 -0.04 -4.15 0.00 0.24 4.16 0.00 -0.03 -2.64 0.01 
February -0.09 -7.85 0.00 -0.09 -8.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.25 0.80 -0.07 -6.15 0.00 
March -0.03 -2.86 0.00 -0.03 -2.54 0.000.10 1.89 0.06 -0.03 -2.41 0.02 
April -0.08 -7.90 0.00 -0.09 -8.56 0.000.02 0.45 0.65 -0.06 -5.60 0.00 
May -0.06 -5.99 0.00 -0.04 -4.95 0.00 -0.10 -1.91 0.06 -0.06 -5.49 0.00 
June -0.08 -6.60 0.00 -0.08 -6.85 0.00 -0.05 -1.10 0.27 -0.04 -2.89 0.00 
July -0.06 -4.45 ()',OO -0.07 -4.80 0.000.30 5.67 0.00 -0.06 -4.43 0.00 
August -0.06 -6.17 0.00 -0.05 -5.79 0.00 -0.02 -0.37 0.71 -0.02 -2.35 0.02 
September 0.02 1.54 0.120.01 0.59 0.55 0.48 6.81 0.00 -0.03 -2.65 0.01 
October -0.11 -11.31 0.00 -0.11 -11.83 0.000.00 0.10 0.92 -0.05 -4.49 0.00 
November -0.02 -1.67 0.10 -0.02 -1.69 0.090.11 2.09 0.04 -0.02 -1.40 0.16 
ARCH-in-Mean 0.15 2.18 0.030.12 1.79 0.07 0.16 2.03 0.04 0.12 1.65 0.10 
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TABLE 44: REGRESSION DIAGNOSTICS FOR EGARCH EsTIMATION OF MONTH OF THE 
YEAR EFFECT 
ISEQ ISEQR ISEGEN ISEFIN 
Stat Sig Stat Sig Stat Sig Stat Sig 
The Ljung-Box Q-Test for Serial Correlation in Normalised Residuals· 
LB (4) 1.49 0.22 1.67 0.20 4.79 0.03 1.61 0.20 
LB (8) 4.53 0.48 4.83 0.44 7.27 0.20 6.19 0.29 
LB (12) 11.96 0.22 12.99 0.16 13.98 0.12 10.99 0.28 
LB (16) 16.05 0.25 15.66 0.27 21.82 0.06 13.83 0.39 
LB (20) 20.49 0.25 19.70 0.29 30.79 0.02 15.77 0.54 
LB (24) 26.82 0.18 26.98 0.17 38.13 om 21.96 0.40 
The Ljung-Box Q-Test for Serial Correlation in Squared Normalised Residuals • 
LB (4) 2.09 0.15 2.23 0.13 0.89 0.34 2.03 0.15 
LB (8) 2.70 0.75 2.73 0.74 1.58 0.90 4.82 0.44 
LB (12) 4.16 0.90 3.26 0.95 3.62 0.93 6.34 0.71 
LB (16) 6.60 0.92 6.44 0.93 4.52 0.98 10.08 0.69 
LB (20) 7.26 0.98 7.10 0.98 6.77 0.99 12.36 0.78 
LB (24) 8.49 0.99 8.23 0.99 9.25 0.99 15.88 0.78 
Jarque-Bera Test for Normality of residuals b 
1741.12 0.00 1345.46 0.00 2064.39 0.00 1289.10 0.00 
F-Test of no ARCH VS. ARCH in Normalised Residuals C 
ARCH (4) 0.56 0.69 0.57 0.68 0.23 0.92 0.49 0.74 
ARCH (8) 0.36 0.94 0.36 0.94 0.20 0.99 0.59 0.78 
ARCH (12) 0.37 0.97 0.29 0.99 0.29 0.99 0.52 0.91 
ARCH (16) 0.41 0.98 0.39 0.99 0.27 1.00 0.61 0.88 
ARCH (20) 0.39 0.99 0.37 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.61 0.91 
ARCH (24) 0.37 1.00 0.35 1.00 0.38 1.00 0.64 0.91 
a: Ho: No Serial Correlation; b: Ho: Normality; c: Ho: No ARCH 
The ARCH- in-Mean tenn in Table 43 is, unlike that in the examination of daily 
seasonality (fable 26), significant or nearly so in all cases. Interpreting the coefficients 
on the monthly dummies as the difference in risk profiles of each month vis-a-vis that 
of December (whose contribution is subsumed in the constant of the variance equation, 
in each case being significant) we that we can begin to assert the importance of 
individual months. For the ISEQ and ISEQR, the months that are important are all save 
September and November; for ISEFlN all bar November, and for ISEGEN only 
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January, July, September and November. Note again the absence of April as an 
important month in a number of the indices. 
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12. Investigation Of Hypotheses 
Refreshing our memory from the discussion in 2 & 4, we can find the following 
hypotheses discussed in the literature to explain the daily seasoml. 
Market Settlement Hypotheses 
These are divisible into two main categories: 
~ Settlement Interest Effects 
• Daily seasonality disappears if we account for the cost of carry using the 
risk free rate of interest 
• Daily seasonality disappears if we account for liquidity effects 
~ Settlement Delays 
• Daily seasonality will disappear if we account for effect of the settlement 
system 
News Specific to the Market 
~ Daily seasonality is caused by unspecified market specific information arrival: 
(The daily seasonality pattern in the % of firms whose price 
rises/falls/unchanged mirrors the pattern of daily seasonality of returns and 
risk) 
~ Daily seasonality is caused by the arrival of macroeconomic information, and 
will disappear when we account for the daily pattern of market sensitive 
macroeconomic information releases. 
~ Firm Specific News 
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• An index of finns reporting on any given day displays different seasonal 
patterns from the index of finns reporting on all other days (Daily 
seasonality is caused by finn specific infonnation arrival 
• Finns that release 'bad news' over the weekend display different daily 
seasonal patterns to those that do not so release . 
• :. Daily seasonality disappears if adjust the data for dividend payments 
.:. Daily seasonality disappears if we adjust the data to account for ex-dividend dates 
It is clear that these hypotheses, while not in opposition to each other, rely on 
fundamentally different causal mechanisms to induce seasonality. It is also clear that 
a number of these hypotheses assume that what is to be explained is a negative 
Monday / positive Friday pattern. This is not the case here, except in the case of the 
ISE Financial indices. For example, the work of Lakonishok and Levi (l982)and 
those who have followed their route, such as Bell and Levin (1998) assumes two main 
beliefs. First, it is assumed that the calendar time hypothesis is in fact correct, and 
second, that there is a negative Monday return occurring from the operation of rolling 
settlement systems. This is not to be confused with the potential for a negative 
Monday return occurring from account week settlement. 
Likewise, although not explicitly stated anywhere in the literature, it seems reasonable 
to assume that either there is an effect which moves the market as a whole, whether 
this be macroeconomic news releases or other news releases, or this news is in fact an 
aggregation of individual finns reporting better or worse news, a finn specific news 
announcement. If both of these factors are operating simultaneously, there is no guide 
in the literature as to a test that may allow the researcher to distinguish between them. 
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Appealing to Occam's Razor, the philosophical principle that states that where trere are 
two equally appealing causal mechanisms to a particular phenomenon the simplest 
should be accepted as the probable cause, it seems reasonable to investigate first of all 
whether or not anyone of these sets of hypotheses seems reasonable. If for example we 
find the change in the settlement system has no effect on the seasonality, in that 
seasonality remains and in a manner for which the literature has not suggested an 
explanation, then it would appear profitless to pursue sub hypotheses relating to 
settlement systems and settlement liquidity. If the Pettengill and Buster (1994) test 
procedure indicates that it is unlikely that the seasonality is as a result of news arriving 
in, as opposed to being generated within, the market then in a similar manner it would 
seem reasonable not to examine the Steeley (2001) hypothesis that it is macroeconomic 
news releases that drive the daily seasonal. It should also be borne in mind that nowhere 
in the literature surveyed does any researcher suggest a mechanism that will induce 
positive Wednesday returns, which seems to be the prevailing feature of the main 
indices that demonstrate significant and persistent seasonality. 
12.1. SETTLEMENT HYPOTHESES IN GENERAL 
A number of the hypotheses adduced in the literature to explain daily seasonality 
revolve around the existence of a settlement system, which has the potential to induce 
particular daily seasonals. Clearly, if the settlement system has an effect on the 
observed pattern of daily seasonality, as hypothesised by Donnelly (1991), Bell and 
Levin (1998) etc, then one immediate consequence will be that as the settlement system 
changes so too will the pattern of seasonality. A simple test therefore for the hypothesis 
that the settlement system is a proximate cause of the daily seasonal is to examine such 
pattern under different settlement regimens. If it is found that the move from one 
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settlement system to another results in a change in the observed daily pattern of stock 
returns then investigation can be focused on the particular time period within which the 
seasonal pattern of interest manifests itself. In Ireland, over the period under 
examination, there have been three separate settlement systems 69. This provides a 
natural experiment that would allow investigation of the hypothesis. As noted in section 
6.3, the settlement week system was in use up to July 1994, after which a rolling 
settlement system operated. Although the settlement system was initially on a lO-day 
basis, subsequently this reduced to 5 days. In both rolling systems the expectation is 
that rolling settlement results in less observed daily seasonality than the fixed settlement 
system. In fact, Jaffe and Westerfield (1985) show, analysing the Canadian settlement 
system, that such a rolling settlement should have no effect on the expected returns for 
any weekday. The settlement system hypotheses however are predicated on the 
assumption that there is a negative Monday. This is not the case here. 
12.2. SETTLEMENT SYSTEM CHANGES AND DAll..Y SEASONALITY 
A settlement week system, as we have seen in 4.1.1, 4.1.2 and 6.3.5 can induce 
settlement effects. Generally, researchers have found the expected effect, which the first 
Monday of an account period should exhibit a higher return than Mondays that are not 
at the start of such a period. However, in the light of the results obtained in Chapter 9, 
concerning the two indices for which there is agreement as between parametric and 
non-parametric methods as to the existence of a daily seasonal, the ISEQ and the ISB-
Financial indices, this would seem prime facia to rule out a settlement effect. Recall 
69 One - the fixed settlement system; two -the 10 day rolling settlement; three- the five day (as at present) rolling 
settlement system. As the 10 day system was in existence for less than a year, and as the system was a simple 
multiple of the five day system, the analysis of the effect of such settlement systems has been conditioned on two 
regimes: fixed (to July 1994) and rolling thereafter. 
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from Table 15 & Table 17 that in these indices there is no hard evidence either for a 
Monday seasonal or for a negative Monday return. However for the ISEQ and ISEQ 
dividend inclusive index, Monday coefficients are statistically insignificant in a 
regression which exhibits overall statistical significance. Table 15 & Table 17 
reinforce this uncertainty. It is therefore not clear what is the pattern of Monday returns. 
Were we able to assert that Monday returns were negative this would be in line with 
international market analyses. Were it to be possible to assert Monday returns as 
positive this might indicate that the settlement-system-induced high return on tlDse 
Mondays on which the account period opened dominated the general tendency for 
Mondays to be negative 70. Neither possibility is credible here, although the evidence 
may point slightly towards the former, even though almost without exception the return 
on Monday is positive. However, a fonnal test of how, if, seasonality and settlement 
regimes are related is warranted. 
TABLE 45: DAILY RETURN AND STANDARD DEVIATION By SETTLEMENT REGIME 
1988-1998 
Total Fixed Settlement (to Rolling Settlement Change from fixed 
Jul~ 1994) (from July 1994) to rolling 
Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. Mean Std. 
Mean Deviation Deviation Deviation Deviation 
ISEQ Monday 0.00 0.45 -0.006 0.48 0.016 0.395 0.02 -0.08 
Tuesday 0.03 0.41 0.020 0.38 0.049 0.463 0.03 0.09 
Wednesday 0.05 0.39 0.026 0.39 0.097 0.365 0.07 -0.03 
Thursday 0.03 0.37 0.041 0.34 0.015 0.412 -0.03 0.07 
Friday 0.01 0.35 -0.006 0.34 0.033 0.368 0.04 0.02 
ISEFINS Monday -0.01 0.57 -0.021 0.61 0.005 0.512 0.03 -0.\0 
Tuesday 0.05 0.55 0.024 0.49 0.100 0.631 0.08 0.14 
Wednesday 0.06 0.54 0.010 0.55 0.133 0.506 0.13 -0.05 
Thursday 0.04 0.57 0.040 0.5\ 0.050 0.644 0.01 0.13 
Frida~ 0.01 0.49 0.000 0.49 0.020 0.500 0.02 0.01 
70 This finding of a settlement induced Monday seasonal is the result found in Donnelly (1991 ~ 
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Table 45 shows the daily returns and standard deviations broken down by settlement 
system. fur the most part, daily returns are greater, but not markedly so, under the 
rolling settlement system. A move from fixed to rolling settlement is expected to have 
the effect on Monday returns of reducing them if the settlement interest hypotheses of 
Lakonishok & Levi and Bell & Levin were correct, but this has not in fact occurred. It 
is interesting to note that the ISEQ index over account week settlement demonstrates a 
pattern similar to that found by Donnelly (1991) in his analysis of non account week 
returns. 
For risk, as proxied by standard deviation, the pattern is clearer. Risk has reduced on 
Monday and Wednesday as we move from fixed to rolling settlement, but overall risk 
levels are increased. Table 46shows the variance across days of the week differs across 
settlement regimes. Under account period settlement, we cannot reject this hypothesis 
for any but the trimmed dividend inclusive index, at a 10% level of significance. 
However, under the rolling settlement system we cannot accept that the variances are 
equal across the days of the week. Thus, the introduction of rolling settlement appears 
to be associated with an increase in daily seasonal effects in the risk profile of the 
indices. This is not predicted in the literature. 
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TABLE 46: TESTfNG FOR EQUALITY OF VARIANCE By DAY OF THE WEEK UNDER 
DIFFERENT S ETILEMENT SYSTEMS. 
Account Period Settlement Rolling Settlement 
Levene's Test Sig. Levene's Test Sig. 
ISEQ 76.441 0.00 0.199 0.939 
ISEFIN 2.095 0.079 0.685 0.603 













TABLE 48: PAIR WISE ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES IN MEAN RElURN By DAY OF THE WEEK UNDER DIFFERENT S EITLEMENT REGIMES 
Tuesda~ Wednesda~ Thursda~ Frida~ 
Fixed Settlement: Diff. Sig Diff. Sig Diff. Sig Diff. Sig 
Tukey's HSD Test 
ISEQ Monday 0.02 0.98 -0.09 0.01 -0.02 0.97 0.00 1.00 
Tuesday -O.ll 0.00 -0.03 0.75 -0.01 0.99 
Wednesday 0.08 0.04 0.\0 0.00 
Thursday 0.02 0.94 
ISEFIN Monday 0.01 0.99 om 1.00 -0.01 1.00 0.04 0.68 
Tuesday -0.01 1.00 -0.02 0.97 0.03 0.90 
Wednesday -0.01 1.00 0.03 0.77 
Thursday 0.04 0.89 
Floating Settlement: 
Tamhanes Test 
ISEQ Monday -0.03 1.00 -0.08 0.32 0.00 1.00 -0.02 1.00 
Tuesday -0.05 0.94 0.03 1.00 0.02 1.00 
Wednesday 0.08 0.29 0.06 0.55 
Thursday -0.02 1.00 
ISEFIN Monday -0.02 1.00 -0.06 0.76 0.02 1.00 0.01 1.00 
Tuesday -0.04 0.99 0.04 0.99 0.03 1.00 
Wednesday 0.07 0.44 0.06 0.56 
Thursday -0.01 1.00 
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TABLE 49: RoBUST ANALYSIS OF DAY OF THE WEEK EFFECT By SETTLEMENT REGIMEN 
OLS AR LAD TLS 
Bayes Variable Coeff T- Sig Coeff T-Stat Sig Coeff T-Stat Sig Bayes Coeff T-Stat Sig 
tlf Stat Stat tlf Stat 
Fixed 
Settlement 
ISEQ 2.75 MON 0.02 0.59 0.55 0.02 0.73 0.46 0.02 1.65 0.10 2.73 0.02 0.01 0.13 
N=1980 2.75 TUE -0.04 - 1.36 0.17 -0.04 -1.57 0.12 -0.01 -0.84 0.40 2.73 0.01 0.01 0.42 
TrimmedN= 2.75 WED 0.14 5.57 0.00 0.14 3.40 0.00 0.11 3.43 0.00 2.73 0.06 0.01 0.00 
1789 
2.75 TIID 0.01 0.51 0.61 0.01 0.70 0.49 0.02 1.71 0.09 2.73 0.03 0.01 0.01 
2.75 FRI 0.01 0.38 0.70 0.01 0.69 0.49 0.01 0.88 0.38 2.73 0.01 0.01 0.27 
F Statistic 7.65 6.77 0.00 17.45 0.00 6.45 0.00 7.53 18.91 0.00 
ISEFINS 2.47 MON -0.01 - 0.19 0.85 -0.01 -0.19 0.85 0.02 1.64 0.10 2.44 -0.01 -0.33 0.74 
N=455 2.47 TUE -0.08 -1.29 0.20 -0.08 -1.43 0.15 -0.01 -0.87 0.38 2.44 0.03 0.83 0.41 
Trimmed 2.47 WED -0.05 -0.83 0.41 -0.05 -0.73 0.46 0.11 3.48 0.00 2.44 0.01 0.19 0.85 
N=401 
2.47 TIID 0.06 1.04 0.30 0.06 1.03 0.30 0.02 1.68 0.09 2.44 0.07 1.77 0.08 
2.47 FRI 0.00 0.02 0.98 0.00 0.02 0.98 0.01 0.85 0.39 2.44 0.02 0.62 0.53 




N= I 003 2.63 MON 0.02 0.55 0.58 0.02 0.57 0.57 -0.00 -0.15 0.88 2.60 0.01 0.42 0.67 
TrimmedN 2.63 TUE 0.05 1.76 0.08 0.05 1.53 0.13 0.06 3.13 0.00 2.60 0.07 3.74 0.00 
=891 
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OLS AR LAD TLS 
Bayes Variable Coeff T- Sig Coeff T-Stat Sig Coeff T-Stat Sig Bayes Coeff T-Stat Sig 
tlf Stat Stat tlf Stat 
2.63 WED 0.10 3.46 0.00 0.10 3.84 0.00 0.09 4.40 0.00 2.60 0.09 5.11 0.00 
2.63 THU 0.02 0.56 0.58 0.02 0.54 0.59 0.04 1.86 0.06 2.60 0.05 2.95 0.00 
2.63 FRI 0.03 1.17 0.24 0.03 1.29 0.20 0.05 2.57 0.01 6.89 0.07 3.68 0.00 
F Statistic 7.00 1.41 0.23 23.71 0.00 39.29 0.00 12.52 0.00 
ISEFINS 2.63 MON 0.00 0.12 0.91 0.00 0.13 0.90 -0.03 -1.03 0.30 2.60 -0.02 -0.68 0.50 
N= 1003 2.63 TUE 0.10 2.55 0.01 0.10 2.28 0.02 0.11 3.70 0.00 2.60 0.10 3.91 0.00 
Trimmed 2.63 WED 0.13 3.39 0.00 0.13 3.78 0.00 0.12 3.92 0.00 2.60 0.10 3.97 0.00 
N=875 
2.63 THU 0.05 1.28 0.20 0.05 1.12 0.26 0.07 2.14 0.03 2.60 0.06 2.46 0.01 
7.00 FRI 0.02 0.52 0.60 0.02 0.59 0.56 0.04 1.35 0.18 6.87 0.04 1.55 0.12 
1.82 0.12 24.11 0.00 36.51 0.00 7.99 0.00 
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Shown in Table 47 is a non-parametric analysis of the extent of daily seasonality under 
the differing settlement regimes. The evidence here is that from a non-parametric 
perspective, we can only accept the existence of daily seasonality under rolling 
settlement. 
Table 48 shows pair-wise differences in daily mean returns across settlement regimens, 
using either Tukey's or Tamhane's tests. The test chosen depends on the results from 
Table 46. From this we see that under account week (fixed) settlement statistically 
significant differences appear as between Wednesday and all other days for the ISEQ. 
No other statistically significant daily differences appear in this analysis. All analyses of 
account week settlement systems, from Jaffe and Westerfield (1985), through 
Condoyanni, O'Hanlon and Ward (1987) to Donnelly (1991) indicate that if account 
week settlement does induces a daily seasonal then this ~ould manifest itself on a 
Monday. The result here is a strong indication that whatever the causal mechanism is of 
daily seasonality in the Irish market it is unlikely to be the account week settlement 
system that operated up to 1994. 
Despite the evidence that the daily seasonal in risk is stronger under rolling settlement, 
as seen in Table 46, the pair-wise differences in mean return are all statistically 
insignificant. Rolling settlement system introduction appears therefore to have resulted 
in the major indices displaying a set of mean return characteristics more in keeping with 
the predictions of the standard financial economics model (no seasonal) than was the 
case under account week settlement. Table 49 shows a robust parametric analysis of the 
daily coefficients conducted along similar lines to Table 46. What is noticeable is that 
while the ISEQ shows seasonality, by means of the regression F &atistic, under all 
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forms of adjustment under fixed settlement, under rolling settlement it is only after 
adjusting for known characteristics of the index that such seasonality becomes evident. 
The ISEFIN demonstrates seasonality only under LAD estimation for fixed settlement, 
while under rolling settlement it too exhibits seasonality under all bar OLS estimation. 
Wednesday appears significant under all forms of estimation for the ISEQ under both 
fixed and rolling settlement, while for the ISEFIN index it is only under rolling 
settlement that we find Wednesday significant other than under LAD estimation. 
Tuesday becomes significant only under adjusted estimation procedures under rolling 
settlement. 
There is therefore some conflict as between the parametric and norrparametric 
statistical evidence as to the effect of introducing rolling settlement. The parametric 
evidence indicates that the extent of daily seasonality has increased, while the norr 
parametric evidence is that if anything it has decreased. It is clear however, that two 
facts arise from this analysis .. First, the conditions necessary for further investigation of 
settlement hypotheses, namely that there be persistent and consistently negative returns 
on Mondays with persistent and consistently positive returns on Friday, and that 
changes in the settlement system are associated with changes in the seasonality pattern, 
are not met unambiguously. Second, the change in the settlement system has had an 
effect on the seasonality, but analysis of change is mt statistically robust. Therefore, I 
conclude that the settlement system is unlikely to be the cause for the daily seasonal in 
the Irish equity market. 
293 
12.3. NEWS IN THE MARKET OR NEWS To THE MARKET? 
Pettengill and Buster (1994) attempt to distinguish between an effect caused by finn 
specific news to one caused by news that affects the entire market, as has been noted 
earlier. One issue that immediately arises in the Irish context is that with the exception 
of the Datastream indices there are no published rise/fall/unchanged statistics for the 
indices under investigation. To overcome this I undertook an analysis of the 
constituents of the ISEQ, ISE Financial and Datastream indices. At all periods the 
constituents of the Datastream market index and financial index consisted exclusively 
of a subset of the ISEQ and ISE Financial constituents. Thus, using these Datastream 
indices of rises/falls/unchanged as a basis I calculated indices of ISEQ and ISE 
Financial rises/falls/unchanged. Table 50 shows the daily variation in proportions of 
fiIms showing rises, falls or remaining unchanged in price for the ISEQ and ISE 
financial Indices. 
TABLE 50: COMPARISON OF MEAN INDEX RETURN AND PROPORTION OF SECURITIES 
DIRECTION 1988-1998 
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Total 
ISEQ 0.002 0.031 0.052 0.032 0.008 0.025 
ISEQ-Rises 23.664 24.913 24.251 24.122 24.739 24.351 
ISEQ-Falls 22.916 22.391 22.303 22.760 22.103 22.486 
ISEQ-Unchanged 53.420 52.696 53.446 53.118 53.159 53.163 
ISEFINS -0.0 II 0.054 0.057 0.044 0.008 0.031 
ISEFIN-Rises 20.259 22.303 21.920 21.604 23.253 21.901 
ISEFIN-Fall 19.803 19.573 18.026 19.657 17.318 18.855 
ISEFIN-Unchanged 59.937 58.124 59.853 58.537 59.428 59.161 
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TABLE 51 : ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENCES IN MEAN PROPORTIONS OF RETURN DIRECTION 
By DAY OF WEEK. 
Kruskal-Wallis H Test ANOYA FTest 
Chi-Square Sig F Sig 
ISEQ Index 
Rises 1.642 0.801 0.64 0.63 
Falls 1.316 0.859 0.40 0.81 
Unchanged 1.772 0.778 0.20 0.94 
ISE Financial Index 
Rises 6.431 0.169 1.75 0.14 
Falls 12.002 0.017 2.51 0.04 
Unchanged 6.168 0.187 1.02 0.39 
For the ISEQ index the highest mean return is on a Wednesday with the highest 
proportion of rises on a Tuesday. The lowest mean return is on Monday, with it and 
Thursday showing essentially the same, highest, proportion of falling stocks. For the 
ISE Financial Index the highest mean return occurs on Wednesday with the highest 
proportion of rising stocks occurring on Tuesday with til! second highest occurring on 
Wednesday. The lowest mean return occurs on Monday, which is the day with the 
highest proportion of falling stocks. 
The work of Pettengill and Buster (1994) assumes implicitly that the market reacts in 
certain ways. It assumes that there is no lag in the mark~t as between a high 
proportion of falling or rising stocks and mean return, and it assumes that the market 
reacts symmetrically to rising and failings stocks. While these may be reasonable 
assumptions, especially in the liquid US market it may be that some lags and 
asymmetric responses occur in less liquid and less sophisticated markets. Regardless 
of this, for both indices the low mean return - high proportion of falling stocks 
relationship posited by Pettengill and Buster is evident. The High mean return - high 
proportion of rising stocks is present only with a one-day lag in the ISEQ and ISE 
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Financial indices. Thus, there exists at least some evidence that a market wide 
phenomenon may be at work. 
This can be formally tested by means of an analysis of varian::e, parametric or non-
parametric (Kruskal-Wallis H). Table 51 shows the results of these analyses of variance 
to investigate the hypothesis that there exist differences in these proportions. Both 
indicate that, with the exception of the ISE financial index proportion of falls we cannot 
accept at a 5% level of significance that there is a significant variation across days of 
the week in terms of the proportion of shares showing a particular sign. This evidence is 
robust to parametric and non-parametric methods of investigation. Thus, while the 
statistical evidence indicates that a market wide effect is not in operation this conflicts 
with the observed evidence; the relationship between the low mean return and high 
proportion of falling stocks along the lines posited by Pettengill & Buster being 
observable in the ISE Financial index. 
It would seem reasonable therefore, to assume that there is some evidence that for 
fmancial stocks in the Irish market a market wide news arrival causes the observed 
daily seasonality. However, despite the high weight of fmancial stocks in the ISEQ 
index as a whole this market wide news arrival does not appear to carry through to the 
overall market. 
12.4. FIRM SPECIFIC NEWS AND ITS EFFECT ON THE ISEQ 
The results of work by such as Patell and Wolfson (1982),Penman (1987),Aboudi and 
Thon (1994) and Aggarwal and Schatzberg (1997) indicates that there is no clear link 
between firm specific news releases and daily seasonality. Indeed, when placed 
alongside the results of the study by Berry and Howe (1994) of news releases by 
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Reuters, showing an inverted U shape with most news releases on Tuesda:r 
Wednesday-Thursday , and similar results for dividends by Schatzberg and Datta 
(1992), there seems little doubt that, for the US , the release of finn specific news may 
not be a significant cause of the weekendIMonday effects. Given however that the daily 
seasonal in the ISEQ index is a mid-week seasonal it seems plausible that results, 
earnings and other firm specific announcements may, if they cluster in the early part of 
the week, provide an explanation. However almost without exception (only 5 instances 
over 10 years for 30 stocks) Irish stocks go ex dividend on days other than Monday. 
Going ex-dividend leads to a reduction in the price that an individu~l will pay for a 
stock, reducing the Monday return. As the seasonal here is a positive Wednesday 
seasonal, the dividend status of the stock seems not to offer a solution. Accordingly, for 
the 10 non-financial equities with the largest contribution (in terms of market value) to 
the ISEQ over the period 1993-199871 details of the days on which they release 
dividerrlleamings information was sought from the Financial Times Fr-McCarthy 
Database. This covers the Financial times, other leading UK newspapers, as well as the 
Investors Chronicle, and the major Irish daily and Sunday newspaper Table 52 
provides details of the reportage seasonality. Over the course of the period the market 
value of the top 10 companies fluctuated between 75 and 80% of the total ISEQ value. 
Thus an analysis of the information releases of these companies can be expected to act 
as a good proxy for those of the ISEQ as a whole. 
11 See Table 4 
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TABLE 52: INFORMATION SEASONALITY OF LARGE NON-FINANCIAL FIRMS 1993-
1998 
Day # % 
Monday 19 20.88% 
Tuesday 28 30.77% 
Wednesday 30 32.97% 
Thursday 12 13.19% 
Friday 2 2.20% 
12.4.1. MICROECONOMIC NEWS SEASONALITY & THE ISEQ INDEX 
The tendency, it is evident from Table 52, is for information to be released most 
frequently on Tuesday and Wednesday. This invested U shape of reporting 
seasonality follows a similar pattern to that noted in the US, as commented on earlier. 
However, the majority of the news releases occur prior to the Wednesday peak in the 
ISEQ. To test whether the company data releases have any significant effect on the 
" daily seasonal pattern I estimated the equation ISEQ, = La,D, + {3CODAT +£, , 
'~I 
over the 1993-1998 period, where CODAT takes the value 1 on a day when company 
results are announced and 0 otherwise. The ex coefficients are now conditional mean 
returns. If company announcements provide an adequate explanation of the daily 
seasonal we should see that (1) there is a substantial change in the daily return means, 
and (2) the ~ coefficient should be statistically significant. The estimated equation 
parameters are show in Table 53 
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TABLE 53: ROBUST EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECT OF COMPANY ANNOUNCEMENTS 
ON DAILY SEASONALITY IN THE ISEQ 
OLS AR LAD 
-
TLS 
Variable Coeff T- Sig CoetT T -Stat Sig CoetT T -Stat Sig CoetT T- Sig 
Stat Stat 
MON 0.03 1.29 0.20 0.03 1.22 0.22 -0.01 -0.51 0.61 0.02 1.00 0.32 
TUE 0.06 2.63 0.01 0.06 2.41 0.02 0.03 2.29 0.02 0.06 3.67 0.00 
WED 0.08 3.41 0.00 0.08 3.47 0.00 0.04 2.87 0.00 0.08 5.08 0.00 
THU 0.03 1.45 0.15 0.03 1.55 0.12 0.04 3.12 0.00 0.05 3.20 0.00 
FRI 0.01 0.57 0.57 0.01 0.64 0.53 0.01 0.76 0.44 0.03 2.20 0.03 
CODATA -0.04 0.32 -0.04 -0.86 0.39 -0.00 -0.03 0.97 -0.02 0.47 
0.99 0.73 
F (5,1506) 1.13 0.34 18.45 0.01 24.27 0.00 1.86 0.10 
The results from Table 53 provide mixed evidence as to the importance of 
micro economic seasonality. The CODATA dummy variable is not in itself significant, 
under either classical or Btyesian assumptions and under various adjustments to the 
residuals of the series, and in fact seems to indicate that on average the market 
perceives the average company announcement to be negative. However, the 
coefficients on the daily dummies, which are the mean return on these days to the 
ISEQ when the effect of any company announcement are factored in, have almost all 
increased from the unconditional means, with the exception of that for Friday returns. 
In all cases, these differences in mean returns am mean returns conditional on 
microeconomic information seasonality are statistically significant, although 
Wednesday returns remain the largest of the week. Tuesday conditional mean returns, 
while significant under classical assumptions are not so under Bayesian 
assumptions 72. Thus, while there is some evidence that the microeconomic seasonality 
of company accounts releases has an effect on the daily seasonality it would not seem 
to provide a full explanation. 
72 The equation above assumes instantaneous transmission of infomlalion and reaction to the company releases. 
However, it is also reasonable to assume that there is some delay in the process of incorporation of information. 
Replacing the CODATA variable with its lagged value. CODATA· I allows for examination of this hypothesis. 
Little change OCClirs in the conditional mean returns and CODATA -I is insignificant under classical and Bayesian 
assumptions. regardless of any adjustment made to the residuals. 
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12.5. MACROECONOMIC NEWS ARmv AlS AND THE ISE FINANCIAL INDEX 
12.5.1. MACROECONOMIC NEWS ARmv AI:'S REVISITED 
Based on the analysis of rises/falls and their relationship with the pattern of mean 
returns, section 10.3 indicated that for the ISE fmancial index a hypothesis of market 
wide news arrivals affecting the mean daily returns was a reasonable starting point. This 
raises the issue immediately of what type of news. 
Research has concentrated on the perspective of macroeconomic news, as distinguished 
from micro, firm specific, news, as being a potential cause of daily seasonality. Some 
papers, such as Chang, Pinegar and Ravichandran (1993) have used the innovations in 
the returns of large company stocks as a proxy for macroeconomic news. Another 
approach, characterised by the papers of Liano and Gup (1989)and Kohers and Kohers 
(1995) have investigated shifts in daily seasonal patterns when the economy is in an 
expansionary as opposed to a contractionary phase, concluding that day of the week 
effects are generally stronger in contractionary environments. 
It is only in Steeley (1999) that we see an examination directly of the daily patterns of 
news releases and how, if, these relate to the pattern of daily seasonality in the UK. 
Steeley partitions the data according to whether or not there is a macroeconomic 
announcement of potential interest, or not. The set of macroeconomic variables whose 
announcement or release believed potentially important is inflation, labour market 
conditions, government borrowing, official interest rate changes and money supply. He 
finds that although there are no statistically discemable day of the week effects overall 
that partitioning the data into positive and negative returns series both leads to 
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significant day of the week (here Monday and Friday returns) effects in the negative, 
bear market, conditions and that this pattern is strengthened when the negative returns 
series is conditioned on announcements. Thus, he roncludes, there is support for the 
contention that macroeconomic announcements are a potential cause of the day of the 
week effect. Steeley also finds that the impact of the infonnation release differs as to the 
kind of infonnation released. 
12.5.2. MACROECONOMIC INFLUENCES ON THE ISE FINANCIAL INDEX 
While there is no dearth of published research on the Irish financial system there has 
been no study that has focused on the empirics of the relevant stock market index, the 
ISE Financial Index. Clearly therefore trere is no body of research to draw on to 
ascertain the macroeconomic influences on the index. Accordingly, the researcher is 
forced to infer such inferences from the known concentration of financial stocks (see for 
example Bacon Associates (1999)) and the literature on the macro dynamics of the 
market as a whole. The most prominert research in the literature is Gallagher 
(1995),Gallagher and Twomey (1998), Devine (1996) and Kearney (1998). However, 
with the exception of Devine none of these papers has focused directly on the issue of 
the macroeconomic influences on the Irish market. None of these examined the ISE 
financial sector index. Gallagher examines, in both papers, the influences of other 
national markets on the changes in the Irish market. 
Kearney examines the callies of volatility over the 1975-1994 period, using monthly 
data. He finds that, after changes in the ISEQ and the FTSE indices that the 
macroeconomic determinants of changes in the ISEQ are changes in interest rates and 
industrial production. Devine proceeds by means of data selection from two sources; 
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applications of the Arbitrage Pricing Theory and interviews with market participants. 
With the variables thus identified a Vector Auto-regression analysis identified that the 
macroeconomic variables, which lIDst influenced monthly stock returns on the ISEQ 
index, were the IO-year bond yield, the dollar exchange rate, and the three-month 
interbank rate. Industrial and retail economic output indicators had little impact on the 
market. 
From the work of the authors above, we see that a number of macroeconomic data 
series are associated with movements in the main indices under examination. Of those 
variables that are determined exogenously to the markets, the official interest rate 
appears to be the only major influence. However, for completeness sake, as well as to 
allow comparison with Steeley, it was detennined that collection of the release dates of 
the major industrial as well as financial series would be useful. Accordingly, release 
dates of the following data for the 1988-1998 period were sourced from the Central 
Statistics Office and the Central Bank of Ireland; From the CSO, National Income and 
Expenditure, Balance of International Payments, Industrial Production & Industrial 
Employment, Consumer, Wholesak! and Agriculture Price Indices, numbers of persons 
on the Liver Register (unemployment claims) and Output, Input and Income in 
Agriculture: From the Central Bank of Ireland the relevant monetary and financial 
statistics, Official External Reserves, Officnl Lending Rate (the central bank lending 
rate charged to the interbank market), domestic credit growth and Broad Money (money 
and other liquid assets). From January 1988 onwards, coinciding with the start of the 
series under investigation, the central bank adopted a policy of releasing the Monthly 
Statistical Bulletin on the first Thursday of the month. 73 Notification of changes in 
73 The author of this work was, at the time of this decision, the relevant officer in the statistical division of the Central 
Bank of Ireland, and thus the person responsible for this harmonisation of release dates. 
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official interest rates, defined here as the Short Tenn Facility, or STF, can occur of 
course on any date. Table 54 provides details of these releases. 
TABLE 54: MACROECONOMIC INFORMATION SEASONALITY 1988-1998 
Monda:t Tuesda:t Wednesda:t Thursda:t Frida:t 
Numbers 
All Releases % 67 69 251 142 
Industrial, BOP & GNP 14 28 26 53 26 
Central Banking Data 119 
Agriculture 24 16 31 32 30 
CPI 2 7 29 16 
Unemployment 34 13 6 67 
STF Rate Change 22 3 6 18 3 
Percentage 
All Releases 15.36% 10.72% 11.04% 40.16% 22.72% 
Industrial, BOP & GNP 9.52% 19.05% 17.69% 36.05% 17.69% 
Central Banking Data 100.00% 
Agriculture 18.05% 12.03% 23.31% 24.06% 22.56% 
CPI 3.70% 12.96% 53.70% 29.63% 
Unemployment 28.33% 10.83% 5.00% 55.83% 
STF Rate Chan~e 42.31%' 5.77% 11.54% 34.62% 5.77% 
Steeley (2001) examines UK macroeconomic infonnation releases, and indicates that 
the majority of these releases are concentrated at midweek. This is not the case here. 
12.S.3. MACROECONOMIC NEWS SEASONALITY & THE ISE FINANCIAL INDEX 
Table 55 shows the results of a series of robust regressions with the dependent variable 
being the ISE Financial Index, with separate results for those days on which there is and 
is not a macroeconomic announcement. We note that in no case is the 'macroeconomic 
announcement dummy statistically significant. Table 56 shows the results of a test of 
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pairwise mean daily differences. The test used is Tamhane's of test, as Levene's test of 
homogeneity of variance indicated that both the sub samples, days with and without 
macroeconomic announcements, displayed significant differences in variance of mean 
daily returns 74. The results of this test, in both sub-samples, indicate no evidence of 
daily differen::es. 
74 The test statistics were 1.354 and 2.256, with marginal significance levels of .249 and .096, for daily mean returns 
on days with and without macroeconomic releases, respectively. 
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TABLE 55: RoBUST ANALYSIS OF MACROECONOMIC SEASONALITY AND DAILY SEASONALITY, ISE FINANCIAL INDEX 1988-1998 
Unconditional 
Mean OLS AR LAD TLS 
Coeff T Sig Coeff T Sig Coeff T Sig Coeff T Sig 
MON -0.011 -0.006 -0.239 0.811 -0.006 -0.235 0.814 -0.031 -1.536 0.125 -0.017 -0.998 0.319 
TUE 0.054 0.057 2.349 0.019 0.057 2.257 0.024 0.056 2.871 0.004 0.058 3.577 0.000 
WED 0.057 0.060 2.461 0.014 0.060 2.476 0.013 0.052 2.478 0.013 0.052 3.243 0.001 
TffiJ 0.044 0.054 2.018 0.044 0.054 2.049 0.040 0.059 3.005 0.003 0.057 3.232 0.001 
FRI 0.008 0.014 0.569 0.569 0.014 0.650 0.516 0.014 0.762 0.446 0.021 1.287 0.198 
Macro -0.023 -0.865 0.387 -0.023 -0.815 0.415 -0.019 -0.918 0.359 -0.014 -0.773 0.440 
F 1.340 0.244 13.278 0.039 24.422 0.000 5.965 0.000 
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TABLE 56: PAIRWISE ANALYSIS OF DAILY SEASONALITY AND MACROECONOMIC 
ANNOUNCEMENTS 
Panel A: Days with Macroeconomic Announcements 
Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
DifT Sig Ditf Sig Ditf Sig Ditf Sig 
Monday -0.13 0.762 -0.14 0.747 -0.1 0.955 -0.04 1.000 
Tuesday -0.01 1.000 0.038 1.000 0.099 0.795 
Wednesday 0.046 0.999 0.107 0.792 
Thursday 0.061 0.984 
Panel B: Days without Macroeconomic Announcements 
Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday 
Ditf Sig Diff Sig Diff Sig Diff Sig 
Monday -0.13 0.089 -0.14 0.857 -0.100 0.908 -0.04 1.000 
Tuesday -0.01 1.000 0.038 1.000 0.099 0.993 
Wednesday 
Thursday 
0.046 1.000 0.107 0.988 
0.061 0.995 
The evidence from Table 56 shows no evidence of any days being different in their 
returns from any other day, using Tamhane's T2 test. Clearly however, from Table 55 
the macroeconomic announcements are causing some alteration in the pattern of daily 
seasonality even though the evidence from there is that there is no statistically 
significant effect on the pattern of daily seasonality. 
Steeley (2001) suggests a test to ascertain which, if any, of the macroeconomic 
variables are causing such changes. This takes the fonn of a regression of the index 
return on its own lagged value, to account for autocorrelation, and on a series of dummy 
variables, each corresponding to a particular macroeconomic announceme nt. His results 
indicate that base rate changes are the most important in tenns of daily seasonality. 
Steeley also includes a dummy variable for Monday. Although to that stage in the paper 
no clear and unambiguous Monday effect was evident, the evidence in the UK is that 
there is at least an intennittent Monday seasonal, which, although not explicitly stated, 
presumably motivates the inclusion of the Monday dummy. In the case of the ISEFIN, 
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conditioned on macroeconomic announcements, there is no clear candidate for a daily 
seasonal. However, Table 48 & Table 49 provide some evidence that, 'especially under 
rolling settlement (post 1994) that Tuesday and Wednesday are important. Therefore 
Table 57shows the results of series of robust regressions of the form below: 
R, =aTT+awW+ 
f3 Jndata, + f3cBCBdata, + f3 AGAGdata, + f3cp,CPI, + f3uE UE, + f3sTFCBrate, + E, 
where T and W refer to dummies taking the value I on Tuesday and Wednesday 
respectively, Indata, CBdata , AGdata, CPI, UE and CBrate are dummies that take the 
value I on days when Industrial, Central Bank, Agriculture, Consumer Prices, 
Unemployment and Short-term Facility Rate Change data are announced and 0 
otherwise. This is estimated only over the post 1994, rolling settlement period. 
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TABLE 57: MACROECONOMIC ANNOUNCEMENT EFFECTS ON DAILY SEASONALITY: ROLLING SETILEMENT ONLY 
OLS AR LAD TLS 
Variable Coeff T-Stat Sig Coeff T-Stat Sig Coeff T-Stat Sig Coeff T-Stat Sig 
TUE 0.102 2.590 0.010 0.102 2.240 0.025 0.052 2.688 0.007 0.087 3.519 0.000 
WED 0.125 3.161 0.002 0.125 3.461 0.001 0.048 2.276 0.023 0.096 3.859 0.000 
INDATA 0.085 1.164 0.245 0.085 1.318 0.187 0.056 1.723 0.085 0.026 0.576 0.565 
CBDATA 0.045 0.544 0.586 0.045 0.447 0.655 0.041 1.015 0.310 0.067 1.314 0.189 
AGDATA 0.039 0.511 0.609 0.039 0.439 0.661 -0.012 -0.307 0.759 0.001 0.020 0.984 
CPI -0.151 -1.514 0.130 -0.151 -0.910 0.363 0.019 0.247 0.805 0.154 2.312 0.021 
UE -0.098 -1.200 0.230 -0.098 -1.132 0.258 -0.088 -2.271 0.023 0.034 0.665 0.506 
CBRATE 0.390 2.069 0.039 0.390 1.228 0.219 0.063 0.822 0.411 -0.031 -0.243 0.808 
3.526 0.000 25.041 0.002 23.009 0.003 4.930 0.000 
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It is again not immediately clear what is the effect of various announcements on the 
financial system. The daily dummies remain significant 'throughout the various 
estimation procedures and the overall signifrt:ance remain via the F test. Adjusting for 
Bayesian data however we note that the significance of the daily dummies declines, 
with neither Wednesday nor Tuesday retaining significance over all estimation 
approaches. Also, the sign of the dummies for the various macroeconomic 
announcements is unstable over the various estimation procedures, with no dummy 
retaining its sign over more than 2 approaches. Thus the effect of the individual 
mU10uncements seems to vary with the estimation process and is not significant in any 
case. We may therefore conclude that there is little evidence of macroeconomic 
announcements being a determining factor in the pattern of daily seasonality in the 
ISEFIN index 
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13. Conclusion And Discussion 
This work had three main objectives. 
By way of setting the scene, a preliminary task was undertaken of reviewing, very 
briefly, the standard model of asset pricing, showing that little room exists within this 
for long-tenn persistence of calendar regularities. The importance of any such regularity 
for the standard model research programme, or paradigm, was emphasised by a brief 
survey of the philosophy of science literature, financial economics being at heart ani in 
its origins a social science. 
The first objective was to provide a comprehensive review of the extensive literature on 
calendar regularities in financial asset returns, concentrating on equity returns and on 
daily regularities. The literature on non-daily seasonal regularities illustrates how 
research programmes working within the standard model can incorporate such 
regularities, albeit with difficulty. In completion of the task of reviewing daily 
seasonality the material was seen to suggest a number of regularities commonly seen in 
across national markets and over time, particularly that markets open low during the 
week and close high. This typically manifests itself in abnonnally high returns on 
Fridays and abnonnally low returns on Monday, with this Monday effect spilling over 
into abnonnally low returns on Tuesday for what can be classed as satellite markets. 
The literature has tended to bifurcate. The first branch consists of those papers that 
concentrate on empirical verification of these regularities, using different statistical and 
econometric techniques, or using different datasets or subdividing the time period under 
investigation according to various presupposed regimes. The second branch consists of 
those works that, while providing reassurance that the phenomenon exists in the frame 
of interest, attempt to provide and test explanatory hypotheses. A sub literature on 
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returns around public holidays shows that returns prior to these holidays is also 
significantly higher, and that this effect appears to be driven by local, as opposed to 
international, causes. 
The second objective this work has achieved is provision of an outline of the Irish 
equity market, placing it in context geographically, in terms of organization and 
regulation, and in terms of its relationships with the large, liquid, London market. The 
importance of this task is twofold. First, from the literature reviewed in pursuance of the 
first task, it is clear that significant potential explanatory power for any daily regularity 
exists in the microstructure of the market under investigation. Second, the period 
selected for analysis in the third task is not arbitrary, but emerges from the political 
economy of the Irish market. 
The third objective involved testing the behaviour of equit y returns in the Irish market 
via three sequential elements; methodology, investigation, and hypothesis testing. First, 
methodological issues are discussed extensively and intensively. This emerges from an 
analysis of the methods used as noted in the first task, partially from statistical 
considerations which I believe have not been heretofore given sufficient prominence in 
the search for daily and other regularities, and partially from considerations of the 
philosophy of science. Using robust and appropriate methodology, and adapting it as 
circumstances warrant, I investigate the existence and extent of daily, monthly and 
holiday seasonality in the Irish equity market. The final element in the sequence that 
completes task three is the testing of these hypotheses. 
The major findings of the work naturally therefore emerge from the third objective. 
These results are novel in the Irish context, and are internationally novel in both their 
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manifestation and I believe in tenns of the variety and complexity of statistics deployed 
in seeking them. In summary, these are 
I) Daily seasonality in the Irish equity market appears to exist across a wide range of 
indices and index construction methods. 
a) This seasonality is more readily detected using parametric methods, even when 
these methods have been adjusted to account for the number of data points 
(what I have called a Bayesian approach), than under non-parametric methods. 
However, with adjustment to account for the distributional characteristics of the 
indices the evidence for such seasonality is much weakened. 
b) There is some evidence that a number of indices, in particular the ISEQ and ISE 
Financial index demonstrate daily seasonality. 
c) The fonn of this seasonality is unusual as compared to its manifestation in other 
equity markets. In Ireland, there is almost never a negative Mondayffuesday. 
Instead, the predominant fonn of seasonality appears to be a persistent and 
positive Wednesday effect. 
d) The daily seasonal appears not to be a risk effect, as there is no evidence that the 
pattern of varying volatility found reflects the pattern of varying returns. 
e) The daily seasonal appears not to be a reflection of the microstructure, the 
settlement system, of the Irish equity market. A natural experiment, the 
changing of the settletrent system from a fixed period to a rolling settlement 
system, in 1994 allows experimentation along these lines 
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f) There is some evidence that differential news impacts drive the general market 
index (microeconomic, or frrin specific news) and the fmancial market 
(macroeconomic news announcements). However, further examination indicates 
that these news impacts provide at best only a partial explanation for the daily 
seasonal. 
2) The Irish equity market demonstrates a pre-holiday anomaly, with the local effect 
dominating 
3) There is a persistent and important January seasonal in the Irish market, but the 
April seasonal found in previous literature seems not to be in evidence. This finding 
is, unlike that for the daily seasonal, robust as to the estimation procedure and the 
method of interpretation. 
Therefore, the daily seasonal, in particular, in the Irish equity market remains a mystery. 
The main hypotheses found' in the literature either provide for explanations that are 
predicated on a pattern not found here or do rot appear to provide a full explanation. 
One therefore has to ask whether this matters, and if so on what grounds. 
There are three main reasons for this finding on daily seasonality being at the least 
intriguing. 
First, while the magnitude of the differences in relative returns across days of the week 
are low, perhaps indicating that a trading strategy based on them would, after 
commission and trading costs, be uneconomical, these differential returns, although not 
statistically robust, do perhaps provide guidance as to trade timing. This approach is 
well summarised by the title of Yale Hirsch's 1986 volume - "Don't Sell Stocks on 
Monday". The implication is of course that if one is to sell stocks, any other day (he 
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suggests Friday) is preferable. As to buying and selling, there is no round trip guidance. 
In the Irish context, over the period under investigation, the high level of commissions 
and charges wmdd have rendered such round tripping unviable. Thus, the existence, if 
real and significant, of these regularities would provide us not with an investment 
strategy but with an investment timing strategy. This approach, of seeking a guidance in 
tenns of timing, is exemplified in for example papers such as Kato (1990),Maberly 
(1995)and Chan, Khanthavit and Thomas (1996). 
Second, as a challenge to the prevailing paradigm the existence of unexplained (not 
inexplicable, as there remains no doubt hypotheses untested or even unfonnulated 
which are quite possibly an explanation) daily seasonality is at best mixed. The 
evidence presented above indicates that it is possible that there do exist daily seasonal 
patterns in the Irish market, but that this evidence is weak and that the existing 
hypotheses are at best partial explanations 6r this. Consequently, either there exists 
another set of explanations 'congruent with existing financial economic theory and 
which is capable of explaining these daily seasonal, or these daily regularities must be 
classed as truly anomalous. 
Third, if we accept the possibility that there exists daily seasonality, why this exists is 
unclear. The hypotheses posed are inadequate as explanations for the Irish case as they 
have proved to be so for others. The main area of potential hypotheses that I have not 
examined, for lack of a clear testable hypothesis, is the area of psychology. Until an 
explanation arises which is rooted in the psychological domain and which uses the data 
available to financial economic researchers such a test remains unfeasible. Regardless 
of this, the philosophy of science literature urges general, testable, falsifiable 
hypotheses. While the Irish results presented here are, it appears, novel, they are part of 
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a more general set of 'anomalies'. Thus any hypothesis that seeks only to expbin the 
Irish results, be it drawn from psychology or otherwise, is deemed ad hoc and partial. A 
more general explanation of asset price formation, which allows for both the general 
pattern of calendar regularities, especially daily seasonals, and for the particular 
manifestation of this daily seasonal in the Irish context is required. This thesis has not 
attempted to do this, contenting itself with data analysis and testing rather than theory 
formation. 
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Appendix III. LB Q Statistics 
EWPI 
Autocorrelations 
-0.0161551 0.0231248 0.0046353 -0.0182414 -0.0122661 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(I) 0.3954 Sig. 0.52947666 
Q(2) 1.2061 Sig. 0.54714241 
Q(3) 1.2387 Sig. 0.74374140 
Q(4) 1.7438 Sig. 0.78274592 
Q(5) 1.9724 Sig. 0.85295741 
EWP2 
Autocorrelations 
0.0050026 -0.0069058 0.0063580 0.0044417 0.0178536 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(I) 0.0379 Sig. 0.84561615 
Q(2) 0.1102 Sig. 0.94638440 
Q(3) 0.1715 Sig. 0.98204787 
Q(4) 0.2015 Sig. 0.99525373 
Q(5) 0.6857 Sig. 0.98374571 
EWP3 
Autocorrelations 
0.02691984 0.05586521 0.02620303 0.04801457 0.02711478 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(l) 1.0979 Sig. 0.29473008 
Q(2) 5.8292 Sig. 0.05422514 
Q(3) 6.8708 Sig. 0.07613188 
Q(4) 10.3704 Sig. 0.03462935 
Q(5) 11.4872 Sig. 0.04253104 
EWP4 
Autocorrelations 
-0.1334281 0.0027867 0.0686236 0.0087827 0.0102433 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(l) 26.9717 Sig. 0.00000021 
Q(2) 26.9835 Sig. 0.00000138 
Q(3) 34.1274 Sig. 0.00000019 
Q(4) 34.2444 Sig. 0.00000066 
Q(5) 34.4038 Sig. 0.00000198 
EWP 
Autocorrelations 
0.16292904 0.10535892 0.13290353 0.10526070 0.06206615 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(I) 40.2170 Si~. 0.00000000 
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Q(2) 57.0455 Sig. 0.00000000 
Q(3) 83.8409 Sig. 0.00000000 
Q(4) 100.6603 Sig. 0.00000000 
Q(5) 106.5119 Sig. 0.00000000 
VWPI 
Autocorrelations 
0.0130291 -0.0024139 0.0014458 0.0007056 0.0036974 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(I) 0.2572 Sig. 0.61206258 
Q(2) 0.2660 Sig. 0.87545816 
Q(3) 0.2692 Sig. 0.96571541 
Q(4) 0.2699 Sig. 0.99167094 
Q(5) 0.2907 Sig. 0.99781418 
VWP2 
Autocorrelations 
0.0243498 -0.0145087 0.0128904 0.0324934 0.0215393 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(l) 0.8983 Sig. 0.34324847 
Q(2) 1.2174 Sig. 0.54406194 
Q(3) 1.4695 Sig. 0.68933798 
Q(4) 3.0722 Sig. 0.54581548 
Q(5) 3.7769 Sig. 0.58195599 
VWP3 
Autocorrelations 
0.04007561 0.02123318 0.03679794 0.00312089 0.02864918 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(I) 2.4332 Sig. 0.11879202 
Q(2) 3.1167 Sig. 0.21048691 
Q(3) 5.1708 Sig. 0.15970717 
Q(4) 5.1856 Sig. 0.26877700 
Q(5) 6.4324 Sig. 0.26638824 
VWP4 
Autocorrelations 
0.06430572 0.04058633 0.11277465 0.04615456 0.02969795 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(I) 6.2649 Sig. 0.01231548 
Q(2) 8.7621 Sig. 0.01251211 
Q(3) 28.0556 Sig. 0.00000354 
Q(4) 31.2894 Sig. 0.00000267 
Q(5) 32.6291 Sig. 0.00000446 
VWP 
Autocorrelations 
0.10546474 0.05686152 0.14733611 0.05982147 0.04373571 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(I) 16.8511 Sig. 0.00004043 
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Q(2) 21.7527 Sig. 0.00001890 
Q(3) 54.6838 Sig. 0.00000000 
Q(4) 60.1162 Sig. 0:00000000 
Q(5) 63.0218 Sig. 0.00000000 
ISEQ 
Autocorrelations 
0.1408339 0.0023291 0.0600222 0.0824637 -0.0077989 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(I) 30.0488 Sig. 0.00000004 
Q(2) 30.0571 Sig. 0.00000030 
Q(3) 35.5223 Sig. 0.00000009 
Q(4) 45.8453 Sig. 0.00000000 
Q(5) 45.9376 Sig. 0.00000001 
ISEQR 
Autocorrelations 
0.1359151 0.0027543 0.0696093 0.0758495 -0.0080464 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(l) 27.9865 Sig. 0.00000012 
Q(2) 27.9980 Sig. 0.00000083 
Q(3) 35.3486 Sig. 0.00000010 
Q(4) 44.0820 Sig. 0.00000001 
Q(5) 44.1803 Sig. 0.00000002 
ISEFlN 
Autocorrelations 
0.0811027 -0.0121592 - 0.0635611 0.0585758 0.0049337 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(I) 9.9652 Sig. 0.00159531 
Q(2) 10.1893 Sig. 0.00612948 
Q(3) 16.3180 Sig. 0.00097582 
Q(4) 21.5265 Sig. 0.00024894 
Q(5) 21.5635 Sig. 0.00063367 
ISEGEN 
Autocorrelations 
0.10389490 0.03658174 0.04778299 0.07081900 0.00727465 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(I) 16.3532 Sig. 0.00005257 
Q(2) 18.3819 Sig. 0.00010196 
Q(3) 21.8456 Sig. 0.00007024 
Q(4) 29.4589 Sig. 0.00000631 
Q(5) 29.5393 Sig. 0.00001817 
TEW1 
Autocorrelations 
0.01937794 0.02672459 0.01152465 0.05509216 0.03411501 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(I) 0.5689 Sig. 0.45070022 
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Q(2) 1.6516 Sig. 0.43787868 
Q(3) 1.8531 Sig. 0.60344585 
Q(4) 6.4605 Sig. 0.16729548 
Q(5) 8.2284 Sig. 0.14408900 
TEW2 
Autocorrelations 
0.05338072 0.03655244 0.03594122 0.01138999 0.05818026 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(l) 4.3170 Sig. 0.03773340 
Q(2) 6.3425 Sig. 0.04195103 
Q(3) 8.3021 Sig. 0.04016324 
Q(4) 8.4991 Sig. 0.07491541 
Q(5) 13.6409 Sig. 0.01805895 
TEW3 
Autocorrelations 
0.06167385 0.11766015 0.12640093 0.08814515 0.08063945 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(I) 5.7626 Sig. 0.01637122 
Q(2) 26.7500 Sig. 0.00000155 
Q(3) 50.9876 Sig. 0.00000000 
Q(4) 62.7819 Sig. 0.00000000 
Q(5) 72.6597 Sig. 0.00000000 
TEW4 
Autocorrelations 
0.09343525 0.07480428 0.05688972 0.02147224 0.01024679 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(I) 13.2262 Sig. 0.00027606 
Q(2) 21.7093 Sig. 0.00001931 
Q(3) 26.6190 Sig. 0.00000708 
Q(4) 27.3189 Sig. 0.00001714 
Q(5) 27.4784 Sig. 0.00004602 
TEW 
Autocorrelations 
0.17820157 0.15700159 0.10169391 0.10074972 0.09692252 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(I) 48.1101 Sig. 0.00000000 
Q(2) 85.4789 Sig. 0.00000000 
Q(3) 101.1673 Sig. 0.00000000 
Q(4) 116.5759 Sig. 0.00000000 
Q(5) 130.8456 Sig. 0.00000000 
TVWl 
Autocorrelations 
0.03908109 0.05711735 0.03694667 0.05176179 0.03134539 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(l) 2.3139 Sig. 0.12822114 
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Q(2) 7.2597 Sig. 0.02651999 
Q(3) 9.3305 Sig. 0.02520443 
Q(4) 13.3977 Sig. 0.00948747 
Q(5) 14.8902 Sig. 0.01084194 
TVW2 
Autocorrelations 
0.03962648 0.02153004 0.06301396 0.05413627 0.06863078 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(l) 2.3789 Sig. 0.12298066 
Q(2) 3.0817 Sig. 0.21420144 
Q(3) 9.1054 Sig. 0.02792239 
Q(4) 13.5543 Sig. 0.00886235 
Q(5) 20.7091 Sig. 0.00091921 
TVW3 
Autocorrelations 
0.09038122 0.09900077 0.06948407 0.10689884 0.09282775 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(l) 12.3757 Sig. 0.00043496 
Q(2) 27.2343 Sig. 0.00000122 
Q(3) 34.5585 Sig. 0.00000015 
Q(4) 51.9054 Sig. 0.00000000 
Q(5) 64.9948 Sig. 0.00000000 
TVW4 
Autocorrelations 
0.0690498 0.0181301 0.0331636 0.0172640 -0.0031709 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(l) 7.2233 Sig. 0.00719619 
Q(2) 7.7216 Sig. 0.02105065 
Q(3) 9.3901 Sig. 0.02452982 






0.11865265 0.04275836 0.05123570 0.01516528 0.01635609 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(l) 21.3289 Sig. 0.00000387 
Q(2) 24.1006 Sig. 0.00000584 
Q(3) 28.0829 Sig. 0.00000349 
Q(4) 28.4320 Sig. 0.00001019 
Q(5) 28.8384 Sig. 0.00002494 
TISEQ 
Autocorrelations 




Q(l) 35.1520 Sig. 0.00000000 
Q(2) 36.0691 Sig. 0.00000001 
Q(3) 36.0849 . Sig. 0.00000007 
Q(4) 36.1191 Sig. 0.00000027 
Q(5) • 37.5342 Sig. 0.00000047 
TISEQR 
Autocorrelations 
0.1420381 0.0283749 -0.0041924 -0.0134726 -0.0413911 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(I) 30.5649 Sig. 0.00000003 
Q(2) 31.7855 Sig. 0.00000013 
Q(3) 31.8121 Sig. 0.00000057 
Q(4) 32.0877 Sig. 0.00000184 
Q(5) 34.6901 Sig. 0.00000173 
TISEFIN 
Autocorrelations 
0.1523737 0.0645355 -0.0185768 0.0177041 0.0028274 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(l) 35.1749 Sig. 0.00000000 
Q(2) 41.4888 Sig. 0.00000000 
Q(3) 42.0123 Sig. 0.00000000 
Q(4) 42.4881 Sig. 0.00000001 
Q(5) 42.5003 Sig. 0.00000005 
TISEGEN 
Autocorrelations 
0.1368267 0.0426248 0.0110561 -0.0342030 -0.0478560 
Ljung-Box Q-
Statistics 
Q(1) 28.3632 Sig. 0.00000010 
Q(2) 31.1176 Sig. 0.00000017 
Q(3) 31.3030 Sig. 0.00000073 
Q(4) 33.0789 Sig. 0.00000115 
Q(5l 36.5577 Si~. 0.00000073 
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